IR 05000387/1989006
| ML17156B156 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/1989 |
| From: | Blough A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17156B155 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-89-06, 50-387-89-6, 50-388-89-06, 50-388-89-6, NUDOCS 8905190501 | |
| Download: ML17156B156 (13) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Report Nos.:
50-387/89-06 and 50-388/89-06 Docket Nos.:
50-387 and 50-388 License Nos.:
Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an 2 North Ninth Street Allentown Penns 1 vania 18101 Fac i 1 ity Name:
Sus uehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection At: Salem Townshi Penns lvania Inspection Conducted:
March
1989 - A ri 1
1989 Inspectors:
F.
Young, Senior Resident Inspector, SSES J. Stair, Resident Inspector, SSES Approved By:
A. Randy.
ugh, Chief Reactor Projects Section'No.
3B Division of Reactor Projects Date Ins ection Summar
Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspections were conducted in the following areas:
plant operations, physical security, plant events, surveillance, and mainten-ance activities.
Specifically, one item reviewed -in more detail in the faci 1-ity operations area was a failure of the Unit 2 'B'eactor feedwater pump dis-charge valve to open during power ascension.
Additionally, the inspector per-formed a followup on an allegation concerning the reactor feedwater pump tur-'ine lube oil system (RFPTLO) pressure switches.
Other items reviewed included the licensee'
February monthly operating report and selected Licensee Even't Reports.
Results:
During this period, Operations Department personnel generally con-ducted activities in a professional manner.and operated the plant safely.
Rou-tine review of maintenance activities noted good control and performance.
The licensee monthly operating report was complete and accurate'icensee Event Reports ( LERs)
were found to provide clear and accurate descriptions of the events and corrective actions taken.
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Ins ection Summar (Continued)
Regarding the allegation concerning the RFPTLO system, the inspector determined that it involved a legitimate safety concern, however, corrective action to alleviate the problem had been taken in 1987.
The licensee's use of Non-Conformance, Reports (NCRs)
appeared to have functioned appropriately to resolve the safety concerns.
The inspector determined that a weakness in the licensee's training program exists in that some corporate office staff are not aware of the avenues available in lieu of the normal chain of command by which safety concerns can be raised without fear of reprisal.
In general, sufficient management involvement and attention were applied to operate both units in a
safe manne TABLE OF CONTENTS
~Pa e
1.0 Introduction and Overview.
l. 1 NRC Staff Activities (Module Nos.
30703, 71707, 90712 and 92701).
~ 2 Unit 1 Summary 1.3 Unit 2 Summary 1.4 Persons Contacted..
2.0 Routine Periodic Inspections 2. 1 Scope of Review.
2.2 Reactor Feedwater Pump Discharge Valve Failed Closed - Unit 2 (Module No. 93702).
3.0 Surveillance and Maintenance Activities 3. 1 Surveillance Observations (Module No. 61726)....
3.2 Maintenance Observations (Module No. 62703).....
4.0 Licensee Reports 4. 1 In-office Review of Licensee Event Reports (Module No. 90712).
4.2 Review of Monthly Operating Reports (Module No. 90713)
~
5.0 Allegation Followup.
5. 1 Details of Allegation 5.2 NRC Review and Findings.....
~...
5.3 Conclusion..
6.0 NRC Meetings 6. 1 Outage Lessons Learned Meeting (Module No. 30702)..
6.2 Exit Meeting (Module No. 30703)..
10
t 1.0 Introduction and Overview DETAILS 1. 1 NRC Staff Activities The purpose of this inspection was to assess licensee activities at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES)
during power operation as it related to reactor safety and worker radiation protection.
With'in each area, the inspectors documented the specific purpose of the area under review, scope of inspection activities and findings, along with appropriate conclusions.
This assessment is based on actual observa-tion of licensee activities, interviews with licensee personnel, measurement of radiation levels, or independent calculation and selective review of applicable documents.
Unit
operated at or near full power for most of the inspection period.
Scheduled power reductions were conducted during the period for control rod pattern adjustments, surveillance testing, and scheduled maintenance.
At 12: 10 a.m.,
on March 29, shutdown of the unit commenced in order to enter the unit's fourth refueling outage.
This was three days earlier than scheduled due to an unisolable
gpm leak on expansion joint XJ-11550B, located on the circulating water system piping downstream of the main high pressure condenser
'B'aterbox outlet isolation valve HV-11550B.
Cold Shutdown was reached at 12:25 a.m.
on March 30 and the refueling mode was entered when reactor head detensioning began on April 2.
No major problems were encountered during the shutdown.
Core offload commenced at 10: 18 p.m.
on April 7', following removal of the drywell head, reactor vessel head, steam dryer and separator.
The outage is scheduled to last about 63 days with a return to power operations in early June.
At the start of the inspection period, Unit 2 was limited to 80 per-cent power due to the 'B'eedwater pump discharge valve's failure to open.
The unit was subsequently shutdown on March 14 in order to disassemble and repair the feedwater valve.
The unit was returned to service on March 17, after the licensee freed the valve and deter-mined that it was acceptable for operation (see Section 2.2).
Full power was reached on March 20, and was maintained throughout the remainder of the inspection perio.4 Persons Contacted During the course of the inspection, the inspector interviewed, dis-cussed issues, and received information from various licensee employees.
P Listed below are the licensee management and employees who supplied substantive information.
Members who attended the exit interview on April 14, 1989, are indicated by an asterisk.
" J.
A. Blakeslee, Assistant Superintendent of Plant, SSES
- R.
G.
Byram, Superintendent of Plant, SSES A. J.'ominguez, Operations Senior Results Engineer J.
R.
Doxsey, Reactor Engineering Supervisor, SSES
" E.
W. Figard, Supervisor of Maintenance, SSES J. J.
Graham, Assistant Manager, NQA A.
F. Iorfida, Supervisor of I&C Computer, SSES
" G. J.
Kuczynski, Supervisor of Technical Support, SSES C.
D. Lopes, Security Supervisor, SSES T.
R. Markowski, Day Shift Supervisor, SSES W.
E.
Mor rissey, Radiological Protection Supervisor, SSES T. J.
Nork, Plant Engineering Group Supervisor, SSES J.
E. O'ullivan', Installation Engineering Group Supervisor, SSES H. J.
Palmer, Jr.
Superintendent of Operations, SSES N.
D. Pitcher, Construction Superintendent, SSES R. J.
Prego, Supervisor of QA Operations, NQA H.
L. Riley, Supervisor of Health Physics/Chemistry, SSES
- D.
F. Roth, Senior Compliance Engineer, SSES
- R.
L. Stotler, Supervisor of Security, SSES H.
G. Stanley, Assistant Superintendent-Outages, SSES B. J.
Veazie, Sr.
Results Engineer - I8C, SSES 2.0 Routine Periodic Ins ections 2.1 The NRC resident inspectors periodically inspected the facility to determine the licensee's compliance with the general operating requirements of Section 6 of the Technical Specifications (TS) in the following areas:
review of selected plant parameters for abnormal trends; plant status from a maintenance/modification viewpoint, includ-ing plant housekeeping and fire protection measures; control of ongoing and special evolutions, including control room personnel awareness of these evolutions;
control of documents, including logkeeping practices; implementation of radiological controls; implementation of the security plan, including access control, boundary integrity, and badging practices; control room operations during regular and backshift hours, including frequent observation of activities in progress, and periodic reviews of selected sections of the unit supervisor's log, the control room operator's log and other control room daily logs; followup items on activities that couldaffect plant safety or impact plant operations; areas outside the control room; and, selected licensee planning meetings'he inspectors conducted backshift and weekend/holiday inspections on April 1, from noon to 4:00 p.m.,
and April 4, from 2:30 a.m.
to 6:00 a.m..
I The inspectors reviewed the following specific item in more detail.
2.2 Reactor Feedwater Pum Di schar e Valve Failed Closed Unit 2 Durin'g power ascension on March 4,
while the operator was in the process of transferring feedwater flow from the low load valve to the main feedwater discharge valves, the
'B'eedwater pump discharge valve would not respond to an open signal, nor would it open manu-ally.
This valve is a
maintenance isolation valve used to isolate the 'B'ain feedwater pump when the pump is not in service.
It is a
Walworth Gate Type Valve with a flexible, wedge-shaped disk.
The failure of the valve to open appeared to be due to a combination of thermal and mechanical binding.'s a result, the licensee maintained power at 80 percent, an administrative limit, until a
replacement valve was procured and the unit could be shut down for repairs to the valve.
On March 14, the unit was shutdown in order to effect repairs to the valve, however, the licensee was unable to disassemble
'the valve without machining out the pressure retaining ring.
The licen-see decided not to continue with the disassembly since during the attempt to disassemble the valve it became free and was able to be opened.
The licensee subsequently stroked the valve several times and determined that it was acceptable for operation.
Startup com-menced on March 17, with full power being reached on March 2 The licensee determined that a
previous modification (PMR 87-9081)
which installed larger motor operators on the feedwater, pump dis-charge valves to provide better seating may have contributed to the problem.
However, discussions with the valve vendor-reaffirmed that the valve is designed for a higher closing torque and this should not have caused the binding problem.
Additionally, the 'A'nd 'C'eed-water discharge'alves had experienced no operational problems in. the past
months.
The licensee, therefore, installed a bypass (2-89-012)
which altered the valve closing philosophy by using the limit switches rather then the torque switches to stop the valve at 97 per-cent closed.
They also installed a
bypass (2-89-013)
which incor-porated 'a differential pressure (dp)
gauge across the valve to help operators equalize the dp across the valve when it is being opened.
Associated procedures have been changed to alert operations personnel of the change in operation of the 'B'eedwater discharge valve.
The licensee plans to disassemble the valve during the Unit 2 third refueling outage which begins in September, 1989.
The inspector discussed the event with licensee representatives of both the engineer ng and maintenance staffs.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the engineering resolution in an effort to deter-mine if the licensee performed adequate evaluations of the event and to evaluate the acceptability of the feedwater valve for use prior to returning the unit to power operations.
The inspector found both the licensee's actions in responding to the event and their
CFR 50.59 review acceptable for continued operations.
A review of the licensee's evaluation of the potential for intrusion of loose parts from the feedwater discharge valve found the results acceptable.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
3.0 Surveillance and Maintenance Activities On a sampling basis, the inspector observed and/or reviewed selected sur-veillance and maintenance activities to ensure that specific programmatic elements described below were being met.
Details of this review are docu-mented in the followi'ng sections.
3.1 Surveillance Observation The inspector observed performance of the following surveillance test to determine that the following criteria, if applicable to the spec-ific test, were met:
the test conformed to Technical Specification requirements; administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained before initiating the surveillance; testing was accomplished by qual-ified personnel in accordance with an approved procedure; test
instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operations were met; test data was accurate and complete; removal and restora-tion of the affected components was properly accomplished; test results met Technical Specification and procedural requirements; deficiencies noted were reviewed and appropriately resolved; and the surveillance was completed at the required frequency.
This observation included:
SI-155-302, 18-Month Calibration of Control Rod Scram Accumu-lator Leak Detectors, performed on April 4, 1989.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
3.2 Maintenance Observations The inspector observed and/or reviewed selected maintenance activ-ities to determine that the work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, Technical Specifications, and industry codes or standards.
The following items were considered, as applicable, during this review:
Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and quality 'control hold points were established where required; func-tional testing was performed prior to declaring the involved com-ponent(s)
operable; activities were accomplished by qualified per-sonnel; radiological controls were implemented; fire'rotection controls were implemented; and the equipment was verified to be properly returned to service.
These observations and/or reviews included:
Efforts to open and disassemble the Unit 2 'B'eedwater dis-charge valve for repairs per work authorization (WA) V93149 and WA V93162, performed on March 15 and 16, 1989.
Work to support the containment instrument gas system pressure upgrade and pneumatic test per construction work order (CWO)
C99025, performed ori April 4, 1989.
Addition of the core spray system division 2 keepfill station vent valve per CWO C99052, performed on April 4, 1989.
No unacceptable conditions were identifie I
'
4.0 Licensee Re orts 4. 1 In-office Review of Licen'see Event Re orts The "inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported, including the accur-acy of description of the cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LERs were reviewed:
Unit
89-005-00 Condensate Pump Motor Power Feed Connection Failure Causes Electrical Transient Resulting In Manual Scram 89-006-00 Manual Shutdown Due To Inoperable Vacuum Breaker; Subse-quent ESF Actuation 89-007-00 Loss Of Fire Detection Due To Component Failure 89-008-00 Unplanned ESF Actuation Incorrect Fuse Removed For Pro-tective Blocking Unit 2 89-002-00 Inadvertent Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Initia-tion and Injection 89-003-00 ESF Actuations Due To Failed RPS M/G Set Motor/Unit Shut-down Due To Failed Containment Isolation Valve The above LERs were found acceptable.
4.2 Review of Monthl 0 eratin Re ort Monthly Operating Report for February, 1989, submitted by the licen-see was reviewed by the inspector upon receipt.-
The report was reviewed to determine that it included the required information; that test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and whether any information in the report indicated an abnormal condition for spec-ific plant operation.
The report was found to be acceptabl.0 Alle ation Followu As part of the NRC's function to assure that issues raised by allegations are adequately investigated and resolved, the inspector reviewed the alle-gations described below.
5.1 Details of Alle ations The concerns are summarized below.
(I)
Reactor feedwater pump turbine lube oil system pressure switches on both Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES)
units are in violation of the original Architect Engineer (AE) specification.
Even though line management was aware of this issue, (}A involve-ment was necessary to get a formal evaluation started.
(2)
A plant modification scope description for the safety related Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)
prepared by PP5L and approved by PP8 L's engineering supervisor was not workable.
Review during preparation of a safe.'y evaluation revealed prob-lems relating to the SGTS system as a whole.
5.2 NRC Review and Findin s
An NRC Region I Allegation Panel was convened to review the documen-tation and determine the proper resolution of the allegation.
The board recommended that the resident inspectors assigned to the facility be tasked with reviewing the allegation.
The resident inspector assigned to the facility conducted a review of this allegation.
Included in this review were all applicable docu-me'nts associated with this allegation, including nonconformance reports, design change packages, and correspondence between the licensee and General Electric Company on the subject of NEPA type switches used in the reactor feedwater pump lube oil system.
The inspector also conducted interviews with PP8 L's line management who were involved with the issues and discussed the allegation with cor-porate quality assurance management to determine the adequacy of their assessment and their involvement in the issues.
Finally, the inspector interviewed the engineer who conducted the evaluation for final disposition of the issue From the review of the applicable documentation and a pTant wzlkdown of selected portions of the feedwater system, the., irrspector deter-mined that NEPA 1 type switches were installed in the plant instead
= of NEPA
type switches called for by the original Architect Engineer specification.
NEPA 13 switches provided better spray and splash protection than NEPA 1 switches'his information was known by the licensee's line management who had been in the process of informally evaluating the problem when the issue was questioned by gA.
The appropriate documentation was presented to the inspector to demonstrate the basis for the licensee's disposition of the problem.
The inspector did note, however, that the switches in question were nonsafety related switches.
The nonconformance reporting (NCR) sys-tem is routinely used exclusively for safety related equipment.
The licensee had elected to use the NCR system to ensure that the con-cerns were tracked and evaluated completely.
This decision was prompted by guality Assurance personnel who were involved in the resolution of the issues.
From discussions with licensee management, the inspector noted that there currently was no system for tracking and resolving problems involving nonsafety related equipment that could arise and not be included in the NCR process.
The licensee stated that they were in the process of developing a parallel system to track items that would not be captured by the NCR system.
The inspector reviewed the applicable NCR associated with the reactor feedwater pump turbine lube oil pressure switches.
This NCR docu-mented the final engineering disposition to use the in-place switches
"as-is."
Corporate engineering determined that this type of switch
. was.acceptable for the application in which it was being used in the plant. If the switches would have had to be replaced, a
shutdown of the unit would have been required, placing an economic burden on the licensee.
In light of the impact replacement of the switches would have had, the inspector interviewed the engineer who had made the final disposition to use the in-place switches
"as-is."
From dis-cussions with the engineer, the inspector concluded that the engineer did not appear to have been pressured by his management and had independently come to his conclusion.
With respect to the SGTS plant modification, the inspector reviewed the NCR generated to address this issue.
Inspector review of the NCR determined that the concerns covered by the NCR's were properly addressed and resolved using the NCR proces The inspector interviewed licensee managers and first line super-visors i'n an attempt to determine if management had impeded evalua-tion of these matters prior to gA taking the initiati.ve.
From the interviews, the inspector could not determine whether or not first-line supervision had st'alled the proper disposition of these matters.
However, supervisors generally indicated awareness of PP&L's policy regarding safety concerns.
The policy includes provisions to ensure that if a safety concern arises, it should be properly addressed through the normal line management, however, there are other vehicles available to ensure that the safety issue could be resolved outside normal line management should it become necessary.
The supervisors felt they had not impeded resolution of the issues'he inspector noted that the licensee's in-place system, which allows for the gA organization to impartially resolve safety issues cannot be resolved by line management, did function as required.
However, the inspector determined that some employees do not know that they have the option to present their concerns to the gA organization for ai'd in resolu-tion.
The inspector questioned the licensee to determine whether a
formal program existed to inform new employees working for PPE L at thei r corporate office what avenues were available for them to resolve their safety concerns if they could not do this using their normal line management.
From these interviews and additional inter-views of other corporate employees, the inspector concluded that no formal program existed.
The inspector stated to the licensee repre-sentative that it was the utility's responsibility to assure that employees are aware of the paths available to them to resolve safety concerns.
The licensee agreed to review the lack of specific train-ing to ensure that employees in the corporate office are aware of the avenues available to resolve safety concerns.
5.3 Conclusion The inspector concluded that the licensee's in-place program to resolve safety concerns worked'nd functioned to resolve the issues.
The licensee had determined that the switches in their present application are acceptable.
The inspector concluded that this reso-lution was a
matter of professional engineering judgement as to whether these switches were suitable for the application in which they are being used.
Based upon his review of the documentation associated with these switches, the inspector had no basis to chal-lenge the licensee's dispositio The concerns with the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) modifica-tion were adequately addressed prior to this inspection by the NCR process.
In summary, based on the above findings, this allegation was substan-tiated in part, in that the switches installed were not as originally specified.
However, the licensee had taken corrective actions to alleviate the problem associated with the switches and the in-place system functioned to resolve this and the SGTS modification concern identified.
Therefore, this issue is considered resolved.
.0 ~ft 6. 1 Outa e Lessons Learned Meetin On March 21, 1989, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company representa-tives met with the NRC at the NRC Region I Office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.
The meeting was held to discuss the lessons learned from the events which occurred during the Unit
second refueling outage in the spring of 1988 and to discuss plans being made for the 1989 Unit 1 fourth and Unit 2 third refueling outages.
A summary of the discussions held during the meeting and a
copy of the material presented by the licensee are included in the NRC Region I Management Meeting Report Nos.
50-387/89-08 and 50-388/89-08, dated March 30, 1989.
6.2 Resident Monthl Exit Meetin On April 14, 1989, the inspector di scussed the findings of this inspection with station management.
Based on NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to
CFR 2.790 restrictions.
At the conclusion, the licensee acknowledged the NRC findings and did not disagree with them or their characterization.