IR 05000255/1996008

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Insp Rept 50-255/96-08 on 960727-0906.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support
ML18066A789
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/18/1996
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML18066A788 List:
References
50-255-96-08, 50-255-96-8, NUDOCS 9612260129
Download: ML18066A789 (14)


Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Docket No.:

License No.:

Report No.:

Licensee:

Facility:

Location:

Dates:

Inspectors:

Approved by:

9612260129 961018 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G

PDR 50-255 DPR-20 50-255/96008{DRP)

Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530 July 27 through September 6, 1996 M. Parker, Senior Resident Inspector P. Prescott, Resident Inspector W. J. Kropp, Chief, Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-255/96008 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident *

inspectio Operations

There were two instances of inadequate senior reactor operator {SRO)

coverage in the control room; however, these incidents had minor safety

  • significance. This is considered a violation of TS 6.2.2b for failing to have a SRO in the control room at all times {Section 01.2).

Maintenance

Maintenance personnel missed a procedure step during post maintenance testing of the new wattmeters for the Emergency Diesel Generator {EOG)

1-The licensee reviewed the event, and the same testing for EOG 1-2 was completed without any problem During the maintenance outage to install the wattmeter, however, a technician operated the ventilation system without proper authorization {Section Ml.2).

Engineering

The Emergency Diesel Generator system engineer took inappropriate troubleshooting actions by manually stopping the fuel rack from oscillating during surveillance testing of EOG 1-1. The licensee took appropriate corrective actions {Section El.l).

  • The inspectors expressed concern to licensee management that initial baseline testing of the containment air coolers had not been performed

{Section El.2).

Plant Support

Radiological worker practices appeared adequate~ {Section Rl.1).

Report Details Summary of Plant Status The unit operated at full power during the inspection perio Conduct of Operations 01.l General Comments C71707l I. Operations Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operation In general, the conduct of opera-tions was professional and safety-conscious; however, on two separate occasions, no senior reactor operator was present in the control room for a short period of time. A violation was issued for failure to meet TS 6.2.2.2 Control Room Manning Inspection Scope C71707l On August 9, the Operations Manager notified the inspectors that no senior reactor operators (SROs) were present in the control room for a short period of tim The inspectors followed up on the licensee's evaluation and corrective action Observations and Findings On August 9, at 4:30 am, the control room supervisor (CRS} left the control room to confer with the other two on-shift SROs, the shift supervisor (SS) and the shift engineer (SE), who were in the shift supervisor's office. The SROs recognized that no SRO was present in the control room, and the CRS immediately returned to the control roo The duration of the absence was believed to be less than 10 seconds, and the CRS was within eyesight of the control room through the viewing gallery windo The inspectors noted that the CRS was not ~ permanent shift holder but was on-shift to maintain proficiency. Also, the CRS had incorrectly assumed that the control room boundaries had been moved to accommodate changes in the physical seating of the SROs as a result of ongoing construction modifications in the control roo The licensee had previously evaluated the impact of construction on the seating arrangements.and work stations of the SROs and had determined that no changes to the defined control room boundaries were necessar On August 13, the Operations Manager informed the inspectors that a second incident of improper shift manning had occurre On August 13, at 3:15 p.m., the SE left the control roo The SE had been asked to maintain control room SRO oversight manning responsibilities while the

CRS left the cQntrol room for a short period of tim The SE left the control room a short time later to process a work order; the absence lasted for less than one minut When questioned by the CRS in the control room, the SE immediately recognized this oversigh The SE stated that he had been briefed on the August 9 incident and that he was aware of the control room boundarie He also indicated that the night orders had addressed this issue and that control room manning had been covered during a prior shift turnover. After recognizing this incident, the shift noted that the oncoming CRS was in the control room during the time of the incident; however, the oncoming CRS was not fully aware of existing plant conditions nor had he received a proper turnover to assume control of the shif Technical Specifications 6.2.2b. and 10 CFR 50.54 (m)(2)(iii) state that at least one licensed senior reactor operator shall be in the control room at all times during conditions other than cold shutdown or refueling. Administrative Procedure 4.00, "Operations Organization Responsibilities and Conduct", Rev. 17, dated June 25, 1996, states in paragraph 5.2.1.a that the shift supervisor shall ensure the operating shift is properly manned and shall be maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54, Palisades Technical Specifications, and the Site Emergency Pla The Operations Control Panel Monitoring Standard, dated February 14, 1996, includes diagram defining both the "At-The-Controls" area of the control room and the control room boundaries and shows the expected shift manning position c. Conclusions Confusion due to ongoing construction activities, compounded in one instance by having a non-permanent shift holder assume the shift, resulted in no SROs being present in the control room when require Due to the short duration of the absences, these incidents were of minor safety significance and were considered two examples of a violation of TS 6.2.2b.(50-255/96008-0l(DRP)).

Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92700 and 92702)

08.l (Closed) Violation CVIOl 50-255/93030-01:

Cooldown Rate Exceede Inadequate procedural guidance and personnel error resulted in failure to maintain the cooldown rates less than 40°F/hr with the primary coolant system (PCS) temperature between 170° and 250° and less than 20°F/hr with the PCS temperature less 170° The licensee's evaluation showed that the proper temperature indication to use in the cooldown calculations was the vessel return temperatur The applicable procedures were revised to include monitoring.vessel return temperature, and the operating crews were given classroom and simulator training.*

Additionally, the calculation for IO CFR 50, Appendix G indicates that the vessel brittle fracture limit had not been exceeded during the September 17, 1993, cooldow This item is close.2 CClosedl VIO 50-255/93030-02:

Procedures Not Implemented as Require Administrative Procedure 4.00, "Operation, Organization Responsibilities, and Conduct," requires the shift supervisor and operating shift to remain cognizant of the cooldow The shift involved*

with the excessive cooldown rate was removed from licensed duties for training which focused on specific tasks associated with reactor system cooldowns, job planning, teamwork and communication skills. The shift*

was then evaluated on the simulator and received an adequate performance rating prior to resuming licensed duties. Also, the remaining shifts received similar training. This item is close.3 CClosedl VIO 50-255/93030-03:

Procedures Not Appropriate to Circumstance System Operating Procedure (SOP) 1, "Primary Coolant System," did not provide sufficient guidance to properly control the plant cooldown and transition from forced circulation to shutdown cooling flo The prime concern was the temperature change of the water flow over the reactor vessel beltline wel The procedure was revised to provide specific guidance on controlling the cooldown rate throughout the transient period corresponding to stopping all primary coolant pump A licensee evaluation concluded that the transition to shutdown cooling (SOC) could be performed within the TS limits by testing the revised procedure on the simulator. The operating crews then received simulator training with the revised procedures. This item is closed~

08.4 Related Open Items In addition to the items discussed in paragraphs 08.1 through 0 above, the following related open items are closed:

o Licensee Event Report 50-255/93010 (closed)

~

Unresolved Item 50-255/93021-0l(DRP) (closed)

Apparent Violation 50-255/93028-0l(DRP) (closed)

Apparent Violation 50-255/93028-02(DRP) (closed)

Apparent Violation 50-255/93028-0Ja(DRP) (closed)

Apparent Violation 50-255-93028-03b(DRP) (closed)

Apparent Violation 50-255/93028-04a(DRP) (closed)

Apparent Violation 50-255/93028-04b(DRP) (closed)

II. Maintenance Ml Conduct of Maintenance Ml.I General Comments Inspection Scope (62703 and 61726)

  • The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:
  • 24612469:

24612917:

PPAC FWS067 P-8A Inspect coupling and change pump oil Removal, inspection and reinstallation of service

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24611504:

24610199:

24513491:

water pump P-78 upper motor bearings Replacement of EOG Tachometer

.

PM on EOG 1-2 Inspection of collector rings and end rotor bearing Repair/Recoat Containment Dome Surveillance Activities

SOP-8 Attachment Two: Testings of the Main Turbine Protective Trip Devices

M0-38: Auxiliary Feedwater System In-Service Test Procedure

SOP-22: (for EOG 1-1) Emergency Diesel Generators

TI-SC-96-011-01: Specification change test for EOG 1-1 newly installed watt-meters

TI-SC-96-011-02: Specification change test for EOG 1-2 newly installed watt-meters

MI-2A:

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip Units

M0-33:

Control Room Ventilation Emergency Operation b. Observations and Findings The work performed under these activities was generally professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use, and supervisors and system engineers frequently monitored job progres When applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in plac c. Conclusions The inspectors observed good procedure adherence practices. Specific discussions of observed maintenance are discussed in paragraph M belo M Emergency Diesel Generator CEOGl 1-2 Maintenance Outage and Testing Inspection Scope (62703 and 61726)

The inspectors observed various preventative maintenance (PM) activities for the EOG 1-2 including testing of a local wattmeter installed under a specification change (SC).

The SC also added.permanent EOG starting circuit timing test jack b. Observations and Findings On August 20, during testing of the wattmeter, a large error was noted between the control room and local panel wattmete Licensee

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troubleshooting found that one of the current transformer shorting switches, TS-8/TS-17, was not closed as required by the test procedur The step had been missed by both the electrical maintenance technician and an independent verifie The wattmeter test instructions included a step which required the technician to close switch TS-2/TS-11, which was done, then close switch TS-8/TS-17, restoring the switch to its normal positio The test s~itches were not labeled, the personnel involved were performing the procedure for the first time, and only one action would normally be performed per procedure step. Additionally, the job was assigned to the electrical maintenance department the same day it was done which left little opportunity for the technicians to perform a walkdown or review the test instructions. The immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee's electrical maintenance management was to stop work and discuss the importance of self-check and independent verification with all electrical maintenance and instrumentation and control personne This failure to properly perform a step in a test instruction constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-255/96008-02(DRP)).

During performance of EOG preventive maintenance, an electrical maintenance technician started the supply ventilation fan to the EOG 1-2 room.without consulting operations personnel or the forema When brought to their attention by the inspectors, licensee management took appropriate corrective actions. This unauthorized manipulation of plant equipment constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being.

treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-255/96008-0J(DRP)).

Conclusions The test instructions were revised and a satisfactory retest was conducte The inspectors observed the test and no further problems were identifie On August 28, the same SC was performed on the EOG 1-The inspectors witnessed the prejob brief, the test connections installation, and the post maintenance test. The prejob brief was thorough and there were no problems noted with either the test connection installation or subsequent testin The licensee took immediate corrective actions to address the inspectors's concerns regarding maintenance personnel operating plant equipment without authorizatio The corrective actions included discussions with personnel about the need to stop and ask questions if procedure steps appear unclear and the importance of self-checking.

The inspectors and the system engineer discussed the impact of the speed oscillations which occurred during performance of surveillance testing on operability of EOG 1-1. During these discussions the inspectors determined that the system engineer may have taken actions not covered by the surveillance procedur The concern about troubleshooting during an operability surveillance was discussed with operations and engineering managemen b. Observations and Findings On August 4, 1996, the licensee performed monthly surveillance M0-7A-l,

"Emergency Diesel Generators 1-1 & 1-2" for the emergency diesel generator (EOG) 1-1. After the EOG was started, but prior to loading the generator, the auxiliary operator and the system engineer noticed that the arm of the fuel rack was oscillating approximately three quarters of an inch of travel. The system engineer had seen these oscillations before and touched the fuel rack arm to stop the. motio The surveillance continued and the EOG 1-1 was declared operable. This manipulation of the fuel racks contrary to the surveillance procedure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-255/96008-04(DRP)).

The system engineer stated the problem was due to the governor requiring tuning and/or possible air entrainment in the governor oi Additionally, in an accident scenario, the EOG would load to a dead bus; therefore, the oscillations would not cause a proble The inspectors were concerned that there was not a full understanding of what may occur if the oscillations had not been stopped and the EOG had been synchronized to a loaded bus instead of a dead bu The purpose of the surveillance was to demonstrate operability of the EOG, not to conduct troubleshootin Licensee management agreed that the system engineer should not have intervened in the surveillanc On August 14, the inspectors observed a surveillance performed to prove operability. The fuel rack oscillations were less pronounced than on the earlier surveillance, and the EOG successfully loaded to the bu No problems were noted while the EOG was loade c. Conclusions Licensee management agreed that it was inappropriate for a system engineer to manipulate equipment during performance of a surveillanc The licensee took appropriate corrective actions to address the inspector's concern El.2 Containment Air Coolers CCACsl Performance Testing Inspection Scope C3755ll The inspectors reviewed condition report C-PAL-96-0845, "Gross Reduction in Service Water Flow to Hypochlorite Eductor Following SW Pump Rotation." One item discussed with system engineers involved testing of the containment air cooler Equipment performance data such as air flow and motor horsepower were tested; however, heat removal capability (overall system performance) was not successfully accomplishe b. Observations and Findings On July 30, 1996, while chlorination was in progress to the service

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water system, the control room switched from pumps P-ZA and P-ZC to P-ZB and P-ZC in service. Following the transfer, the control room received

  • the "chlorination trouble" annunciator. A similar alarm occurred on May 29, 199 On May 31, maintenance personnel removed a section of piping downstream of the chlorination system educto The inner surfaces of the eductor and observable downstream piping were coated with a thick layer of calcium carbonate. Pieces of the coating, approximately three quarters of an inch in diameter, had broken off, and the inspectors were concerned about the possibility of heat exchanger foulin The chemistry technician believed that the pieces were too large to pass through the one-half inch dilution manifold perforations in the intake bay of the service water pump During discussions with plant system engineers, the inspectors became aware that the new CACs, installed during the 1995 refuel outage, did not have any baseline performance data nor had any performance testing been performed since initial installatio The inspectors reviewed the licensee's commitments to Generic Letter (GL) 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment."

In response to GL 89-13, an action item record (AIR), A-NL-90-036 required the licensee to test the heat transfer capability of CACs VHX-1, VHX-2 and VHX-3, demonstrating that the original CACs would perform the intended design function. This test, performed at the end of a refuel outage with negligible heat loads in containment, showed that the temperature differential between service water and containment temperature was margina In AIR A-NL-92-099, the licensee documented the-potential inaccuracy of the test data and. committed to perform testing in subsequent outages at different times of the year to determine if the test results would be consisten Post-modification testing was performed on the new CACs after the original coolers were replaced due to system leak As with the original coolers, the testing was performed at the end of a refuel

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outage, and the performance data was determined to be inconclusiv Also, permanent instrumentation was installed to provide more accurate data on system parameters and allow on-line testing; however, from the I995 refuel outage to present no testing was performe In fact, test procedure T-3I8 "Containment Air Coolers Performance Test," was inactive. Licensing personnel believed that the commitments to GL 89-I3 had been met, since the original CACs had been tested. The inspectors stated that GL 89-I3 was intended to ensure SW system reliability and that the licensee's internal position to GL 89-I3 was for testing of the heat exchangers to continue on a periodic basi c. Conclusions The system engineer stated that the test procedure was under review and that CAC testing was scheduled for the end of the I996 refuel outag The system engineer's workload had not allowed ample time to prepare for testing at the start of the I996 refuel outage, when sufficient heat load in containment is expected to provide satisfactory data. Testing of the CAC heat exchangers was scheduled during plant heatup following the I996 refuel outage. Also, engineering will conduct an assessment of all GL 89-I3 heat exchangers to review the overall adequacy of heat exchanger performance trendin The evaluation of potential plugging of SW heat exchangers due to pieces of calcium carbonate breaking loose was considered an Inspection Followup Item (IFI 50-255/96008-05) pending inspector revie IV. Plant Support Rl Rad;ological Protection and Chem;stry Controls RI.I Maintenance Outages and Daily Radiological Worker Practices Inspection Scope (83750}

The inspectors observed radiological worker activities during the various maintenance outages detailed in this inspection report and monitored radiological practices during daily plant tour Observations and Findings Where applicable for maintenance outages, radiation technicians were present at the job sites. The technicians took appropriate actions and surveys in accordance with good ALARA practice c. Conclusion The inspectors concluded that radiological practices observed during the - - ****---

maintenance outages and plant daily walkdowns were adequat The inspectors had no concern IO

  • V. Management Meetings Xl Exit Meeting SUD111ary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 9, 1996.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. A. Fenech, Vice President, Nuclear Operations T. J. Palmisano, Plant General Manager K. P. Powers, Nuclear Services General Manager G. B. Szczotka, Nuclear Performance Assessment Manager H. L. Linsinbigler, Design Engineering Manager T. C. Bordine, Licensing Manager D. W. Rogers, Operations Manager J. P. Pomeranski, Maintenance and Construction Manager D. P. Fadel, System Engineering Manager D. G. Malone, Shift Operations Supervisor D. J. Malone, Chemical & Radiation Protection Services Manager K. M. Haas, Training Manager S. Y. Wawro, Planning & Scheduling Manager M. E. Parker, Senior Resident Inspector, Palisades P. F. Prescott, Resident Inspector, Palisades

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:

IP 61726:

IP 62703:

IP 71707:

Onsite Engineering Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observation Plant Operations IP 83750:

Occupational Radiation Exposure IP 92700:

Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92702:

Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations Opened 50-255/96008-01 VIO 50-255/96008-02 NCV 50-255/96008-03 NCV 50-255/96008-04 NCV 50-255/96008-05 IFI Closed 50-255/93030-01 VIO 50-255/93030-02 VIO 50-255/93030-03 VIO 50-255/93021-01 URI 50-255/93028-01 APP VIO 50-255/93028-02 APP VIO 50-255/93028-03a APP VI /93028-03b APP VIO 50-255/93028-04a APP VIO 50-255/93028-04b APP VIO 50-255/93010 LER 50-255/96008-02 NCV 50-255/96008-03 NCV 50-255/96008-04 NCV ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Failure to have a SRO in the control room at all times Failure to perform a step in a test instruction Unauthorization operation of plant equipment Failure to follow surveillanc procedure Calcium carbonate fouling of CAC heat exchanger Cooldown rate exceeded Procedures not implemented as required Procedures not appropriate to circumstances Excessive cooldown rate Failure to maintain cooldown rate less than 20 degrees an hour Failure to maintain cooldown rate less than 40 degrees an hour Failure of.the control room operators to remain cognizant of the cooldowri rate *

Failure of the shift supervisor to remain cognizant of the cooldown rate Failure to maintain an adequate cooldown data log for monitoring the cooldown rate SOP-I did not consider the transition of temperature monitoring for T-cold to SOC Exceeding the primary coolant system cooldown rate Failure to perform a step ina test instruction Unauthorization operation of plant equipment Failure to follow surveillanc procedure

  • AIR ALARA APP CAC CFR CR CRS DRP EOG FSAR GL I&C IFI IP IR LCO LER NRC NRR PCS PDR PM PPAC PPEP PPM PSIG REF OUT SC soc SE SOP SRO SS SW TI TS URI VIO WO LIST OF ACRONYMS USED Action Item Record As Low As Reasonably Achievable Apparent Containment Air Cooler Code of Federal Regulations Condition Report Control Room Supervisor Division of Reactor Projects Emergency Diesel Generator Final Safety Analysis Report Generic Letter Instrumentation & Control Inspection Followup Item Inspection Procedure

Inspection Report

Limiting Condition of Operation

Licensee Event Report

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Primary Coolant System

Public Document Room

Preventative Maintenance

Periodic and Predetermined Activity_ Control

Palisades Performance Enhancement Program

Parts Per Million

Pounds per Square Inch Gauge

Refuel Outage

Specification Change

Shutdown Cooling

Shift Engineer

System Operating Procedure

Senior Reactor Operator

Shift Supervisor

Service Water

Test Instruction

Technical Specification

Unresolved Item

Violation

Work Order