ML17158B567
| ML17158B567 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1996 |
| From: | Eugene Kelly, Kenneth Kolaczyk NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17158B566 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-96-03, 50-387-96-3, 50-388-96-03, 50-388-96-3, NUDOCS 9604110192 | |
| Download: ML17158B567 (65) | |
See also: IR 05000387/1996003
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:DOCKET/REPORT NOS: LICENSEE: FACILITY: LOCATED AT: INSPECTION DATES: INSPECTOR: U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 50-387/96-03 50-388/96-03 Pennsylvania Power and Light Company Allentown, Pennsylvania Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Berwick, Pennsylvania December 11-15, 1995, and Harch 4-8, 1996 Douglas A. Dempsey, Reactor Engineer, RI INSPECTOR: K nneth S. Ko aczyk, eactor Engineer ystems Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety D te APPROVED BY: Eugene H. ly, Chief Systems neering Branc Division Reactor Safe y 0 Da e 'P604iiOi92 960403 PDR ADOCK 05000387 8 PDR
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 1.0 2.0 INSPECTION SCOPE HYDROGEN WATER CONTROL INJECTION SYSTEM MODIFICATION 2 .1 Scope . . . . 2.2 Findings and Observations . 2.3 Conclusion ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3.0 CORE SHROUD INSPECTION PLANS 3.1 Scope . 3.2 Findings and Observations . . . 3.3 Conclusion ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4.0 RESOLUTION OF BACKLOGGED DESIGN ISSUES 4. 1 Moderate Energy Piping 4.2 Electric Protection Assembly Setpoints 4.3 Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation Setpoints 4.4 Single Failure of Standby Gas Treatment and Reactor Buil Recirculation Systems . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ding ~ ~ ~ 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM 5.1 Inspection Scope 5.2 Observations and Findings . 5.3 Conclusions . REVIEW OF CONDITION REPORTS . 6.1 Inspection Scope 6.2 Observations and Findings . 6.3 Conclusion SYSTEM ENGINEERING REVIEW . 7. 1 Inspection Scope 7.2 Observations and Findings ~ 7.3 Conclusions . TOUR OF PLANT AREAS . (CLOSED) UNRESOLVED ITEM 95-01-01 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT MANAGEMENT MEETINGS VALVE PRESSURE LOCKING ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 10 10 10 14 14 14 14 15 16 16 16 17 18 18 18 19
SUS(UEHANNA ENGINEERING INSPECTION 96-03 (December 11-15, 1995; Parch 4-8, 1996) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY System engineers were knowledgeable regarding the design, operation, and performance of their systems and effectively coordinated the efforts of site and corporate support organizations to resolve problems and enhance system reliability. Senior level managers maintained familiarity with system performance. Effective use was made of industry experience in the design of a hydrogen water control injection system. Apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified involving insufficient attention to the plant licensing basis in operability assessments and failure to identify and correct design deficiencies in a timely manner. For example: (1) an engineering evaluation of reactor water cleanup leak detection system capability did not reconcile conflicts between system sensitivity and licensing basis requirements (EEI 96-03-01); (2) longstanding single failure vulnerabilities involving the standby gas treatment and reactor building recirculation systems were not corrected in a timely manner (EEI 96-03-04); (3) susceptibility of high pressure coolant injection system injection valves to pressure locking was not promptly identified and corrected, resulting in valve damage and system inoperability (EEI 96-03-05, 96-03-06); (4) seismic- monitoring instruments were installed contrary to technical specification location requirements (EEI 96-03-07). Regarding the standby gas treatment and reactor building recirculation systems, use of probabilistic analysis as a measure of compliance with the single failure criterion of 10 CFR 50.55a(h), and the siting criteria of 10 CFR part 100 as a standard of system operability was unresolved pending further NRC review. (URI 96-03-02). An additional unresolved item was identified concerning performance of 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations for longstanding degraded or nonconforming conditions. (URI 96-03-03). The nonsafety-related TBCCW system was found to be tested, trended, and maintained at a level equivalent to that applied to safety-related systems, and commensurate with its risk significance. An unresolved item (URI 95-01-01) concerning the timeliness of controlled drawing and procedure updates was closed with no enforcement action taken.
DETAILS 1.0 INSPECTION SCOPE The objective of the inspection was to evaluate the effectiveness of the engineering organizations at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), using NRC Inspection Procedure 37550, "Engineering." The inspection entailed reviews of system engineering, plant modifications, technical work assignments, and corrective action programs. 2.0 HYDROGEN WATER CONTROL INJECTION SYSTEM MODIFICATION 2.1 Scope The inspector reviewed the licensee's plans for installing a hydrogen water control (HWC) injection system. Hodification scoping documents and preliminary drawings were compared with the NRC safety evaluation report (SER) that endorsed the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines for boiling water reactor hydrogen water chemistry installations. 2.2 Findings and Observations The licensee intends to install a HWC system at Susquehanna to reduce the occurrence of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of reactor vessel internals. The inspector reviewed the design package that was prepared to support installation of the system. At the time of the inspection, the final design had not been finalized, and only the scoping documents and preliminary drawings were reviewed. In July 1987, the NRC endorsed a generic HWC system design described in EPRI report, "Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installations." The inspector discussed the SER and several aspects of the proposed design with licensee engineers, including fire brigade training, leak detection and mitigation, and ALARA considerations. The inspector found that the licensee has changed its originally-proposed design and system performance criteria based on discussions with utilities that have already implemented the modification. The licensee also was sensitive to the manner in which the HWC system may affect assumptions contained in the plant final safety analyses report. The licensee intends to place the HWC systems into service at Units 1 and 2 by Hay 1997 and November 1997, respectively. 2.3 Conclusion The inspector concluded that the licensee has made reasonable efforts to ensure the proposed HWC system corresponds to the EPRI guidelines. The licensee has made effective use of industry experience in developing the design of the HWC system.
3.0 CORE SHROUD INSPECTION PLANS 3.1 Scope The inspector reviewed the licensee's core shroud inspection plans for the upcoming Unit 1 refueling outage. The purpose of the review was to determine if the proposed inspections comported with the NRC's 1995 SER concerning cracks that were identified in the Unit 1 core shroud welds. 3.2 Findings and Observations On Hay 3, 1995, the NRC issued an SER concerning weld cracks in the Unit 1 core shroud that were identified by the licensee. The NRC concluded'the plant could continue to operate safely for one additional cycle, provided the licensee inspected or repaired the deficient welds during the refueling outage scheduled for September 1996. The inspector determined that the licensee intends to inspect 50X of the accessible core shroud'elds in lieu of performing repairs. The licensee's decision to defer the repairs is based upon crack growth rate predictions that were performed in 1994. The calculations indicated that repairs would not be required for the next two operating cycles. Based on the use of conservative crack growth rates, the licensee anticipates that the results of the inspections planned for 1996 will provide an adequate basis for deferring the implementation of repairs beyond the next two operating cycles. In addition, the licensee believes that the need to implement repairs will be reduced further by the installation of a hydrogen water control injection system in Hay 1997. 3.3 Conclusion, The inspector concluded that the licensee's core shroud inspection plan, is consistent with the NRC safety evaluation report. 4.0 RESOLUTION OF BACKLOGGED DESIGN ISSUES The inspector reviewed PP&L's dispositions of four longstanding equipment or system deficiencies. The items were selected from a list of 14 outstanding engineering deficiency reports (EDR). The review was focused on how the licensee reconciled the deficient conditions with the current licensing bases described in the SSES technical specifications (TS) and the final safety analysis report (FSAR). 4. 1 moderate Energy Piping EDR G00171, dated September 1990, discussed the lack of documented evaluations regarding the protection of essential systems and components from the effects of postulated piping failures in moderate energy systems. A licensee study of the matter identified approximately 100 items of electrical equipment at Susquehanna that were located near moderate energy piping whose failure may impact adversely the achievement of safe shutdown following a postulated pipe. break. Apparently, the lack of documented evaluations was based upon the fact
3
that Bechtel,
the Susquehanna
architect engineer,
performed
a qualitative
rather than quantitative
assessment
of the effects of a moderate
energy line
break.
N
Moderate energy piping is described
in Section 3.6 of the Susquehanna
FSAR as
piping containing fluid at less
than 200'F
and
275 psi.
The Susquehanna
FSAR
states
that the plant design basis for moderate
energy piping conforms to the
criteria contained in Branch Technical
Position
(BTP)
ASB 3-1, "Protection
Against Piping Failures in Fluid Systems
Outside Containment."
BTP 3-1
requires
a plant to be capable of achieving cold shutdown in the event of a
moderate
energy line break
and
an additional single active failure.
To address
the deficiency, the 'licensee
performed
a series of confirmatory
engineering
evaluations
to verify the original Bechtel qualitative analyses
was correct.
The licensee utilized two approaches:
(1) failures of moderate
energy piping were postulated,
and analyses
were performed to verify safe
shutdown could
be achieved with surviving equipment.
The analyses
took credit
for the flooding analyses
that were performed for the fire protection
(10
CFR
50, Appendix R) program;
(2) where survival of the needed
complement of safe
shutdown
equipment
could not be assured,
stress
analyses
were performed to
eliminate the need to postulate
a pipe failure at that location.
The licensee
had not completed its technical
evaluations
at the end of the
inspection.
However, the inspector did not identify any operability concerns.
I
4.2
Electric Protection
Assembly Setpoints
EDR G30024,
dated April 19,
1993,
documented
the following problems:
(1)
Conflicts existed'between
the original
and subsequent
information
concerning
the reactor protection
system
{RPS) electric protection
assembly
(EPA) voltage setpoints.
(2)
Differences existed
between field voltages
measured
on different
occasions.
{3)
Calculations that fully supported
the specified
EPA setpoints
did not
exist.
The discrepancies
originally applied to both Susquehanna
units, but at the
time of the inspection the items
had
been resolved at Unit 2.
The
EPAs are designed
t'o protect the equipment
connected
to the
RPS
distribution system
from degradation of the non-lE source of power.
Undervoltage,
overvoltage,
and underfrequency
protection is provided.
EPA
setpoints
are located in Technical Specification 3.8.4.3.
Despite concerns
regarding the
EPA voltage setpoints,
PP&L considered
the
EPA's operable
since the current
EPA over and undervoltage
setpoints
appeared
to adequately
protect the most limiting reactor protection equipment
components. The inspector reviewed the licensee's operability assessment and concluded that adequate technical justification was provided to consider the EPAs operable pending completion of the confirmatory calculations. 4.3 Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation Setpoints The inspector reviewed EDR 93-115 regarding reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system isolation setpoint discrepancies. The licensee's operability determinations, compensatory measures, and corrective actions were evaluated against the plant licensing basis defined in the FSAR and the technical specifications and applicable NRC safety evaluation reports (SER). Diverse methods are utilized at SSES to isolate the RWCU system in the event of a piping leak, including: (1) high system flow rate, (2) high room temperature, and (3) high area ventilation differential temperature. The setpoints for the isolation systems are contained in Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2. The high area ventilation differential temperature isolation system uses a series of temperature-sensing elements that are located in RWCU piping areas. In the heat exchanger and pump room, the differential temperature "hot leg" is mounted on the room wall, while in the penetration room, the "hot leg" element is mounted on the face of the ventilation exhaust register. In other rooms, detectors are located at the outlet of the ventilation supply duct registers ("cold leg") and on the compartment walls ("hot leg"). In 1988, to correct recurring spurious isolation of the RWCU system, the licensee repositioned penetration room ventilation supply duct louvers to desensitize the "cold leg" sensors to changes in supply air temperature. The adjustment, in effect, changed the TS isolation setpoint for the room. The licensee did not submit a TS setpoint change request to the NRC until January 9, 1991. The NRC approved the TS amendment in October 1992, and in April 1993, the licensee implemented the new setpoints. However, the licensee did not restore the ventilation supply duct louvers to their original positions at that time due to concerns expressed by the system engineer regarding the validity of the new setpoints. One concern involved the ability of the new setpoints to prevent spurious system isolation caused by seasonal variations in supply air temperature. The October 1992 SER documented the licensing basis of the area ventilation differential temperature isolation system and approved the setpoint changes proposed by the licensee in its TS change request. The SER stated that the system is designed: (1) to detect and isolate the RWCU piping before a system pipe leakage rate of 25 gallons per minute (gpm) is reached, and (2) to avoid spurious RWCU system isolation. The 25 gpm leak rate was based upon isolating a pipe crack before the critical crack size is reached (i.e., prior to a structurally unstable pipe failure). EDR 93-115 documented three deficiencies concerning the RWCU system differential temperature isolation setpoints:
5
.
~
The bases for the ambient temperat ure
and differential temperature
setpoints
did not agree.
The setpoint analysis did not consider variations in area ventilation
supply air temperature.
The loss of reactor building heating units was not considered.
To resolve the issues
concerning the
RWCU differential temperature
setpoint,
the licensee initiated
an action plan that included the following items:
~
Implement
a temporary modification (bypass)
to accurately monitor and
record
RWCU penetration
room differential temperature
"cold and hot leg"
data
and
use the information to perform additional ventilation system
transient
analyses.
~
Identify all of the appropriate ventilation system transients,
off-
normal events,
and accident
scenarios
for which the
RWCU leak detection
systems
must function 'without spuriously isolating.
~
Based
on the results of the above,
prepare
appropriate
TS setpoint
changes.
In October
1993, the licensee
performed
a leak isolation system operability
determination for the original
EDR,
and updated
the assessment
on
June
28,
1995.
Based
on new ventilation system performance
data,
the licensee
repositioned
the ventilation louvers at Unit 2 to improve the leak detection
sensitivity of the system.
The corresponding
louvers at Unit
1 were not
readjusted.
During the inspection,
the licensee
performed additional
analyses
of the
isolation system capability in response
to the inspectors
questions.
In a
revised operability assessment,
dated
Harch 12,
1996, the licensee
concluded
the present ventilation system configuration satisfied the licensing-basis
sensitivity requirement of 25
gpm and that the isolation system
was operable.
The licensee
was evaluating historical
system operability at the end of the
inspection.
The inspector
found the
1993
and
1995 operability determinations
to be
inadequate
in that neither
assessment
recognized that the current ventilation
system configuration
and isolation setpoints
exceeded
the licensing .basis
25
gpm leak rate sensitivity criterion specified in the
SER.
In addition, the
licensee
did not evaluate
the system's ability to detect
a leak rate below the
critical crack size of the
RWCU system piping.
For example,
the
1993
assessment
stated that the leak detection
system only could detect
leakage
rates of 30 to 55 gpm, while the
1995 assessment
concluded that the detectable
leakage rate
was
60 gpm at Unit
1 and
200
gpm at Unit 2 (prior to louver
repositioning).
The inspector
observed that the licensee's
current
(1996) operability analyses
utilized "realistic" rather than licensing basis
assumptions.
For example,
the licensee
credited
room pressurization
and thermal stratification effects
following a postulated
pipe break.
The inspector considered
that the licensee
did not properly control the
repositioning of the ventilation supply duct louvers in 1988.
Specifically,
a
bypass
and
10
CFR 50.59 evaluation for the changes
was not performed
by the
licensee until December
1994, six years after the adjustment
took place.
The inspector also considered
the licensee's
1995 operability determination to
be inadequate.
Specifically,
based
upon the ventilation performance
data,
the
licensee
repositioned
the ventilation supply duct louver at Unit 2 to
decrease'he
detectable
leak rate to approximately
60 gpm.
However, the
60 gpm leak
rate still exceeded
the licensing basis limit of 25 gpm.
The inspector
concluded that,
on several
occasions
since
1988, the licensee
did not properly consider the
SSES licensing basis either in its assessments
of system operability or in implementing compensating
measures
and corrective
actions.
Further,
the
FSAR was not updated to reflect changes
in the
isolation system design basis
as required
by 10
CFR 50.71(e)(4).
These
matters
are apparent violations
(EEI 96-03-01).
4.4
Single Failure of Standby
Gas Treatment
and Reactor Building
Recirculation
Systems
The inspector
reviewed
EDR G00153 that was initiated by the licensee
in
August 1990.
The report discussed
potential
secondary
containment
atmosphere
cleanup
systems
single failures that could compromise the ability of the
systems
to maintain post-accident,
off-site,
and control
room radiological
doses within the bounds described
in the in the
FSAR,
The condition was
reported
by PPKL in, Licensee
Event Report
(LER) 94-15,
dated
October
12,
1994,
and initially documented
in
NRC Inspection
Report 94-20/94-21.
The inspector
reviewed licensee
documentation
and discussed
the issue with licensee
engineers
to ascertain
the history of the problem
and the status, of corrective
actions.
The secondary
containment
(reactor building) is designed to minimize the
ground level release
of airborne radioactive materials
and to provide for
controlled, filtered release
of the containment
atmosphere
to the environment.
The standby
gas treatment
(SGT) system
and the reactor building recirculation
(RBR) system act in concert to control the release
of radioactive material
following a loss of coolant accident
(LOCA), thereby maintaining radiological
doses within the site boundary limits of 10
CFR 100 and the control
room
limits of 10
CFR 50, Appendix A, General
Design Criterion
(GDC) 19.
The safety functions of the
SGT system
are to prevent direct leakage
from the
reactor building by drawing down and maintaining
a negative
pressure
of about
0.25 inches of water gage (" WG) and to remove radioactive particulates
and
iodine.
When automatically actuated,
two SGTS fans initially draw air solely
from the reactor building via the
RBRS plenum to minimize drawdown time.
When
the required negative
pressure
is attained,
outside air makeup
dampers
modulate
open to establish
the minimum total
system flow needed
to ensur e
stable fan operation. The dampers are arranged in parallel and tie into the common suction header of the SGTS fans. Each damper is controlled by an instrument loop consisting of a differential pressure transmitter and a flow controller. Indication of damper position and controller output signal strength is available either in the control room or the reactor building. , Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.5. 1 requires one SGT system train to draw down the three reactor building ventilation zones to a vacuum greater than or , equal to 0.25" WG in less than or equal to 92 seconds. The TS was approved in by the NRC in an SER for Amendment 21 to the Susquehanna operating license. The approval was based, in part, on analysis that assumed a three-minute draw down time. The purpose of the RBR system is to circulate the reactor" building atmosphere to dilute and permit the decay of radioisotopes leaked from the primary containment during a LOCA. The system consists of two redundant, full- capacity fans, isolation dampers, and controls. The system is aligned with one recirculation fan in the standby condition, and the position of the fan discharge dampers is available to plant operators. The idle fan discharge damper must remain closed to maintain the proper mixing volume. The LOCA analysis described in the Susquehanna SER and Chapter 15 of the FSAR assumes that leakage of the primary containment atmosphere into the reactor building is mixed with 50K of the reactor building volume. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup," requires the SGT and RBR systems to be capable of performing their safety functions assuming a single failure, and 10 CFR 50.55a(h) requires protection systems to meet the single failure criterion set forth in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 279, "Criteria For Protection Systems For-Nuclear Power Generating Stations." In September 1994, PP8L concluded that several "realistic" (though improbable) single-failure modes existed in the design of the SGT and RBR systems. Failure of a differential pressure transmitter or flow controller would cause the associated outside air makeup damper to open prematurely affecting both SGT system trains. The licensee calculated that reactor building drawdown time would increase from three to 18 minutes. Another failure mode involved spurious opening of the normally-closed discharge damper associated with an idle RBR fan due to a random short circuit, in the damper, actuator cable. The licensee concluded that the condition would reduce the reactor building mixing volume from 50Ã to 6.5X. These failure modes had not been considered in the FSAR system failure modes and effects analyses, and-each adversely affected an assumption made in the post-LOCA radiological dose analyses documented in the FSAR. While dose consequences calculated by the licensee were below 10 CFR Part 100 limits, they exceeded the values described in the FSAR. The inspector also noted that the revised dose consequences were based on "best estimate" calculations and that design-basis analyses could result in higher dose predictions. The inspector reviewed the licensee's September 1994 operability determination, which was still in effect during this inspection. The licensee concluded that the SAT system was potentially degraded but operable, based on
acceptable
TS surveillance test results
and the ability of the systems
to
maintain radiological
doses
below
10
CFR 100 limits.
PP&L also concluded that
the safety significance of the single-failure
modes
was minimal.
Using
failure data from the riuclear plant reliability database
system
and
IEEE
Standard
500-1977,
the licensee
calculated
the failure rate of the outside air
dampers to be 1.09E-5 failures/hour
(10.51 years
between failures)
and the
probability of undetected
opening of an idle
RBR fan discharge
damper
coincident with a
LOCA to, be approximately
2.87E-10 occurrences
per life of
the plant.
In addition,
using realistic (versus
design-basi.s)
source-term
assumptions,
the licensee
concluded that the single failures would affect the
radiological
consequences
of a
LOCA only minimally.
Finally, the licensee
-implemented
compensatory
measures
intended to reduce the likelihood that non-
demand
SGT and
RBR system
damper failures would remain undetected
by control
room operators.
The inspector questioned
whether the draw down test required
by TS 4.6.5.
1 was
a valid test of system operability,
as it was
assumed
that
no single failure
of the
SGT system
dampers
had occurred.
In addition, the inspector questioned
the licensee's
use of the siting criteria of 10
CFR 100 as
a basi.s for system
operability.
Finally, the inspector questioned
the use of probabilistic
analysis
as
a standard
to determine
compliance with the single failure
criteria mandated
by 10
CFR 50.55a(h)
[IEEE Standard
279].
These matters
are
uhresolved
pending additional evaluation
by the
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
(URI 96-03-02)
The existence of the potential
SGT and
RBR system single failures initially
was documented
by PP&L in a secondary
containment single failure analysis
report,
dated April 1986.
In July 1987, the licensee
generated
an engineering
work request to evaluate
the report
and propose corrective actions,
and in
1988,
a calculation intended to show that
SGT outside air makeup
damper
failure would not increase
secondary
drawdown time was initiated.
However, in
September
1988,
work on the calculation
was stopped.
In Harch
1990, the
engineering
work request
was closed
due to competing work priorities.
The issue
was, reopened
by PP&L in August
1990
(as
EDR G00153)
under the
new
deficiency report program.
At that time, the
EDR was dispositoned
to review
the potential
SGT and
RBR failure modes against
the
SGTS design basis
and to
evaluate their validity.
In September
1990,
as
a result of another
EDR, the
licensee
began to develop
a calculation
intended to model
SGT system
performance
and secondary
containment
pressure
response
to
a design-basis
accident.
Revision
1 of EDR G00153
was issued
in spring
1991.
The licensee
concluded that the postulated
damper failures were safety significant due to
potential
adverse
affects
on the
TS reactor building drawdown time and the
design-basis
mixing volume.
However, since the failure modes
were considered
only to be potential conditions,
the licensee
concluded that the
SGT system
was operable
and that further analysis
was required to characterize
the
problem.
In Hay 1992,
PP&L concluded that the design-basis
documentation
program was
the appropriate
administrative vehicle for further evaluation of the
condition,
and the
EDR was closed.
However,
as
a result of a subsequent
licensee initiative to reexamine
previously-closed deficiency reports,
the
EDR
was reopened in April 1993. The EDR was dispositioned to determine whether the postulated single failures were realistic (i.e., physically possibl'e) and to quantify their effect on secondary containment drawdown time. The licensee considered the safety significance of the conditions to be minimal based on a realistic (vice design-basis) analysis of the Susquehanna source term. In January 1994,. PP&L completed an analysis of the radiological dose consequences of the single failures using design-basis assumptions, and in August 1994, the licensee concluded that the single-failure modes were credible. Consequently, in September 1994, the licensee concluded that the single failures placed the plant outside its design basis. In early Narch 1996., the licensee implemented a design change that eliminated the SGT system outside air makeup damper single failure mode. The modification installed time delay relays in the damper control circuits that are adjusted to maintain the dampers in the closed position until the design- basis draw down time has expired. The inspector reviewed the design change package and concluded that the modification effectively corrected the problem. In addition, the licensee concluded that single failure of a RBR fan discharge damper was not credible, and that further corrective action was not required. The inspector observed that prior to implementing the SGT system damper modification, PP&L had not performed a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation to determine whether plant operation with the uncorrected single-failure modes was an unreviewed safety question. The inspector discussed the issue with the site engineering staff and found that PP&L did not consider a change to the facility to exist, provided the ultimate intention was to correct the nonconforming condition. In that case, the licensee would perform a 50.59 review when the corrective actions were decided upon. Thus, Susquehanna may operate for years with degraded or nonconforming conditions that would never be evaluated against 50.59, as long as the licensee's ultimate intent was to . correct the problem either through modifications or a change to the plant design basis. The inspector considered that failure to install the SGTS and RBRS, as originally described in the FSAR was a change to the facility as actually licensed by the NRC and that a 50.59 safety evaluation was not performed. This matter is unresolved pending additional NRC review. (URI 96- 03-03) The inspector discussed the EDR corrective action plan with the licensee ~ engineering staff. Due to the age of the EDR and the potential significance deficiencies, PP&L senior management was apprised periodically of the status of the EDR. Two corporate engineers were assigned the sole responsibility of performing a new failure modes and affects analysis .of the SGTS.. Based on completion of a credibility evaluation of each common mode single failure vulnerability identified in the analysis, the licensee intended to finalize a corrective action plan by the end of the first quarter of 1996. The inspector concluded that the SGT and RBR system single failure vulnerabilities constituted a condition adverse to quality that existed since plant construction and remained uncorrected approximately 10 years after initially being identified by the licensee. The inspector concluded that PP&L's failure to promptly identify and correct the nonconforming conditions
10
was
an apparent violation of 10
CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective
Action), that requires conditions
adverse
to quality to be promptly identified
and corrected.
(EEI 96-03-04).
5.0
HIGH PRESSURE
COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEN VALVE PRESSURE
LOCKING
5.1
Inspection
Scope
During a forced shutdown of Susquehanna
Unit
1 in November
1995, the licensee
discovered that high pressure
coolant injection
(HPCI) system injection valve
HV155F006
(F006)
was damaged.
PPKL attributed the damage to valve bonnet
overpressurization.
The inspector
performed
independent
calculations to
assess
valve operability prior to the shutdown
and reviewed licensee
responses
to
NRC and industry operating
experience
information to evaluate
the factors
that contributed to the condition.
5.2
Observations
and Findings
In April 1992, the licensee
refurbished
valve
F006 by lapping the seats
and
installing
a new bonnet (with an improved stem packing system),
graphoil
pressure
seal,
and disk;
Upon disassembling
the valve on November
19,
1995,
PP&L found the pressure
seal
spacer ring twisted
and the four retaining ring
segments
and packing follower flange bent.
The licensee
calculated that
bonnet pressures
of about
3500 psig
and 6378 psig had
been required,
respectively,
to deform the segmented
ring and packing flange.
Valve F006 is
a 14-inch, Anchor/Darling flexible-wedge gate valve located
approximately four feet from the main feedwater
header.
The valve stem
and
bonnet
are oriented horizontally.
The valve is operated
by a Limitorque
Corporation size
SB-3 motor-actuator
powered
by
a 250 volt dc (direct current)
motor rated at
150 foot-pounds (ft-lb) nominal starting torque.
The inspector
used valve performance
data from PPEL's motor-operated
valve
test
program
and utilized
a method developed
by Commonwealth
Edison
Company to
estimate
the opening forces required
under pressure-locking
conditions.
Standard
Limitorque-sizing equations
and assumptions
were used to calculate
the torque
and thrust capability of the valve.
The inspector determined that
the thrusts
needed
to open the valve were between
182,206 pounds-force (lbf)
(bonnet pressure
= 3500 psig)
and 308,356 lbf (bonnet pressure
= 6378 psig),
while motor-actuator output capability (at nominal voltage)
was 86,878 lbf.
The inspector also determined that the maximum bonnet pressure
that the motor-
actuator
could overcome
(assuming
nameplate
motor starting torque)
was
approximately
1325 psig.
Assuming
a water-solid bonnet,
the inspector
calculated that only a 10'F temperature
rise of the entrapped fluid would be
necessary
to attain this pressure.
PPKL estimated that the temperature
rise
at the valve during plant startup is about 275'F due to conduction through the
pipe wall.
The inspector
concluded that valve
F006
had
been
ino'perable (for an
indeterminate
period of time) due to overpressurization
induced
by heatup of
fluid trapped in the bonnet cavity.
The condition existed since plant startup
from the sixth refueling outage in mid-May 1992 (following valve
0 refurbishment) until the plant was shut down on November 10, 1995. Reactor operation with questionable operability of the HPCI system is an apparent violation of TS 3.5. l.c.2, which requires an operable flow path to the reactor vessel. (EEI 96-03-05) The inspector reviewed PP&L's earlier actions to address the potential for thermally-induced pressure locking (TIPL) of valve F006 and found that the licensee previously identified that the valve was susceptible to TIPL in November 1992. However, the licensee decided to defer re-performing, previous, incomplete, pressure-locking studies pending issuance of NRC generic guidelines and did not perform a quantitative evaluation of valve operability or implement corrective actions. In response to a 1984 industry-operating 'experience report (PP&L Industry Event Review Program-IERP-No. 84187), PP&L reviewed earlier evaluations of pressure locking that had been performed under the IERP. Although the TIPL mechanism was described explicitly in the 1984 report, the licensee's study (completed in August 1985) was not a systematic evaluation of the phenomenon's effect on the gate valves, at Susquehanna. Only two previously-evaluated valves were identified in the study as being susceptible to pressure locking. The inspector found that IERP reviews of two subsequent industry notices regarding TIPL (General Electric Service Information Letter GE SIL - 368, dated October 14, 1988; and industry event report, dated Parch 25, 1988) were closed on the unverified assumption that the mechanism had been addressed under IERP 84187. As a result of an outside audit in 1989 of PP&L's response to the 1984 industry report, the licensee concluded that the initial study had been'nadequate. An engineering work request (EWR H00265) was initiated in April 1990 to reevaluate pressure locking and thermal binding of gate valves at Susquehanna. The EWR also included within its scope consideration of information contained in GE SIL 368, Revision 1, Supplement 1, dated August 14, 1989. The SIL reported TIPL events at other nuclear facilities and explicitly identified HPCI system injection valves as being potentially susceptible to the mechanism. Pursuant to the EWR, the licensee completed three comprehensive pressure- ,locking/thermal-binding studies between August 1990 and October 1991. The initial study's (SEA-HE-277) screening criteria did not include TIPL, but valve F006 was included in the susceptible valve group. The second study (SEA-HE-278) was performed for PP&L by Gilbert/Commonwealth, Incorporated (G/C). Although TIPL again was not a screening criterion, ~ G/C determined that four HPCI and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam supply valves were susceptible to the phenomenon. G/C found valve F006 to be "briefly" susceptible to pressure locking caused by feedwater system depressurization, but recommended no corrective action for the condition. PP&L's calculation of motor-actuator capability concluded that the valve was able to overcome this "transient" form of pressure locking. The stated purpose of the third study (SEA-ME-344) was to ensure that all of the concerns contained in IERP 84187 had been addressed. However, PP&L focused its efforts on the susceptible valves identified in the G/C report and did not verify that the report's design inputs and assumptions encompassed all of the pressure-locking
12 mechanisms discussed in the 1984 industry report. The licensee overlooked the susceptibility of injection valve F006 notwithstanding the consideration of TIPL with respect to steam supply valves. Based on the three studies, the licensee closed EWR M00265 and GE SIL 368. The inspector concluded that PP&L had been familiar with the TIPL mechanism, but missed the opportunity to identify the susceptibility of the HPCI injection valves as a result of incomplete review of the G/C study. In December 1992, PP&L completed an evaluation of an industry operating experience report concerning overpressurization of isolated feedwater system piping during plant heatup. In the study, the licensee noted that three feedwater system isolation valves at Susquehanna had experienced TIPL and had been modified in 1990. The report also documented that the HPCI system injection valves were subject to TIPL due to their proximity to hot feedwater system piping. Recognizing that the potential for "liquid entrapment heatup overpressurization" of the HPCI system injection valves had not been addressed, PP&L initiated EWR H28225 to reopen the earlier pressure-locking studies. The inspector found that the licensee did not consider susceptibility of the injection valves to TIPL to be safety significant in 1992,. based on informal and undocumented engineering judgement. Factors that underlay the licensee's judgement included: (1) successful valve operation during startup testing and events early in plant life, (2) lack of maintenance problems attributable to valve bonnet overpressurization, (3) expected (though unquantified) valve seat leakage, and (4) an air pocket in the valve bonnet caused by valve orientation and local leak rate testing. Thus, PP&L focused its engineering resources on resolving the pressure-locking concern for the susceptible valves identified by G/C. In October 1993, PP&L closed EWR H28225, based on plans to perform a "global" revision of earlier studies under its GL 89-10 HOV program; TIPL and other program revisions were deferred pending issuance of additional generic guidance by the NRC. The NRC published Supplement 6 of GL 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," on March 8, 1994. In the Supplement, the NRC provided examples of unacceptable reasons for eliminating gate valves from consideration of pressure locking, including: (1) lack of event occurrence at a specific plant, (2) valve leak rate, and (3) engineering judgement without justification. The licensee did not document a determination HPCI system injection valve operability following issuance of the GL supplement. The inspector concluded that the licensee's approach to valve F006 operability had been inconsistent with information contained in GL 89-10. NRC information notices (IN) issued on February 28, 1995 (IN 95-14); March 15, 1995 (IN 95-18); and March 31, 1995 (IN 95-18, Supplement 1); discussed thermally-induced pressure locking of containment sump recirculation and safety injection system valves, respectively, at pressurized water reactors. On April 26, 1995, the NRC issued in the Federal Register a draft of GL 95-07, "Pressure Locking And Thermal Binding Of Safety-Related Power- Operated Gate Valves," for public comment. In response to these publications, PP&L revisited the TIPL issue, beginning with the HPCI system injection valves. In November 1995, the licensee concluded that entrapped air may not
13 prevent valve bonnet overpressurization or TIPL during plant heatup. A condition report was initiated on November 10, 1995, to evaluate valve operability, and the licensee made plans to stroke valve F006 to demonstrate operability and to vent potential excess pressure from the valve bonnet. However, during subsequent unplanned outage at Unit 1, the licensee decided to modify the HPCI system injection valves to eliminate the pressure-locking concern. While implementing the modification, the licensee discovered the damage to valve F006. The inspector reviewed the root cause analysis contained in licensee Condition Report 95-682. PPSL concluded that valve F006 had been designed (and maintained) to be a leak-tight pressure boundary and that no provisions,had been made in the original design for pressure relief or equalization. Earlier pressure-locking screenings had been inadequate in that not all pressure- locking mechanisms and contributors had been well understood by PP&L at that time. Consequently, valve F006 was not identified as being susceptible to TIPL until the criteria contained in GL 95-07 were provided. The licensee drilled pressure relief holes in the reactor side disk of the Unit 1 HPCI injection valve and implemented compensatory measures to preclude TIPL of the corresponding Unit 2 valve pending an outage of suitable duration. The inspector reviewed PP&L study EC-VLV-1003, "Generic Letter 95-07 Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding Screening and Susceptibility Evaluation Guidelines." The study contains guidance for evaluation of TIPL, including: (1) proximity to heat sources, (2) valve heatup via bypass warmup pathways, (3) ambient heat sources, (4) high energy line break heatup, and (5) valve orientation and mitigative effects of air/gas pockets. The adequacy of PP&L's actions regarding pressure locking and thermal binding of gate valves overall is under NRC review. However, the inspector concluded that the study's guidelines acceptably addressed the technical issues identified in the condition report. In CR 95-692, the licensee did not address additional factors that potentially contributed to the incomplete pressure-locking studies prior to 1992. For example, licensee IERP reviews closed certain industry notices concerning TIPL based on an inadequate previous evaluation, and the licensee did not independently review the assumptions and design inputs utilized by a contractor to screen safety-related valves for susceptibility to pressure locking. Finally, the licensee did not address the failure in 1992 to utilize formal quality assurance program processes to evaluate the operability of valve susceptible to TIPL. The inspector concluded that PP&L missed the opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of its IERP and vendor review programs in its causal analysis. The inspector concluded that, since November 1992, PP&L operated Susquehanna Unit 1 at power, based on inadequately-justified engineering judgement and without performing analytical calculations to verify the operability (under conditions conducive to TIPL) of HPCI system injection valve HV155F006. Failure to take adequate corrective action to preclude overpressurization and
14
pressure
locking of valve
F006 is
an apparent violation of 10
CFR 50, Appendix
8, Criterion XVI (Corrective Action), which requires that significant
conditions adverse
to quality be identified and corrected
promptly.
(EEI
96-03-06)'he
inspector
noted that the issue of untimely identification and correction
of valve bonnet overpressurization
also
may have applied to the
RCIC system
injection valves.
Susceptibility of these
valves to TIPL was not developed
fully during this inspection.
However, unlike the
HPCI injection valves,
these
valves
have
been
opened
on
a quarterly basis during inservice testing,
and
have exhibited
no indication of TIPL;
In addition, the inspector
anticipated that the licensee's
corrective actions to assure
HPCI injection
valve operability sufficiently addressed
similar concerns
regarding the
RCIC
injection valves.
5.3
Conclusions
The inspector identified two apparent violations of NRC requirements
involving
inoperability of the Susquehanna
Unit
1 HPCI system injection valve
(and
system)
due to pressure
locking and licensee failure to promptly identify and
correct the condition.
The licensee's
actions to prevent recurrence
did not
address
potential contributing causes
of the condition such
as
inadequate
review of vendor
and
NRC information and incomplete review of contracted
engineering
work.
6.0
REVIEW OF CONDITION REPORTS
6.1
Inspection
Scope
At the time of the inspection,
there were
450 open condition reports
(CR)s at
Susquehanna.
The inspector selected
three
CRs for in-depth review to assess
the effectiveness
of the licensee's
corrective actions.
The review was
focused
on the extent to which PP&L's actions reflected the design
and
licensing
bases
contained in the technical specifications
(TS)
and the final
safety analyses
rep'ort
(FSAR).
The following CRs were reviewed:
95-255, battery load profile discrepancies
96-09,
scram time surveillance test discrepancies
95-637,
seismic-monitoring
instrumentation operability
6.2
Observations
and Findings
The inspector
found that the licensee's
resolutions of CRs 95-255
and 96-09
adequately
addressed
the current plant licensing
bases for the applicable
systems.
On November 7,
1995,
the licensee initiated
CR 95-637 to document
discrepancies
concerning the location of seismic-monitoring
instrumentation
including:
15 FSAR Section 3.7.b.4. 1 and TS Table 3.3.7.2-1 state that seismic monitors are located on the containment foundations of both units. However, the seismic monitors are located only on the reactor building basemat. FSAR Sections 3.7.b.4. 1. 1 and 3.7.b.4. 1.4, and TS Table 3.3.7.2-1 state that a seismic monitor is located on nuclear boiler equipment or piping supports. However, the seismic monitor is located on an instrument channel support welded to the bio-shield wall. The licensee concluded that the seismic-monitoring instruments were operable, based on a qualitative assessment that the existing locations provide essentially the same or better information concerning plant response to a seismic event. The licensee's long-term corrective action plan includes relocation of instruments currently mounted on the reactor building floor to the containment basemat. The instrument located on the drywell bio-shield wall was to remain in its current location, and an FSAR update was planned to reflect this change. The inspector concluded that the licensee's operability evaluation did not reconcile the present instrument locations with existing technical specification (current licensing basis) requirements. In addition, the inspector considered the licensee's decision to retain the bio-shield instrument "as-is" to be a change in the facility as described in the FSAR. However, the licensee did not perform an unreviewed safety question determination per 10 CFR 50.59 to justify the change. The inspector found that the licensee system engineer was uncertain as to the applicability of 10 CFR 50.59 to the existing condition. As of the conclusion of the inspection on March 8, 1996, the licensee had not submitted a special report to the NRC regarding the mislocated, seismic- monitoring instruments. Further, the licensee had not performed an analyses per 10 CFR 50.59 to justify leaving the seismic instrument located on the bio- shield wall. The failure to submit a special report to the NRC or perform an analyses per 10 CFR 50.59 is an apparent violation. (EEI 96-03-07) 6.3 Conclusion The inspector identified a violation of TS operability and reporting requirements involving seismic-monitoring instruments. The licensee's operability ev'aluation of the monitors was technically reasonable, but did not address adequately the plant licensing basis. Finally, some licensee engineers were unclear regarding the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 for changes in the plant design basis.
16 7.0 SYSTEM ENGINEERING REVIEW 7.1 Inspection Scope The inspector evaluated the effectiveness of system engineering through review of the turbine building component cooling water (TBCCW) and standby gas treatment (SGT) systems. The insp'ection consisted of system walkdowns with the system engineers and review of the final safety analysis report (FSAR), procedures and test records, and industry operating experience. 7.2 Observations and Findings TBCCW The nonsafety-related TBCCW system was chosen for review on the basis of risk significance, as discussed in the Susquehanna individual plant examination report. Anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) sequences account for approximately 80K of the calculated core damage frequency. Loss of the TBCCW system is a dominant initiator for ATWS sequences due to its role in providing cooling to the control rod drive, condensate, and station air systems. The inspector walked down the accessible portions of the SGT and TBCCW systems. Housekeeping and material conditions were acceptable, and the systems were aligned properly in accordance with operating procedures. System status reports are prepared by the system engineers and presented annually to site managers. The inspector attended a presentation involving the reactor recirculation system and noted the attendance of senior level corporate managers. The TBCCW system status reports for 1994 and 1995 were reviewed. The reports were comprehensive; system reliability and performance trends, maintenance history, open item status, equipment deficiencies, maintenance strategies, and planned modifications and enhancements were discussed. TBCCW system pump vibration is monitored and trended by the licensee's vibration monitoring program, and the system engineer periodically reviews this information. The licensee collects data on the component drivers, which exceeds regulatory requirements. In addition, the licensee supplements routine vibration data with spectrum analysis when potential problems are identified. The inspector noted that the licensee had detected degrading TBCCW pump and motor performance in time to implement repairs prior to failure and concluded that the vibration monitoring program was effective. Heat exchanger performance also is monitored, and the system engineer was involved in efforts to provide a technical basis for cross-connecting the heat exchanger service water side to the operating unit in order to maintain cooling to station air system compressors during refueling outages.
17 SGT The inspector discussed PPSL's response to NRC Information Notice (IN) 88-76 with the SGT system engineer. The IN documented a condition at another nuclear facility in which the SGT system was not able to maintain the required negative pressure in the higher elevations of the secondary containment during cold weather. That facility's design, in which the differential pressure detectors were located at ground level, had not accounted for the temperature- induced difference in the vertical pressure gradients inside and outside of the reactor building. Since the SGT system differential pressure sensors at Susquehanna are located on the reactor building roof, the licensee concluded that the plant was not susceptible to this particular problem. The pressure differential created by different inside and outside air densities also contributes to reactor building in-leakage (stack effect), though this subtle effect is not discussed in the IN. The system engineer noted a possible connection between this phenomenon and a recent (November 1995) secondary containment drawdown surveil.lance test failure. The test had been performed on an unusually cold day and had failed ostensibly because of excessive in-leakage through a truck bay door. While the test was performed successfully following repairs to the door seal, the system engineer questioned the impact of stack effect on the technical specification (TS) acceptance criterion for secondary containment in-leakage. The inspector noted that the secondary containment transient analysis conditions contained in FSAR Table 6.2-17 assumed an outside air temperature of 92oF and agreed with the system engineer that the analysis may not have resulted in appropriate TS in-leakage limits. The system engineer discussed the issue with the corporate engineering staff and initiated an engineering work request to examine the potential problem. The inspector also reviewed several condition reports involving SGT system damper failures and secondary containment in-leakage pathways. The system engineer effectively communicated with the site maintenance and corporate engineering staffs to resolve the problems in appropriate and timely manner. 7.3 Conclusions The inspector found that the system engineers were knowledgeable regarding the design, operation, and status of their systems, and were instrumental in coordinating the efforts of site and corporate personnel to resolve deficiencies. Senior level managers were apprised of overall system performance and reliability through comprehensive status reports and presentations. The TBCCW system was maintained and .tested in a manner equivalent to a safety-related system and commensurate with its risk significance. The licensee's vibration-monitoring program was effective in detecting and correcting degraded TBCCW system pump performance.
,
18 8.0 TOUR OF PLANT AREAS The inspector toured various areas of the plant to assess overall plant cleanliness and material condition; Specific'reas examined included the emergency service water (ESW) pump house, the control structure and the reactor building, and a diesel generator room. The inspector concluded the plant areas were clean. Spare tools and equipment were properly stored; pipe leakage was minimal; and contained, stray combustible materials were not evident. The material condition of equipment in the ESW pumphouse was excellent. For example, no rust was noted on plant equipment, equipment-grounding straps on electrical components were properly secured, and few trouble reports were located on equipment. Based upon the plant tours, the inspector concluded the licensee had an effective housekeeping program. 9.0 (CLOSED) UNRESOLVED ITEN 95-01-01: Timeliness of post-modification updates to control room Class I drawings. The licensee's administrative procedures did not ensure that quality drawings in the control room were updated promptly to reflect plant modifications. The condition contributed to a "near miss" involving an inadequate equipment release form and blocking permit (safety tagout) for a control rod drive system pump. The licensee revised Nuclear Records Instruction No. RI-002, "Drawing Stick File Establishment and Maintenance," to require posting of drawing changes in the control room and work control center within 24 clock hours after receiving notice of receiving notice of modification closure. Also, the operational readiness form that is reviewed and signed off by operators prior to accepting a modified system was revised to identify the impact of modifications on issued and pending personnel safety permits. Although implementation of the revised .procedures was not verified directly, the inspector concluded that the new process was sufficient to ensure that control room drawings wHl be revised by the licensee in a timely manner. 10.0 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a manner contrary to the FSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the FSAR description. While performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspector reviewed the applicable portions of the FSAR (Chapters 3, 5, 6, 7, and 15) that related to the areas inspected. The inconsistencies between the FSAR descriptions and existing plant conditions that were noted during the inspection are discussed in Sections 4.3 (RWCU leak detection and isolation), 4.4 (SGT and RBR system single failures), and 6.2 (seismic-monitoring instrumentation) of this report.
19
11.0
HANAGEHENT HEETINGS
Licensee representatives
were informed of the purpose
and scope of the
inspection at entrance
meetings
conducted
on December
11,
1995,
and
Harch 4,
1996.
Findings were discussed
periodically with the licensee
throughout the course of the inspection.
I
The inspectors
met with the principals listed below to summarize preliminary
findings on December
15; 1995,
and Harch 8,
1996.
The licensee
acknowledged
the preliminary findings and conclusions with no exceptions taken.'he
bases
for the inspection conclusions
did not involve proprietary information,
and
none
was involved in this inspection report.
Penns lvania
Power
and Li ht
Com an
G. Jones,
Vice President
Nuclear Engineering
G. Kuczynski, Plant Hanager H. Palmer, Hanager -'Nuclear System Engineering G. Hiller, Hanager - Plant Services H. Simpson, Hanager -'uclear Technology R. Saccone, Hanager
Nuclear Hodifications
J. Kenny, Supervisor - Nuclear Licensing U. S. Nuclear Re ulator Commission E. Kelly, Chief, Systems Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) K. Kolaczyk, Reactor Engineer, DRS D. Dempsey, Reactor Engineer, DRS H. Banerjee, Sr. Resident Inspector - Susquehanna
I
Evc L..Z
NVREG-1600
I
General Statement of Policy
and Procedures for NRC
Enforcement Actions
Enforcement Policy
~nusetipt Completed: June 1995
e Published: July 1995
Office of Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
~A %COD
C
o
~y
nD
P'e
+~ +<a++
UNITED STATES . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlSSlON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-ooot IMPORTST NOTICE: REVISED NRC EmORCEMENY POX.rCV (NUREC-X6OO) On June 30, 1995, the Commission published a revised Enforcement Policy in the Federal Register (60 FR 34381) that became effective on that date. The Commission also announced that the Enforcement Policy was being removed from the Code of Federal Regulations where it has traditionally resided as Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 2 (60 FR 34380; June 30, 1995). The Policy is being published as NUREG-1600, "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," to provide widespread dissemination. This Policy applies to all NRC licensees, vendors, contractors, and their employees involved in NRC licensed activities. The revised Enforcement Policy is intended to: Emphasize the importance of licensees identifying violations before events occur or before NRC identification, Direct more NRC attention against licensees with multiple significant violations in a relatively short time period, ~ Place more emphasis on current performance, ~ Provide that licensees who lose radioactive sources and do not identify and report the, loss to the NRC will normally be subject to a civil penalty at least in the order of the cost for an authorized disposal or transfer to an authorized recipient, ~ Provide that enforcement actions only be issued for violations of more than minor significance, ~ Continue a trial program of conducting approximately 25 percent of predecisional enforcement conferences open for public observation, and ~ Utilize discretion to ensure that NRC sanctions provide the appropriate regulatory message. It should be noted that this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Commission may deviate from this statement of policy and procedure as appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case.. James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement Enclosure: NUREG-1600
Abstract
This
document
includes
the
U.S:
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission's
(NRC's or Commission's)
revised
General
Statement
of Policy
and
Procedure
for Enforcement
Actions
(Enforcement
Policy)
as it was
published
in the Federal
Register
on June
30,
1995
(60
FR 34381}.
This document also includes the notice announcing the removal of the
Enforcement
Policy
from
the
Code
of
Federal
Regulations
(60
FR 34380;
June
30,
1995).
The Enforcement Policy is
a general
statement of policy explaining the NRC's policies and procedures
in
'nitiating
enforcement
actions,
and of the presiding officers
and
the Commission in reviewing these actions.
This policy statement
is
applicable
to
enforcement
in matters
involving the
radiol'ogical
health
and safety of the public,
including employees'ealth
and
safety,
the common defense
and security,
and the environment.
This
statement of general policy and procedure is published
as NUREG-1600
to provide widespread dissemination of the Commission's
Enforcement
Policy.
However, this is
a policy statement
and not
a regulation.
The
Commission
may
deviate
from this
statement
of poli<y
a d
p ocedure
as
appropriate
under
the circumstances
of
a particular
r
n
case.
guestions
concerning
the Enforcement
Policy shou'Id
be directed to
the NRC's Qffice of Enforcement at 301-415-2741.
NUREG-1600
Abstract
~
~
~
I
~
~
j
~
~
~
~
~
~
1
~
~
~
~
~
Notice Announcing
Removal of the Enforcement Policy From
the Code of Federal
Regulations
.
Statements
of Consideration for RevisedEnforcement
'Poli
Revised
Enforcement Policy
Table of Contents
.
Preface
.
I.
Introduction and Purpose
II.
Statutory Authority
A.
Statutory Authority .
B.
Procedural
Framework
III. Responsibilities
IV.
Severity of Violations
.
A.
Aggregation of Violations
.
B.
Repetitive Violations
.
C.
Wil-lful Violations
D.
Violations of Reporting
Requirements
V.
Predecisional
Enforcement
Conferences
VI.
Enforcement Actions
.
A.
Notice of Violation .
B.
Civil Penalty
.
l.
Base CivH Penalty
2.
CivH Penalty Assessment
a.
Initial Escalated
Action
b.
Credit for Actions Related to Identifi
.c.
Credit for Prompt
and Comprehensive
Corrective Action
.
d.
Exercise of Discretion
cy
tion
ca
C.
Orders
D.
Related Administrative Actions
VII.
Exercise of Discretion
.
A.
Escalation of Enforcement
Sanctions
.
1.
Civil Penalties
.
2.
Orders
3.
Daily Civil Penalties
.
B.
Hitigation of Enforcement
Sanctions
.
1.
Licensee-Identified
Severity Level
IV Violation
2.
Violations Identified During Extended
Shutdowns
or Work Stoppages
.
3.
Violations Involving Old Design
Issues
4.
Violations Identified Due to Previous
Escalated
Enforcement Action
5.
Violations Involving Discrimination
.
6.
Violations Involving Special
Circumstances
C.
Exercise of Discretion for an Oper'ating Facility
VIII.
Enforcement Actions Involving Individuals
.
IX.
Inaccurate
and Incomplete Information
.
X.
Enforcement Action Against Non-Licensees
.
XI.
Referrals
to the Department of Justice
XII.
Public Disclosure of Enforcement Actions
.
XIII.
Reopening
Closed
Enforcement Actions
~
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~
~
2
3
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
7
7
7
7
8
9
9
9
9
9
12
12
13
14
14
14
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
16
16
16
16
16
17
19
19
20
20
20
NUREG-1600
Supplements
Supplement
Supplement
Supplement
.Supplement
Supplement
Supplement
Supplement
Supplement
I - Reactor Operations
.
II - Part
50 Facility Construction
.
III - Safeguards
.
IV Health Physics
(10.:CFR Part 20)
V Transportation
.
.
VI Fuel Cycle and Materials Operation
VII Miscellaneous
Matters
VIII Emergency
Preparedness
.
20
.
20
.
21
. 22
. 22
.
23
.
24
.
25
Rgure
Civil Penalty Assessment
Flowchart
.
.
. .'
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. ll
Tables
IA
Base Civil Penalties
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
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NVREG-1600
Vl
Friday June 30, 4995 Part Ill Nuclear Regulatory -- Commission 10 CFR Part 2 Enforcement Actions Policy and Procedure: Final Rule and Notice
d4810 ..:." -i.taderal Register "r'iOI.. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNSQON 10 CFR Part 2 Policy and Prooedure for Enforcement Actiona; Removal AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTIOff:Policy statement. %fwu ftY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is removing its General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy) from the Code of Federal Regulations because the Enforcement Policy is not a regulation. DATEs: This action is effective on June 30, 1995. Submit comments on or before hugust 14. 1995. Comments received after this date willbe considered ifit is practical to do so but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before this date. ADDRESSES: Send written comments to: The Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DC 20555. hTlN: Docketing and Service Branch. Hend deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike; Rockville. Maryland. between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm. Federal workdays. Copies ofcomments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 LStreet, NW, (Lower Level). Washington. DC. FOft FURTNER NFOfudATIOffCOKTACT: James l.ieberman. Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC 20555 (301) 415-2741. StippLEMENTARYNFofufATIoN:On May 13. 1994, the NRC's Executive Director . for Operations established a review teem to assess the NRC enforcement prograirI. The review team report, NUREG-1525. i "hssessment of the . ~ Copies ef NUIIEC-1525 rnsy be purcbeeed from the Supermtendenr oi Documents. UWCevwnmenr Printing Ofhce. P.O. 8ax 37042. Weshi ngron, DC 20013-1042. Copiee are eisa eeeliebie hem tbe Ner lane I Technicsl Inbrmeuon See>>los. $2aS Port lp 60,'>>o." 126.<<, Fridas'. June 30. '1995 NRC Enforcement Pr'ogram.- was published in hpril 1995. The team report. in Recommendation il.G-3, recommended that the Enforcement Policy be removed from the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) because the Enforcement Policy is not a regulation. The NRC Enforcement Policy has been codified at 10 CFR Part 2. hppendix C to provide widespread dissemination ofthe Commission's Enforcement Policy. However. after the Commission first published the Enforcement Policy on October 1, 1980 (<5 FR 66754). the Commission has maintained that the NRC Enforcement Policy Is a policy statement and not a IYrgulation. The Commission'8 reason for having a policy statement rather than a rule was explained in the Statement of Considerations that accompanied the publication ofthe 1982 Enforcement Policy. The Commission stated then: I ha underlying basis ofthis policy that is reflecte throughout it is that the determination of the appropriate sanction requires the exerctsa ofdtscret lors such that each enforcement actioa ts tailored to the petticlllar factual sltuatloiL IR view ofthrr discretion provided, the enforcement policy 'is being adopted as a statement ofgeneral policy rather than as ~ rcgutattoa, notwithstanding that the statement has beoa promulgated with aotfce and comment procedures. h general statement ofpolicy willpermit the Commission maximum flexibilitin revising the policy statement ~ad it ls expected that the statement, especially the supplement, willbe revised as necessary to reflect changes Ia policy aod direction af the Commissioa (4y FR 9989: Merch 9, 1992). For the same reasons, the Commission continues to hold the view that the Enforcement Policy is a policy statement. However. at least one court. in considering whether an enforcement policy was a policy statement or a regulation. noted that ifthe policy were published in the CFILitwould be properly treated as a regulation because the CFR is reserved for documents -having general applicability and legal Royal RoacL springfield. Virglnle 22281. h copy ls also erelieble for Inspection end copying for a iee In tbe NRC public Document ltoern. 2120 LStreet, Nw. ILower Leveli. washington. Dc 20sss-ecol. i Rules and'ag'ulaetions -. >> -'.":" qa.>>".;:. effect " (Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shel Oil Co.. 796 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. - 1986) citing44 U.S.C. 1510(1982 'herefore. because the Enforc Policy is not a regulation, the Commission is removing it from the Code of Federal Regulations. Revisions of the Enforcement Policy willcontinue to be published in the Federal Register To ensure widespread dissemination. the Enforcement Policy willbe provided to licensees, made available on an ~ electronic bulletin board. and published as NUREG-1600. "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement hctions." Paperwork Reduction hct Statement This policy statement contains no information collection requirements and, therefore. is not subject to the Paperwork Reduction hct of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). LiatofSubjects in 10 CFR Part 2 hdministrative praalce and procedure, hntitrust. Byproduct material, Classifie information. Environmental protection. Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalties. Sex discrimination, Source material. Special nuclear material; Waste treatment and disposal. PART 2RULES OF PRACTICE DOMESTIC UCENSINQ PROCEE AND ISSUANCE OF ORDERS 1. The authority citation for part 2 continues to read, in part. as follows: hutbocfty: Secs. 161. 181 ~ 68 Stat. 948. 953, as amended (42 VS.C 2201 ~ 2231): sec. 191. as emended. Pub. I 82-615. 76 Stat. 409 (42 US.C 2241): eec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242. es emended (42 U.S.C 5841)' e Appendix C to Port 2 (Removed j 2. hppendix C to Part 2 is removed. Dated at Rockville, MD. this 23rd day of luae. 1995. For the Nuclear Regulatory Conunission. Jobss C. Heyie. Secrrrrary offire Cornrnission. (FR Doc. 95-15951 Filed 6-2~5: 8:45 aml ~abase COOa ~SW
vs r-'Fedori('.Keg(ster I, Vol:"60. No, 126 I. Frtdav Jucte 30,'995 1"Notices...""'4381 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMSSION 'eton of tho NRC Enfarcomont tcy ANNOY:Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTtOK: Policy statement. RlggggnRY: hs a result af an assessment ofthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) enforcement program, the NRC has revised its General Statement of Policy and Pccscoduro for Enforcement hcttons (Enforcecnent Palicy or Poticy). By a separate action published today tn the Federal Reyster. the Commission is removing the Enfaccomont Policy from the Code of Federal Regulatians. OATE52 This action is effect tvo orf'Juno 30. 1995. while comments aro being rocotvod. Submit comments on or before hugust 14. 1995. hdditionally. the Commission intends to provide an apportuntty for public comments after this revised Enforcement Policy has been in a)feet forabout 16 months. ADDRESSES: Send written comments to: The Secretary ofthe Commission, U.S. Nuclear Rogulatary Commtsston. Washington, DC 20555. hTTN: Docketing and Service Branch. Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockvillo o. Rackvillo, Maryland. between 7:45 and 4:15 pm, Federal workdays. ies ofcomments received may be examined at tho NRC Public Document Room. 2120 LStieot, NW. (Lower Lovel). Washington. DC. FOR FURTHER tKFORggATlOK COKTACTt James Lioberman. Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DC 20555, (301) 415-2711. IUPPt.Egcf KTARYIKFDRMATtoK:On May 13, 1994, the NRC's Executive Director for Operations established a review toom to assess the NRC enfaccemont program. In its report (NUIIEG-1525.s "hssossmont of the NRC Enfoccomont Program," hpril 5. 1995), tho covtow team concluded that the existing NRC ~nforcoment program, as implemented. is appropriately directed toward supporting the agency's overall safety mission. This conclusion is.reflected in sovoraI aspocts of the program: ~ The Policy cecosnizes that violations have differing degrees of safety significance. 'npiea 0( NUREG-2 525 may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents. US.'Covenunent Printing Oface. htail Stop SSOP. Washington. DC zoe02-922L Copies are also available from the Ctationat Technical tnformatfon Service. 5255 Port al Road. Springfi~id. Virginia 221st. A copy is vailabl ~ for inspection and copying for a fee RC Public Document Room. 2l20 t. Streeh wer Leveli, 'Washington. OC 20555-0001. As reflected in the severity levels. safety significance includes actual safety consequence, potential safety consequence, and regulatory significance. The use of graduated sanctions fram Notices of Violation to orders further cettects the varying seriousness of noncontpliances. ~ The enfoccecnent conference is an icnportant step in achieving a cnutual understanding of facts and issues before making significant enforcement decisions. Although these conferences take time and effort for both the NRC and licensees. they generally contribute to better decision. making. ~ Eafoccemerit actions deliver regulatory messaftes pco peciy focused on safety. These cnessattcs emphasize the need for licensees to identify and coccect violations. to address the coat causes. and to be responsive to initial opportunities to identify and prevent violations. ~ The use ofdiscretion and ludftcnont 'hroughout the deliberative process recognizes that enforcement ofNRC requirements does not leod ttsetf to mechanistic treatment. However. the Rovteesr Team found that the oxisting enforcement program at times provided mixed regulatory messages to licensees. and room for impravom'ent existed in the 'nforcement Policy. The review suggested that the program's focus should be clarified to: ~ Emphasize the importance ofidentifying pcobiecns before events occur. and of taking prompt. comprehensive corrective action when problems ace tdeattfrect: ~ Olcoct afteacy attentton at licensees with multiple enforcement actfons toa relatively short period: and ~ Focus on current pecfoccnance of licensees. In addition. the review team found that the process for assessing civil penalties could be simplified to improve the predictability ofdecision-making and obtain better consistency between regions. hs a result'af its review. the review team made several recommendations to revise the NRC Enforcecnont Policy to produce an onfoccomont program with c!oaror regulatory focus and more predictability. The Commission is issuing this policy statement after considering those recommendations and the bases for them in NUREG-1525. The mote stgniticant changes to the cutTont Enforcement Policy are doscribod below: L Introduction and Purpose This section has been modNod to emphasize that the purpose and objectives ofthe enfarcomont program ace focused on using onfarcemont actions: (1) hs a deterrent to emphasize the importance of compliance with requirements: and (2) To encourage prompt identification and prompt. comprehensive correction of violations. IV.Severity ofUto)attons Severity Level V violations have been eliminated. The examples at that level have been withdrawn fram the supplements. Formal enforcement actions willnow only be taken for violations categorized at Severity Level, I to IVto bettor focus the inspection and enforcement process on safety. To the extent that minor violations acts described in an inspection report. they willbe labeled as Nan&tted Violations (NCVs). When aJicensooatoes nat take correct tvo act ton ar repeatedly or willfullycommits a minor violation such that a formal response would be needed. the vtolatian should be categorized at least at a Severity Level IV. The NRC staff willbe reviewing the severity level examples tn the supplements ovor tho next 6 months. The purpose ofthis review is to ensure the examples are appropriately focused on safety significance. including consideration ofactual safety consequence. potential safety consequence. and cegulatocy significance. V. Predectstanat Enforcement Conferences Enforcement canforonces are being renamed "prodocisional enforcement conferences." These conferences should be held for the purpose ofahtaining information to assist NRC in making enforcement decisions when the agency reasonably expects that escalated enforcement actions willresult. They should also normally be held if requested by a licensee. In addition they should normally be held before issuing an ocdor or a civilpenalty to an unlicensed individual. In light af the changes to the Enforcement Policy, the Commission has decided to continua a trial program af conducting approximately 25 percent ofottgtbto conferences open to public observation pending further evaluation. (Seo 57 FR 30762; July 10, 1992, and 59 FR 36796; July 19, 19rH). The intent of open conferences ts not to maximize public attendance. but is rather for determining whether providing the public with an opportunity to observe the regulatory process is compatible with the NRCs ability to exercise its regulatory and safety responsibilities. The provisions of the trial program have been incorporated into tho Enforcemcnt Policy.
34382,'-",~~%i';.;:::.".;-",'- Federal Rcgistcic $;:Vol. 60,'. No. '126',-',/,. Fiiday'".Junc".30<<'i1995 I'o'ticcs -'T:"..:"".Pi "Q%+' ' Vl. Eaforccmcat Actions A. Notice of Violation This section was'modified to clarify . that the NRC may waive all or portions' of a licensee's written response to a Notice ofViolation to the extent ~,relevant information has already bein provided to the NRC in writing or documented in an NRC inspection rc~mrt and is on the applicable docket in the NRC Public Document Room. 8. CivilPenalty I 1. Base CivilPenalty Tables 1A and 1B have been revised. In Table 1B the percentage forSeverity Level IVviolations has been deleted . since such violations willnot be subject to civil penalties. Ifa violation that would otherwise be categorize at a Severity Level IVviolation merits a civil penalty because ofits significance. the violation would normally be catcgoriacd at a Severity Level III. Table lAhas been simplified to combine categories of licensees with the same base penalty amounts. The base penalty amounts have generally remained unchanged. The revised policy notes that the base penalties may be adjusted on a case4y~se basis to reflect the ability to pay and the gravity ofthe violation. 10 CFR Part 35 licensees (doctors. nuclear pharmacies, and other medical related licensees) are combined into an overall medical category. based on the similarity of hanuds. Because transportation violations for all licensees are primarily concerned with the potential for personnel exposure to radiation. the violations in this area willbe treated the sama as those in thc health, physics area. The $100.000 base civilpenalty amount for safcguards violations. which applies to only two categories of licensees. fuel fabricators and independent fuel and monitored retrievable storage installations, has been deleted. The penalty amount for safcguards should be the same as for other violations at these facilities. NRC has not had significant safeguards violations at these facilities. Ifthe penalty that would normally be assessed for operational violations is not adequate to address the circumstances of the violation. then discretion would be used to determine the eppropriate penalty amount. ~ The base civilpenalty for "other" materials licensees. cunently set at $1000. has been increased to $5000. The primary concerns for these licensed activities are individual radiation 'exposure and loss of control of material to the environment. both of which %w l warrant a more financially meaningful penalty. A$500 civilpenalty for a Severity Level IHviolation (at 50% of the Severity Level Ibase amount) does not'reflect the seriousness ofthis type ofviolation forthis category of'licensee. It ls noted that withthe revised assessment approach, these licensees willnot normally receive a civilpenalty ifpmmpt and comprehensive corrective action is taken for isolated non-willful Severity Level IIIviolations. 2. CivilPenalty Assessment This section has been renamed to reflect that the pmcess for assessing civilpenalties has been substantially changed. The revised pmccss is intended to: ~ Continue to emphashecompliance in a manner that deters future violations: ~ Encourage prompt identification and prompt. comprehensive conection ofviolations and their root causes; ~ Applythe recognition ofgood past performance to give credit to a licensee committing a non-willfulSL III violation who has had no previous significant violations during the past 2 years or 2 inspections (whichever is longer); ~ Place greater attention on situations ofgreater concern (i.e., where a liceasee has had more than one significant violation in a 2-year or two-inspection period, where corrective action Is less than prompt and comprehensive. or where egregious circumstances. such as'here it is clear that repetitiveness or willfulness, are involved) ~ Streamline the NRC decisional process in a manner that willpreserve judgment and discretion, but will provide a clear normative standard and produce relatively predictable results for routine cases; and ~ Provide clear guidance on applying fewer adjustment factors in various types of cases. in order to increase consistency and predictability. Once a violation has been categorize at a Severity Level IIIor above, the assessment process considers four basic decisional points: (1) Whether the licensee has had a previous escalated enforcement action during Ihe past 2 years or past 2 inspections. whichever is longer, (2) Whether the licensee should be given credit for actions related to identification: (3) Whether the licensee's corrective actions may reasonably be considered prompt and comprehensive; and (4) Whether. in view of all the circumstances. the case in question warrants the exercise of discretion. As described in the Enforcement Policy. ascii of these decisional points m ' have several associ'ated considerations for any g.ven ~. How'ever. the '"'utcome of a case. absent the exe discretion, is limited to th~ rc civilpenalty. a base civilpenalty base civilpenalty escalated by 100~ D. Related hdministrotivc Actions .. The refereace to related administrative mechanisms have been replaced with related administrative actions to cIarify the documents as aetio as. VILExaniaa oFDiscretion The ability to exercise discretion is preserved with the revised policy. Discretion is provided to deviate from the normal approach to either increase or decrease sanctIons where necessary to ensure that the sanction reflects the significance ofthe circumstances and conveys the appropriate regulatory message. This section has been modifiec to provide examples where it is appmpriate to consider civilpenalties or escalate civilpenalties notwithstanding the normal assessment process in Section VIofthe Enforcement Poficy. One significant example to note involves the loss of a source. This example Is being added to, emphasize the importance of licen being aware ofthe location of the'oumcs and to recognize that the should not be an economic advan for inappropriate disposal or transfer. As to mitigation ofsanctions foi ~ violations involvingspecial circumstances, mitigation can be 'considered ifthe licensee has demonstrated overaH~stained perfonnance which has been particularly,good. The levels ofapprov: for exercising discretion are described in this section. Finally. Table 2. "Examples ofProgressions of Escalated Enforcement Actions for Similar Violations in the Same ActivityArea Under the Same License," has been withdrawn from the Enforcement Poficy. The guidance in that table is nc needed because the policy is clear that each case should be judged on its own merits, especially those repetitive violation cases to which the table appliecL VIII.Eaforccmcat Actions Involviag Individuals The Enforcement Policy has been, clarificd to pmvide that some action i. normally to be taken against a licensee for violations caused by significant aci of wrongdoing by its employees. contractors, or contractors cmpl The Policy lias also been modi state that the nine factors in Sc
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- ": '-.:,-';-..:..: '.'..'...'".::"'":.Medial'Register.'iol:. 60i'Ncr.-126 -( Ftida)I tutie 30."199Y I 'IOtlceg
" " '43 j3 ~ ~ ( ~ ~ should be used to assist in the decision on whether enforcement action should ~ bfrtaken, against an unlicensed ~ ~ ~ ~ 'ndividual as well as the licensee. The olicy curgently uses these factors to detefmfne whether to take enforcement action against an unlicensed person rather than the licensee. These changes are consistent withthe intent ofthe Commission in promulgating the rule on defiberate misconduct (56 FR <066<. 40666. hugust 15. 1991). Less I significant cases may be treated as an NCV under Section VH.B.1. h Letter of Reprimand!s not a sanction and Is now referred to as an administrative action consistent with Section VLDofthe Policy. The Commission expects that the changes to the Enforcement Policy should result in an increase in the protection ofthe public health and safety by better emphasizing the prevention. detection. and correction of violations before events occur with impact on the public. ln about 2 years the Commission intends to review the Enforcement Policy. ln that regard, it is expected that ln about 18 months an opportunity willbe provided to receive public comments on the implementation ofthis Policy. General Statement ofPolicy and ure for NRC Enforcement ctions abte oCCoaf eats Preface I. Inueductioa and Purpose II.Statutory Authorit A. Statutory Authority B. Procedural Framework IILRcsponsfbfiitfes IV.Scvort ty ofViolations A. Aggregation of Violations B. Repetitive Violations C. WillfulViolations D. Violations of Reporting Rcquiscmenfs V. Predocisional Enforcement Confercaces VI. Enforccmcnt Actions A. Nofice af Violation B. Civil Penalty t. Base CivilPenalty 2. Civil Penalty Assessment a. Initial Escalated Actfoo b. Credit for Actions Ratated to Identificaffon c. Credit for Pfoffspt and Comprehensive Cormctlve Action cL Exesclso of Disaetian C Orefcrs D. Relatecf Administrative Actions VII.Exercise of Disaefion A. Escalation ofEnforcement Sanctions t. CivilPenalties 2. Orders 3. Daily Civil Penalties B. Mitigation of Knforccmcof Sanctions 1. Licensee.identified Severity Level IV Violations 2, Violations Idcnfificcf During Extended Shutdowns or IVork Stoppages 3. Violations InvolviagOld Design Issues <. Vlotatioas Idcntffied Due to Pre<tous Escalated Enfofcemeat Action 5. Violations involving Discrtfnlnation 6. Violations InvolvingSpecial CIrcumstanCcs C Exercise ofDiscretion foraa Operating Facility VIILEnforcement Actions Involving Individuals IX. Inaccurate and Incomplete Infonaatioa X. Enforcement Action Against Non- Lfcensees XI. Referrals to the Department of lustice XII.Public Disclosure ofEaforcemeat Actions XIILRoopeaiag Cloeed Eafoccasneet Actions Supplements Preface The followingstatement ofgeneral policy and procedure explains the enforcement policy and procedures of the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) and the NRC staff (steff) in initiating enforcement actions. and ofthe presiding officers and the Commission in reviewing these actions. This statement ls applicable to enforcement in matters involvingthe radiological Wealth and safety ofthe public, including employees'ealth and safety. the common defense and security, and'he environment.s This statement of general policy and procedure willbe published as NUREC-1600 to provide widespread dissemination ofthe Commission's Enforcement Policy. However, this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Commission may deviate from this statement ofpolicy and procedure as appropriate under the circumstances ofa particular case. L introduction and Purpose The purpose of the NRC enforcement program is to support the NRC's overall safety mission in protecting the public and the environment, Consistent with that purpose. enforcement action should be used: ~ hs a deterrent to emphasize the Importance ofcompliance with requirements. and e To encourage prompt identification and prompt. comprehensive correction of violations. Consistent with the purpose ofthis program. prompt and vigorous enforcement action willbe taken when dealing with licensees. vendors,a contractors, and their employees, who do not achieve the necessary meticulous attention to detail and the high standard ~ hnlifsusf enforcement mauers willbe cfealt with ou a cassidy~ basIs. s The senn "vendot- as used in thIs policy means a supplier af pcoducss or services lo be used in an ICRC licensed facilityor aaivhy, ofcompliance whiqh the NRC expects.e Each enforcement action is dependent on the circumstances ofthe case and. requires the exercise ofdiscretion alter consideration ofthese policies and rocedures. ln no case. however, will 'censees who cannot achieve and maintain'adeqtgate levels ofprotection be permitted to conduct licensed activities. KStatutory huthority and Procedural Framework r h. Statutory hufhority The NRCs enforcement jurisdictio is drawn from the htomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended. and the Energy Reorganization hct (ERA)of1974. as demanded. Section 161 ofthe htomic Energy hct authorizes the NRC to conduct inspections and lnvesti'gations and to Issue orders as may be necessary or ! desirable to promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property. Section 166 authorizes the NRC to revoke licenses under certain circumstances (e.g., for material'false statements. in response to conditions that would have warranted refusal of a license on an original application. for a licensee's failure to build or operate a facilityin accordance with the terms of the permit or license, and for violation ofan NRC regulation). Sectiofr 234 authorizes the NRC to impose civil penalties not to exceed $100,000 per violation per day for the violation of certain specified licensing provisions of the hct. rules. orders. and license terms implementing these provisions, and for violations for which licenses can be revoked. ln addition to the enumerated provisions in section 234, sections 84 and 147 authorize the imposition of civilpenalties for violations of regulations implementing those provisions. Section 232 authorizes the NRC to seek injunctive or other equitable relief for violation of T latory requirements, 'on 206 ofthe Energy 'eorganization hct authorizes the NRC to impose civilpenalties for knowing and conscious failures to provide certain safety information to the NRC. Chapter 18 ofthe htomlc Energy hct provides for varying levels ofcriminal 'This policy prfcuasfly addresses the acuvhiee of ffRC Ifcensees and applicants for HRC licenses. Thecefcue. she teaa "llceusee" ls used throughout she polfcy. However, In!hose cases whece (he NRC decscmiaes that It Is appcuprfate to fake ~nfoccemeaf aaioa agafusl a non licensee or individual. the guidance In this polfcy willbe used. as applicable. SpecIAc guidance segacding eufomeuMaf aaioa againss individuals and uou~ licensees is addressed iu Sections VIIIand X. ccspcaivrly.
"" 34384 .'::. ~:"-..-'s,"'>" Federal RciPstcr.-..l: Val',-'60,No';: 126. I, Fridavi":tunes'30':. 1995".I'gatlccs:~,";.'-<;".~~r~<"4k~ .' J' ~ pcnaltics (i.e.'. mpnet'aiy fines and , imprisonment) forwillfulviolations of the hct and regulations or orders issued under sections 65. 161(b). 161(i), or . 161(o) oftho hct. Section 223 provides ~ that criminal penalties may bo imposed on certain individuals employed by 'irms constructing or supplying basic components ofany utilizatlon facilityif the individual knowingly and willfully violates NRC requirements such that a ba1lc component could be significantly impaired. Section 235 provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who interfere with inspectors. Section 236 provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who attempt to or cause sabotage at a nuclear facilityar to nuclear fuel. Alleged or susp'ected criminal violatians ofthe Atomic Energy hct are refetred to the Department ofJustice for appropriate action. 8. Pr'acedural Framework Subpart B of 10 CFR part 2 ofNRCs regulations sets forth the procedures the NRC uses in-exercising its enforcement authority. 10 CFR 2.201 sets forth the procedures for issuing notices of . violation. The procedure to be used! n assessing civilpenalties is set forth.in 10 CFR 2.205. This regulation provides that the civilpenalty process is initiated by issuing a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a CivilPenalty. The licensee or other person is provided an opportunity to contest in writingthe proposed imposition ofa civil penalty. biter evaluation ofthe response, the civil penalty may be mitigated, remitted. or imposed. An opportunity is provided for a hearing ifa civil penalty is Imposed. Ifa civil penalty is not paid followinga hearing or ifa hearing is not requested. the matter may be referred to the U.S. Department of Justice to institute a civilaction in District Court. The procedure for issuing an order to institute a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke a license ar to take other action against a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission is set forth in 10 CFR 2.202. The licensee or any other person. adversely affected by th'e order may request a hearing. The NRC is authorized to make orders immediately effective ifrequired to protect the public health. safety. or interest, or ifthe violation is willful.Section 2.204 sets- out the procedures for issuing a Demand for Information (Demand) to a licensee or other person subject to the Commission's jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether an order or other enforcement action should be issued. The Demand does not 81 1, ~ - provide hearing rights. as only information is being sought. A licensee .must answer a Demand. An unlicensed '- person may answer a Demand by either providing the requested information or explaining why the Demand should not have been issued, III.Responsibilities The Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and the principal cnfarccmcnt ,-officers ofthe NRC. the Deputy
- ,Executive Director far Nuclear Material
Safety. Safcguards and Operations Support (DEDS) and thc Deputy Executive Director for Nuc)ear Reactor Regulation. Regional Operat tons, and Research (DEDR). have been delegated the authority to approve or issue all escalated enforcement actIons.'he DEDS is responsible to the EDO for the NRC enforcement programs. The OAice ofEnforcement (OE) exercises oversight ofand implements the NRC enforcemcnt programs. The Director. OE, acts for the Deputy Executive Directors in enforcement matters in their absence or as delegated. Subject to the oversight and direction ofOE. and with the approval of the appropriate Deputy Executive Director. where necessary. the regional'oflicos normally issue Notices ofViolation and proposed civil penalties. However. subject to the same oversight as the regional offices, the Oflice ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Office ofNuclear Materiel Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) may also issue Notices af Violation and proposed civil penalties far certain activities. Enforcement orders are normally issued by a Deputy Executive Director or the Director. OE. However. orders may also be issued by the EDO. especially those, involving the more significant matters. The Directors ofNRR and NMSS have also been delegated authority to issue orders, but it is expected that normal use of this authority by NRR and NMSS willbe conlined to actions not associated with compliance issues. The Director. Oflice of the Controller, has been delegated the authority to issue orders where licensees violate Commission regulations by nonpayment of license and inspection fees. In recognition that the regulation of nuclear activities in many cases does not lend itself to a mechanistic . treatment. judgment and discretion must be exercised in determining the severity levels of the violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions. 'he Iran -escalated ento ream en t action- as used in ihls policy means a riottee ol Violation or civilpenaliy Ior any Severity Level i. 0. or III violation lor probieml or any order based upon a violation. including thedccisipn to issue a Not ofViolation, pr tp p+pQ5Q pr I civilpenalty and the amount of penalty. after considering the g Prin IP)cs afthis statement of and the technical significance pfthc violations and the surrounding circumstances. Unless Commission consultation or notification is oui~ by this policy the staff may depait. where warranted ir. the public's Interest. from this policy as provided in Section VII Exercise of Enforcement Discretion." The . Commission willbe provided written notification af all enforcement actions involvingcivilpenalties or orders. The 'Commission willalso be provided notice in those cases where discretion is exercised as discussed in Section VII.B.6.In addition. the Commission willbe consulted prior to taking action in the followingsituations (unless the urgency ofthe situation dictates immediate action): (1) hn action affecting a licensee's operation that requires balancing the public health and safety or common defense and security implications of not operating with the potential radiological or other hazards associated with continued operation: (2) Proposals to impose civil penalties in amounts greater than 3 times th Severity Level I values shown in 1A: (3) hny proposed enforcement ac that involves a Severity Level I v1olition; (4) hny enforcement action that involves a finding ofa material false statement: (5) Execcisiagdisaetipn formatters meeting the criteria of Section VII.A.1 for Commission consultation; (6) Refraining from taking i enforcement action for matters meeting the criteria ofSection VII.8.2: (7) hny proposed enforcemcnt action that involves the issuance of a civil penalty or order to an unlicensed ~ individual or a civilpenalty to a licensed reactor operator. (8) hny action the EDO believes warrants Commission involvement: (9) hny proposed enforcement case involving an Office of Investigation (OI) report where the staff (other than the OI , stafO does.not arrive at the same conclusions as those in the OI report concerning issues of intent ifthe Director of OI concludes that Commission consultation is warranted: and (10) hny proposed enforcement action on which the Commission asks to be consulted.
Irs ,"=;-', Federal Re)pstcT i VQL 60. No. 126 I Friday, Juno 30; f,Q95 / Notices IV.Severity ofVlo4tiona Regulatory requirements s have ~ ' varying degrees of safety, safeguards. or environmental significance, Therefore, the relative importance ofeach violation. indudlng both the technical significance and the regulatory significance is evaluated as the Grst step in the enforcement procesL Consequently. for purposes of formal enforcement. action. violations are normally categorized in terms of four levels of severity to show their relative importance within each ofthe following eight activity areas: L Reactor Opetaf)onr. il. Fee))lty Coaatrucffoa: )li. Safeffuards: ~ IV. Health Phys)on V. Trans portaf faa: VLFuel Cyc)e and Maferia)a Qfsacaf)oas: Vli.Mfeca )aaeous Matters: and Vlii.Emer))ency Pra paredaesa Licensed activities willbe placed in the activity area most suitable in light of the particular violafion involved including activities not cUrectiy covered by one of the above listed areas, e.g.. export Ucanse activities. Withineach activity area, Severity Level I has been assigned to violations that are the most significant and Severity Level IV violations are the least significant. Severity Level I and II~lations are of very significant regulatory conoarn. In general, violations that are included in these severity categories involve actual . or high potential impact on the public. Severity Level IIIviolations are cause for significant regulatory concern. Severity Level IVviolations are less serious but are ofmore than minor concern: i.e.. iflait uncorrected, they could lead to a more serious concern. The Commission recognizes that there are other violationa of minor safety or environmental concern which are below the level ofsignificance ofSeverity Level IVviolations. These minor violations are not the subject of formal enforcement action and are not usually described in inspection reports. To the extent such violations are describe, they are noted u Non<(ted Violations.e Comparisons ofsignificance between activity areas are inappropriate. For example, the immediacy ofany hazard to the public associated with Severity Level I violations in Reactor Operations is not directly comparable to that associated with Severity Level I violations in Facility Construction. s The teem "requirement" u used In fhLpolicy means a legally bfadfag requirement such as ~ scacuce. reguLcfoa. license condition. cochnlcal speciflcaclon. or order. ~ A faan4ftod Vioiation fHCV)is a violacloa ihaf has oot been locmallsed faro ~ 10 cFR 1.10f Notice f VioLCian. Supplements Ithraugh Villprovide exa'mples and serve as guidance ln determining the appropriate severity ~ level for violations in each ofthe eight activity areas. However, the examples are neither exhaustive nor controlUng. In addition. these examples do not czeate new requirements. Each is designed to illustrate the significanc that the NRC places on ~ particular type ofviolation ofNRC requiremantL Eich ofthe examples in the supplements is predicated on a violation ofa regulatory uirement. e NRC reviews each case being considered for enforcement action on its own merits to ensure that the severity of a violation is characterized at the level best suited to the significince ofthe particular violation. In some cases, special dfcumstances may warrant an adjustment'to the severity level categorization. A. Aggregation ofViolations Agroup ofSeverity Level IV violations may be evaluated in the aggregate and assigned a single, increased severity level, thereby resulting in a Severity Level IIIproblem, ifthe violations have the same underlying cause or programmatic deficiencies, or the violations contributed to or were unavoidable consequences ofthe underlying problem, Normally, Severity Level II and IIIviolations are not aggregated into a higher severity level. The purpose of aggregating violations is to focus the Ucensee's attention on the fundamental underlying causes for which enforcement action appears warranted and to reflect the fact that several violations with a common causa may be more significant collectively than individuallyand may therefore. warrant a more substantial enforcement action. 8. Repetitive Violofions The severity level ofa Severity Level IVviolation may be increased to Severity Level IQ, ifthe violation can be considered a repetitive violation v The purpose ofescalating the severity level of a repetitive violation is to acknowledge the added significance of the situation based on the Ucensee's failure to implement effective corrective action for the previous violation. The decision to escalate the severity level of 'The cerca-cepeclflre vfolsuon" ar "similar vfohcfoa" as used ln this policy statement caoans a vloLclon char reasoaabiy could have boon . prevented by a ikeasoo's corrective sccloa for a pervious vtolaiioa nanna) lyoccurring if)within the past 1 years ofibe Inspecclon ac issue. or i1) che 'period wlchln the last cwa inspections. whichevoc ~ L longer. a repetitive violation willde pand on.the circumstances, such as. but not limited to, the number ofthaes the violation has occurzed, the similarityofthe violations and their toot causes. the adequacy of previous corrective actions, the period of time between the violations, and the significance ofthe violations. C WillfidViolatioffs Willfulviolations are by definition of i particular concern to the Commission ) because its reguhtofy program is based ! on Ucensees and their contractors, employees. and agents acting with
- integrity and con1municating with
candor. Willfulviobftions cannot be tolerated by either the Commission or a licensee. Licensees are expected to take significant remedial action in responding to willfulviolatibns commensurate with the circumstances such that itdemonstrates the seriousness ofthe violation thereby creating a deterrent effect withinthe Ucansee's organization. hlfhough . removal ofthe person is not necessarily i required, substantial cUsciplinary action 's expected. Therefore, the severity level of a violation may be Increased ifthe drcumstances surrounding the matter involve careless disregard of uirements. decapfion. or other in cations ofwiUfulness. The term "wiBfulness" as used in thii policy embraces'a s pectrum ofviolations ranging from deUberate intent to vlf)late 'r falsifyto and induding careless disregard for requirements. Willfulness does not Indude acts which do not rise to the level ofcareless disregard; e.g., inadvertent clericil errors in a document submitted to the NRG In determining the spedfic severity level of a violation involving willfulness, consideration willbe given to such factors as the position and responsibiUties of the person involved in the violation (e.g., Uicensee officiala or non-supervisory employee). the significance ofany underlying violation. the intent ofthe violator (Le.. careless disregard or deUberataness), and the economic or other advantage, ifany, gained as a result ofthe violation. The te)ative weight given to each of these 'e The cecca "licensee ofdcfal" es used in chio policy scacecaoac cnoans ~ dcsc.line supervisor or abave. ~ Ikeasod individual. ~ rsdLclan safecy omcer. or an authorised u~ of licensed material wbechec oc noc flared oa a ikense. ffacwfchscanding an fndfrfdual's )ob title. sevecfcy )oval categacfsacloa loc wflffulaces inroiring iadfrfdus~s wbo can be consider>>d )ksnsoe ofdcfals will consider several fsccocs. lncfudfag the pea)cion ot the Indfrldua) relaure co the licensee's argsnlcacloaal scruccuce and the individual's cesponsfbfllcfoe reiadn co the arecslghc af liccns~a ~cciricleo aad to the uso af licensed msr ~cfsl.
~ ': 34388 ', "~.",'-"...","'Federal'Reciter./;Vol.~60.'-. No~%28~f."rFriday Juctei30'.'-1995' 'Notfees". factors in arrivin at tho appropriate 'everity level willbe dependent oa tho circumstances ofthe violation. However. ifa Bconsoe refuses to correct a minor violation withina ceasonablo time such that itwillfullycontinues, the violation should be catogorizod at least at a Severity Level lV. D. Violations ofReporting Requirements Tbo NRC expects Bcensoes to provide complete. accurate. and timely information and reports. Accordingly. unless. otherwiso categorized in the Supplements. the severity level of a violation involving the failure to make a required report to the NRC willbo based upon the significance ofand the circumstances surrounding the matter that should have boon reported. However. the severity level of an untimely report. In contrast to no report. may be 2reduced do pending an the circumstances surrounding the msttar. A licensee willnot normally be cited for a failure to repor a condition or event uclloss Old licensed was actli4llyaware of the condition or event that it failed to report. A licensee will,on the other hand. normally be cited for 4 failure to report a condition or event ifthe licensee knew ofthe information to be reported. but did not recognize that it was coquired to make a coport. V:Prcddcisioaal Enforcement Conferences Whenever the NRC has learned ofthe existence ofa potontiak violation for which escalated enfoccomont action appears to be warranted. or recurring nonconformance on the part of 4 vendor, the NRC may provide an opportunity for a pcodecisional enforcement conference with the licensee. vendor. or alber person before taking enfoccemeat action. The purpose of the conference is to obtain information that willassist the NRC in ", determining the appropriate enforcement action, such as: (1) h common understanding of facts, coot causes and missed oppoctunitios associated with the apparent violations, (2) a common understanding of corrective action taken or planned. and (3) 4 common understanding ofthe significance of issues and the nood for lasting comprehensive corrective action. ifthe NRC concludes that it.has sufficient information to make an informed enforcement decision. 4 conference willnot normally be held unless the licensee coquosts it. However, an opportunity for a conference will normally be,provided before issuing an order based on 4 violation ofthe rule on Deliberate Misconduct or 4 civil penalty to an unlicensed person. If4 conference is not held, the Bcensee wiBnormally. be requested to provide a wcitten response to an inspection report. if . Issued, as to the Bcenaee's views on the, . apparent violations and their root causes and a descriptioa ofplanned or implemented corrective action. g the pcedocisional enforcement confecenco, the licensee. vendor. or other persons wi0 be given'an opportunity to provide information consistent with the purpose ofthe conference, including an explanaOon to the NRC of the immecBate conoczive actions (ifany) that ware taken followingidentificatioa ofthe potential violation or nonconformance and the long.term comprehensive actions that 'were taken or wiBbe taken to prevent recurrence. Licensee, vendors, or other parsons willbe told when 4 meeting is a pcodecisional enforcement conferenCe. A proddcisional enforcement conference is a meeting between the NRC and the licensee. Conferences are normaBy held in the regional officds and are not nocmaBy open to public 'bservation. However. a trial program is being conducted to open approximately 25 percent ofall eligible conferences for public observation. Le every fourth eligible conference involving one of three categories oflicensees (reactor. hospital. and other materials licensees) willbe open to the public. Conferences willnot normally be open to the pubBc ifthe enforcement action being contemplated: (1) Would be taken against an individual. or ifthe action. though not taken against arr individual. turns on whether an Iridlvidualhas committed wrongdoing; (2) Involves significant personnel failures whore the NRC has requested that the individual(s) involved be present at the conference; (3) Is based on the findings ofan NRC Office of Investigations report; or (4) Involves safeguards mformatlon, Privacy hct information. or information which could be considered proprietar; In addition. conferences willnot normally be open to the public if: (5) The conference involves medical misadminlstcations or overox posucos and the conference cannot be conducted wlOiout disclosing Old exposed individual's name: or (6) The conference willbe conducted by telephone or the conference willbe conducted at a relatively smell licensee's facIBty. Notwithstanding meeting any of these criteria. a conference may still be open ifthe conference involves issues related to an ongoing adjudimtocy proceeding with one or caore intervenors or where the evidentiary basis for the conference is a.matter ofpublic record, su~ adjudicatocy decision by'thd Department ofLabor. In addition with the approval ofthe ExocuOvo Direct Operations. conferences w(B not b open to the public where good caters h boon shown afar balancing thd bono fit ofthe pubBc observation against tho patential Impact oa the agency's enfoccemont actioa in a. particular case. As soon as it Is determined that a coaforonce willbe open to public observation, the NRC willnotify the licensee that the confocince willbe open to public obsorvafion as part ofthe agency's trial program. Consistent with the agency's policy on open meetings. "StaffMeetings Opoa to Public." published September 20. 1994 (59 FR 48340), the NRC intends to announce open conferences normally at least 10 working days in advance ofconferences through (1) notices posted in the Public Document Roam. (2) a toll-free telephone recording at 800-952-9674; and (3) a toB-free electronic bulletin board at 800-952-9676! In addition. the NRC willalso issue a press release and notify appropriate State liaison officer that a pcedocisioasl enforcement confocencd has been scheduled and that it is open to public observation. The public attending opan conferences under the trial program ma observe but not pacticipate in the conference. It Is noted that the purpose ofconducOng open conferences under the trial program is not to maximize public attendance, but rather to determine whether providing the public with opportunities to be informed of NRC activities is compatible withthe NRC's ability to exorcise its regulatory and safety responsibilities. There fore. members of the public willbe allowed . access to the NRC regional offices to attend open enforcement conferences in accordance with the "Standard Operating Procedures For Providing Security Support For NRC Hearings hnd Meetings," published November 1, 1991 (56 FR 56251). These procedures provide that visitors may be subject to personnel screening, that signs, banners, posters. otc.. not larger than 18" be permitted. and that disrupQve persons may be removed. Members ofthe public attending open conferences willbe reminded that. (1) the apparent violations discussed at pcodocisional dnfoccomont conferences are subject to further civiow and may be subject to change prior to any resulting onfoccomont action and (2) the statements ofviews or expressions of opinion made by NRC employees at pcedocisionsl enforcement conferenc or the lack thereof, are not intended t represent final determinations or beliefs.
~ 'I ~ ..- -'=: '..: ~":-'4"-K'OAgkcr Federal Register~lgVol460~o Q6%!~ Fridays'. June 30 199S.:! Notfcesi-.'<~~~c'.r=",- 34387 ~ e csons attending open canfecences will 'to be undec oath; floicaaHy. responses be provided an opportunity to submit " 'nder qath':will'be,'required only in written cacnments concerning the trial " connection"w(th Severity Level I. H. or 'iogram anonymously to the regional IHviolations'or orders. ffice. These comments willbe 'he NRC uses'the Notice ofViolation ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ bsequeatly forwarded to the Director. as the usual cnetha'd for formalizing the fthe Office of Enfoccecaant for review 'xistence ofa'viohtioa. Issuance ofa and consideration. ~ Notice ofViolation is normally the only When needed to protect the public enforcement actfori'taken, except in health and safety or common defense casos where.the criteria for issuance of anc: security. escalated enforcement civilpenalties and orders, as set forth in action, such as the issuance of an . 'ections VLBand VLC. respectively. ace immediately effective ardor, willbe met. However. special circumstances taken before the conference. In these cegacdiag the violation findings may . cases. a conference may be held after the warrant discretion being exemised such escalated enforcement action is taken. that the NRC refrains from Issuing a Notice of Violation. (See Section VQ.B, "MitigationofEnforcement Sanctions'.") This section describes the In addition, Hcenseos are not ordinarily enforcement sanctions avaflablo to the cited for violations resulting from NRC and spodfios the caaditions under'atters not within their control. such as which each may be used. The basic oquipmont failures that were not enforcement sanctions are Notices of avoidable by reaionable licensee quality Violation.civilpeaaltios, and orders of assurance measures or management various typos. As discussed furthe in'ontrols. Generally, however. licensees Section VI.D, related administrative ace held responsible for the acts oftheir actions such as Notices of employees. Accordingly, this palicy .Nonconformance, Notices af Deviation, should aot be construed to'excuse Confirmatary Action Letters, Letters of personnel errors. Reprimand. and Demands far Information ace used to supplement the '"'c P'nforcement program. In so!ecting the h dvil penalty is a monetary penalty enforcement sanctions ar administrative that may be imposed forviolation of (1) actions, the NRC willconsider .certain spedfied Hcensing provisions of enforcement actions taken by other . the Atomic Energy hct ar ' ~ ~ eral or State cegulatory bodies supplementary NRC rules or ordecs; (2) ing concurrent jurisdiction. such as any requirement forwhich a license transportation matters. Usually. rctay be revoked; or (3) reporting . whenever a violation afNRC; ceq'uirements under section 206 ofthe requirements of moro than a minor Energy Reorganization Act. Civil concern is identified.'enforcement penalties ace designed to deter future action is taken. The nature and extent of violations both by the involved licensee the enforcemont action is intended to as wall as by other licensees conducting reflect the seriousness af the violation similar activities and to emphasize the involved. For the vast majority of need for licensees to identify violations yialatians. a Notice of Violation or a and take prompt comprehensive Notice of Nonconformance is the normal corrective action. action. Civilpenalties are considered for Severity LovilHIviolations. In addition, civilpenalties willnormally be assessed h Notice of Violation is a written for Severity Level! and H violations and notice setting forth one or more knowing and conscious violations of the violations of a legally binding reporting requirements of section 206 of requirement. The Notice of Violation the Energy Reorganization Act. normally requires tha recipient to ~ Civilpenalties ace used to encourage provide a writtoa ¹atemoat describing prompt identification and prompt and (1) the ceasans for the violation or. if compcehonsive correction of violatians, contested, the basis for disputing the to.emphasize compliance in a manner violation: (2) corrective stops that have that deters future violations, and to been taken and the results achieved: (3) serve to focus licensees'ttention on cor'roctivo steps that willbe taken ta violations af significant regulatory prevent recurrence: and (4) the date concern. when fullcompliance willbe achieved. Although management involvement. The NRC may waive all or portions of direct or indirect. in a violation may a written response to the extent relevant lead to an increase in the civilpenalty. information has already been provided tho lack of management involvement to the NRC in writing or documented in may not be used to mitigate a civil NRC inspection report. The NRC may penalty. Allowingmitigation in the ire responses to Notices of Violation latter case could encourage the lack of management involvomont in Hcensecl activities and a decrease in protection of the public health and safety. 1. Base CivilPenalty The NRC imposes diff'erent levels of peaaltios far diffecent severit level violatioas aad different c)asses of liconseos. vendors. and other persons. Tables 1h and 1B show the base civil pjcnalties far various reactor. fuel cycle; materials. and vendor programs. (Civil penalties issued ta individuals are determined on a case-by~ basis.) The structure ofthese tables generaHy takes irito account the gravity ofthe violation as a primacy consideration and the ability to pay as a socondacy consideration. Generally. operations involving greater nuclear material inventories aad greater potential consequences to the public and licensee employees receive higher civil penalties. Regarding the secondary factor ofabilityofvarious classes of licensees to pay the civilpenalties, it is not the NRC's intention that tho ec'onamic impact ofa civilpenalty be so severe that it puts a licensee out of business (ardors. rather than civil penalties, are used when the intent is to suspend ar terminate licensed activities) or adversely affects a licensee's ability to safely conduct licensed activities. The deterrent effect ofcivilpenalties is best served when the amounts of the penalties take into account a licensee's
ability to pay'. In determining the amount ofcivilpenalties for licensees for whom the tables do not reflect the ability to pay or tho gravity ofthe violation. the NRC wiHconsider as 'ecessary an increase or decrease on a case-by~so basis: Normally, ifa .licensee can demonstrate financial hardship. the NRC willconsider payments over time, including interest. rather than reducing the amount of the civilpenalty. However. where a licensee claims financial hardship. the licensee willnormally be required to address why it has sufficiont resources ta safely conduct licensed activities and pay license and inspection fees. 2. CivilPenalty hssossmont In an effort to (1) emphasize the importance of adhoronce to requirements and (2) reinforce prompt self-identificatio of problems and root causes and prompt and comprehensive correction ofviolations, the NRC reviews each proposed civilpenalty on its own merits and, after considering all relevant circumstances, may ad just the base civilpenalties shown in Table 1h and 1B for Severity Lovel I. ILand ill violations as described below.
- " 34388
g<'.:.4".'-"-'.~Federal "Register+~ .Vol'"'.60".No~126-..IWridav;fune:40:".1995~ =Notices~= 4 T The civil penalty assessment process whether the licensee's corrective actions each violation or problem, absent the ~ considers four decisionat paints: (a) are"prompt and comprehensive: and (d) exercise ofdiscretion', is limited to o Whether the licensee has had any whether. in view ofttllthe'f the followingthree results: no ci V previous escalated enforcement action 'ircumstances. the matter in question penalty. a base civilpenalty, or a ~ (regardless ofthe activity area) during requires the exercise ofdiscretion. civilPenalty escalated by 100%. The the past 2 years or past 2 inspections, hlthough each ofthese decisional . f)ow chart presented below is a graphic whichever is longer; (b) whether the points may have several associated representation ofthe civilpenalty, licensee should ba given credit for considerations forany given case, the a sessmant procesL actions related to idanti6cation: (c) outcome ofthe assessment process for 'ars+ coos~
Federal ReIpster /'VOL 60. No. 126 / Friday. June.3O.'.i995 / Notices -j.'~'>- .:, 4389'ES 1st NON W!LLFUL SL III IN/2f NO Kl C$%NT ' CA CRHXT T YKI Q CP CA CAEOlT 'hoe&!uo'awn ow Oe ytwn orecN ~ own e ~e4Ke4 to idontÃoettont O b 04an5mq y~ S. Ia+5 IMisdone eeoeldnonnotg eeeutt In o doe penalty ngotOooe ot 0 end Ch bASK CP +%ONE
p / ~ 34390: ':"' Federal Register I Vol. 60. No. 126 / Friday.'June 30. 1995 /'Nogces ~ ~ a. Initialescalated action. When the NRC determines that a non-willful Severity Level IIIviolation or problem has occuned. and the licensee has not had any previous escalated actions (tegard less ofthe activity atee) during the past 2 yoaii or 2 Inspections, whichever Is longor, the NRC will consider whether the licensee's corrective action for the present v'.ilatlon or problem is reasonably prompt and comprehensive (soe the discussion under Section VI.B.2.c. below). Using 2 years as the basis for aaseeament is expected to cover most situations. but considering a slighlly longer or shorter period might be wanantod based on the citcutnstances ofa particular case. The starting point ofthis period should be considered the date when the licensee was put on notice ofthe need to take collective action. For a licensee-identified violation or an event. this would be whoa the licensee is aware that a problem or violation exists requiring corrective action. Fo'r an NRC-identified violation, the starting point would be when the NRC puts the licensee on notice. which could be during the inspection, at the inspection exit mooting, or as part ofpost-inspection communication. Ifthe corrective action is judged to be prompt and comptehonsive, a Notice of Violation normally should be issued with no associated civilpenalty. Ifthe corzectivo action is judged to be less than prompt and comprehensive, the Notice of Violation normally should be issued with a base civilpenalty. b. Credit foractions related to identification. (1) Ifa Severity Level I or 0 violation or a willfulSeverity Level III violation has occurted-or if,during the past 2 years or 2 inspections, whichever is longer. the licensee has been issued at least one other escalated actionthe civil penalty assessment should normally consider the factor of idontification in addition to corrective oct ton (soe the discussion under Section VI.B.?A:,below). hs to identi6cation, tbe NRC should consider whethor the licensee should be given credit for 'ctions related to identification. In each case, the decision should be focused on identificatio ofthe probloin requiring corrective action. In other words, although giving credit for Idontification and Corrective hction shouid be separate decisions. the concept of Identification presumes that the identifier recognizes the'existence of a problem, and understands that corrective action is needed. The decision on Identification requires wnsidering all the circumstances of dontificalion including: (i) Whether the problem requirin corrective action was NRC-identified, licensee-identified, or revealed through an event:e (ii)Whether prjor opportunities existed to identify the problem requiring corrective action, and ifso. the age and number ofthose opportunitie; (iii)Whether the problem was revealed as the result ofa licensee self- monitoring effort. such as conducting an audit. a test. a surveillance. a design review. or troubleshootin)t. (iv) For a problem revealed through an event. the ease ofdiscovery. and the degree of licensee initiative In identifying the root cause 'ofthe ptoblem and any associated violations; (v) For NRC-idontified issues. whether the licensee would likelyhave identified the Issue in the same time- period ifthe NRC had not been involved; (vi) For NRC-identified Issues, whether the licensee should have identified the issue (and taken action) earl/er. and (vfi)For cases in which the NRC identifies the overall problem requiring corrective action (e.g.. a programmatic issue), the degree of licensee initiative or lack ofinitiative in identifying the problem or problems requiring corrective action. (2) hlthough soma cases may consider all ofthe above factors. the importance ofeach factor willvary based on the type of case as discussed in the followinggeneral guidance: (i) Licensee-Idontified. When a ioblem requiring comctivo action is ice nsee-identi fiod (i.e.. identified before the problem has resulted in an event), the NRC should normally give the licensee credit for actions related to idontification. regard less of whether prior opportunities existed to identify (il)Identified Through an Event.'hen a problem requiring corrective action is identified through an avant. the decision on whether to.give the s ha "evenl." as used hece. means t1) ad ewnl chaceaectzed by an acllw advecse tcnpaa on ~qulpment or pecsonneL seedily obvious by human obeecvat ion or instcumealstloa. or tZ) ~ cedlologlca) tmpea on pecsoanel oc the eavlconmenl ln excess oi ceSutsiocy limits. such as an ovecex poeuce. ~ celease olcadioeclive matecia) above HRC lbails, or a loss ol cadiosalve material. For example. an ~quipmenl tel)ace dlscoveced lhcouah a spill ot liquid. ~ loud noise. the falluce lo have a system respond pcopecly. or an annunciator a)scca would be consideced aa ewnl: ~ system discoveced to be lnopecabl ~ lhcouab a document ceview would not. Similarly.lla licensee dlscoveced. thcouSh quaclecly dosimetry ceedinas. that employees had been inadequslely monltoced toc radiation. the issue would normally be consideced licensee. idenliiied: however. illhe same dosirneuy cesdlnSs disclosed an ovecexposuce. the issue would be considered an evenl. licensee credit for actions relet 'dentification normally should the ease ofdiscoveiy. whether the occurred as the result ofa licensee self. nt monitoring effort (Le., whether the hcensoe was "lookhg forthy problem"), the degree oflicensee Initiative in identifyingtho problem or problems tequiring corrective action. and whether pnor opportunitlos existed to Identify the problem. hny ofthese considerations moy be overridin lfparticularly noteworthy or particu~y egrtigious. For example. If the event occuned as the result of conducting a surveillance or similar self monitoring effort (Lethe licensee was looking for the problem), the lic'ensoo should normally bo given.credit'for identification. hs a second instance. evan ifthe problem was easily discovered (e.g.. revealed by a largo spill ofliquid), the'NRC may choose to give credit because noteworthy licensee effort was exerted in foneting out the root cause and associated violations, or simply because no prior opportunities (e.g., procedural cautions, post- maintenance testing. quality control fai(utes, teadily observable parameter ttends, or repeated or locked-in annunciator warnings) existed 'to I'dontifythe problem. (iii)NRC-Identifie. When a pro requiring corrective action is NRC- Ilionlifitid,tho decision on whether to give the licensee credit for actions related to Identification should normally be based on an additional 'question: should the licensee have reasonably idontifiodthe problem (and taken action) earlier? In most cases. this reasoning may be based simply on the ease of the NRC inspector's discovery (e.g., conducting a walkdown, observing in the control room, performing a confirmatory NRC radiation survey. hearing a cavitating pump. or finding a valve obviously out of position). In some cases. the licensee's missed opportunities to identify the problem might include a similar previous violation, NRC or industry notices. internal audits. or teadily observable trends. lfthe NRC identifies the violation bul concludes that. under the circumstances, the licensee's actions related to Identification were not tuiroasonable, the marter would be treated as licensee-identified for purposes of assessing the civilpenaltv In such cases, the question of Identification credit shifts to whet h the licensee should be penalized NRC's identification of the pr'ob) (iv) Mixed Identification. For -.. identification situations (i.o.. whe. multiple violations exist. some 4l:l
e Federal Register I Vol. 60, No.-126'/'.Friday.-june '30."199S I Notices ., ~..","- 3/391 identified, some licensee-identified, or where the NRC prompted the licensee to take action that resulted in the identificatian ofthe violation). the NRCs evaluation should normally determine whether the licensee could reasonably have been expected to identify the violation ln the NRC's absence. This determination should cansider, among ather things. the timing ofthe NRC's discovery. the information available to the licensee that caused the NRC concern. the specificity ofthe NRC's concern. the scope ofthe licensee'a afforts, the level of Ucensea resources given to the investigation. and whether the NRC's path of'analysis had been dismissed or was being pursued in parallel by the licensee. In socne cases. the licensee may have addressed the isolated symptoms of each violation (and may have identified the violations). but failed to recogiuxe the common root cause and taken the necessary comprehensive action. Where this is true, the decision on whether to give licensee credit far actions related to identification should focus on identi6cation ofthe problem requiring canective action (e.g.. the programmatic breakdown). As such. depending on the chronology af the various violations. the earliest ofthe individual violations might be considered missed ~ ~ portunities for the licensee to'have entified the lager problem. (v) Missed Opportunities to Identify. Missed opportunities include prior notifications or missed opportunities to identifyor prevent violations such as (1) thraugh normal surveillances, audits, or quality assurance (Qh) activities: (2) through prio notice i.e., specific NRC or industry notification; or (3) through other reasonable indication of a potential problem or violation, such as observations ofemployees and contractors. and failure to take effective corrective steps. It may include findings of the NRC, the licensee, or industry made at ather facilities operated by the licensee where it is reasonable to expect the licensee to take action to identify or prevent similar problems'at the facility subject to the enforcamant action at issue. In assessing this factor, consideratian willbe given to. among other things, the opportunities available to discover the violation, the ease of discovery. the similarity between the violation and the notificatio. the period of time between when the violation occurred and when'the notification was issued. the action taken (or planned) by the licensee in zes ponse to the notification, and the level af anagement review that the notification eived (or should have received). Regardless of other. circumstances ~ (e.g.. past enforcement history. identificatlon), the licensee's corrective actions should always be evaluated as part ofthe civilpenalty assessment process. As a reflection of the importance given to this factor, an NRC judgment that the licensee's conective action has not been prompt and comprehensive willalways result in issuing at least a base civilpenalty. In assessing this factor, consideration willbe given to the timeliness af the conectiva action (Including the romptness tn developing the schedule or long term conectlve action), the adequacy ofthe licensee's root cause analysis forthe violation. and; given the significance and complexity ofthe Issue. the comprehensiveness ofthe corrective action (i.e., whether the action is focused nanawly to the specific violatIon or broadly to the ', general area ofconcern). Even in cases when the NRC. at the time ofthe enforcement conference, identifies additional peripheral ar minor corrective action still to be taken, the licensee may be given credit in this area, as long as the licensee's actions addressed the underlying coot cause and are considered sufficient to prevent recunence ofthe violation and similar The evaluation of missed opportunities should normally depend on whether the information available to the licensee should reasonably have caused action that would have prevented the violation. Missed opportunities is normally not applied where the licensee appropriately reviewed the opportunity for applicatian to its activities and reasonable action was either taken or planned to be taken within a reasonable time. In some situations the missed opportunity Is a violation in itseK In theae cases. unless the missed opportunity is ~ Severit Level III violation in itself, the missed opportunity violation maybe grouped with the other violations into a single Severity Level QI "problem,"'owever, ifthe missed opportunity is the only violation, then it should not, normally be counted twice (i.e., both as the violation and as a missed opportunity"double counting") unless the number of opportunities missed was particularly significant. The timing ofthe missed opportunity should also be considered. While a rigid time-frame is unnecessiizy, a 2-year period should generally be considered forconsistency in implementation, as the period zeflecting relatively cunent performance+ (3) When the NRC determines that the licensee should receive credit for 'ctians related to Identification. the civilpenaltyassessment should normally zesult in either no civil penalty or a base civilpenalty, based on whether Canective Action Is judged to be reasonably prompt and comprehensive. When the licensee is not given credit for actions related to identification. the civilpenalty assessment should normally result in a Notice af Violation with either a base civilpenalty or a base civilpenalty escalated by 100%, depending on the quality ofCorrective Action. because the Bcensee's perfonnance is clearly not acceptable. c. Credit forprompt and comprehensive corrective action. The purpose ofthe Conective Action factor is to encourage licensees to (1) take the immediate actions necessary upon discovery ofa violation that willrestore safety and compliance with the license, regulation(s), or other requirement(s): and (2) develop and implement (in a timely manner) the lasting actions that willnot only prevent recunence ofthe violation at issue. but willbe ap'prapriately comprehensive. given the significance and complexity of the violation, to prevent occurrence of violations with similar root causes. violations Normally. the judgment ofthe adequacy ofconective actions will hinge on whether the NRC had to take... action to focus the licensee's evaluative ind conective process in order to obtain comprehensive canective action. This willnormally be judged at the time of the enforcementcanference (o;g;Ay outlining substantive additional areas where canective action is needed). Earlier informal discussions between the licensee and NRC inspectors or management may result in improved corzective action, but should not normally be a basis to deny credit for Conective hction. Far cases in which the licensee does not get credit for actions related to Identification because the NRC identified the problem. the assessment ofthe licensee's corrective action should begin from the time when the NRC put th'elicensee on notice of the problem. Notwithstanding eventual goad campzehenslve corzective action. if Imniediate conective action was not taken to restore safety and compliance once the violation was identified. corzective action would nat be considered prompt and comprehensive. Corrective action for violations involving discrimination should normally only be cansidezed ~ comprehensive ifthe licensee takes prompt, comprehensive corrective action that (1) addresses the broader
34392::."';,<;;:"':t:.; Federal Register"-.l: VoL'60;, No..-'.126':I. Frjdav."June 30. 1995:/. Notices a. Power reactors .. b. Fuel fsbAcaioa. Industrial pfocossoa, aAd lAdepeAdeAI speAI tuel ahd fAoAitofedfe- Inevsbia storage IAstsllaboAs c. Test feactoa, mila and fxa- nium conwaloA Bosses. coAIfaotoa, vendors. waste disposal IiceAsees, arrl n- dusIASI fadioga phea d. Aeseafch feactoa. aoa- deinc, medical,.or ofhef fhs- SI00.000 25,000 t0,000 5.000 lTtiis apphes Io AOAPfoQ iASbtuOOAS AOI ofhefwfse categoAzed fA Ihls tacks, fllobile flu clear sefvices, nuclear phaffnscies, ahd physi- cian ollces. TABLE 1B.~AS E CIVILPENAL'TIES Seventy level Base ciel peA- ally amount (Pef- cent ol afnouAI Icsied in Tatse IA) C. Orders. hn order is a written NRC directive to modify. suspend. or revoke a licensei to cease and desist from a given practice or activity; or to take such other action as may be proper (see 10 CFR 2.202). Ordea may also be issued in lieu of. or in addition to. civil penalties, as appropriate for Severity Level i, Q. or Gl violations. Orders may be issued as follows: 1. License Modification orders are issued when some change in licensee equipment. procedures. personnel. or management controls is necessary. 2. Suspension Orders may be used: (a) To remove a threat to the public health and safety. common defense and security. or the environment: (b) To stop facilityconstruction when. (i) Further work could preclude or significantly hinder the identificatio or environment for raising safety concerns in the workplace. and (2) provides a remedy for the particular discrimination at issue. d. Exercise ofdiscretion. hs provided in Section VH, "Exercise ofDiscretion," discretion may be exefased by either escalating or mitigating the amount of the civilpenalty determined after applying the civilpenalty adjustment sctors to e ns ure that the propos ed civil penalty reflects the NRC's concern regarding the violation at issue and that itconveys the appropriate message to the licensee. However. in no instance willa civilpenalty forany one violation exceed $100.000 per day. TABLE 1A.BaSe Civil PenaltieS correction ofan improperly constructed safety-related system or component: or (ii)The licensee's quality assurance program implementation ls not adequate to provide confidence that construction activities are being properly, carried out; (c) When the licensee has not . tes ponded adequately to other enforcement action: (d) When the licensee interferes with the conduct ofjn inspection or investigation; or (e) For any reason not mentioned above for which license revocation is legally authorized. Suspensions may apply to all or part ofthe licensed activity. Ordinarily, a licensed activity is not suspended (nor is a suspension prolonged) for failure to comply with requirements where such failure is not willfuland adequate corrective action has been taken. 3. Revocation Orders may be used: (a) When a licensee is unabla or unwillingto comply with NRC t ..'., uifements: ) When a licensee refuses to correct a violation: (c) When licensee does not respond to a Notice ofViolation where a response was required: (d) When a licensee refuses to pay an applicable fee under the Commission's regulations: or (e) For any other reason forwhich revocation is authorized u'nder section 186 ofthe htomic Energy hct (e.g., any condition which would warrant refusal of a license on an original application). 4. Cease and Desist Orders may be used to stop an unauthorized activity that has continued after notification by the NRC that the activity is unauthorized. 5. Orders to unlicensed persons. including vendors and contractors, and employees ofany ofthem, are used when the NRC has identified deliberate misconduct that may cause a licensee to be iriviolation of an NRC requirement or where incomplete or inaccurate information is deliberately submitted or where the NRC loses its reasonable assurance that the licensee willmeet NRC requirements with that person involved in licensed activities. Unless a separate response is warrarited pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201. a Notice ofViolation need not be issued where an order is based on violations described ln the order. The violations described in an order need not be categorized by severity level. Orders are made effective imniediately, without prior opportunity for hearing, whenever it is determined that the public health, interest. or safety so requires. or when the order is responding to a violation involving Willfulness. Otherwise; a prior opportunity for a hearing on the ord is afforded. For cases in which the believes a basis could reasonably exi for not taking the action as proposed, the licensee willordinarily be afforded an opportunity to show why the order should not be issuecl in the proposed manner by way ofa Demand for information. (See 10 CFR 2.2N) D. Related odministfati ve actions. in addition to the formal enforcement actions, Notices ofVlolatlon. civil penalties. and orders. the NRC also uses administrative actions. Such as Notices ofDeviation. Notices ot Nonconformance. Confirmatory hction Letters. Lattersof Reprimand. and Demands for information to supplement its enforcemant program. The NRC expects licensees and vendors to'adhere to any obligations and commitments resulting from these actions and willnot hesitate to issue appropriate orders to ensure that these obligations and commitments are met. 1. Notices ofDeviation are written notices describing a licensee's failure to satisfy a commitment where the commitment involved has not been made a legally binding requirement. h Notice ofDeviation requests a licensee to provide a written explanation or statement describing corrective steps taken (or pfanned). the results achiev and the date when corrective action wl be completed. 2 Notices ofNonconformance are written notices describing vendor's failures to meet commitments which have not been made legally binding requirements'by tqRC. An example is a commitment made in a procurement contrict with a licensee as required by 10 CFR Part 50. hppendix B. Notices of Nonconforlnances request non.licensees to provide written explanations or statements describing corrective steps (taken or planned), the results achieved. the dates when corrective actions will be completed, and measures taken to preclude recurrence. 3. Confirmatory hction Letters are letters confirming a licensee's or vendor's agreement to'ake certain actions to remove significant concerns about health and safety, safeguards, or the environment. 4. Letters of Reprimand are letters addressed to individuals subject to Commission jurisdiction identifying a significant de ficiancy in their performance oflicensed activities. 5. Demands for information afe demands for information from licensees or other persons for the purpose of enabling the NRC to determine whe an order or other enforcement action should be issued.
~ A E I ~, ~ / Federal Register / Vol. 80. No. 126 / Friday, June 30. 1995 / Notices.'4393 (p VII.Exmaise ofDiscretion . Notwithstanding the normal guidance contained ln this policy, as provided in on GI, "Recponcibi)IUec," the NRC may choose to exercise discretion and either escahte or mitigate enforcement sancUons within the Commission's statutory authority to ensure that the resulUng enforcement acUon appropriately reflects the level ofNRC concern regarding the violation at', issue and conveys the ap'prapriate message'o the licensee. A. Escalatioa ofEnforcement Sanctions The NRC considers viohtions categorize at Severity Level I, II.or IH to be ofsignIGccnt regu4tory concern. Ifthe appflcaUon ofTe normal guidance ln this policy does not result in an appropriate sanction, withthe approval ofthe appropriate Deputy Executive Director and consultation with the EDO and Commiscio, as wananted, the NRC may apply its full enfotcement authority where the action is warranted. NRC action may indude (1) eeca4Ung civilpenalUes, (2) Issuing appmpriate orders, and (3) assessing civilpenalties forconUnuing vlolaUons on a per day basis. up to the statutory limitof$100,000 per violation, per day. 1. Civilpenalties. Notwithstanding the outcome ofthe normal civilpenalty ent pmcess addxesse'd in Section B, the NRC may exercise discreUon y either proposing a dvilpenalty where application ofthe factors would otherwiee result in zem penalty or by escalatIng the amount ofthe lesultUlg civilpenalty (i.e.. base or twice the base civilpenalty) to ensure that the pmposed civilpenalty re flects the signiGcance ofthe circumstances'and conveys the appmpriate regulatory message to the licensee. Consultation with the Commissibn is required ifthe deviation in the amount of the civil nalty proposed under this discretion m the amount of the civilpenalty assessed under the norma1 process is more than two times tbe base civil penalty shown in Tables 1h and 1B. Examples when th4 discretion should be considered induce. but are not limited to the folio (a) Problems catego at Sevmity Level I or G; (b) Overexpocutes, or releasee of radiological material in excesc of NRC uirements; c) Situations involving particularly poor licensee performance, or involving willfulness; (d) Situations when the licensee's previous enforcement history has bean 'cularly poor, or when the current olaUon is directly re petitive of an belier violation; (e) Situations when the excessive. duration of a problem has resulted in a substanUal increase in risk: (f) SituaUons when the licensee made a cons'dous decision to be in noncompliance in order to obtain an economic beneGt: or (g) Cases lnvolvfngthe loss of a soutce. In add(Uon, unless the licensee self.idenUGes and reports the loss to the NRC, these cases should normally result in a civilpenalty in an amount at least in the order'of the cost ofan authorixed disposal ofthe material or ofthe transfer ofthe material to an authorized tedpient. 2. Orders. The NRC may, where necessary or desirable, hsues orders in conjunction with or ln lieu ofdvil penalUes to achieve or formalize correcUve actions and to deter further recurrence ofserious violattons, 3. DailycivilpenaIUeL In order to recognixe the added technical safety signiGccnce or regu4tory signiGcance for those cases where a very strong message 4 warranted for a sign(Geant violatio'n that conUnues for more than one day, the NRC may exercise diccreUon and assess a separate violaUon and attendant dvil penalty up to the statutory limitof$100,000 for each day the violation continues. The NRC may exerdse this discretion ifa licensee was aware or dearly should have bean aware ofa violation. or ifthe licensee had an opportunity to idenU fy and correct the vio Uon but failed to do so. B. MitigationofEnforcement Sanctions The NRC may exercise discretion and refrain from Issuing a civilpenalty and/ or a Notice ofViolation.ifthe outcome ofthe normal process described in Section VLBdoes not result in a sanction consistent with an apprapriate regulatory message. In addition. even if the NRC exerdses this discretion, when the licensee failed to make a required . report to the NRC, a separate enforcement action willnormally be issued for the licensee's failure to make a required report. The approval ofthe Director. OfGce ofEnforcement, with consultation with the appropriate Deputy gxecuUve Director as warranted, Is ~uired forexmcicing discreUon of the type described In SecUon VILB.1.b where a willfulviolation is involved, and of the types described in Sections VILB.2through VILB.S.Commission consultation is required for exercising discretion ofthe typo described in Section VG.B.2 and the approval ofthe appmpriate Deputy Executive Director a'nd Commission noUficaUon is required for exerdsing the discreUon of the type descri~ (o ~on VG.B.6. Examples when discretion should be considered for depardng fram the normal appraach in Section VLBinclude but are not limited to the following: 1. Licensee-IdenUGecgi Severity Level IVVlo4tions. The NRC. with the approval ofthe Regional hdmlnistrator or h4 designee. may refrain from issuing a Notice ofVio4Uon for a Severity Level IVvio4tion that is documented in an tnspecUon report (or ofidal Geld notes for some material cases) and described therein as a Non- Cited Vlolatlon (NCV) provided that the inspection report lndudes ~ brief description ofthe correcUve action and that the vio4Uon meets all ofthe followingcriteria; (a) Itwas identiGed by the licensee, induding identiGcation through an event: ~ (b) It was not a vio4tion that could reuonably be expected to have been pteventad by the Iicerisee's corrective action fora previous violation or a previous Hcensee finding that occurred withinthe pact 2 years of the inspection at issue. or the period within the last two inspections. whichever Is longer. (c) ltwas or willbe corrected wtthin a reasonable time. by spedGc corrective action committed to by the licensee by the end ofthe inspection. including immediate cortecUve action and comprehensive corrective action to prevent recunence; 'd) lt was not a willfulviolation or-if- itwas a willfulviohtion: (i)The information concerning the violaUon, ifnot required to be reported: was promptly pmvided toappmpriate NRC personnel, such as a tesident inspector or regional section or branch chief; (ii)The violation involved the acts of a low-level individual (and not a licensee ofGdal as defined in Section IV.C): (Ui)The violation appears to be the isolated acUon ofthe employee without management involvement and the vtolaUon was not caused by lack of 'management oversight as evidenced by either a history ofIso4ted willful vio4tions or a lack of adequate audits or supervtaon ofemplopes: and (iv)SignIGccnt temechal action commensurate with the circumstances was taken by the licensee such that it dmnonstrated the eeriousnecs of the violation to other employees and contractors, thereby creaUng a deterTent effect within the licensee's organixation. hlthough removal ofthe employee from licensed activiUes is not necesauily required, substantial disciplinary action is expected. 2. ViolaUonc IdentiGed During Extended Shutc!Owns or Work
34394 i' '". '"Federil Registe'i"/ Vol:,60,'No.'.126=/:Friday..June 30. 1995 / Notices::.'"-." 'toppages. The NRC may cefrain from".'ssuing a Notice ofViolation or a pmpoaed civilpenalty for a violation that is identiFied after (i)the NRC has taken signlficant enforcement action based upon a ma)or event contributin to an extended shutdown ofan operating reactor or a material licensee (or a work stoppage at a censtructton site). or (ii)the licensee enters an extended shutdown or work stoppage related to generaBy poor perfonnance over a long period oftime. provided that the violation ls documented in an inspection report (or offictal Geld notes for some material cases) and that it meets aB ofthe foBowlng criteria: (a) lt was either licensee-tdent tfied as a result ofa comprehensive program for problem identificatio and correction that was developed in ces ponse to the shutdown or identtfied as a result ofan employee allegation to the licensee; (If the NRC ident! Ges the violation and aB ofthe other criteria are met, the NRC 'hould detecmtne whether enfomement action is necesluy to achieve remedial action. or ifdiscretion may still be 'ppmpriate.) (b) ft is based upon activities ofthe licensee prior to the events leading to the shutdown: (c) It would not be categorized at a severity level higher than Severity Level II; (d) lt was not willful;and (e) The lttxcnsee's decision to restart the plant requires NRCconcucrence. 3. Violations InvolvingOld Design Issues. The NRC may refrain from proposing a civilpenalty for a Severity Level IIor Illviolation involving a past problem. such as in engineering, design. or installation, provided that the violation is documented in an inspection report (or oflicial field notes for some material cases) that includes a description of the corrective action and that it meets aB of the followingcriteria: (a) lt was licensee. identified as a result of its voluntary initiative; (b) lt was or willbe corrected, including immecBate corrective action and long tenn comprehensive corrective action to prevent recurrence. within a reasonable time followingidentification (this action should involve expanding " the initiative, as necessary;to identify other failures caused by similar root causes): and (c) It was not'likely to be identified (aRer the violation occurred) by routine licensee efforts such as normal surveillance or quality assurance (Qh) activities. In addition. the'NRC may refrain from issuing a Notice of'Violation for cases that meet the above criteria provided th
- violation was caused by conduct that is
" not reasonably linked to present 'erformance (normaBy, violations that are at least 3 years old or violations occurring during plant construction) and there had not been prior notice so that the licensee should have reasonably identl6ed the violation earlier. This exercise ofdiscretion is to place a premium on Bcensees initiating effocts to identify alid correct subtle violations that ace not likelyto be identlfied by routine efforts before degraded safety systems are called upon to work. 4. Vtolatio'ns Identtfied Due to Previous Escalated Enfomement hctlon. The NRC may retrain fmm issuing a Notice ofViolationor a proposed civil penalty for a violation that is Identified aRer the NRC has taken escalated enforcement action fora Severity Level IIor HIviolation. provided that the violation is documented in an inspection report (or officialfield notes for some material cases) that includes a description of the corrective action ind that it meets aB ofthe foBowtng criteria: '(a) It was licensee-identified as part of the corrective action for the previous escalated enfoccement action: (b) It has the same or similar root cause as the violation forwhich escalated enforcement action was issued; ~ (c) It does not substantially change the ~ safety significance or the character of the regulatory concern arising out ofthe initialviolation: and (d) It was or willbe corrected, including immed tate corrective action and long term comprehensive corrective action to prevent recurrence. within a reasonable time followingidentification. 5. Violations Involving Certain Discrimination Issues. Enforcement disaetion may b'e exercised for discrimination cases when a licensee who. without the need for government intervention. identifies an issue of discrimination and takes'prompt. comprehensive, and effective correct tve action to address both the particular situation and the overall work environment for raising safety concerns. Similarly. enforcement may not be wacranted where a complaint is Glad with the Department of Labor (DOL) under Section 211 ofthe Energy Reorgantxatton hct of 1974. as amended, but the licensee settles the matter be fore the DOL makes an initial finding of discrimination and addresses the overall work environment. hlternatively, ifa finding of discrimination is made. the licensee may choose to settle the case before the evidentiary hearing begins. in such cases. the NRC may exercise its e discretion not to take enforcement action when the B'censee has a'dd the ovaraB work envimnment for~. safety cocicerns and has pubBctzed a comphtint ofdisaimlnation for engaging in protected activity was made to the DOL, that the matter was settled to the satisfaction ofthe employee (the teccns ofthe spectfic settlement ent need not be ed). and that, ifthe DOLhrea OfBce found dtscrtcntciatton, the Bcensee has taken ~ctton to poitttvely reemphastxe that cBsccimlnation willnot be tolerated. StmBarly. the NRC may refrain from taking enforcement action ifa Bcensee settles a matter promptly after a person 'omes to the NRC wtthaut going to the DOI Such cttaaetton would normally- not be exercised in cases in which the Bcensee does not appmpriately address the overall work environment (e.g., by using training, posttngs, revised policies or pmceduces, any necessary dtsctpBnacy action. etc.. to coccununtcate its policy against discrimination) or in cases that involve: allegations ofdiscrimination as a result ofproviding tnfocmattoct directly to the NRC, aBegattons ofdtscrimtnation caused by a manager above Grst-line supervisor (consistent withcurrent Enforcement Policy classification of Severity Level Ior Iiviolations), aBegattons ofdiscrimination where history offindings ofdiscrimination the DOLor the NRC) or settlements sugge'sts a programmatic rathenhcin an isolated discriminatio problem, or allegations ofdiscrimination which appear particularly blatant or egregious. 6. Viotattou~otvingSpecial Circumstances. Notwithstanding the outcome ofthe normal civilpenalty assessment pmcess addressed in Section .VI.B.as provided ln Section III, "Responsibilities," the NRC may reduce or refrain from issuing a civilpenalty or a Notice ofViolation for a Severity Level IIor GI violation based on the merits of the case after considering the guidance in this statement of policy and such factors as the age of the violation, the safety slgnificance ofthe violation, the overaB sustained performance o'f the licensee has been particularly good. and other relevant ctccumstances, including any that may have changed since the violation. This disaetion is expected to be exercised only where application of the normal guidance in the policy is unwarranted. C. Exercise ofDiscretion for an Opnating Faci%ty On occasion, circumstances may arise where a licensee's compliance wit Technical Specification (TS) Limi Condition for Operation or with ot license conditions would involve an
k Federal Register r 1 j Vol. 60. No. 126 JI / Friday, June 30. 1995 / Notices 34395 I~ ututecessary plant transient or performance oftesting, inspection, or tern realignment that is inappropriate th the speci6c p4nt conditions, or unnecessary delays ln phnt startup without a corres ponding health and, safety benefit. In these circumstances, the NRC staff may chooae not to enforce the applicable TS or other )icense cmdition. This enforcement discretion. designated as a Notice ofEnforcement Discretion (NOED), willonly be exerdsed ifthe NRC staff fs dearly satfsfied that the action fs consistent with protecting the public health and safety. h ffcqnsea seekfng the issuance of a NOED must provide a written justification. or in drcumstances where good cause fs shown. oral justfficatfon followed as soon as possible by written justfficaffon, which documents the safety basis for the request and provides whatever other information the NRC staff deems necessary in making a dedsion on whether or not to issue a NOED. The appropriate Regional 'dmfnfstrator. or his or her designee, may issue a NOED where the noncompliance is temporary and nonrecurring when an amendment is not practfcaL The Dftector. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or his or er designee. may issue a NOED ifthe pected noncompliance willoccur uring the brief period oftime it . requires the NRC staff to process an emeqpncy or exigent license amendment under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) or (6). The person exercising enforcement discretion will document the decision. For an operating plant. this exercise of enforcement discretion is intended to minimize the potential safety consequences of unnecessary plant transients with the accompanying operational risks and impacts or to eliminate testing. inspection, or system realignment which is inappropriate for the particular plant conditions. For plants in a shutdown condition. exercising enforcement discretion is intended to reduce shutdown risk by. again. avoiding testing, inspection or system realignment which is inappropriate for the particular plant conditions. in that, it does not provide a safety benefit or may, in fact. be detrimental to safety in the particular plant condition. Exercising enforcement discretion for plants attempting to startup is less likely than exercising it for an operating plant, as simpLy delaying startup does not usually leave e plant in a condition in which it uld experience undesirable transients. such cases. the Commission would expect that discretion would be exerdsed with respect to equipment or systems only when it has at least concluded that, notwithstanding the conditions ofthe ffcenset (1) The equipment or system does not perform a safety function in the mode in whtch operation fs to occur. (2) the safety functio'n perfoctned by the equipment or system is ofonly marginal safety benefit, provided remaining fn the current mode increases the likelihood of an unnecessary p4nt transient: or (3) the TS or other license condition requires a test. inspection or system realignment that fs inappropriat forthe particular plant conditions; in that ft does not provide a sa$ety benefit, or may, in fact. be detrimental to eafety in the cular plant condition. e decision to execcfse enforcement discretion does not change the fact that a violation willoccur nor does it imply that enforcement discretion is being exercised forany violation that may have led to the violation at issue. In- each case where the NRC staff has chosen to issue a NOED. enforcement action willnormally be taken for the root causes. to the extent violations were involved. that led to the noncomplianoe for which enforcement discretion was used. The enforcement action is intended to emphashe that licensees should not rely on the NRCs authority to exercise enforcement discretion as a routine substitute for compliance or forrequesting a license amendment. Finally. it is expected that the NRC staff willexercise enforcement discretion in this area infrequently. hlthough a plant must shut down, refueling activities may be suspended, or plant startup may be delayed, absent the exercise of enforcement discretion. the NRC staff is under no obligation to take such a step merely because it has been requested. The decision to forego enforcement is discretionary. When enfoccement discretion is to be exercised. it is to be exercised only if the NRC staff is clearly satisfied that 'uch action is warranted from a health and safety perspective. VIG.Enforcement Actions Inrofriag Individuals Enforcement actions involving .individuals. including licensed operators. are significant personnel actions, which willbe closely controlled and judiciously applied. hn enforcement action involving an individual wfBnormally be taken only when the NRC is satisfied that the ~individual fullyunderstood, or should have understood. his or her responsibility: knew, or should have known, the required actions: and kttowfngfy,or with cLueless disregard (i.e., with mote than mete negligence) failed to take required actions which have actual or potential safety significance. Moat transgressions of individuals at the level ofSeverity Level IIIor IVvfo4tfons willbe handled by. dtfng only the fadllty)fcensee. More serious vfo4tfons. induding those involvingthe integrit ofan individual (e.g., lyingto the NRC) con matters withinthe scope of the individual's responsibilities. willbe considered for enforcement action against the individual as well as against the facffftylicensee. hction against the fndividual. however, mllnot be taken ifthe improper action by the individual was caused by management failures. The followingexamples ofsituations fBustzate this concept: ~ Inadvertent fndtvfdual mistakes resulting kom inadequate training or guidance provided by the fadlity licensee. ~ Inadvertently mfssfnff an fnsfgnfficant procedural requirement when the action fs routine, fairly uncomplicated, and there is no unusual drctunstance indicating that the rocedures should be refened to and ollowed step-beep. ' Compliance with an express direction ofmanagement, such as the Shift Supervisor or Plant Manager. resulted iniviolation unless the individual did not exptess his or her concern or objection'to the direction. ~ Individual error directly resulting from followingthe:technfcaladvice of an expert unless the advice was clearly unreasonable and the licensed individual sh'ould have recognised it as such. ~ VLolations result mg from inadequate procedures unless the individual used a faulty procedure knowing it was faulty and had not attempted to get the procedure corrected. Listed below are examples of situations which could result in enforcement actions involving individuals, licensed'or unlicensed. if the actions described in these examples are taken by.a licensed operator or taken deliberately by an unlicensed individual. enforcement action may be taken directly against the individual. However, violations involving willful 'onduct not amounting to deliberate action by'an unlicensed individual in these situations may result in enforcement action against a fic'ensee that may impact an individual. The situations include, but are not limueii to. violations that involve: ~ Willfullycausing a licensee Lo "" violation of NRC requirements.
34396'.: "" Federal Register J VoL 60: No 126 I Friday. june'30. i995 I Not(cease." '. """i-..'"'- ~ Willfullytaking action. that would have caused a licensee to be in violation of NRC requirements but the action did not do so because it was detecte4 and 'orrective action was taken. ~ Recognizing a violation of 'rocedural tequitements and willfully not taking cottctctive action. ~ Willfullydefeating alarms which . have safety significance. ~ Unauthorized abandoning ofreactor mntmls. ~ Dereliction ofduty. ~ Fa)sifying records requited by NRC regulations or by the fadlitylicense. ~ Willfullyproviding. or causing a licensee to provide, an NRC inspector or investigator with inaccurate or incomplete Information on a matter material to the NRC. ~ Willfullywithholding safety significant infottnation rather than making such information known to appropriat supervisory or technical personnel in the licensee's organization. ~ Submitting false information and as a result gaining unescorted access to a nuclear power pbtnt. ~ Willfullyproviding false data to a licensee by a contractor or other person who provides test or other services,. when the data affects the licensee's compliance with 10 CFR part 50. appendix B. or other regulatory requirement. ~ Willfullyproviding false certiftcation that components meet the requirements of.their intended use, such as hSME Code. o Willfullysupplying, by vendors of equipment for transportation of radioactive material, casks that do not comply with their certificates of compliance. ~ Willfullyperforming unauthorized bypassing of required reactor or other facilitysafety systems. ~ Willfullytaking actions that violate Technical Specification Limiting Conditions forOperation or other license conditions (enforcement action for a willfulviolation willnot be taken ifthat violation is the result ofaction taken followingthe NRCs decision to forego enforcement ofthe Technical Specification or other license condition or ifthe operator meets the uirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (x), (Le., un ess the operator acted utiteasonably considering all the relevant circumstances surrounding the emergency.) Normally. some enforcement action Is taken against a licensee for violations caused by significant acts of wmngdoing by its employees, contractors. or contractors'mployees. ln deciding whether to issue an enforcement action to an unlicensed person as well as to the licensee. the NRC recognizes that judgments w(IIhave to be made on a case by case basis. In making these decisions. the NRC willconsider factors such as the following: I.The level ofthe individual.within the organization. 2. The individual's training and experience as well as knowledge ofthe potential consequences ofthe wrongdoing. I 3. The safety consequences ofthe misconduct.. 4. The benefit to the wmngdoer.e.g.', personal or corporate gain. 5. The degree ofsupervision ofthe individual.l.e., how closely is the individual monitored or audited, and the likelihood ofdetection (such as a radiographer working Independently in the field as contrasted with a team activity at a power plant). 6. The employer s response. e.g.. disciplinary action taken. y. The attitude oftlie wrongdoer, e.g., admission ofwrongdoing. acceptance of responsibility. 8. The degree ofmanagement responsibility or culpability. 9. Who identifie the misconduct. " hny proposed enforcement action involvingIndividuals must be Issued with the concurrence ofthe appmpriate Deputy Executive Ditctctor. The particular sanction to be used should be determined on a case-by~se basis.'o Notices ofViolationand Orders are examples ofenforcement actions that may be appropriate against individuals. The administrative action ofa Letter of Reprimand may also be considered. In addition, the NRC may issue Demands for Information to gather information to enable it to determine whether an order or other enfomement action should be issued. Orders to NRC-licensed reactor operators may involve suspension for a specified period. modification. or revocation oftheir individual licenses. Orders to unlicensed individuals might include provisions that would: ~ Prohibit involvement in NRC licensed activities for a specified period oftime (normally the period of suspension would not exceed 5 yettts) or ~Eacept for individuals sublect to civilpenalties under section goa ofthe Energy Reorganisatlon Act of 197a. as amended. NRC willnot normally impose a civilpenalty against an indlvlduah However. section gga ofthe Atomic Energy Act fAEA)gives the Commission authority to impose civilpenalties on "any person." "Person" ls broadly deCined in Section iis of the AEAto include individuals. a variety of orgsntsat tons. and any representatives or agents. This gives the Commission authority to impose civilpenalties on employees of licensees or on se parate entitles when a violation of a requirement directly imposed on them is i committed. until certain conditions are satisfied, e.g.. completing specified trainin meeting certain qualification. ~ Requite notification to the before resuming work in licensed activities. ~ Requite the person to tell a pmspective employer or customer engaged in licensed actlvlties that the person has been subject to an NRC order+ In the case ofa licensed operator s failure to meet applicable fitness-for- duty requitaments'(10 CFR SS.S3(j)). the NRC may Issue a Notice ofViolation or a civilpenalty to the Part SS licensee, or an order to suspend, modify. or tevoke the P~ SS license. These actions may be taken the'irs time a licensed operator fails a drug or alcohol test. t)tat Is, receives a confitmed positive test that exceeds the cutofflevels of 10 CFR Pert 26 or the fadlltylicensee's cutoff levels. Iflower. However. normally only a Notice ofViolationwillbe issued for the first confirmed positive test in the absence ofaggravating circumstances such as etmts in the performance of licensed dufies or evidence of prolonged use. In addition. tha NRC intends to Issue an order to suspend the Patt 55 license forup to 3 years the second time a licensed operator ctxceeds those cu ff levels. In the event there are less t 3 yeats temaining in the term of t IndMdual's license. the NRC may .consider not renewing the individual's license or not Issuing a new Hcense after tha three year period is completed. The NRC intends to issue'an order to revoke the Part 55 license the third time a licensed operator exceedschose cutoff levels. A licensed operator or applicant who refuses to participate in the drug and alcohol testing programs established by thtf facilitylicensee or who is involved in the sale, use, or possession ofan illegal drug is also subject to license suspension, revocation, or denial. .In addition. the NRC may take enforcement action against a licensee 'that may impact an individual, where the conduct of the individual places in question the NRC's reasonable assurance that licensed activities willbc properiy conducted. The NRC may take enforcement action for ieasons that would warrant refusal to issue a license on an original application. hccordingly. appropriate enforcement actions may bc taken regarding matters that raise issues ofIntegrity. competence, fitness-for- duty. or other matters that may not ne'cessarily be a violation of specific Commission requirements. In the case of an unlicensed p whether a fttm or an individual. order modifying the facilitylicense ma
~ ~ ~ ~ Fedora) Regi5ter I Vol. 60. Na. 126 / Friday. June 30, 1995.I Notices -'""'4397 be issued to nrquire (1) The removal of thtr person from all licensed activities for a specified period oftime or indefinitely. (2) prior notice to the NRC before utilixingthe person in licensed activities. ar (3) the licensee to provide notice af the issuance ofsuch an order to other persons involved in licensed activities making reference inquiries. ln addition. orders to employers might ~uire retraining, additional oversight. or independent verification ofactivities porformed by the person. ifthe poison is to be involved in licensed activities. D4 Inaccurate and lncocnplote QLfarmafian A violation af the nrgulations involving submittal ofincomplete and/'r inaccurate information. whether or not considered i material false statement, cin result in the fu)l range af enforcement sanctions. The labeling of a cammunication failure as a material false statement willbe made on a case- by~se basis and willbe reserved for egregious violations. Vialattons involving inaccurate or incomplete information or the failure to provide significant information identiiiod by a licensee normally willbe categorized based on the guidance henrin. in Section iY;-Severity ofViolatians." and in Supplement V(L The Commission recognizes that oral nfonnation may in some situations be inherently less reliable than written submit tais because ofthe. absence of an opportunity far reliection and management review. However, the Commission must be able to rely on oral cammunicatians fram licensee afficials concerning significant information. Therefore. in determining whether to take enforcement action for an oral statement. consideration may be given to factors such as (1) The degree of knowledge that the communicator should have had. regarding the matter. in view of his or her position. training. and experience; (2) the opportunity and time available prior to the communication to assure the accuracy or completeness ofthe information: (3) the degree of intent or negligence, if any, involved: (4) tho formality ofthe communication: (S) the reasonableness of NRC reliance on the infonnatian; (6) the importance af the information Which was wrong or nat provided; and (7) the reasonableness of the explanation for not providing complete end accurate information. Absent at least areless disregard. an 'ncomplete or inaccurate unsworn oral statement normally willnot be subject enforcement action unless it involves gnificant information provided by a iconseo officicl..Hn~ever. enforcement action may be taken for an unintentionally incomplete or inaccurate oral statement provided to the NRC by a licensee officialor others on behalf ofa licensee, ifa record was made of the oral information and provided to the licensee thereby permitting an opportunity to correct the oral information. such as ifa transcript ofthe communiation ar mooting summary containing the ermr was made available to the licensee and was not subsequontly conected in a timely manner. ,WHen a licensee has conoctod inaccurate or incomplete information. the decision to issue a Notice of Violation for the initialinaccurate or incomplete information normally will be dependent on the cizcunrstances. including the ease ofdetection ofthe onor, the timeliness ot the correction. whether the NRC,or the Ucensoe identified tho problem withthe communication, and whether the NRC relied on the information prior to the conoction. Cenenr)ly, lfthe matter was promptly identified and corrected by the licensee priorto reliance by the NRC. or before tho NRC raisod a question abaut the information. no enforcement action willbe taken for the initial inaccurate az incomplete information. On the other hand. ifthe misinformation is identlfiod alter the NRC relies on it. or aRor some question is raised regarding the accuracy oftho inl'ormation, then some enforcement action normally willbe taken even lflt is in fact carzected. However. ifthe initial submittal'was accurate when made but later turns out to be ermneous because ofnewly discovered information or advance in technology. a citation normally would not be appropriate lf. when the new information became available or the advancement in technology was made, the initialsubmittal was canoctod. , The failure to correct inaccurato or incomplete information which the licensoo does nat identify as significant normally willnot constitute a separate violation. However, the circumstances sunounding the failure to cornrct may be considered relevant to tho determination ofenforcement action for the initialinaccurate or incomplete statement. For example, an unintentionally inaccurate or incomplete submission may be treated as a more severe matter ifthe licensee later determines that the initial submittal was in error and does not co'rzect it or ifthere were clear opportunities to identify the onor. lf 'nformation not corrected was r'ecognized by a licensee as significant. c separate ciiciion'may be made for the failure to provide significant information. ln any event, in serious cases where the licensee's actions in not conocting or providing information raise questions about its commitment to safety or its fundamental trustworthiness, the Commission may exercise its authority to issue orders modifying, suspending, or revoking the license. The Commission recognizes that enforcement determinations must be made on a caseky~se basis. taking inta consideration the issues described in this sect(air. X. Enforceaeat AcfianAgainst Noa- Ucansoes The Commission's enfomement policy is a)so appliable to non-licensees. inc)uding employees oflicensees. to contractors and subcontractors, and to emplayees ofcontractors and subcontractors. who knowingly provide components. equipment. or other goods or services that relate to a licensee's actlvlties subject to NRC regulation. The pmhibMons and sanctions forany of these persons who engage in deliberate misconduct or submlsslon of incomplete ar inaccurate information are pmvided in the rute on deliberate misconduct.e.g.. 10 CFR 30.10 and SO.S. Vendors of products or services provided for use in nuc)ear activities are subject to certai requirements designed to ensure that the pmducts or services supplied that could affect safety are'of- high quality. Through pmcurement contracts with rorictor licensees, vendors may be required to have quality assurance pmgrams that meet appliable roquirements including 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix B, and 10 CFR Part 71. Subpart H. Vendors supplying products or services to reactor. materiaiS, and 10 CFR Part 71 licensees aro subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 regarding reporting of defects in basic components. When ins ans determine that violations of NRC requirements have'ccunod. or that vendors have failed to fulfillcontractual commitments (e.g.. 10 CFR Part SO. Appendix B) that could adversely affect the quality of a safety significant pmduct or service, enfomement action wiltbe taken. Notices af Violationand civilpenalties willbe used, as appropriate, for licensee failures to onsure that their vendors have programs that meet applicable requirements. Notices ofViolation will be issued for vendors that violate 10 CFR Part 21. Civilpenalties willbe imposed against individual directors or responsible officers of a vendor organization who knowingly and consciously fail to provide the 'notice required bv 10 r ~ 21.21(b)(1,'crices
34398 I ~ l Federal'Register I Vol. 60. No. "l26' Fridav. June 30. 1995 I Notices- "- .-" of Nonconformance willbe used for vendors which fail to meet commitments related to NRC activities. XLReferrals to the Department of Justice , Alleged or suspected criminal violations ofthe Atomic Energy Act (and of other relevant Federal laws) are referred to the Department of Justice (DGJ) for investigation. Referral to the DOJ does not preclude the NRC from taking other enforcement action under this policy. However, enforcement ~ctions willbe coordinated with the DOJ in accordance with the Memorandum ofUnderstanding between the NRC and the DOJ. 53 FR 50317 (December 14. 1988). XILPubBc Disclosttrtt ofEnforcement Actions Enforcement actions and licensees'esponses, tn accordance with 10 CFR 2.790, ale publicly available for inspection. In addition, press releases ale generally Issued for orders and dvil penalties and are issued at the same time the order or proposed imposition ofthe civilpenalty ia issued. In addition, presa releases are usuaBy issued when a proposed civilpenalty is withdrawn or substantiafiy mitigated by some amount. Press releases are not normally issued for Notices ofViolation that are not accompanied by orders,or proposed civilpenalties. XIII.Reopening Closed Enforcetnent hctiotts Ifsignificant new information is received or obtained by NRC which indicates that an enforcement sanction was incorrectly applied, considaration may be given, depttndent on the drcumstances, 'to reopening a closed enforcement action to increase or decrease the severity of a sanction or to correct the record. Reopening decisions willbe made on a case4y~ basis, are expected to occur rarely. and require the sped fic approval of the appropriate Deputy Executive Director. Supplement IReacior Operations This supplement provides examples of violations in each ofthe four severity levels aa guidance in determining the appropriate seyerity level for violations in the area of reactor operations. A. Severity Level IV'iolations involving for example: 1. h Safety Limit.as defined in 10 CFR 50.36 and the Technical Specifications being exceeded; 2. A system <<designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being "'rhe tenn system" as used in these suppiements. inciudee administrsttee and able to perform its intended safety function t> when actually called upon to work: -'. An accidental criticality;or 4. A licensed operator at the controls ofa nuclear reactor. or a senior operator directing licensed activities, involved in procedural errors which result in, or exacerbate the consequences of, an alert or higher level emergency and who, as a result ofsubsequent testing. receives a cohfinned positive test result for drugs or alcohol. B. Severity Level II Violations involving forexample: 1. A system designed to pfevent or mitigate serious safety events not being able to perform its intended safety function: 2. A Bcensed operator involved in the use. sale. or possession ofillegal drugs or the co'nsumption ofalcohoBc beverage'S, withinthe protected alee: or 3. Alicensed operator at the control ofa nudear reactor. or a senior operator directing Bcensed activities, involved in procedural anors and who, as a result ofsubsequent testing, receives a confirmed positive test result for drugs or alcohoL C. Severity Level Bl Violations involvingforexample: '. Asignificant fail'ule to comply with the ActionStatement for a Technical Sped fication LimitingCondition for Operation where the appropriate action'as not taken within the required time. such asl (e) In a pressurized water reactor, in the applicable modes, having one high- pressufe safety injection pump inoperable for a period in excess of that allowed by the action statement; or (b) In a boiling water reactor. one primary contailunent isolation valve inoperable for a period in excess of that aBowed by the action statement. 2. Asystem designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event: (ajNot being able to perform its 'ntended function under certain conditions (e.g.. safety system not operable unless offsite power is available; materials or components n'ot environmentally quaBfied); or (b) Being degraded to the extent that a detailed evaluation would be lequiled to determine its operability (e.g.. component parameters outside approvecl Bmlts sttch as pulnp flow rates. heat exchanger transfer characteristics. safety valve lilt set points, or valve stroke times); nMnaaerfal control systesns. as well as physical systems ss" intended safety function- means tbe total safety function. and is not directed toward s loss ofredundancy. A foes of one subsystem does not defeat the intended safety function as lena as th< other subsystem is operable. 3. Inattentivene'ss to duty on the of hcensed personnel 4. Changes in leactor parameters cause unanticipated reductions in margins ofsafety 5. A significant failure to meet the requirements of10 CFR 50 s'sg, includin a failure such that a required license amendment was not sought; 6. A Bcensee failure to conduct adequate oversight ofvendors resulting ln the use ofproducts or services that are ofdefective or indeterminate quality and that have safety significance: 7. Abreakdown in tha control of licensed activities involving a number ofv'iobttions that ale related (or, if isolated. that ale recurrin violations) that coBectively represent a potentially significant lack ofattention or carelessness toward licensed responsibiBtles: or 8. A Bcensed operator's confirmed positive test for drugs or alcohol that does not result in a Severity Level I or Iiviolation. 9. Equipment failures caused by inadequate or improper maintenance that substantially complicates recovery from a plant transient. D. Severity Level IV Violations involving forexample: 1. A less significant failure to co with the Action Statement for a Technical Spedfication Limiting Condition forOperation wheai the appropriate action Has not taken within the required time, such as: (a) In a pressurized water reactor, a 5% defidency~emquired volume of the condensate storage tank; or (b)'In a boiling water reactor, one subsystem ofthe two independent MSIV leakage control subsystems inoperable: 2. A failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 that does not result in a Severity Level LO, or Bl violation: . 3. A failure to meet regulatory requirements that have mole than minor safety or environmental significance; or 4. A failure to make a required Licensee Event Report. Sopplatoeat IIPart 50 Facility Cottstrocboll This supplement provides examples ofviolations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area ofPart 50 facility construction. h. Severity Level IViolations involving structures or systems that are completed t e in such a manner that "Tb t "wwpla&" Ml sb supplement means compietion of construction indudtna teelese and acceptance by th<< construction QA oraantaation.
IA ', .Federal.Regcster:J;Voh 60" No. ~126l1!-'Friday:".tune'30~'I995 'I 'Notices': -:~'>>,'.,~34399 would not have satisfied their intended sa fety related purpose. B, Severity Level liViolations involving for example: 1. A bceakdown in the Quality urance (Qh) program as exemplified y deficiencies in construction Qh related to more than one work activity, (e.g., structural, piping, electrical, foundations). These deficiencies noccncfily involve the licensee's failure to conduct adequate audits or to take prompt corrective action on the basis of such audits and normally involve multiple examples ofdeficient construction or construction of unknown quality due to inadequate program implementation: or 2. A structure or system that is completed in such a manner that it could have an adverse effect on the safety of operations. '. Severity Level IIIViolations; involving for example'. Adeficiency in a licensee Qh program forconstruction related to'a single workwctivity(e.g.. structural, piping. electrical or foundations). This significant deficiency normally involves the licensee's failure to conduct adequate audits or to take prompt corrective action on the basis of such audits, and normally involves multiple examples ofdeficient construction or nstruction ofunknown quality due to dequate program implementation; . A failure to confirm the design fety requirements ofa structure or system as a result of inadequate preoperational test program implementation; or 3. A failure'to make a cequired 10 CFR ,50.55(e) ca port. D. Severity Level IVViolations involving failure to meet regulatory requirements including one or more Quality hssurance Criterion not amounting to Severity Level l, il. or iii violations that have more than minor safety or environmental signiiicance. Supplement IIISafeguacds This supplement provides examples of violations in each oftba four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of safeguacds. h. Severity Level IViolations involving for example: l. An act of radiological sabotage in which the security system did not function as required and. as a result of the failure. there was a significant event, such as: (a) h Safety Limit,as defined in 10 CFR 50.36 and the Technical ificelions. was exceeded; ) h system. designed to prevent or gate a serious safety event was not able to perform its intended safety function when actually called upon to work: or (c) hn accidental criticalityoccurred: 2. The theft. loss, or diversion of a formula quantity '"ofspecial nuclear material (SNM): or 3. hctual unauthorize production of a formula quantity ofSNM. B. Severity Level IIViolations involving forexample: 1. The entry ofan unauthorized individual ls who cepcesents a thceat into a vital area <" from outside the protected acea; 2. The theft. loss or diversion ofSNM ofmoderate strategic significance s'n which the security system did'not function as requincd; or 3. hctual unauthorixed production of SNM. C Severity Level 11IViolations involving forexample: 1. A failuce or inabilityto control 'access through estabHshed systems or procedures. such that an unauthorixed individual (i.e.. not authorized unescocted access to protected area) could easily gain undetected access <<'nto a vital area fram outside the protected area; 2. h failure to conduct any search at the access control point or conducting an inadequate search that resulted in the introduction to the protected acea of firearms, explosives. or incendiacy devices and reasonable facsimiles thereof that could significantly assist. radiological sabotage or theft of strategic SNM; 3, A failure. degradation. or other deficiency ofthe protected area intcusion detection or alarm assessment systems such that an unauthorixed 'individual who represents a threat could predictably circumvent the . system or defeat a specific zone with a high degree ofconfidence. without insider knowledge, or other significant. degradation ofoverall system capabiflty: d. A significant failure ofthe safeguacds systems designed or used to prevent or detect the theft. loss. or diversion ofstrategic SNM: 5. A failure to protect or control ciassified or safeguards information ' See 10 Cnt tsar for the definition of"formula quanuty." 's The tenn "unauthortaed individual"as used in this supplement means someone who was noi auihorbred (or entrance laio the area ln quesuon. or not authorised lo enter In the manner entered. >'he phrase "viralarea" as used in this suppiemenr includes viral areas and malarial access ~ s See 10 CFR ZSA for the de6nnion of"special nuciw matenal ofmoderale strategic signiCicance.- " ln determining whether access can be easily gained. feelers such as prediclabilily. idenufisbilny, ~nd ease ol passage should be considered. considered to be significant while the infortnation is outside the protected area and accessible to those not authorized access to the protected area; 6. h signi6cant failure to respond to an avant either in sufficient time to provide protection to vital equipment or strategic SNM, or with an adequate re ponse force: 7. h failure to perform an appropriate evaluation or background investigation ~so that information relevant to the access determination was not obtained or considered and as a result a person, who would likelynot have been granted access by the licensee, ifthe required investigation or evaluation had been performed; was granted access: or 8. h breakdown in the security pcogcam involving a number of violations that ace related (or, ifisolated. that ace recurrin violations) that collectively reflect a potentially significant lack ofattention or carelessness toward licensed cesponsibilities. D. Severity Level IVViolations involving forexample: 1. h failuce or inabilityto control access such that an unauthorized individual (Le.. authorized to protected area but not Io vital area) could easily gain undetected access into a vital area from iciside the protected area or into a controlled access area; 2. h failure to respond to a suspected event in either a timely nldciner or with an adequate response force: 3. h failure to implement 10 CFR Parts 25 and 95 with cespect to the information addressed under Section 142 ofthe hct. and.the NRCsi pproved security plan relevant to those parts; 4. h failure to make, maintain, or provide log entries in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 (c) and (d), where the omitted information (i) is not otherwise available in easily retrievable cecords, and (ii)signiiicantly contributes to the .ability ofeither the NRC or the licensee to identify a programmatic breakdown: 5. A faiiuce to conduct a proper search at the access control point: 6. h failure to properly secure or protect classified or safeguard s information inside the protected area which could assist an individual in an act of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic SNM where the information was not removed from the protected areal 7. h failure to control access such that an opportunity exists that could allow unauthorized and undetected access into the protected area but which was neither easily or likely to be exploitable 8. h failure to conduct an adequate search at the exit from a material access area:
ra ~,, ~ ':.. 344QQ ....-'.y'..;; . Federal Register I.;Vol..60;:No '1'z6 'I Friday.'-'Junse"30" 1995,J..Nottcogs.' ' ~ gt'. h theA or loss ofSNM of low strategic signiTicenco that was not detected withia the time period specified in the security plan, other relevant document. or regulation; or '0. Other violations that have more thaa minor safeguants significance. Supplement IV-Health Physics (10 CFR Part zo) 'his. supplement provides examples of violations in each ofthe four severity levels Its guidance in determining the ~ppropriate eovedty level for vio4tlons in the irea of health physics, 10 CFR Part zo.te A Severi'ty Lovel I Violations involving for example: I. A rad4ttoa exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 25 nims total effective dose equivalent. 7$ rema to the lens ofthe eye. or 250 rade to the skin ofthe whole body, or to the feet. ankles, hands or forearms. Or to any other organ or tissue; 2. A radfat ton exposure over the gestation period ofthe embryo/fetus of a declaied pregnant woman tn excess of 2.5 rema total effective dace equivalent: 3. A radiation exposure during any year ofa minor in excess of2.5 rems total effecttve dose equtvalent. 7.5 rema to the lens af the oye, or 25 gems to the skin of the whole body. or to the feet. ankles. hands or forearms. or to any other organ or tissue; 4, hn annuttt exposure of a member of the public tn excess of 1.0 rem total effective dose equivalent; 5. h release ofradioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in excess of50 times the limits for members of the public as described in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i); or 6. Disposal of licensed material in quantities or concentrations in excess of 10 times the limits of 10 CFR 20.2003. B. Severity Level HViolations involving for excmiPl: 1 1. h radiatioa exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 10 gems total effective doea equivalent, 30 rema to the lens ofthe aye, or 100 rema to the skin of tho whole body. or to the feet. ankles, hands or foreanas. or to any other organ or ttsgua; 2. h radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo/fetus of a declared pntgna'nt woman in excess of 1.0 rem total effective dose equivalent: 3. h radiation exposure during any year of a minor in excess of 1 rem total effective dose equivalent; 3.0 rems to the lens ofthe eye, ar 10 rems to tho 'v personne I overex pos urea and associated violations inc'urred during ~ lile-saving or other emergency response ~lion ~illbe treated on ~ case- bycase basis. skin of the whole body. or to the feet. ankles. hands or forearms, or to any other organ ar tissue; a. An annual exposure of a member of the public in excess of0.5 rem total effective'doso equivalent; 5. h rolease ofradioactive material to an ugtntstricted area at concentrations in excess of10 times the limits for membors ofthe public as described in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c)): S. D4posal of licensed matodat tn quantitiaa or conceatratloae in excess af five times the Itmtts of '10 CFR 20.2003: or 7. h failure to make an immediate nottficatton as required by 10 CFR 20.2202 (a)(1) or (a)(2). C. Severity Level IHViolations involving for example: l.Aradiation exposure during any year of a warker tn excess of 5 gems total effective dose equivalent. 1$ gems to the lena ofthe aye. or $0 rome to the akin ofthe whole body or to the feet. ankles. hands or forearms. or to any other organ or tissue; 2. Aradiation exposure over the gestation pedod ofthe embryo/fetus of a declared pregnant woman ln excess of 0.5 ntca'otal effective dose equivalent (except when doaee u>> in accontance with the provisions ofSection zo.lzos(J)); 3. h radiation exposure during any year ofa minor ln excess of0.5 gem total effectiv dose equivalent; 1.5 rema to the lans ofthe eye, or 5 rome to the akin ofthe whole body. or to the Eeet. ankles, hands or forearms. or to any other organ or tissue; 4. A worker exposure above regulatory limits when such exposure ntfleet a pmgnunmatic (rather than an isolated) weakness in the radiatioa control program; 5. An annual exposure ofa member of the public in excess of0.1 rem total effective dose equivalent (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has baca ~pproved by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c)): 6. A release ofradioactive materiat to an unrestricted area at coacentratiane in excess oftwo times the eflluent concentration limits referenced in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(t) (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c)): 7. h failure to make e zh-hour notificatio required by 10 CFR 20.2202(b) or an immediate notification required by 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1Xi): S. A substantial potential for exposures ar releases in excess of the 4 applicable limits in 10 CFR pan.20 actions 20.1001-'20tzlot, whether o not an exposure or release 9. Disposal af licensed mate covered in Sevedty Levels Ior Io. A release for unntstdctod use of contamttlated or radioactive material c equipment thit poses a rea)tsttc ential forexpoctgre oftho public to evels or docog excoechtg tho annual dose limitcformembers ofthe public. ar that reflects a programmatic (rather than an isolated) weakness in the , radiation control pmgram; 11. Conduct ofItceaeoe activities by technically unquaMod person; 12. h stgnificant t'allure to control licensed matedaj: or. 13. h breakdown In'he radiation. safety pmgram involving a number of violatioas that are related (or, lfisolatec that are rocurdng) that collective ty represent a potential ty significant lack ofattention ar carelessness toward licensed responsibilities. D. Sevedty Level IVViolations involving Eor example: 1. Expocures in excess ofthe limits ol 10 CFR 20.1201. 20.1207,.or 20.120S no constituting Severity Level I. H. or IH vialatioas; 2. Agelaaae ofradioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations ir excess ofthe ttmtts for members public as referenced in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) (except when a up to 0.$ gem a year haibeen appro ed by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c)); 3. A radiattoa dose rate in an unrestricted or controlled area'in exces: af 0.002 rem.in cay 1 hour (2 mtttireml" hour) or 50 millirems in a year. 4. Failure to maintain and implement radiation pmgrams ta keep radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable; 5. Doses to a member ofthe public in excess ofany Eph genenilly applicable environmental radiation standards, suc. as 40 CFR Part 190: S. h 6ttlure to make the 30-day aottficatton required by lo CFR 20.2201(eX1)(fl) or 20.2203(a): 7. h tatture to make a ttmoty written report as required by 10 CFR 20.2201(bi 20.2204. or 20.2206; or S. Any other matter that has more than a minor safety, health. or environmental significance. Supplement V Transportation This supplement provides examples ofvio4tions in each of the four sever levels as guidance in determining tb~ appropriate severity level for violet
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. ~ " '."', ' Federal Register / VoL'60.. No. 126./ Friday, Jun'e 30. 1995'/;.'Notices'~' " 34401 r'inthe acea af NRC transportation cequicements ~'. h. Severity Level IViolations involving for example: 1. Failure to meet transportation uirements that resulted in loss of control of radioactive material with a 'breach in package (ntegrity such that. the material caused a radiation exposum to . a mn~ber ofthe public and them was 'clear potential for the public to receive j more than.l rem to the whole body: 2. Surface contamination in oxcess of 50 times the NRC limit:or 3. External radiation levels in oxcess of 10 ticnes the NRC limit. B. Severit Level HViolations involving far example: 1. Failuce to meet transportation requirements that rosulted in loss of contm( af radioactive material with a breach in package integrity such that there was a clear potential for the member ofthe public to receive more than .I cem to the whole body; 2. Surface contamination in excess of 10. but not more than 50 times the NRC limit'. 3. External radiation levels in excess offivo,but not more than 10 times the NRC limit:or 4. h failure to make required initial notifications associated with Severity Level I or H violations. 'C. Severity Level IHViolations olving for example: . Surface contamlnatioa'in excess of ve but not mace than 10 times the NRC limit: 2. Extecnal radiation in excess of one but nat mote than five times the NRC limit: 3. hny noncompliance with labeling, placarding. shipping paper. packaging. loading, or other requirements that'ould reasonably result in the foflowingi (a) h significant failure to identify the type. quantity. or form of material; (b) h failuce of the carrier or recipient to exercise adequate contmls: or (c) h substantial potential foreither personnel exposure or contamination above regulatory limits or Improper transfer of material; l. h failure to make required initial notification associated with Severity Lovel HI violations; or 5. h breakdown in the licensee's program for the transportation of licensed material involving a number of violations that are related (ar. ifisolated, that are recurring vialatians) that <<Some transponation requirements are applied ~ to more than one licensee involved in the same activity such as a shipper and a carrier. When a violation ar such a requitement occurs. en(orcement n willbe directed acainst the responsible which. under the circumstances ol the msy be one or more ol the licensees involved. collectively reflect a potentially significant lack ofattention or carelessness toward licensed responsibilities. D. Severity Level IVViolations involving for example: 1. h breech of package integrity without external radiation love)s exceeding the NRC limitar w(thaut contamination levels exceeding five times the NRC limits: 2. Surface contamination in excess of but nat moro than five times the NRC limit; 3. hfaiiuce to register as an authorized user ofan NRGCertifiod Tcanspoct package; 4. h noncompliance with shipping papers, marking. htbe(ing, placacd(ng, packaging or loading not amounting to a Severity Level I, H, or HIviolation; 5. h failure to demonstrate that packages forspedal Yarm radioactive material meets applfcablo ceguhttocy requirements; 6. h failure to demonstrate that packages meet DOTSped ficatlons for 7h Type h packages: ar .I. Other vialatians that have moro than minor safety or envtmnmentai significance. Suppkment VlFuet Cyde and Materials Operations This.supp(emont provides examples 'ofvlo)ations in each ofthe four sovority levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level forviolatlpns in the area af fuel cyde and materials operations. h. Severity Level IViolations involving forexample: 1. Radiation levels. contamination levels, or releases that exceed 10 times the limits specified in the licenso; 2. h system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being operable when actually required to perform its design fu'nction; 3. h nudear criticalityaccident: or 4. h failure to fallowthe procedures ofthe quality management program. required by Section 35.32. that cesults in a death or serious injury (e.g.. substantial organ impairment) to a patient. B. Severity Level HViolations involving for example: 1. Radiation levels, contamination levels, or releases that exceed fivo times the limits specified in the license: 2. h system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event being inoperable; or 3. h substantial programmatic failure in the implementation of the quality management program required by 10 CFR 35.32 that results in a misadministration. 'C. Severity Level Hi 'Violatians involving for example I. h failure to control access to licensed materials for radiation purposes as specified by NRC requirements; 2. Possession or uso ofunauthorized equipment or'materials ln the conduct of licensee activities which degrades safety; 3. Use ofradioactive material on humans where such ustt is not autharized; 4. Conduct oflicensed activ(ties by a technically unqualified parson: .5. Radiation love(s. contamination levels, or releases thit exceod the limits spedfied in the Hcense; . 6. Substantial failure to implement the quality management pm'gram as requiied by Section 35,32 that does not result in a misadminlstratian: failure to repor a mlsadministcat(on: or programmatic weakness in the implementatian af the quality management pmgram that results in a misadcnlnistnt(on. 7. h breakdown in the contml of licensed activ(t(es involving a nuthber ofviolations that are related (or. if isolated, that ace cecurring violations) that collectively represent a potentially signlficant hick ofattention ar carelessness toward licensed responsibilities; ' h failure. during radiographic operations, ta have present or to use -'adiographic equipment. radiation survey instruments, and/or personnel monitoring devices as required by 10 CFR Part 34: 9, h failure to subcnit an NRC Form 241 in accordance with the cequicements in Section 150.20 of 10 CFR Part 150; 10.'h failure to receive required NRC approval prior to the implementation of a change in licensed activities that has radiological or programmatic significance. such as, a change in ownership; lack ofan RSO or replacement of an RSO with an unquaUfied individual: a change in the location where licensed activities are being conducted. or where licensed material ls being stoced where the new fadlities do not meet safety guidelines: or a change in'the quantity or type of cadioactive material being pmcessed or used that has radiological significance: af 11. h significant failure to meet decommissioning mquirements including a failure to notify the NRC as required by regulation or license condition. substantial failure to.meet decommissioning standards. failure lo conduct and/or complete decommicsionir." - "s itious ir,
I ~ ~ 34402 ..'.,'."", .Federal Re(&et /'Vol:.60. No..426 "/'Fi{day;'June'.30.'995./. NoUcesr-- r.::..'":: '~'r'. ":o'c accordance with regulation or license condition. or failuze to meet required schedules without adequate jusUficaUon. D. Severity Level IV V{o{aUons invo{~for example: '1. A fai{uze to znainta{n patients hospitalized who have cobalt~, cesium-137, or iridiu-192 implants or to conduct required leakage or contamination t~. or to use properly calibrated etpi{ptnent: 2. Other violations that have more than minor safety or environmental signlficancs;.or '. Failure to followthe quility znanagement program, {nc{ud{ng procedures, whether or not a misadministration cxxua. provided the failures az>> {soiated, do not demonstrate a pzogzanunatic weakness in the implementation ofthe QM piogzam, and have limited consequences ifL misadministration is involved: failure to conduct the required program review; or failure to take corrective actions as zequ{zed by Section 35.32: or w. A fs{luze to keep the records required by Sections 35.32 or 35.33: Supp)etzMtnt VI~4acellaneoos Matters This supplement provides examples ofviolations in each ofthe four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violaUons involvingmiscellaneous matteia. A. Severity Level IViolaUons involving for example: l. Inaccurate or incomplete information z'hat is provided to the NRC (s) deliberately with the knowledge of a {icensoe official that the {nfozmation is incomplete or inaccurate, or (b) ifthe information. had it been complete and sccurate at tha time provided, likely would have resulted in regulatory action such as an immediate order required by the public health and safety. 2. Incomplete or inaccurate information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee that is (a) incomplete or inaccurate because of falsification by or with the knowledge of a licensee official,or (b) ifthe inforznaUOO, had it been complete and ecctizate when reviewed by the NRC. likelywould have ~ resulted in regulatory acUon such as an immediate order required by public health and safety considerations; 3. Information that the licensee has identified as having s{gnifiant implications for public health snd safety >> In applyinz the examples in this supplement resardins Inaccurate or incomplete iniortnation aod record+ reference should also be made to the Suidance in Section IX."Inaccurate and Incomplete Inionnation.- and to the deilnltlon oI "licensee oAiclal"contained in Section IV.C or the common defense and security ("s{gn{fiantinformation identified by a licensee" ) and is deliberately withheld from the Commission: 4. Action by senior cozpozate management in violation of10 CFR 50.7 or similar regulations against an employee: 5. Aknowing and lntenUonal failure ~ to provide the noUce required by 10 CFR Part 21: or 6. A fa{luze to substantially {mplement the required fitnesa-foMuty program.zz 8. Severity Level I{ ViolaUons involvingforexample: 1. Inacsnizate or {ncocnplete {nfozznaUon that {s provided to the NRC (a) by a licensee oNc{al because of careless di for the completeness or eccuzacy ofthe {nfozmaUon, or (b) if the {nfozznaUon, had {tbeen complete and accurate at the Ume provided, likely would haw resulted in regulatory action slich as a show caiise order ot a different regulatory pos{Uon; 2. Incomplete or inaccurate {nfozznaUon that the NRC zequlres be kept by a licensee which {s (a) incomplete or inaccurate because of careless disregard forthe eccttzacy ofthe infozmaUon on the part ofa {{censee offic{al.or (b) lfthe {nformaUon. had {t bean complete and accurate when zeviewed by thi NRC. likelywould have resulted in zegulatory acUon such as a show cause order or a different regulatory tion; 3. "Sign{i{ant{nfolmat{onidentified by a licensee" and not provided to the Commission because ofcareless disregard on the part ofa licensee official; 4. An ection by plant management above first-line supervision in violation of 10 CFR 50.7 or similar regulations against an empfoyee: . 5. A failure to provide the notice ~ required by 10 CFR Part 21; 6. h failure to zemove an individual {zom unescorted access who has been involved in the sale, use, or possession of illegal drugs within the protected azee or take ection for on duty misuse of alcohol, prescription drugs, or over-the- counter drugs; 7. A failure to take reasonable action when observed behavior withinthe protected azea or credible infozznation concezzi{ng activities within the protected area indicates possible unfitness forduty based on drug or alcohol use; 8. A'delibstrate failuie of the licensee'znployee Assistance Program (EAP) to notify licensee's management when st The example for violations for fitnesa.iorduty relate to violations of io CFR Part 25. EAP's staff {s aware that an individ l. cond{Uon may adwzsely a~ saf related activities; or 9. The fs{luze of {{censee manage 'to take effecUve acUon in cozzectizig a hosUle work environment. C. Severity Level i{IViolations {nvolv{ngforexam le: 1. Incomplete or te {nfozznaUon that {s provided to the NRC . (a) because of {nadequate actions on Uie pazt of {{cansee o{fic{aisbut not amounting to a Severity Level Ior Il violaUoa, or (b) ifthe {nfozmaUon. had itbeen complete and accurate at the time prov{dad, likelywould have resulted in a zeconsideraUon ofa zegu{atozy Uon or substantial further {nqu{zy as an idd{tionalinspection or a forrnal zequest for {nfozmaUon: 2. Incomplete or inaccurate information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee that {s (a) incomplete or {neccttzate because of{nadequate ~ctions on the part of {{censee offiicials but not amounting to a Severity Level I or IIv{O4UOO, or (b) ifthe {nfolmaUOO, had ltbeen complete and accurate when reviewed by the NRC, likelywould have zesulted in a recons{dezaUon of a zeguistozy pos{t{onor substantial further {nqu{zysuch as an additional inspection or a formal request for information: 3. h {allureto provide "sign{fica {nfozmaUon {dentifiedby a licensee the Commission and not amounUng t a Seventy Level Ior IIvlolatlo'n. 4. An action by fizst-line supervision in violet{onof 10 CFR 50,7 or similar regulations against an employee; 5. An inadequate review or fe{lure to review such 4hatdf an.approprittte review had been made as requited. a 10 'FR Part 21 report would have been made; 6. h failure to complete asu{table inquiry on the basis of 10 CFR Part 26. keep zecozds concerning the denial of access, or respond to inquiries 'oncerning denials of access so that. as a result ofthe fs{{uze, a person previously dttn{ed access for fitness-for- duty reasons was improperly gzanted access; r 7. h failure to take the requited action fora person confizmed to have been tested positive forillegal drug use or take action for onsite alcohol use; not amounting to a Severity Level II violation; 8. h failure to assure, as required, that . contractors or vendors have an effective fitness-for4uty program; 9. h breakdown in the fitness-forMuty program involving a number of violations ofthe basic elements of t fitness-forduty progzam that collecUvely reflect a significant lac attantioa or carelessness towards
e, ~ , ' ' Federal Register I Val. 60. No. 126 I Friday. June 30. 1995 I Notices 34403 meeting the objectives of 10 CFR 26.10; or 0. Threats ofdiscriminatian or ~ ~ ~ ctivo ayeements which are ations under NRC regulations such as 10 CFR 50.7(f). D. Severity Level IVViolations involving for example: '.1. Incamplete or inaccurate Igformhian ofmore than minor: significance that is provided to the NRC but not amounting to'a Sevecity Level I, ILor QI violation: '2. Information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee and that is incomplete or inaccurate and af mote than minor significance but not amounting to a Severity Level I, II,or III violation; 3. hn inadoquate review or failure to review under 10 CFR Part 21 or other procedural violations associated with 10 CFR Pact 21 with mote than minor safety significance; 4. Violations ofthe cequicements of Pact 26 ofmore than minor significance; 5. h failure to report acts of licensed operators or supervisors pursuant to 10 CFR 26.73: or 8. Discrimination cases which. in themselves. do not warrant a Severity Level IIIcategorization. plecnent VIGEmecgency is supplecnent provides examples ofviolations in each ofthe four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severit lovel forviolations in the area of emergency preparedness. lt should be noted that citations are not normally made far violations involving emergency preparedness occurring during emergency exercises. However, where exercises reveal (i) training, procedural,'r repetitive failures for which corrective actions have not been taken. (ii)an overall concern regarding the licensee's ability to implement its plan in a manner that adequately protects pubBc health and safety, or (iii) poor self critiques ofthe licensee's exercises, enforcement action may be appropriate. h. Severity Level IVialatians , involving forexample: In a general emergency. licensee failure to promptly (1) correctly classify the event. (2) make required notifications to responsible Federal. State. and local agencicnr, or (3) respond to tho event {e.g.. assess actual or potential oifsite consequences, activate emecgency cespanse facilities. and auynent shift stafg. 8. Severity Level IIViolations involving for example: l. In a site emergency. licensee 6siluce to promptly (1) correctly classify the evont. (2)'make required notification to responsible Federal. State, and local agencies. oc (3) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual ar potential affsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and auynent shih staff): or 2. h licensee failure to meet or implement one emeigency planning standard involving asseQ'ment or notification. C. Severity Level.IIIViolations involving for example: 1. In an alert, licensee failure to promptly (1) correctly classify the event, (2)make required natifications to 'esponsible Federal. State, and local agencies. or (3) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential offsite consequences, activate emergency response facilMes, and auynent shih stall); 2. h licensoe failure to meet or implement mote than one emergency planning standard involving assessment or notificatio: or 3. h breakdown in the control of licensed activities involving e number. ofviolations that are related (or, if. Isolated, that are recurring violations) . that collectively represent a potentielly significant lack ofattention ar carelessness toward licensed responsibilities. D. Severity Level IVViolations involving for example: h licensee failure to meet or implement any emergency planning standard or cequhement not directly related to assessment and notification. Dated at Rockvilia, Maryland. this 23rd day ofJune 1995. For the Nuclear ttegulatory Commission. Jeha C Hoyle, Secnrtacyof the Commission. iFR Doc. 95-15952 Flied e-29-95: eia5 aml
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