IR 05000255/1996004
| ML18065A730 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1996 |
| From: | Gardner R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18065A729 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-96-04, 50-255-96-4, NUDOCS 9605290105 | |
| Download: ML18065A730 (12) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II I INSPECTION REPORT No. 50-255/96004(DRS)
FACILITY Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant LICENSEE Palisade Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530 DATES March 18 through April 29, 1996 INSPECTORS E. Cobey, Reactor Inspector D. Butler, Reactor Inspector APPROVED BY 5/7-<?/f fo R. N. Gardner, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Date AREAS INSPECTED A special, reactive safety inspection was conducted to review th circumstances surrounding several fire protection conditions identified by the licensee as being outside the design basis of the facilit RESULTS Two apparent violations were identified involving:
1) failure to provide an operable alternative or dedicated shutdown capability where systems required for hot shutdown were-not protected (e.g., a fire in the cable spreading room); and 2) hilure to promptly identify and take effective corrective actions for several significant fire protection conditions adverse to quality.
9605290105 960520 PDR ADOCK 05000255 Q
INSPECTION DETAILS
-**--'-----1~. 0-~ *Summary ~of Events
On July 28 through September 30, 1986, the NRC conducted an Appendix R inspection in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2515/62, Revision 2, documented in Inspection Report No. 50-255/86022(DRS).
This inspection resulted in two violations for failure to maintain fire barriers due to unsealed conduits and fo~ failure to provide required emergency lightin In addition, the inspection resulted in five unresolved items and three open items pending further analysis by the license The licensee's response to the inspection report on December 12, 1986, committed to seal the conduits to provide an adequate fire barrier and to conduct a re-evaluation of the emergency lighting for all areas containing safe shutdown equipment and their access and egress route On May 9 through June 30, 1988, the NRC conducted a fo 11 ow-up *Appendix R inspection, documented in Inspection Report No. 50-255/88012(DRS).
This inspection resulted in one Severity Level III violation for inadequate corrective actions related to the lack of a spurious signal analysis for the volume control tank outlet isolation valve, M0-208 As a result of this violation, the licensee was assessed a $75,000 civil penalt It also resulted in two Severity Level IV violation The first violation was for an inadequate breaker coordination analysis and for not.
performing a high/low pressure interface analysi The second violation was for inadequate corrective actions associated with the emergency lighting syste The licensee's response to the inspection report on January 20, 1989, committed to form a Technical Advisory Group to act as an oversight review group to re-review technical issues and provide direction to ensure Palisades' compliance with Appendix Also, the activities of this group were to be presented to plant management on at least a quarterly basi As a result of the enforcement conference on September 2, 1988, and the commitments made in the licensee'~ r~sponse to the violations on January 20, 1989, these violations were considered closed by the NRC as described in Inspection Report No.. 50-255/89004(DRP).
Subsequent investigation by the licensee identified two conditions outside the design basis of the facilitj as described in Licensee Event Reports (LER)89-013, "Inadequate Separation Between Circuits for Redundant Safety Equipment," and LER 91-014, Supplements 1 through 3,
"Safety-related Circuits Routed with Opposite Channel Circuits." Also, in November 1989, Palisades contracted with Tenera Engineering Services to perform an assessment of the Fire Protection/Appendix R Progra The Tenera assessment_identified numerous programmatic. weaknesses which' were consistent with the technical issues identified during the two previous NRC inspection From 1989 to early 1994, Palisades had an Appendix R Improvement Plan in place to address these weaknesse However, it received little management attention and resources; and henc~, it was not successful in resolving these issues.
- --
..
As a result of a new Palisades management team and in conjunction with the concerns raised during and subsequent to the NRC Diagnostic
.. _Evaluation Team InspEl.~tion conducted at Palisades in early 1994, the l fEensee *raised the priority for resolution of the long standing
- Appendix R compliance issues. During June 1994, Palisades contracted with Engineering Planning and Management, Inc. (EPM) to conduct an assessment to determine the facility's compliance with Appendix R *
requirement The assessment conducted by EPM was critical and raised nu~erous weaknesses that*were similar to those that had previously been identified, yet had not been corrected. Subsequently, the licensee initiated the Appendix R Enhancement Program to identify and resolve all*
Appendix R issue.1 * Alternate Shutdown Panel Inoperable due to the Improper Setting of.the Low Voltage Cut-off CLER 96-003):
The alternate shutdown panel was installed in mid 1981 by Facility Change, FiC-407-14 This facility change failed to address the inverter low voltage cut-off setpoin As a result, post-modification inspections and testing did not verify the operability of the alternate shutdown panel when powered directly from the battery. This configuration would be required for a fire which resulted in a loss of off-site power and loss of battery chargers (e.g., a fire in the cable spreading room).
Consequently, the current testing program failed to address the inverter low v~ltage cut-off setpoin On September 27, 1995, during the performance of Technical Specification Surveillance Test Procedure Q0-23, "Alternate Hot Shutdown Panel Instrumentation Checks," the DC input breaker tripped ope S~bsequent troubleshooting revealed that the ~ltern~te shutdown panel alarm board had faile It was also discovered that the inverter low voltage cut-off was set at approximately 120 Volts D When the new circuit board was installed, system engineering directed that the low voltage cut-off be conservatively set to minimum, 100.3 Volts DC; however, no setpoint methodology was applied in establishing this new setpoint. A condition report, C-PAL-95-1519, was initiated to address the deficiencies;.
however, the condition report description did nbt appropriately describe the condition. Consequently, the evaluation was cursory and did not discover that the alternate.shutdown panel had been inoperable as a result of the low voltage cut-off setpoint; and, the license~ failed to
- recognize that th*e event was reportabl *
-
On January 15, 1996, while research1ng information for the Appendix R Alternate Shutdown Battery Capacity Analysis, the licensee discovered-that during the performance of work order #24513506, the inverter low voltage cut-off had been found set at approximately 120 Volts D Thus, the low voltage cut-off was set higher than the calculated initial battery terminal-voltage at the onset of a.fire requiring alternate shutdown coincident with a loss of off-site power and loss of battery chargers: The licensee initiated a condition report, C-PAL-96-0051, to address the above.issues. Subsequent evaluation also discovered a missed opportunity to identify this condition in June 198 General Electric Service Information Letter No. 418, "Topaz Inverter Low Voltage Shutoff," described this condition for a Topaz inverte However,* the licensee did not evaluate the condition since they possessed an inverter
- -------
1. 2 purchased from a different vendor, even though it was susceptible to the same conditio fhe-se-'ffodings repre_;sent an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.48(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections 111.G.3 and 111.L.l in that from original installation in 1981 through September 27, 1995, the Alternate Shutdown Panel, EC-150/EL-150A, was inoperable due to the improper setting for the inverter low voltage cut-of Lack of Circuit Fuse Coordination Which Affects Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment (LER 95-013):
On November 3, 1995, the licensee ~iscovered that the diesel generator 1-1 potential transformer secondary side fuses, FUZ/Al020-l, did ~ot coordinate with the primary side fuses, FUZ/All07-As a result, a postulated fire in the cable spreading room or the control room could have faulted (ground) this circuit and caused the primary side fuses to bl6w before the secondary side fuse Failure of the primary side fuses would have caused a loss of automatic and manual voltage control and would have rendered the diesel generator inoperabl For a postulated fire in the cable spreading room or the control room, it could be assumed that a loss of off-site power and a loss of diesel generator 1-2 would have occurred as a result of the fire damag Thus, due to this lack of fuse coordination in the diesel generator 1-1 potential transformer circuit, a fire induced station blackout could have resulted. Therefore, until diesel gener~tor 1-1 was recovered, the licensee would have been unable to maintain the reactor in a hot standby conditio In response to this deficiency, the licen~ee initiated a condition-report, C-PAL-95-169 One of the corrective actions for this condition report was to provide guidance to the operators for recovering diesel generator 1-1 following this even At the time of the inspection, this had not been effectively completed. This issue had been briefly covered -
during operator refresher training. However, the operators on shift did not fully understand the extent of the actions that would be necessary to recover the diesel generato In the event that this scenario had occurred, *the operators would have been forced to figure out how.to recover the diesel generator without the benefit of any guidanc A~
the-time of the inspection, Off Norma1 Procedure ONP-20, "Diesel Generator Manual Control," was in the process of being revised; however, the inspectors were unable to determine whether the revised procedure would have adequately addressed this issu These findings represent an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.48(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections 111.G.3 and 111.L.l and 7 in that from 1981 through March 29, 1996, Diesel Generator 1-1 was not properly isolated from associated circuit.3 Redundant Diesel Generator Circuit Separation (LER 95-004):
On July 14, 1995, the licensee discovered that diesel generator 1-2 power and control circuits did not meet Appendix R separation requirement Diesel generator 1-2 power and control circuits were
- ----~--
. /----. *
routed through the air intake plenum for diesel generator 1-The diesel generator 1-1 air intake plenum was not considered a separate
__ fire area and the barrier that separated the air intake plenum from the diesel room was not fire rated. Therefore, a fire in the diesel generator 1-1 room could have caused a loss of both emergency diesel generator The licensee's corrective action for this deficiency was to determine an effective fire rating for the barrier between the diesel generator 1-1 room and the air intake plenum using the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 86-10, "Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements."
The evaluation, EA-FPP-95-047, dated November 14, 1995, "Analysis of the Effects of a Fire on the Barriers Between Diesel Generator Room 1-1 and the East Air Plenum Room," concluded that the concrete wall had a three hour fire rating while the ventilation ducting and recirculation damper penetrations had an equivalent one hour fire ratin The fire rating of the ventilation ducting and recirculation damper penetrations were established by engineering judgemen In addition, the evaluation performed a fire loading calculation for the diesel room and determined that the room had an equivalent fire severity of 20 minute Therefore, the evaluation concluded that the barrier provided adequate protection to prevent a fire* from affecting both emergency diesel generator The NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and concluded that it was not. sufficient 1 y rigorous to demonstrate that the barrier had* an equivalent fire rating commensurate with the fire loading of the room for the following reasons:
The analysis was not bounding. Specifically, it did not consider all possible failure modes for an operating diesel or operating modes of the diesel room ventilation syste Also, the analysis did not evaluate the potential impact of de~raded or inoperable suppression system *The methodology utilized to evaluate the fire severity was not conservative. Non-cellulosic materials such as combustible liquids and plastics burn with a greater severity; therefore, a fire involving these materials could initially exceed the standard time temperature curv These.findings represent an apparent violation of the requirements to promptly identify and correct significant fire protection and safe shutdown conditions adverse* to quality. Those requirements are described in Consumers Power Company Quality Assurance Topical Report CPC~2A and required pursuant to Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
.Opera~ing License No. DPR-20, Amendment No. 171, Section 2.2.C.(3), Fire Protecti.on Safety Evaluation Report Supplement No. 2, dated February 10, 1981*, -section 3.2.2, and Consumers Power Company letter dated June 19, 197.
Lack of Procedural Guidance for Low Pressure Safety Jnjection Pump Repair Following a Fire (LER 95-009):
On July 28, 1995, the licensee discovered that the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) circuits did not meet the separation requirements of 5 *
Appendix The LPSI pump suction pressure permissive was routed in the east engineered safeguards room, fire area 10, where the redundant LPSI
--***-.
~---pump was located and in the 590' corridor auxiliary building, fire.
area 13, where the redundant power supply and pump pressure permissive.
circuit were located. A fire in these areas could have resulted in the loss of both trains of low pressure safety injection which were needed to support cold shutdown of the facilit This issue had been identified by the licensee's original Appendix R evaluations; however, the licensee's resolution to control the pump locally at the power supply breaker was inadequate since a failure in the pump pressure permissive circuit would have' resulted in a loss of control power to the breake As a result, the LPSI pump could not be op~rated without isolating the fault and replacing the breaker control power fuse The licensee's corrective actions for this deficiency were to proceduralize the necessary repairs to allow local manual operation of the breaker and to place spare control power fuses in the warehouse as emergency spare part The licensee conducted a review of maintenance procedures EPS-E-7, Revision 5, Section 5.5, "Local Tending of 2.4 KV Bus IC Switchgear," and EPS-E-8, Revision 5, Section 5.6, "Local Tendirig of Diesel Generator 1-2 (K-6B) and 2.4 KV Bus ID Switchgear," and concluded that sufficient guidance was contained in those procedures to isolate the fault and locally control the LPSI pump breake These corrective actions were completed on December I, 199 However, the NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's ccrrective actions and determined that they were inadequate to isolate the fault and allow local manual operation.of the LPS I pump breake Spec if i ca 11 y, there *
was no direction to replace the control power fuses; and, EPS-E-7 did not require SF4 Link-9 and SF4 Link 11 to be opened, and similarly, EPS-E-8 did not require TB-A Link 11 and TB-XD Link 12 to be opened which*
were necessary to isolate the faul ~ubsequent.inspection revealed that the corrective actions did not reieive a technical review which could have id~ntified this defic~ency. In r~sp6nse *to the inspectors concerns, the licensee initiated procedure and drawing changes to address the deficiencies. Also, the licensee initiated a condition report, C-PAL-96-400, to evaluate this issue; however, the inspectors were C()!lC_err:ied_that thiscond_ition _report did not address. the licensee's*_
failure to perform a technical review of the previous corrective actions~
These findings represent an apparent violation of the requirements to promptly identify and correct significant fire protection and safe shutdown conditions adverse to quality. Those requirements are described in Consumers Power Company Quality Assurance Topical Report
- -
- cpc:..2A and required pursuant to Palisades Nuclear* Generating Plant*
Operating License No. DPR-20, Amendment' No. 171, Section 2.2.C.(3}, Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report Supplement No. 2, dated February 10, 1981, Section 3.2.2, and Consumers Power Company letter dated June 19, 197.5 Spurious Operation and Damage to Alternate Shutdown Motor Operated Valves CLER 95-015}:
- ---- - ---
On February 28, 1992, the NRC issued Information Notice {IN) 92-18,
"Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire." This IN identified a potential failure mechanism of motor*
operated valves (MOV) in which a postulated fire could damage the valve control circuit in such a way as to bypass the valve protective features such as valve limit switches, torque switches, or thermal overload device The resulting spurious operation of a valve potentially could result in physical damage to the valve operator or the valve itsel The licensee's original response to this IN assumed that the valve operator may be damaged to the point where it could no longer function; but, it did not consider the possibility that physical damage to the valve itself could have been significant enough to have precluded.manual repositioning of the valv As part of the. Appendix R Enhancement Program in the fall of 1994, a re-review of this IN was conducted which concluded that further analysis was required to determine whether any of the facility's MOVs were susceptible to this conditio In September 1995, when weak link and valve actuator thrust data became available, the licensee completed engineering analysis EA-APR-95-026, Revision 0, "Evaluation of
- Information Notice 92-18 - Motor Operated Valves Subject to Spurious Actuation in the Event of an Appendix R Fire." This evaluation identified that eight LPSI valves were susceptible to this conditio In response to this issue, a condition report, C-PAL-95-1518,.was initiateq. During review of this condition report in December 1995, the evaluation was revised to utilize one time* allowable stresses vice continuous allowable stresses and to determine valve motor stall thrust values based on 100 percent v6ltage and actual measured valve coefficients of friction when availabl The net effect was to identify 20 MOVs in the main steam, chemical and volume control, high pressure safety injection, and low pressure safety injection systems which. were susceptible to this conditio In response to the findings of the revised evaluation, the licensee initiated another condition report, C-PAL-95-185 The inspectors rev.iewed the MOVs that were identified as.being..
susceptible to this condition. All of these valves were isolable from the primary coolant system by either check valves or by the operation of manual valve Howe~er, the inspectors noted that in the event of a
- fire (e.g., a fire in the cable spreading room) which resulted in a hot short associated with the volume control tank outlet isolation valve, M0-2087, the potential existed to gas bind the charging pump when the volume control tank emptie Thus, the ability to add borated water to
- the primary coolant system would have been los In response to the inspectors' concerns, the licensee indicated that the revised evaluation which identified this valve as being susceptible was overly conservative, and that the valve was not susceptible to damage from this conditio In addition, the licensee's staff indicated that further analysis.would show that only.four of the twenty MOVs were actually susceptible; however, the inspectors were concerned with the licensee's 7. 7 ability to perform a thorough evaluation of this condition since the licensee's previous three evaluations had apparently been inadequat The inspectors were also concerned with the lack of interim guidance provided to the operations staf In the event of a fire causing damage to these MOVs as described in this IN, the operators could have recovered the affected systems by taking manual action However at the time of the inspection, no specific guidance had been provided to the operator These findings represent an apparent violation of the requirements to promptly identify and correct significant fire.protection. and safe shutdown conditions adverse to qualit Those requirements are described i~ Consumers Power Company Quality Assurance Topical Report CPC-2A and required pursuant to Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Operating License No. DPR-20, Amendment No. 171, Section 2.2.C.(3), Fire*
Protection Safety Evaluation Report Supplement No. 2, dated February 10, 1981, Section 3.2.2, and Consumers Power Company letter dat~d June 19,
197.
Lack of DC Panel Breaker/Fuse Coordination (LER 96-005):
On February 2, 1996, the licensee discovered that type FB3100, 72-104, and 72-207 circuit breakers did not coordinate with FUZ/Dll-1 and FUZ/021-1 on the main supply to the 125 Volt DC panels ED-11-1 and ED-21-In the event of a fire in th~ F & G bus switchgear house, the**
1-C switchgear room, or the turbine building, fire induced faults
occurring on branch circuits fed by the i'dentified breakers couid have caused the main panel fuse to clear prior to the branch circuit breake The cl~aring of the main panel fuse would have caused the loss of the entire panel; thus, the safe shutdown equipment powered by the panel would have.been lost. This deficiency was not timely identifie These findings represent an apparent violation of the requirements ~6 promptly identify and correct significant fire protection and sa"fe shutdown conditions adverse to qualit Thos~ requirements are described in Consumers Power Company Quality Assurance Topical Report CPC-2A and required pursuant to Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Operating License N DPR~20, Amendment No. 171, Section 2.2;C.(3), Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report Supplement No. 2, dated Febrljary_ 10, _
- 1981, Sect ion 3. 2-. 2, --and "Consumers P*ower,Company i etter dated June 19, 197 Inadequate Emergency Lighting:
On July 28 through September 30, 1986, the NRC conducted an Appendix*R inspection in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2515/62, Revi~ion 2, documented in*lnsp*ection Report No. 50-255/86022(DRS).
This inspection resulted in a violation for failure to provide requ,red emergency lighting units.. The licensee's response to the inspection report on December 12, 1986, committed to conduct a re-evaluation of the emergency lighting for all areas containing safe shutdown equipment and their access and egress routes:
-*--~
-.. -- On May 9 through June 30, 1988, the NRC conducted a follow-up Appendix R inspection, documented in Inspection Report No. 50-255/88012(DRS).
This inspection resulted in a violation for inadequate corrective actions associated with the emergency lighting syste The licensee's response to the inspection report on January 20, 1989, committed to form a Technical Advisory Group* to act as an oversight review group to re-review technical issues and provide direction to assure Palisades'
'compliance with Appendix Also, the activities of this group were to be presented to plant management on at least a quarterly basi On March 21, 1996, the licensee discovered two areas containing safe shutdown equipment without adequate emergency lighting, the cable spreading room il1uminating ED-21-2 and the west mezzanine of the turbine building illuminating the hogge Also, the licensee identified that with the new Appendix R compliance strategy, which was scheduled to be implemented in late June 1996, ten other areas needed additional emergency lighting; and in ten areas, emerg~ncy lighting units needed to be re-aime In response to this cpndition, the licensee implemented compensatory measures, requiring operators to carry flashlights; however, the inspectors considered the use of hand-held flashlight~ to be inadequate since operators cannot effectively hold a flashlight, use a procedure, and operate equipment simultaneousl These findings represent an apparent violation of the requirements to promptly identify and correct significant fire protection and safe shutdown conditions adverse to quality. Those requirements are described in Consumers Power Company Quality Assurance Topical Report CPC~2A and required pursuant to Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Operating License No. DPR-20, Amendment No. 171, Section 2.2.C.(3), Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report Supplement No. 2, dated February 10, 1981, Section 3.2.2, and Consumers Power Company letter dated June 19,
. 197.
Root Causes The following root causes appear to have contributed to the occurrence of each of the issues:
The licensee's original eval~ations and analyses to ensure co~pliance with the requirements of_Appen~ix R were inadequat Licensee management, prior to June 1994, was not sensitive to the safety significance associated with the facility's noncompliance with the requirements of Appendix As a result, the commitments and corrective actions from both NRC Appendix R inspections were not appropriately prioritized and effectively managed to ensure that all deficiencies were identified and correcte Prior to June 1994, there was an inadequate Appendix R self-assessment progra.1 Alternate Shutdown Panel Inoperable due to the Improper Setting of the Low Voltage Cut-off (LER 96-003):
--~--- *-
Inadequate post modification and subsequent surveillance and maintenance testing failed to ensure operability of the alternate shutdown panel during all required condition *
The lack of a thorough evaluation of industry experience information resulted in a missed opportunity to identify the significance of the inverter low voltage cut-off setpoin 'The licensee's staff failed to recognize the safety significance of the alternate shutdown panel inverter lo~ voltage cut-off setpoin As a result, the condition report initiated in response to the inverter failure did not appropriately reflect the inoperability of the alternate shutdown pane.2 Lack of Circuit Fuse Coordination Which Affects Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment (LER 95-0lll: Due to the improper selection of fuse types, lack of fuse coordination in the diesel generator potential transformer circuit
. has existed since original constructio In addition, subsequent circuit analysis either assumed fuse coordination existed or were not sufficiently rigorous to identify the deficienc Licensee management was not sensiti~e to providing effective interim guidance to the operations staff which would-have enabled them to recover from a known condition which was outside thQ design basis of the facilit Redundant Diesel Generator Circuit Separation (LER 95-004):
The original Appendix R evaluations did not properly address the actual diesel *generator configuratio.4 Lack of Procedural Guidance for Low Pressure Safety In.jection Pump Repair Following a Fire (LER 95-009):
Due to a lack.of technical review, the corrective actions were inadequate to isolate the fault and restore co'ntrol power to all.ow local manual operation of the LPSI pump breake.5 Spurious Operation and Damage to Alternate Shutdown Motor Operated Valves (LER 95-015):
The licensee's staff was not sensitive to industry experience
- informatio As a result, a thorough evaluation of NRC Information Notice 92-18 was not performe Licensee management was not sensitive to providing effectiv interim guidance to the operations staff which would have enabled them to recover from a known condition which was outside the design basis of the facilit.6 Lack of DC Panel Breaker/Fuse Coordination CLER 96-005):
- ----
The Appendix R design review for facility change FC.:.653 in 1986, for the installation of fuses FUZ/Dll-1 and FUZ/D21-l, was inadequat.7 Inadequate Emergency Lighting:
The corrective actions for the emergency lighting violations contained in inspection reports 50-255/86022(DRS) and 50-255/88012(DRS) were inadequat.0 Safety Significance While the probability of a fire occurring as described by Appendix R is relatively low, the consequences of the event occurring at Palisades resulted in the safety significance of these deficiencies being considered hig Specifically, a fire which caused a loss of off-site power and loss of battery chargers (e.g., a fire in the cable spreading room) would have resulted in the licensee being unable to maintain the plant in a hot standby conditio Since the implementation of Appendi~ R, Palisades management has not been effective at ensuring compliance with fire protection requirement While increased management attention in this area has been noted since June 1994, the licensee has continued to conduct poor evaluations of technical issues-and has failed to implement adequate corrective actions in some instance In addition, the-licensee has not provided adequate interim guidance to the operations staff to enable them to promptly
-
identify and appropriate 1 y respond to poss*; b 1 e event Management Debriefing The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 5.0) after the inspection on April 29, 1996, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio During the exit meeting, the inspectors discussed the documents and processes reviewed by the inspectors during the conduct of this inspection and the likely informational content of the inspection repor Licensee representatives did not identify_ any such.documents. or p_rocess~_s as proprietar.0 Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company
- K. Powers, Engi_neeri ng Manager
- T. Palmisano, Plant Manager
- G. Szczotka, Manager Nuclear Performance Assessment Department
- D. Smedley, Licensing Manager
- D. Rogers, Operations Manager
- R. Scudder, Supervisor Engineering Programs
- Philips~ Senior Engineer, Fire Protection/Appendix R
- D. Crane, Engineer, Appendix R
- L. Young, Fire Protection Engineer
g
.
- * ~------- ** * * * * * * * *
Pomaranski, Maintenance and Construction Mariager Sleeper, Operations Support Coordinator Brzezinski, Supervisor l&C/Electrical Design Ford, System Engineering Ritt, Administrative Manager Wawro, Planning Manager Vincent, Licensing Supervisor Engle, Licensing Engineer Mathews, Licensing Engineer McCaleb, NPAD Site Assessment Supervisor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- J. Grobe, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety
- E. Cobey, Reactor Inspector
- N. Jackiw, Reactor Inspector
- Denotes those present during the exit meeting on April 29, 1996.
12