IR 05000387/1999001
| ML17164A972 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17164A971 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-99-01, 50-387-99-1, 50-388-99-01, 50-388-99-1, NUDOCS 9903110016 | |
| Download: ML17164A972 (22) | |
Text
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION I
50-387, 50-388 NPF-14, NPF-22 Report No.
50-387/99-01, 50-388/99-01 Licensee:
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Location:
P.O. Box 35 Berwick, PA 18603-0035 Dates
/
. Inspectors:
Januar'y 5, 1999 through February 1, 1999 S. Hansell, Senior Resident Inspector J; Richmond, Resident Inspector A. Blarney, Resident Inspector Approved by:
Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects 9903ii00i6 990303 PDR ADQCK 05000387
EXECUTIVESUMMARY Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 8 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-387/99-01, 50-388/99-01 This inspection included aspects of Pennsylvania Power and Light Company's (PP&L's)
operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support at SSES.
The report covers a four week period of routine resident inspection activities.
~Oerations A Unit 2 feedwater heater leak was promptly identified, repaired, and returned to service.
Management highlighted the importance of reactivity control manipulations prior to the plant's return to full power and maintained a 1% per hour increase in reactor power.
(Section M1.2)
Maintenance
~
Instrument and controls technicians identified that Technical Specification instruments had been contaminated with sodium hydroxide during planned surveillance tests.
Initial
. corrective'actions included a detailed operability determination and a thorough review to determine the extent of the sodium hydroxide contamination.
Instruments were sampled, drained, flushed, and re-calibrated to restore equipment operability. (Section M1.1)
During restoration of the "B" emergency diesel generator to service, following a 20 year overhaul, and removal of the maintenance spare "E" emergency diesel generator from service, the restoration of an operable emergency diesel generator was unexpectedly delayed due to work coordination issues and continued problems with the diesels'on-safety related control air system.
Nonetheless, the restoration of an operable diesel was completed within the allowed time.
(Section M1.1)
Enrnineering
~
Two Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings, related to a Unit 1 "C" reactor feedwater drain valve leak seal repair and a generic main generator synchronization issue, demonstrated that PORC conducted in-depth reviews of safety issues.
The PORC recommendations for both meetings were sound and supported by a conservative decision making process.
(Section E7.1)
~
The NRC identified that two accessible fire zones were not inspected by hourly flirewatches since 1992. PP8L incorrectly treated the areas as inaccessible when in fact they were accessible.
Once recognized, PP&L took immediate and effective corrective actions.
(Section F1.1)
The NRC identified that two inaccessible fire zones, located in high radiation areas, were not entered by hourly firewatch patrols since 1992. The firewatches monitored the room door temperature and checked for smoke outside of the room door, but did not enter or observe conditions in the room. The failure to enter or observe conditions in the affected fire zones willbe tracked as an unresolved item, to determine ifthe actions were acceptable or represented a violation of NRC requirements.
(Section F1.'1)
TABLEOF CONTENTS I. Operations
Conduct of Operations..
01.1 Unit Operations and Operator Activities
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Operational Safety System Alignment II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Surveillance and Pre-Planned Maintenance ActivityReview..
M1.2 Unit 2 "3C" Feedwater Heater Shell Side Steam Leak,......
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues.
M8.1 Followup of Open Items III. Engineering
.
E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering E7.1 Plant Operations Review Committee Activities..
IV. Plant Suppo'rt..
F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities..
F1.1 Firewatch Duties for Inaccessible Areas
.
V. Management Meetings...........
X1 Exit Meeting Summary INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
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2
2
6
.7
. 7
.8
8
11
12.
Re ort Details Summa of Plant Status Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Unit 1 operated at 100% power through out the inspection period.
SSES Unit 2 was at 100% power at the beginning of the inspection period. Power was briefly reduced to 85% on January 9, for a control rod pattern sequence exchange.
On "January 18, power was reduced to 80% when a feedwater heater string was removed from service, due to a steam leak on the "3C" feedwater heater.
On'January 22, power was further reduced to 35%, to allow weld repairs to the feedwater. heater.
Following heater repairs on January 25, power was increased to 80%, while the feedwater heater string was returned to service, with power reaching 100% on January 26.
Conduct of Operations
'1.1 Unit 0 erations and 0 erator Activities (71707)
I The inspectors determined routine operator activities were satisfactorily establish'ed, communicated, and conservatively performed in accordance with SSES procedures.
Control room activities were well performed.
Control room logs accurately reflected plant activities. Control room operators displayed good questioning perspectives during work planning meetings and prior to releasing scheduled work activities. On two occasions; operations appropriately postponed scheduled work (alcohol flush of emergency diesel water jacket and flowelement inspection inside reactor building stack ventilation ducting) ~
During this inspection period, the shift turnover process was improved. The shift briefing was moved from the technical support center into the control room to allow the unit supervisors to attend the briefing. In addition, each on-coming operator provides a status review of their watch station.
Prior to this change the shift supervisor provided the entire plant status.
Shift turnovers were observed to be detailed and complete.
The inspectors discussed plant conditions with plant control operators, the unit supervisors, and the shift supervisor following shift tumovers and found that operators were knowledgeable of plant and system status.
'Topical headings such as 01, MS, etc., are used in accordance with the NRC standardized reactor inspection report outline.
Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topic Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 0 erational Safet S stem Ali nment (71707)
A partial walkdown of the Unit 2 core spray system and "B" and "E" emergency diesel generators was performed.
During plant tours, the alignment and operability of various safety systems, engineered safety features, and on-site power sources were verified.
Overall equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping conditions were good.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Surveillance and Pre-Planned Maintenance Activit Review a.
Ins ection Sco e 61726 6270740500 The inspectors observed and reviewed selected portions of pre-planned maintenance and surveillance activities, to determine whether the activities were conducted in accordance with NRC requirements and SSES procedures:
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors observed portions of the following work activities and surveillances:
Activities S90104 V98556 V73542 S 82129 S 90158 S83656 HV10612C Leak Seal Repair HV24182B Agastat Relay Replacement Clean and.Inspect Control Rod Drive Pump Lube Oil Cooler 2E124A Reactor Building Stack Flow Element Profiler lrispection
"B" EDG Bearing and Torque Verification Maintenance Support for TP-024-146/ "B" EDG Restoration /Turbo Charger Coast Down time and Tachometer installation and Removal P83856
"B" EDG Miscellaneous Check Valve Replacement TP-024-146 Diesel Generator "B" Restoration OP-024-002 Diesel Generator "B" Lube Oil Sump Fill The inspectors found pre-planned maintenance and surveillance activities were appropriately conducted and controlled.
In addition, selected portions of procedures, drawings, and vendor.,technical manuals, associated with the maintenance and surveillance activities, were also reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
In general, maintenance personnel were very knowledgeable of their assigned activitie Sodium Hydroxide Contamination of Safety Related Instrumentation On January 12, 1999, following a calibration activity, PP8L determined that a hand pump, used for instrument calibration, had been contaminated with sodium hydroxide.
PP8 L initiallydetermined that 12 instruments had been contaminated, as a result. The affected instruments were flushed and re-calibrated.
PP8L performed an operability determination, and concluded that the materials (i.e.,
stainless steel, viton, etc.) used in any of the instruments which may have been potentially contaminated, would not be adversely affected by sodium hydroxide, at the observed concentrations, ifexposed for a period of one year.
PP8L further concluded that the total cumulative volume of sodium hydroxide which could have been introduced into reactor system instruments or tubing during the calibration process was very small (less than 1 pint). The amount of sodium hydroxide would not have a measurable effect on reactor coolant chemistry, even ifthe total amount migrated from the instrument racks into the reactor coolant system.
PP&L conducted further investigations to evaluate the extent of the condition. Allother hand pumps of the same type (4 additional pumps) were checked, and were found to be not contaminated.
Because the contaminated hand pump was a tool, not a piece of measurement and test equipment, there was no direct record to indicate the specific instruments that were calibrated using the hand pump.
As a result, the instrument and controls (I&C)group was reviewing all work activities, performed within the last quarter, which would have performed instrument calibrations utilizing a hand pump of this type; approximately 150 instruments have been identified. About 120 additional instruments have been sampled, with only 4 additional instruments indicating sodium hydroxide contamination.
The 4 additional instruments were last calibrated on December 22, 1998, indicating that the hand pump has been contaminated since at least mid December 1998. Condition report 88273 was written to evaluate both the extent ofthe, condition, and how the contamination occurred.
"B" EmergencyDiesel Generator (EDG) Restoration following 20-Year Inspection In November 1998, the "B" EDG was removed from service to perform the 20 year, 5 year and 18 month preventative maintenance inspection.
The "E" EDG (maintenance spare) was connected to the onsite class 1E electrical power distribution system, tested and declared operable to.support the extended maintenance on the "B" EDG. PP8L completed the planned maintenance and on January 26, 1999, at 4:30 am, PP8L removed the "E" EDG from service and re-aligned the "B" EDG to the onsite class 1E.
electrical power distribution system in preparation for operability testing.
TS 3.8.1.B, "AC Sources - Operating," a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limiting condition for operation (LCO) was entered on both unit During the performance of procedure TP-024-146, Diesel Generator "B" restoration, a failed diaphragm on the "lowturbo lube oil pressure" switch prevented the "B" EDG from completing an automatic five minute cooldown run. The repair of the diaphragm introduced carbon particles into the non-safety related air control system.
On a subsequent diesel run the automatic five minute cooldown failed for the "B" EDG due to the additional carbon particles.
On January 27th operations removed. the "B" EDG from the standby alignment to correct the non-safety related air system problems.
The "E" EDG was realigned to the onsite electrical distribution system and tested.
The
"E" EDG shutdown prior to completion of the five minute coo!down run and was declared inoperable at 7:31 a.m. on January 28, 1999. At the 8:00 a.m. station status meeting on January 28, 1888, the priority of the EDG work was not communicated clearly between the work groups. As a result, actual work on the "E" EDG did not start until approximately 5:30 p.m. Work was completed and the "E" EDG was returned to service, tested and declared operable at 10:35 p.m. on January 28, 1999.
PP8L has experienced and documented numerous problems with the non-safety related air control system in,the following condition reports:
"A"EDG 51547; "B" EDG 51801, 69482, 69489; "C" EDG 62765, 75808, 75112; and "E" EDG 59542.
On January 29, 1999, engineering initiated a trend condition report 89483, on the EDG non-safety related air control system to address the recurring problems.
Previous corrective actions did not resolve the continued air control system problems.
This resulted in additional EDG out of service time to verify operability of the "E" EDG and clean the non-safety related air control system.
Conclusions Instrument and controls technicians identified that Technical Specification instruments had been contaminated with sodium hydroxide during planned surveillance tests.
Initial corrective actions included a detailed operability determination and a thorough review to determine the extent of the sodium hydroxide contamination.
Instruments were sampled, drained, flushed, and re-calibrated to restore equipment operability.
/
During restoration of the "B" emergency diesel generator to service, following a 20 year overhaul, and removal of the maintenance spare "E" emergency diesel generator from service, the restoration of an operable emergency diesel generator was unexpectedly
'elayed due to work coordination issues and continued problems with the diesels'on-
'afety related control air system, Nonetheless, the restoration of an operable diesel was
. completed within the allowed tim M1.2
Unit 2 "3C" Feedwater Heater Shell Side Steam Leak (71707,62707,37551)
On January 18, a nuclear plant operator identified an unusually load noise in the vicinity of the Unit 2 "C" feedwater heater room during a routine plant tour. Subsequent investigation identified a steam leak on the shell side of the "3C" feedwater heater.
Control room operators used appropriate off-normal procedures, reduced reactor power to 80%, isolated extraction steam to the heater, and removed the "C" feedwater heater string from service.
The feedwater heater shell had a /~ by 2 inch hole, located close to the centerline of the extraction steam inlet nozzle, just below where the steam inlet baNe plate ended.
Ultrasonic test (UT) inspections revealed that the heater shell was below minimum wall thickness over an area of approximately 2 feet by 4 feet. An internal inspection found the baffle plate in good condition, and did not reveal any root cause for the condition.
PP&L concluded that the shell hole was caused by erosion. An American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code repair, using a flush patch, was performed.
PP&L continues to evaluate the failure, and plans to perform UT inspections of the feedwater heaters during the Unit 2 refueling outage scheduled in March.
'C Maintenance engineering formed a team to evaluate and repair the leak. The team consisted of members from many different PP&L organizations.
The team was well focused on its primary objective, developed detailed plans, and coordinated the evaluation, support, and repairs to the feedwater heater.
Information was appropriately disseminated to plant organizations.
The inspectors observed that PP&L's efforts were very good.
The inspectors observed the restoration of the "C" feedwater heater string and return to full power. The operations unit supervisor led a detailed pre-evolution briefing that included the reactor engineering (RE) group and highlighted the importance of reactivity control manipulations.
The RE and control room operators'discussed the coordination of reactor recirculation pump flow increases and withdraw of control rods to return,the Unit to 100% power. A dedicated plant control operator and unit supervisor coordinated the power increase with the RE's guidance.
The evolution was well controlled, methodical and performed without error. The power increase was performed at a very conservative rate of approximately 1% per hour. Management's decision to implement the restricted power ramp rate was a conservative standard.
In conclusion, a Unit 2 feedwater heater leak was promptly identified, repaired, and returoed to service.
Management highlighted the importance of reactivity control manipulations prior to the plant's return to full power and maintained a 1% per hour increase in reactor powe M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues M8.1 Followu of 0 en Items (62707,92902,37551)
'I Closed URI 50-387 388/98-06-02 Safety Relief Valve Acoustic Monitor Failures Since 1994, PP&L has experienced numerous acoustic monitor failures that resulted in three TS required shutdowns and three Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) from the NRC. PP&L and the original equipment manufacturer performed testing after the most recent acoustic monitor failures and identified degraded charge converters, In an effort to identify the failure mechanism PP&L has recently completed a containment temperature study. The preliminary results of this study indicated that acoustic monitor local area temperatures were higher than that assumed in the Environmental Qualification (EQ) of the acoustic monitors.
PP&L EQ Binder EQAR-021 assumes an ambient temperature profile that is as much as 10 degrees Fahrenheit lower than the measured local temperature around the acoustic monitoring equipment.
Based on preliminar'y calculations, this willdecrease the expected life from 30 years to approximately 10 years.
In July 1998, PP&L replaced all Unit 1 acoustic monitor accelerometers, charge converters, and hard-line and soft-line cables, per DCP 97-9111.
Corrective actions are still on-going to analyze and calculate a new EQ end of life, based on the upgraded equipment and containment local temperature profiles. The action plan involves a review of the frequency of preventive maintenance activities. There have been no failures since the installation of the modification.
In conclusion, during the past five years, PP&L has experienced three Technical Specification required shutdowns and received three Notices of Enforcement Discretion for acoustic monitor charge converter failures. PP&L has determined that many of these failures were attributed to charge converters reaching their end-of-life. PP&L has
.
upgraded the Unit 1 acoustic monitors and has had no failures since the upgrade.
Corrective actions are still.ongoing to analyze and recalculate a new end-of-life. No violations of NRC requirements were identified. This unresolved item is close III. En ineerin E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering E7.1 Plant 0 erations Review Committee Activities a.
Ins ection Sco e 37551 7170740500 Portions of two Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings were observed to determine the safety perspective of the committee.
b.
Observations and Findin s The January 7, 1999, PORC reviewed a generic concern related to a main generator synchronization problem at another nuclear power plant. An operations procedure change, providing detailed guidance to heighten awareness of a possible single phase connection of the main generator to the electrical grid, was presented by engineering.
The associated safety evaluation was detailed. The Radiation Protection Manager provided excellent feedback to improve the procedure format. An example was noted for the relocation of required operator manipulations from the procedure "Discussion" section to the "Operator Action" section.
The January 12, 1999, PORC reviewed the Unit 1 "C" reactor feedwater pump suction drain valve leak seal repair plan. The review included an excellent discussion of industry events related to leak seal repair problems.
AllPORC members provided good comments to ensure that proper details were provided in the work authorization plan.
Vendor control and oversight were discussed in detail by the site personnel and within the work plan. The PORC recommendations were sound and supported by a
.
conservative decision making process.
c.
Conclusions Two Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings, related to a Unit 1 "C" reactor feedwater drain valve leak seal repair and a generic main generator synchronization issue, demonstrated that PORC conducted in-depth reviews of safety issues.
The PORC recommendations for both meetings were sound and supported by a conservative decision making proces IV. Plant Su ort
\\
Control of Fire Protection Activities Firewatch Duties for Inaccessible Areas Ins ection Sco e 7175092904 The inspectors reviewed firewatch duties for inaccessible areas, to determine whether the activities were conducted in accordance with NRC requirements and SSES procedures.
Observations and Findin s General Plant Tour Observations SSES has several fire zones, in high radiation areas, with fire wrapped cable raceway barriers (i.e., Thermo-Lag insulation) which has been inoperable since 1992. Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), and Technical Specifications (TS) prior to October 1998, require an hourly firewatch patrol, as a compensatory measure for the inoperable fire rated assemblies.
Administrative procedure NDAP-QA-0443, "Firewatch Procedure,"
does not require the firewatch to enter inaccessible high radiation areas, in order to maintain personnel radiation exposure As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA).
The firewatch is only required to touch the room door and verify normal door temperature and no smoke at the door. PP8L had previously installed cameras in the rooms, for use by a continuous firewatches, but the cameras and monitors are no longer functional for, these rooms.
On January 5, 1999, the inspectors observed portions of a.1-hour roving firewatch patrol and reviewed the firewatch patrol log sheets.
The inspectors observed four areas, on the firewatch patrol log sheet, that the firewatch did not enter, fire zones 2-3C-W, 0-28H, 1-6I and 2-5C.
AllAccessible Areas Not Entered by Firewatch Patrols Fire zone 2-3C-W was not in a high radiation or contaminated area, and was accessible.
This fire zone is in the Unit 2 reactor building equipment access room, on elevation 683.
The equipment access room consists of three separate fire zones, with fire zone 2-3C-W located approximately 75 feet down an equipment hallway and around a corne, from the room doorway. For this area, the firewatch was observed to open the room door and look in, but could not see the posted fire zone from the doorway. Discussions with firewatch supervision and the SSES fire protection engineer indicated that there had been no significant change in how the firewatch patrolled this fire zone since the fire zone was originally posted, in 1992. On January 6, 1999, PP8L completed modification work for the fire rated barriers in this area.
This fire zone no longer requires a compensatory hourly firewatch patro Fire zone 0-28H was not in a high radiation or contaminated area, and was accessible.
This fire zone is an I&C instrument shop in the control structure on elevation 771, adjacent to the safeguard battery rooms. The I&Cshop was kept locked for control of stored instruments.
Firewatches did not have a key to the room, and had been instructed to touch the door iflocked. SSES firewatch personnel indicated that the door was typically found locked, and that the firewatch patrols did not normally enter the room.
This fire zone has been posted since 1992.
On January 26, 1999, the firewatches were given a room key and instructed to enter and patrol the room.
The performance of the firewatch patrols, as observed by the inspectors, and the written instructions on the firewatch patrol log sheets, for fire zones 2-3C-W and 0-28H, did not meet the requirements of the SSES fire protection program, as delineated by NDAP-QA-0443, in that these fire zones are not located in inaccessible or high radiation areas.
The inspectors concluded that there was low safety significance, due to the improper performance of the firewatch patrols in these fire zones, because of the low volume of combustible materials and operable smoke detectors in the affected areas.
PP&L initiated condition report (CR) 82284 to evaluate roving firewatches which were not fullychecking an assigned "accessible" fire zone.
Initial corrective actions were good, and included issuing a door key to the firewatches for the l&Cinstrument shop (fire zone
.
0-28H), with instructions to enter the room during routine patrols.
Firewatch personnel identified several other areas where firewatches did not routinely enter, due to locked doors; keys were provided to the firewatches.
The failure to perform an hourly firewatch patrol in the affected fire zones constitutes a violation of minor.significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action.
Inaccessible Areas Not Entered by Firewatch Patrols At fire zones 1-6I and 2-5C, the firewatch patrol was observed to touch the room door, but did not open the door. The inspectors verified that both fire zones had operable smoke detectors, such that a continuous firewatch was not required.
Discussions with firewatch supervision and the SSES fire protection engineer indicated that there had been no significant change in how the firewatch patrolled these fire zones since the areas were originally posted, in 1992.
NDAP-QA-0441, "Fire Protection System Status Control," requires an hourly firewatch as a compensatory action for impaired fire rated assemblies, and defines "Alternate Protection (i.e., compensatory actions)" as suitable actions to minimize fire risk, such as firewatches in the affected areas.
The inspectors concluded that touching the door and monitoring for smoke outside the room door, without entering or observing conditions in the room, may not have been adequate to ensure fire risks were minimized.
TRM 3.7.3.7 requires an hourly firewatch patrol for inoperable fire rated barriers.
The TRM basis states individual fire zones on the hourly firewatch patrol shall be toured at intervals of sixty minutes with a margin of fifteen minutes. The inspectors concluded that without entering the area or observing conditions in the vicinity (e.g., in the room) of the'noperable barrier, the requirements of the TRM may not have been satisfied, in that the
immediate area around the inoperable fire rated barrier (e.g., in the fire zone) was not toured.
License Condition 2.C(6) of operating license NPF-14 (Unit 1) and License Condition 2.C(3) of operating license NPF-22 (Unit 2) require PP&L to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program, as described in the Fire Protection review Report (FPRR), for the facilities and as approved by the NRC safety evaluation report (SER), dated August 9, 1989. The FPRR Table 5.0-1, Section B.3 states, in part, that normal and abnormal conditions or other anticipated operations should be reviewed, and special actions and procedures such as firewatches implemented to assure adequate fire protection.
Section 5.4.1(d) of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, of Facility Operating Licenses NPF-14 and NPF-22 requires that procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering Fire Protection Program implementation.
PP&L initiated CR 90000 to evaluate whether hourly firewatch patrols, for inaccessible high radiation areas, are in compliance with TRM requirements.
The inspectors observed minor housekeeping discrepancies, including missing trash container lids and very small amounts of loose combustible material, in the affected fire zones.
PP&L stated that the identified discrepancies would be resolved during the next work window entry into these high radiation rooms.
The inspectors expressed concern that monitoring the door temperature, and monitoring for smoke outside the room door, may not have been a suitable compensatory action to minimize the fire risk in the affected fire zones, and, therefore, may not have satisfied the TRM requirement for touring the affected fire zones.
The failure to enter or observe conditions in the affected fire zones willbe tracked as an unresolved item (URI), and will be reviewed to determine ifthe actions were acceptable or represented a violation of NRC requirements.
(URI 60-387;388/99-01-01)
Conclusions The NRC identified that two accessible fire zones were not inspected by hourly firewatches since 1992.
PP&L incorrectly treated the areas as inaccessible when in fact they were accessible.
Once recognized, PP&L took immediate and effective corrective actions.
The NRC identified that two inaccessible fire zones, located in'high radiation areas, were not entered by hourly firewatch patrols since 1992. The firewatches monitored the room door temperature and checked for smoke outside of the room door, but did not enter or
~
observe conditions in the room. The failure to enter or observe conditions in the affected fire zones willbe tracked as an unresolved item, to determine ifthe actions were acceptable or represented a violation of NRC requirement V. Mana ementMeetin s
X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of PP&L management at the conclusion of the inspection period, on February 5, 1999.
PP&L acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked PP&L whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identifie IP 37551 IP 40500 IP 61726 IP 62707 IP 71707 IP 71750 IP 92902 IP 92904
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Onsite Engineering Observations Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems Surveillance Observations, Maintenance Observations Plant Operations Plant Support Activities Followup Maintenance Followup Plant Support
~Oened ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED URI 50-387,388/99-01-01 Opened Firewatch Duties for Inaccessible Areas (section F1.1)
0 ened/Closed None.
Discussed None.
Closed URI 50-387,388/98-.06-02 Closed Safety Relief Valve Acoustic Monitor Failures (section M8.1)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA ASME CFR CR EDG EQ FPRR I&C IR LCO M8TE NDAP NOED NRC NRR PORC PP&L PDR QA RE SER SSES TRM TS URI UT VIO" As Low As Reasonably Achievable American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code of Federal Regulations Condition Report Emergency Diesel Generator Environmental Qualification Fire Protection Review Report Instrument and Controls
[NRC] Inspection Report Limiting Condition for Operation Measurement and Test Equipment Nuclear Department Administrative Procedure Notice of Enforcement Discretion Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Reactor Regulation Plant Operations Review Committee Pennsylvania Power and Light Company
[NRC] Public Document Room Quality Assurance Reactor Engineer
[NRC] Safety Evaluation Report Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Technical Requirements. Manual Technical Specification
[NRC] Unresolved Item Ultrasonic Test Violation