IR 05000254/1985027

Insp Repts 50-254/85-27 & 50-265/85-30 on 851001-1207. Violations Noted:Failure to Comply W/Tech Spec Requirements Re Fire Detection Equipment on Refuel Floor & Inadequate Corrective Actions Re Part 21 Rept

ML20137C259
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	12/31/1985
From:	Boyd D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137C216	List: IR 05000254/1985027 ML20137C212 ML20137C231 ML20137C259
References
50-254-85-27, 50-265-85-30, NUDOCS 8601160256
Preceding documents:	ML20198D152 (15 May 1986)
Download: ML20137C259 (18)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY :COMISSION-

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Reports No. 50-254/85027(DRP); 50-265/030(DRP)

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Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 i

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 707 Chicago, IL 60690 t Fay.ility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 s ,

i Inspection Conducted: October 1 through December 7, 1985

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I-Inspectors: A.L. Madison J

! A.D. Morrongiell ?,

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Approved By: D. C. Boyd, Ch' f .. /2 -iV- h-

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l Reactor Projects Section 2 . Date l s

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! Inspection Summary: '

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i Inspection on October 1 through December 7, 1985 (Reports No. 50-254/85027(DRP);;

i 50-265/85030(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, 6nannounced insp'ection by the resident inspectors

of actions on previous inspections findings; operations; radiological controls; j maintenance / modifications; surveillance;housekesyt,ngprocedures; fire

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protection; emergency preparedness; security; qualityl assurance; quality control; administration; routine reports, LER review; bulletin followup;- .

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regional requests; training; and independent inspection. The Jnspection

. involved a total of 399 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors, -

including 79 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

, Results: Two violations were identified. The first involved failure to l ' comply with technical specification requirements concerning fire detection equipment on the refuel floor. T.he second involved inadequate review and

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corrective actions concerning a 10 CFR Part 21 report on Ruskin fire damper Overall, the licensee's performance has improved in' operations and remained steady in all other area t i

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", 8601160256 860102 ~,.

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PDR ADOCM 05000254i

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• N. Kalivianakis, Station Manager

• D. Bax, Production Superintendent

• T. Tamlyn, Technical Services Superintendent T. Lihou, Technical Staff Supervisor R. Roby, Assistant Superintendent Operations

• N. Griser, Senior Quality Assuranc Specialist

• B. Strub, Compliance Coordinator The inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined the areas stated in the inspection summary and acccmplished the following inspection module Design Changes and Modifications 42700 Plant Procedures

61726 Monthly Surveillance Observations 62703 Monthly Maintenance Observations 65051 Low Level Rad Waste Storage Facilities 71707 Operational Safety Verification 71710 ESF System Walkdown 90713 Review of Periodic and Special Reports 92700 Onsite Review of LERs 92702 Violation Followup 92703 IE Bulletin Followup'

92705 Followup - Regional Requests 92706 Independent Inspection 93702 Onsite followup of Events The inspectors verified that activities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initiating any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the limiting 4 conditions for operation were met during normal operation and while

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components or systems were . removed from service; functional ~ testing and/

or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and review of ',

test results were' accomplished; quality control records and logs were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials, and equipment were properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained as applicable;

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, and adverse plant conditions including equipment malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel errors were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and. proper corrective actions and reviewed by appropriate management personne .

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Further, additional observations were made in,the following areas:

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. ' Action 6n Fr'evious Inspection Findings ? >

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r c (1) '(Closed) Open Item'(254/84023-03; 265/84021-02(DRP)): .

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Confirtsatory Action Letter Item,6. 761s item remained open '

l pending the licensee's respotise/to ther report including the .

i violation and long term corrective actions. Areas'of concern- '

were Shift Control-Room Engineer (SCRE) responsibilities and

, authority and operators, remaining at the controls during

. off-normal events at the,other unit.

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The' licensee conducted extensive training and discussions with i all SCREs and operators and updated their training program to

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inc?ude lessons learned. -Also, the licensee revised applicable procedures to reflect the 'need for operators to remain at the

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cdntrols until' properly relieved and the' responsibilities of .

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i the SCRE until relieved by the Shift Engineer. (SE) during i f off-normal' events. . The inspectors._ reviewed the licensee's actions, the revised procedures, and interviewed several

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, operators and SCREs to determinar adequacy.of long term

A corrective actions. The licens'ee's' actions were determined e to be acceptable and no further concerns.were identified. No

further actions are require "

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(2) (Closed) Open Item'(254/85002-03 and 265/85002-03): No procedure for independent verification to beiperformed on release of equipment-from service. This item was used to track the implementation of procedures,that wodld address independent verification of equipment ~' status when equipment

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was removed from service and when it was returned to servic ;

The licensee has changed the appropriate proceoures to~ addres this item. The inspectors reviewed these changes and found them adequat No further actions are require .

) (3) (Closed) Violation'(265/85007-01(DRP)): . Failure to Report Scram While Shutdow On March 28,'1985, Unit two was. shutdown.

1 / for refueling. A reactor scram signal from Main Steam Line

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High Radiat. ion was initiated by Radiograph ~ in the vicinity-of

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the detectors.o The licensee failed to report this-event as

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, require'd by 10.CFR 50.72(G)(2)(ii) due to a misinterpretation

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e of the requirement of a ." preplanned sequence of events."

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• .7 Discussion with the inspectors clarified the requirements and the licenseelrevised applicable procedures to ensure continued- '

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compliance. 'No further~ actions are required.. - , 6 'D 4 s a r-(4) '(0 pen) Unresolve'd Item'(254/850Df03; 265/85019-02(DRP)):-

, =< 1 Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Trips'and Challenges to Standby *

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. Gas Treatment. The licensee has continued to investigate-

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d this concern and additional spuric0s trips have ' occurred, p , providing. additional-opportunity to' isolate this; intermittent

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problem.

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4 4-One potential resolution was identified in Unit 2 LER 85-012, Revision 01. It was determined'that the practice of calibrating the instruments in the' shop rather than in place was contributing ,

to setpoint drift.. A procedure-change to QIS35-l',." Reactor  ;

Building Fuel-' Pool Radiation Monitoring Calibration and _

Functional Test Data Sheet".was submitted to eliminate this possible sourc .

.- Also, the Instrument Maintenance Department has' discovered a

. higher than normal induced voltage on the IB Fuel Pool Monitor.-

It is currently planned to reroute the signal cable for this  :

l monitor to avoid high' noise areas. This reroute is_ expected to-be completed by August 30, 1986. Further testing will be-performed to determine the necessity of additional modification '

No violations or deviations ~ were identifie l-i Operations

, As part of the licensee's ongoing efforts to improve station '

performance, a " quiet time"'from 2

15 p.m. to 3:15 p.m. has been

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instituted in the control room. This time period has been identified by past events as having a greater potential for confusion or j miscommunication due to shift change and the increa' sed activity l associated with that. The " quiet time" or restriction of activities

.._is expected'to reduce this. potential. Also, the station has' initiated-

an afternoon planning meeting _ similar to_ the routine morning meetings to help coordinate the afternoon and evening work activitie .

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(1) Unit One

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On' November 11, 1985, while running the'1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) operability surveillance,-the output breake '

to Bus 13-1 would not close. Since the surveillance was being I

run as required for "A" Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)

outage, an Unusual Ever.t was declared at-.214 The breaker was .

l tested again (several times) and operated properly. The Unusual  !

! Event was terminated at 2150. .Further . investigation by the *

licensee was inconclusive and no' reason for the apparent failure

- could be identified.

4-i On. November 24, 1985~at 1725, the 1/2 EDG was again deciared

inoperable when' it failed 'to ~ close~ 'on- Bus 113-1. Since the'ID Residual Heat Removal-(RHR) Service Water pump was also out of'

, service, an Unusual! Event was declarediand the Unit. began t '

' shut down.' The AssistantlSuperintendent for: Maintenance,Lthe; Master Electrician,. Electrical' Engineers from Operational-' ' ' ' ,

-Analysis Department (OAD) and: Technical-Support worked i

' 'throughout the night and determined that the'HACR-1' relay-(this;. ,

~ prevents closing the outputtbreaker when not electrically - .

. synchronized and is not'used during; emergency actuation) had-ipoorly crimped. wires which may produce poor: electrical- J

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connection and resulted in this intermittent problem. The l wires were recrimped and the breaker tested satisfactoril Following a two hour operability run, the 1/2 EDG was declared 1 operable at 0850 on November 25 and the Unusual Event was terminate The HACR-1 relay wire crimping problem had been previously identified by the licensee as potentially generic to j Commonwealth Edison (CECO) onl These relays are manufactured by Commonwealth Edison for use at all their facilitie Since the relay is not electrically in use j during emergency actuation of the EDG, it is not considered safety related and thus no 10 CFR Part 21 report was issue However, a notice was issued to all CECO facilities which required 0AD to check and verify adequate crimping on all similar relays. Apparently, this was not accomplished at

Quad Citie Subsequent to the November 24, 1985 event, the licensee verified adequate crimping on all EDGs at Quad Cities Station. Pending determination of the reason _why these relays were not checked, this item will be tracked as an Unresolved Item (254/85027-01; 265/85030-01(DRP).

Following the termination of the Unusual Event, the licensee continued to investigate the 1/2 EUG to verify that the intermittent problem had been resolved. Additional problems were encountered and at 1025 on November 25, an Unusual Event was again declared. Since'it appeared that the 1/2 EDG was never operable, the start time of the Unusual Event was conservatively set at.1725 on November 24. Thus, with power reduced to 100 MWE, Unit One was scrammed at 1230 in order to comply with the Limiting Condition of Operation which required cold shutdown in 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> It was determined that the problem was an intermittent fault in the " fully racked in switch" on the diesel out'put breake Following repairs to the 1/2 EDG output breaker and thorough testing, the Unit was returned to operation on November 26, 198 '

Unit Two

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On October 3, 1985, while at full power, it was discovered at'

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approximately 1840 that the 28_RHR and 28 Core Spray (CS) room-

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cooler. fan belts were broken. At 1900 an Unusual Event was declared and a controlled' shutdown wa's~ initiated.- The belts were replaced, the room coolers were tested operable,- and the Unusual Event was terminated at 221 At 0510 on October 10, 1985, Unit 2 EDG output breaker tripped during routine surveillance. 'The breaker was reset and tripped again at 0518. This time indicating a ground on control power.

i Concurrently, the containment cooling valves for RHR were out of service for Environmental Qualification (E.Q.) modifications; 4'

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therefore, at 0536~an Unusual Event was declared. The-valves were immediately returned to service and the Unusual Event was

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secured at 0537. The problems with the EDG were then  ;

! investigated and repaired.

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At 2246'on October 15, 1985, Unit 2 experienced a reactor scram ~  ;

from 100% power. While performing routine. surveillance,Lan 3 instrument mechanic committed an' inadvertent valving error on-a Yarway. .This caused a pressure transient on the entire instrument-

rack which in turn caused a low low level scram and a Group I,.

II, and III isolatio All systems functioned as expected. The ,

licensee lected e to proceed to cold shutdown and perform >

modifications in the drywell as well as repairs to the Reactor :  ;

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Water Cleanup pumps and Reactor' Building Equipment Drain pumps

and preventive maintenance to the unit output transformer. 'The-

Unit returned to service on October 24, 198 i .

. a On November 7, 1985, the inner seal for'the~28 recirculation .

. pump failed. The licensee' decided to place'. Unit 2 in cold i shutdown and to effect repairs rather than rely on the outer-

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seal for an extended period. The unit was returned to service on November ,

During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the High Pressure Coolant Injection

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l Systems, the Residual Heat Removal systems, and the Core Spray .

Systems and performed the applicable portions of Inspection <

Procedures 71710 "ESF System Walkdown".

i No violations or deviations were identified.

I c. Radiological Controls I 4 j (1) The radiation protection department received information about.

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l a situation at the Cooper Nuclear. Station. At that station dose rate levels between the~ reactor and the fuel pool at an elevation I

corresponding to the. head-flange area were approximately 280R/hr.

l The resident inspector accompanied a health physics' technician

to investigate whether or.not a.similar condition existed at i Quad Cities. -The survey revealed'that the situation does not-i exist at this sit (2) The licensee-is building.an onsite Interim R'dwaste a Storage  ;

Facility (IRSF) for low level radwaste storage in anticipatio .

of the closure of the burial sites on January.1,- 1986, authorized ,

) by 1980 Congressional legislation. An inspector reviewed the- *

blueprints and toured the IRSF. :The IRSF .is a generic CECO design,'similar to those under construction at the Zion'and ,

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, LaSalle stations, and is located within the protected area for

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access and radiological controls. Processed containers, meetin DOT and NRC shipping limits will be transferred from the radwaste' .

processing area to the IRSF by truck. .As an ALARA meosure, the; '

, -containers will.be positioned in the IRSF storage vault by;

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remotely operated crane; no personnel' access to the vaults' has -

been designe Licensee representatives estimate storage capacity at approximately four years with low level processed resin being ,

t the primary component. No dry active waste.will be stored in the IRSF; other alternatives. are being evaluated. Projected "

completion date for the IRSF is January 2,'1986.

{ The IRSF is a poured concrete-structure building in accordance with the Uniform Building Code. In accordance with current NRC-guidance for onsite low level storage facilities the111censee

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i has conducted a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation of safety issues associated with the IRSF. This evaluation, pending' final

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approval, was reviewed by an inspector. The evaluation will be further reviewed pending additional generic guidance from NRC'

rad waste staff. This review will be tracked as an Open Item (254/85027-02,~265/85030-02(DRSS)).

The licensee is currently developing operational and radiological

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surveillance programs for the IRSF. In response to the inspector's comments, the licensee agreed to: (1) establish *

monitoring program for airborne activity, waterborne activity,  ;

and general radiation fields in the IRSF (0 pen Item:(254/85027-03; J 265/85030-03)); (2) evaluate the possibility of hydrogen an '

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gaseous generation from spent resins, and determine the-need for- r

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monitoring (0 pen Item (254/85027-04;'265/85030-04)); (3) establish an inspection program of container integrity on a routine basis (0 pen Item (254/85027-05;- 265-85030,-05));- and.._(4) evaluate the -

use of grating positioned directly on-the-concrete floor to

minimize condensate accumulation on contair ers (0 pen Item

(254/85027-06; 265/85030-06)).

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The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Observed repacking of Olit 1 drywell sample pum (2) Observed installation of Unit 2. Instrument Air Compressor heat- *

exchanger.

i- (3) Observed installation of temperature control-valves on Unit'~1

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and 2 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System (RBCCW).

-(4) Observed replacement of the Unitil~and 2 Instrument Air

Compressor Motor.

(5) Observed removal-of Unit 2 RBCCW-pump motor for-bearing

, replacemen (6)- Observed trouble shooting of Unit ~2 Scram Discherge. Volume-

level, alarms.

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(7) Observed testing of various valves following E.Q. modifications for Unit I and (8) Reviewed E.Q. modifications of drywell components for Unit 1 and (9) Reviewed corrective maintenance on 1/2 ED Via Generic Letter 85-15, " Equipment Qualification", the Commission promulgated a deadline of midnight, November 30, 1985 for the completion of all modifications to comply with Environmental Qualification concerns. Throughout the year, the licensee has 3 diligently worked to comply with this requirement and has taken ~

several small outages for this purpose as well as extending planned and unplanned outage Aggressive management attention combined with good planning and the cooperative attitude of the maintenance staff resulted in the completion of all modifications on November 29, 198 ,

The inspectors have noted an improvement in interstation communication with the CECO organization as evidenced by problems with E.Q. wiring of Limitorque valve motors at Zion station being immediately '

communicated to Quad Cities for resolution. Also, problems at Quad Cities station are transmitted to other CECO stations through several t formal and informal communication channels. However, one recent event ,

at LaSalle County station was not' communicated to Quad Cities although the problem may have been applicabl ,

LaSalle station experienced a problem with Mobil Vaprotec light oil ;

used in their Reactor Core Isolation Cooling turbines and switched ;

to Gulf Crest 32 with a special additive. While Quad Cities uses ;

Mobil Vaprotec light oil in RCIC and High Pressure Coolant Injection -

(HPCI) turbines, this information was not comniunicated by LaSalle station. Quad Cities has not experienced a problem in the past with this oil, but, when informed by the resideat inspectors of this potential, the maintenance staff did commit to investigate the issue further. Resolution of this concern will be tracked as an Open Item *

(254/85027-07; 265/85030-07). No problems ~have been identified to '

date however, this is evidence that further improvements in Corporate communication channels are required'to ensure that- ,

experiences at other stations are incorporated into the .

activities of Quad Citie '

No violations or deviations were identifie I t

e. Surveillance

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The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Observed performance in the field of high reactor pressure scram surveillance for Unit i

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(2) Observed control. room portions of pump and valve operability

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check for RHR on linit 2.

l-(3) Observed performance in the field of low low level scram testing for Unit i t-(4) Observed control roo,a portions of operability testing of

. the 1/2 ED (5) Observed control room portions of pump and valve functional

testing for Unit 2 core spra (6) Observed tip traces for Unit 2 and subsequent APRM adjustment .

! ' Procedures Reviewed QAP 500-15 Conduct of Maintenance Revision 1

QAP 500-13 Environment Qualification Program Revision 2 1

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-QAP 300~5

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Shift Change for Shift Control Room Engineer / Shift Technical' Advisor Revision-5 *

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l- QAP 300-7 Shift Change for Nuclear Station [

Operators ~ Revision 7 - i QAP 900-S2 New Control Rod. Receiving Inspection . Revision 3 QMP-100-3 Fire Prevention for Welding and l Cutting = Revision 5-

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e QMP 100-S1 Welding and Cutting Permit- Revision 3 b 3

, Q0P 1100-1 Standby Operation'of Standby Liquid . .

t i Control System Re'ision v 4 _

j j QOP 1100-2 Injection of Standby Liquid Control Revision 4 _ !

QAP 300-2 ' Conduct of Shift Operations  : Revision 16 l Review of Routine and Special Reports- '

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The inspectors reviewed the monthly performance reports for Units-1: 1-and 2 for the months of September and October.-

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No violations.or deviations were identified.

' LER Review-l 4 .(1) (Closed) LER 85-016; Revision 00: ~ Refuel floor monitor spike l j and start of standby gas treatmeht., - <

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On September 5, 1985, Unit 1 was in the RUN mode at approximately .)

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100 percent of !sted core thermal power. At 1348 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.12914e-4 months <br /> the 1 Control Room received a spurious high alarm and trip of the IB i Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor. The Reactor Building Ventilation 1 isolated and the Standby Gas Treatment initiated. No abnormal '!

radiation levels were. discovered and these systems were manually- :

reset at 1350 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.13675e-4 months <br />. The cause of this trip was probabl electrical noise interferenc The Instrument Maintenance *

Department has discovered a' higher than norma 1' induced voltage on the IB Fuel Pool Monitor. 'It is currently planned to reroute the signal cable for this monitor to avoid high noise area This reroute is expected to be completed by August 30, 198 The' ongoing problems with Fuel Pool Radiation Monitors has been addressed in previous ~ LERs and . Inspection: Reports. This LER.is considered closed, however, the~overall concern and ultimate resolution is being tracked by Unresolved Item (254/85017-03;.

265/85019-02(DRP)).

(2) (Closed).LER 85-017,.Revisio'n 00: ' Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Discharge Valve would not ope On October 15, 1985, Unit One was in the RUN mode at 90 percent of rated core thermal-power. During the performance of-surveillance QOS 1300-3, " Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Motor Operated Valve Operability Test", it was discovered that the RCIC pump. discharge valve would not open from the Control Room after it was closed. RCIC was, therefore, declared inoperable. It was found that the main contactor in the breaker for the motor-operator for the valve was dirty and would not close completely, thereby failing to supply power to the motor. After the breaker-was reset, the valve was successfully cycled three times and RCIC was declared operabl The buildup of dirt on the main'cantactor was the result of using the lubricant on the main contactor's pivot point. The lubricant collects dirt which= increases the; viscosity of the mixture to a value that prevents the main breaker from working:

properly.' The use of this lubricant was a recent change to the surveillance procedure and had not been:used on other breaker This practice has been discontinued as a result-of this even No further actions are require Unit 2

'(1) -(Closed) LER 84-013 Revision 00: Missed Service Water Grab Samples. This. item remained open pending revisions to the

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sampling and administrative review procedures to ensure continued comp 1iance. eAdequate revisions were implemented and reviewed by-the inspectors.- No further actions are require '9-

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3 (2) '(Closed) LER 85-012, Revision 00 and 01: On December 1, 1984,

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' Unit 2 was operating'at approximately 99 percent core thermal power. At 9:25 a.m., the Reactor Building Fuel Pool Channel iB'

Area Radiation Monitor ~ tripped, isolating the Reactor Building Ventilation and starting the. Standby Gas Treatment System. A- ' '

. check on both channels of the Fuel Pool' Area Radiation Monitors

did not indicate any abnormal radiation levels. The Reactor Building Ventilation and Standby Gas Treatment were returne to normal. The Instrument Maintenance Department found that-the l trip setpoint of the iB' Radiation Monitor-was at 35 mr/ hour I t

rather than the normal'setpoint'of 100 mr/ hour, allowing norma ,

instrument noise to trip the monitor. Corrective action was to l recalibrate and functionally test the monitor. The cause of-the

setpoint being set at 35 mr/ hour w'as'dtfe to the instrument being I

calibrated in the Instrument Maintenance shop rather than-in place. The variations in using two different power supplies and j physical movement contributed to the set ~ point drift.

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A search through two previous sets of calibration data for this specific instrument revealed that its' calibration"setpoint had '

drifted abnormally during'the last several months. A procedure c.hange to QIS 35-1, " Reactor Building Fuel Pool Radiation i Monitoring Cal.ibration and Functional. Test Data Sheet" was

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submitted to have the Trip Unit calibrated in place, using the~  ;

normal power suppl The ongoing problems with Fuel Pool Radiation Monitors has been-

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addressed in previous LERs and Inspection reports. _This'LER is

! considered closed, however, the overall concern and ultimate F resolution is being tracked as Unresolved Item (234/85017-03; i 265/85019-02(DRP)).

l (3) (0 pen) LER 85-018, Revision 00: Low Condenser Vacuum Set Point Drift.

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On August 26, 1985, at 11:55 a.m., Unit 2 was operating-in the RUN mode at approximately 98-percent core thermal power. ~Durin .

the performance of " Low Condenser Vacuum Calibration",'QIS 19-1, 1 i the setpoints'of. Pressure Switches PS-2-503A and PS-2-503C were

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found to have drifted to 20 8 inches Hg vacuus:and 19.4 inches Hg vacuum, respectively. :he switches were recalibrated'to j within Technical Specification .

. There have been 13 previous occurrences of-~setpoint I driftEfor-

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this type of switch. -Therefore, the licensee is investigating-

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enginee*ing solutions-or possible replacement of these switches, with more stable switches.~ ~Pending final resolution, this LER will' remain ope '

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l (4) _(Closed) LER 85-019, Revision 00:.. Main Steam'Is'olation Valve 1 p Closure Times and Initiation of Orderly Shutdow i I

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- On September 8, 1985, Unit 2 was operating at 72 percent of rated core thermal power. At'0225 hours0.0026 days <br />0.0625 hours <br />3.720238e-4 weeks <br />8.56125e-5 months <br />, while performing Main

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Steam Isolation Valve Closure Time Testing (QOS 250-4), valves

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A0 2-203-1B,:2-203-1C, and 2-203-10 had closure times of 2.72

. seconds, 2.89 seconds, and 2.80 seconds, resputively. Table ,

4-3.7.1, of the Technical Specifications, requires a closing time:

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of 3 to 5: seconds. At 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br /> a Unit 2 Reactor shutdown commenced per Technical Specification 3.7.D.3. A Drywell. entry was made to adjust to the closure stimes; the three valves were 4 retested satisfactorily and the Reactor shutdown was terminated at 300 MWe, at 1314 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />4.99977e-4 months <br />.

i The cause was the speed control valve adjustment on the hydraulic control cylinder drifting aut of adjustmen There'

. have only been four previous occurrences of'a similar nature

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during the lifetime of_ Unit 2, therefore no further corrective j action is planned or required at this time.

F (5) (Closed) LER 85-020, Revision 00: Unit 2 Condenser 5 foot ,

Circulating Water Pump Trips Out of Servic '

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{ On August 26, 1985, Unit 2 was operating ~at 97 percent of rated

, core thermal power. The Equipment Operator was performing QOS'

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i 030-3, " Condenser Pit High Level and 5 Foot Trip Circuitry Test". The test is performed by putting a pencil =into the'

opening of the level switch chamber and actuating the level switch. While the test is being performed, the circulating-water pump high level trip test- switches are open to disabia the circulating water pump trips. -During the-test,.the pencil that

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was used to actuate the switch broke off inside the 3 foot

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level alarm switch. A work request was then written for the .-

l Electrical Maintenance Department to remove;the_ broken pencil.in the level alarm switc '

On September 16, 1985, an~ Electrician reported to the Shift

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< Engineer for permission to work on the~1evel alarm switch. The

! Shift Overview Superintendent.(SOS), observing their discussion,

! suggested that they disable the trips while' removing the pencil

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so that the electrician would'not accidentally trip the circulating '

- water pump The Shift Foreman suggested if they were_ going to i disable the trips, they should take them out of. service for the Shift Engineer so they would not forget to-return them to servic !

I The Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) completed the out of service process and all,four-pump trips were taken out of service. This action,- however, did not affect the operability-

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- of the 3 foot alarm switches.because their circuitry.is i

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physically separated from that of the.5 foot pump trips. The Electrician was.given permission'to go~to work at:1345. hours.on l September 16, 1985, and the job was completed at 1415-hours on L the same. da He then informed the Unit 2.0peratorr.that the l

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e job was completed, but the pump trips were not. returned to service until 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />'on September'17, 1985, when the situation was identified by the licensee during normal supervisory review .

t-Technical Specification 3.5.H.2 requires the condenser pit..

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water level switches to trip the condenser circulating water pumps and alarm in the Control Room-.if the water level in the condenser pit exceeds a level of.5 feet above the pit floo If a failure occurs in one of these trip and alarm circuits,

the_ failed circuit is required to be immediately placed in a j trip conditio Reactor operation is permissible for the-

following seven days'unless the circuit is sooner made. operable,

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or an orderly shutdown must be initiated and the Reactor.must be-in a Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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The switches were taken out of service, and the pump trips were

disabled. More than one switch was taken out of service but they were not placed in a trip condition, and a seven day clock ,

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was not started contrary to Technical Specification 3.5. !

L The cause of this deviation is that the Shift Foreman, Shift Engineer and Shift Overview Supervisor involved in the initial

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l discussion were more concerned with preventing an inadvertent circulating water pump trip and did not consider the Technical'

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! Specification requirements. The fact that the testing procedure ' '

, required that the trips be disabled while the Equipment Operator

is under the hotwell was a contributing factor in the decision j to disable the pump trips.

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i The people involved in the decision'were not familiar with the .  ;

circuitry of the pump trips. The 3. foot alarm switch is physically separated from the 5 foot pump' trips. Therefore, it was'not

! necessary to remove the 5 foot pump trips to work on the 3_ foot i level alarm switches. There.are four pump trip switches, of-

which two are needed to energize the pump trip relay ;

The SOS stated that he never meant for the Shift Engineer to .

l - disable all of the pump' trips. If:he had been familiar with the

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i electrical prints, he would have known that the knife. switches- '

are-in the trip logic from the relay's energized contacts and ,

not in the level switch circuit.

!' The.only person not directly involved in the initial decision-who~ could have provided an independent check of the out-of-servic '

4 - decision was_the day shift SCRE. However,'he failed to check the-  ?

I Technical Specifications for violation j

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. The 1500-2300 Shift Engineer was not made' aware during the. shift i . change with the 0700-1500 Shift Engineer that all of the tri circuits were disabled. Consequently, the 2300-0700 Shift-

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L Engineer _was also not aware of the circulating pump trip out ofL service. This was the contributing cause of~not having the_ pump 'i

! trips returned to service'in a timely manner.

A meeting was held with the Production Superintendent,-Assistant Superintendent of Operations,- Operating Engineers, Shift Engineers, Shift Control. Room Engineers, and Shift Foremen to--

discuss this' specific' event in detail and this information was included in operator training and retraining lessons.

[ Several past errors have happened at shift changes when there is

! increased activity. This activity _is mainly.from maintenance, ,

either returning the day's work to service or requesting.

l equipment out of service fur the'next day. Several steps were j taken to reduce this activity.

4 .

'Ar. afternoon meeting was initiated at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> between the

! maintenance schedulers and the Operating Engineers. ' Equipment'

l- returned to service and requests for the next-day's'out of service take place in thir. meeting.- ,

Station personnel have.been directed not to disturb,.the

Operating personnel involved in a shif; .hangc during the period from 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br /> to 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br /> unless absolutely i .necessar The Communication Center personnel should be i available to provide information neede ~ '

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This event could have been prevented if the pencil used.to i- actuate the level switches had not broken off. ~A metal bolt"

! has been installed and attached by a chain to the switch,!so-i that-it can be inserted and not broken off--inside the switch.

l Additionally,procedurechangeshave'beenaccomplishedt$

provide cautionary notes to QOS 030-3 and other similar i procedures to prevent repetition of this event. Because this

event was identified by the licensee during normal supervisory

reviews and because of the subsequent prompt and extensive ^ corrective actions taken, no violation was issue .

(6) (Closed) LER 85-021, Revision 00: Unit 2 Scram-Low Level'

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Indication During Testing.

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At 10:45 p.m., on October 15, 1985, Unit 2-was operating in:-the

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RUN mode-at approximately-100 percent'of rated core thermal

. powe Instrument Maintenance personnel were performing

! " Low-Low Reactor Water' Level Calibration",.when the Instrument

! Mechanic noticed leakage from an instrument _ tap.: The. leakage U

. indicated that one of the isolation valves on a level indicating- switch was-leaking.- When he~ attempted to tighten the low side

! valve on the switch, the Instrument Mechanic mistakenly cracked

! :the valve open. He immediately reclosed theivalve. .This action j caused a pressure-transient on the instruments connected to this-l

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instrument line. A Reactor scram and Group I,.II, and III Isolation resulted from.the transient. This event has been reviewed with the Instrument Maintenance Department as part of f their training.

. Also,.the station is pursuing continuing efforts to replace the

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presently installed diaphram-type instruments with analog i devices, wherever possibl These analog devices are much-less susceptible to transient pressure spike No further actions

are required at this time.

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(7) (Closed) LER 85-022, Revision 00: Relay Block Dropout causing

{ three quarter Scram Signal While Shutdown i

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On October 24, 1985, at 12:36 p.m. Unit 2 was in the SHUTDOWN-

, mode. Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) Closure Monthly' Scram

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Sensor Functional Test, were blocked closed per procedure to i make it appear as if the condenser was under a. vacuum, because

! low condenser vacuum can also cause MSIV closure. Further along

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in the test, a one-half scram on the +A' Channel was being reset when the block on a relay fell out. This caused a one-half scram on the 43' Channel. This one-half scram on the +B'

i Channel combined with the half-reset one-half scram on the +A'

} Channel resulted in a three quarter scram. -The other half'of l the one-half scram on the +A' Channel was immediately reset leaving only.a one-half scram on the +B' Channel.

I This is the first occurrence of this type, therefore, no-further j actions are planned or required at this time.

i No other violations or deviations were identified.

4 Bulletin Followup

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(1) (Closed) IEB 80-07:. BWR Jet Pump Assembly.

Nureg/CR-3052 concerning closeout action of.IEB 80-07 was-

prepared by Parameter Inc. under' contract to the NRC. -The NRC i staff has reviewed the report and concluded that the generic

aspects of jet pump integrity have.been adequately addressed by

!. licensee corrective measures. The resident inspectors verified l' that approved procedures were in place to ensure continued i surveillance as follows:

'(a) Individual jet pump flow readings are taken prior to unit j startup from a cold condition, and after starting a -

recirculation pump with the reactor.at rated temperature I

and pressure.

(b) Pursuant.to. the.. Technical Specifications,' recirculation i pump speed and pump' flow are compared' daily tofthe l characteristic established speed / pump flow curves.' lIf the.

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_ comparison is greater than 10%, a test is performed which compares the indicated total core flow to the total core l flow value derived from the established power / core flow . t curve. If this comparison is greater than 10%, a jet pump l problem exist (c) A daily test is performed similar to item b. above, except .I that recirculation pump speed and jet pump loop flow are !

compared to the characte 'stic established speed / loop flow !

curves. If this comparison is greater than 5%, a jet pump problem may exis (d) A daily-jet pump surveillance-test is performed when the- !

reactor mode switch is in RUN. Individual jet pump' flow l readings are recorde Normalized flow values are !

calculated by dividing each jet pump flow reading by the j average jet' pump flow for the corresponding recirculation '!

loo These normalized values are compared against the ;

range of characteristic values.for each jet pump. If a ;

normalized value falls outside this; characteristic range, ;

there may be a jet pump proble +

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The inspector also. verified that visual and ultrasonic  :

examinations were performed at every refueling outage of the jet pump beams. Approved procedures are in place to ensure !

continued compliance. The licensee does not intend to replace l any beams'with the new typ '

No further actions are require ;

-, (Closed) IE Bulletin 80-25 Operating Problems with Target Rock- .

Safety-Relief Valves at Boiling Water Reactors i s

While Utility personnel responded acceptably on March -17,-1981, ~l indicating that (a) no corrective action was required for- l-

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Actions 1 and 2, (b) modifications were initiated for the installation of a relief valve on the drywell pneumatic ~ supply l header and (c) an annunciator would be changed, verification of ,

b and c was incomplete or not fully' documented.' The resident- *

inspectors have verified that the modifications.have been ,

completed and that the annunciator change was complet Dates "

of the completions were for Unit 1 March 4, 1983'and for Unit 2 1 January 14,~198 No further actions are. require No violations or deviations were' identifie j. Fire Protection (1) From September 20 to October 21, a routine . unannounced safety:

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inspection in the fire protection area'was conducted by DRSS at Dresden Units 2 and 3. -Areas included in the' inspection were-the adequacy of the facilities' Fire Protection program

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t implementation, addressing LERs, and previous Open Items.

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During the course of the inspection it was noted that several-deficiencies were present. Specifically the deficiency c consisted in a failure to comply with a Condition of the License in the area of fire detectio DRSS, concerned that a similar

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problem could exist at Quad Cities,= notified the resident- .

, inspectors of the situation. The resident inspectors confirmed - L that a_similar deficiency existed in that the refuel. floor did

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not contain fire _ detection equipment listed in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) as required by Technical Specifications.

4 This is a violation as noted in the Appendix (254/85027-09;

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265/85030-09(DRS)). ,

j An enforcement Conference was held in theLRegion III' offices on November 19 at which time the licensee identified additional

' discrepancies. -At Quad Cities,'these discrepancies _-included cable separation concerns and protection'of~ electrical

distribution panels from falling debri The licensee will- 1

submit an updated report. listing each discrepancy and the.

I corrective actions taken or planned. These actions will be  ;

followed by the resident inspector ,

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(2) The Ruskin Manufacturing Company, in a letter to Quad Cities t i dated November 6, 1984, under a potential 10 CFR Part 21, i indicated that test methods originally used by Ruskin may not i have accurately depicted actual field conditions for dampers

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installed inshie ducting. In addition,.Ruskin stated such 3 dampers may also fail to close under actual flow conditions'and ,

l recommended that Ceco test the dampers for operability.

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Ceco's Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) performed an evaluation and determined.this condition was not applicable-

i to Quad Cities as documented on SNED inter-company meno dated ,

j January 17, 1985.~  ;

A review by a Headquarters NRC inspector'during a special.

' inspection of the control room HVAC system indicated the . ,

existence of at least one damper (No. CECO 1/2-9472-01) which j was required to close under flow due to"its interface with area- ,

smoke detectors and the control room air supply system.

I The failure to properly and accurately evaluate 'the. original t issue raised by Ruskin is considered a violation as noted in the Appendix (254/85027-10; 265/85030-10(DRP). .

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No other violations or deviations were identifie Regional Requests  ;

Region III_ observed over the course of three inspections of~  !

preoperational testing of the Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS)-

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that the involved licensees.were not adequately. implementing the

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testing requirements.of Regulatory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants." Review of the SLCS ,

preoperational-test at LaSalle, Perry, and Clinton indicated that testing of the air sparger sub-system was being done improperl The testing methodology being employed failed to demonstrate that the sodium pentaborate solution was being adequately mixed after sitting for a period of time or that the sampling methodology to be used to satisfy Technical Specification surveillance requirements would yield valid results. Review of'preoperational tests performed at Quad

Cities confirmed that similar tests have been performed. The licensee is reviewing this situation to determine appropriate actions .

to tak Resolution of this issue will be tracked as an Unresolved Item (254/85027-11; 265/85030-11(DRP)).

1. Independent Inspection (1) Recent LERs at other stations have identified several instances where loose electrical connections have been the cause of

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reactor scrams or other safety system challenges. The inspectors reviewed the issue with licensee maintenance-personnel. The licensee has committed to review electrical and inst.ument surveillance procedures and implement changes t ;

require periodic checks for loose electrical connector This- ,

will be traced as an Open Item (254/85027-12; 265/85030-12(DRP)).

(2) A design deficiency was identified at the Trojan Station in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Syste Should an RHR pump fail on demand such that the motor breaker closes.but the pump fails t provide flow (e.g. , sheared shaft), its associated mini-flow recirculation valve would open and provide an alternate. flow _ ,

path from the redundant RHR train and starve some of the flow to, the reactor coolant system. Thus, less water woulu be pumped into the reactor coolant system than intended during the .

injection ' phase of a large break loss of coolant acciden ;

b The inspectors reviewed the RHR system at the Quad Cities station and ascertained that a similar. design-deficiency did not exist., ,

s l (3) During an audit at the Maine Yankee station,.the licensee ,

discovered that pressurizer pressure transmitters, pressurizer '

i level transmitters, and steam' generator level-transmitters > 2

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were not installed in accordance with manufacturers

!- recommendations in that the conduit seal assemblies did not-l .

.have thread sealant applied and may not have been properly.

! torqued. Also E.Q. requirements were not factored into.

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periodic surveillance procedures. These deficiencies could1

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invalidate the environmental qualification of the transmitter I

~ The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions at Quad Cities-and verified that thread sealant was.used during installation l-

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and that manufacturers recommendations for surveillance-requirements were considered. These requirements have~been incorporated into existing surveillance procedure (4) While investigating the cause of failure-of threaded oipe joints in the fire protection system at Comanche Peak station, the licensee discovered the presence of Microbiological Induced Corrosion (MIC), a chemical form of corrosion caused by the presence of microbes in stagnant wate To prevent a similar situation at Quad. Cities, licensee procedures require a system flush twice_per year and a flow test.each year to verify no degradation. A flo'w test was recently performed and no indication of piping degradation was foun No violations or deviations were-identifie . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. 'The open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2.c, 2.d and . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed'during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2.b and . Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted.in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the. inspection on December 6, 1985, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The inspectors also discussed the'likely informational content of.the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the-inspectors during the inspection. _ The licensee _ did not identify any-such documents / processes as proprietar .