IR 05000254/1999004
| ML20207E635 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207E607 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-99-04, 50-254-99-4, 50-265-99-04, 50-265-99-4, NUDOCS 9903110025 | |
| Download: ML20207E635 (13) | |
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- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 111 l
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Docket Nos:
50-254;50-265-
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License Nos:
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Report Nos:
' 50-254/99004(DRS); 50-265/99004(DRS.
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company l
Facility:
Quad Cit'es Nedear Power Plant
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Location:
22710 206th Av9nue North Cordova,IL 61242 l
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Dates:
Fabruary 1-5,1999 -
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r inspector:
James E. Foster, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Analyst Approved by
. James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety.
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DR ADOCK O M 254
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Reports 50-254/99004; 50-265/99004
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This inspection reviewed the Emergency Preparedness (EP) program, an aspect of Plant Support. The inspector selectively evaluated the quality of EP program-related audits and
. reviews, reviewed the effectiveness of management controls, verified the adequacy of emergency response facilities and equipment, reviewed a number of EP training and
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qualification activities, and included follow-up on previous inspection findings. This was an
- announced inspection conducted by a regional inspector.
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Overall, the EP program had been effectively maintained in a state of operational
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readiness. Interviewed key emergency response personnel demonstrated competent knowledge of responsibilities and emergency procedures. -(X1)
The inspected emergency response facilities, equipment, and supplies were well-
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maintained. Equipment performed very well when demonstrated. (Section P2.1)
Reviewed sections of the emergency plan and implementing procedures were
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adequately detailed. (Section P3)
The EP training program was effective. Selected key emergency response
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organization (ERO) personnel demonstrated competent knowledge of emergency responsibilities and procedures. The site training matrix differed from the corporate matrix, adding a requirement for training of nuclear engineers. This training had
. inadvertently been missed in 1998. Procedure changes rectified the discrepancy. All other personnel reviewed were qualified for their emergency response positions.
Significant efforts had been expended in proceduralizing and providing the Severe Accident Management (SAM) training modules. (Section PS)
The licensee's 1997 and 1998 EP program audits satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(t). (Section P7)
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Report Details i
IV. Plant Support P2 Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources P2.1 Material Condition of Emeroency Response Facilities (ERFs)
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Inspection Scope (IP 82701)
The inspector evaluated the material condition of Emergency Response equipment in the control room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC),
- Joint Public Information Center (JPIC),~ and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Two vans maintained for use by field monitoring teams were also inspected. The licensee demonstrated the performance of several pieces of emergency response equipment, including radiological survey instruments, portable generators, dose assessment and plant data computers', and communications equipment.
b.
Observations and Findinas The OSC, TSC, and EOF facilities, equipment, and supplies were well-maintained.
Status boards in the EOF, TSC, and OSC were in good material condition and ready for use. All commercial, dedicated, and licensee phone lines checked were found operable. Facility copies of the emergency plan, annexes to the plan, and emergency plan implementing procedures were found to be of the current revision. Current (July 1998) Nucletr Accident Reporting System (NARS) forms were r;oted in each facility.
The NRC inspector noted that position-specific binders had been developed for key response positions. These binders contained relevant procedures and forms for the particular response position. Key positions also had position-specific briefing guidelines covering items to be discussed during briefings, and copies of the fission product barrier matrix for hot initiating conditions.
l A table and procedures / guidelines for use by individuals performing Severe Accident Management (SAM) had been added to the TSC layout. An excellent Severe Accident Management Guideline (SAMG) Fact Sheet utilized a reactor level chart to provide large amounts of SAM data on a single chart. Discussion indicated that SAMG flowchart placement was under review to determine the most effective method / location
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for flowchart display. The Technical Director's position also had a copy of the Technical Support Guidelines Reference Manual, Revision 0, dated November 1998, supporting SAMG.
- Some loosening of the weatherstripping was observed on two of the doorways in the TSC. The weatherstripping assured a tight seal when these doors are closed, enabling isolation of the TSC air envelop during an emergency. The weatherstripping was
- immediately repositioned.
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~ License personnel demonstrated the effective performance of the dose assessment
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software, MESOREM 96. Discussion indicated that MESOREM 99 was under
. development by the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS), and would contain j
provisions for fuel pool accident release calculations. Accurate calculation of the i
= source term for a spent fuel pool accident would require data for each fuel bundle such j-as equivalent full power days, time since shutdown, etc.
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The process for activating the Emergency Response Data system (ERDS) using
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i Windows 95 was observed. The administrative mode of the software could provide for
simulator data to be transmitted via ERDS, while the control room can only initiate
transmission of actual reactor data.
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The EOF and Joint Pubic information Center facility, located in Morrison, Illinois, was in
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very good condition? All inspected equipment was operable. Several indications of i
j severe moisture intiusion during the summer months were noted, and three
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. dehumidifiers were present in the EOF, Discussion indicated that moisture had been
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l high during the summer. The NRC has approved a proposed centralized EOF to be
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located in Downer's Grove, Illinois. Licensee personnel stated that when this concept is
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fully implemented, the EOF portion of the facility will not be maintained.
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f Equipment in the two field team vans, including radios and portable generating I
equipment, was operable and ready for use. Some field team equipment was stored in
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the security gatehouse (due to temperature considerations), and this equipment was I
also verified operable.
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Review of siren availability data for calendar years 1997 and 1998 revealed high operability percentages for both years, with a lows of 95.5% operability during July
' 1997, and 96.5% operability in July 1998. Cumulative operability figures for 1997 and
,1998 were 98.0% and 99.1%, respectively, well above the 90% siren operability criteria utilized by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Calendar year 1998 inventories for the various fac'ities, first aid and decontamination kits, relocation centers, and environs sampling kits were reviewed. Corrective action had been taken on a timely basis for the rare occasions where inventoried materials were missing or deficient.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that the services of the Community Alert Network, Inc. (CAN) had been contracted to perform Emergency Response Organization (ERO) augmentation call-outs. The system was described as being able to handle 100 calls per minute over multiple lines, and was capable of calling the four ERO teams, using four call sequences, caliing the members of the duty team first. The system would begin to call ERO members by proximity to the site if augmentation by the duty team members could not be accomplished. The system had the capability to call house telephones, cellular telephones, or pagers.
Records for the monthly communications drills conducted during 1998 were reviewed.
These drills were performed per EPIP QEP 0720-S01, " Drills And Exercises," Rev. 7, i
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dated January 1999, which provided comprehensive instructions and criteria. The procedure and the records reviewed were both excellent and comprehensive.
Corrective actions appeared to have been timely when these drills identified communications problems.
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Conclusions The emergency response facilities, equipment, and supplies were well-maintained, and j
effectively performed their functions when demonstrated.
P3 EP Procedures and Documentation i
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Inspection Scoos (IP 82701)
. The inspector reviewed a selection of emergency plan implementing procedures
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(EPIPs) and emergency plan sections.
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b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed QEP 0400-03, " Emergency Teams," Rev. 6, dated April 1997.
Section F.1.B.1 provides for Urgent Priority Tasks, and that OSC teams assigned such
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tasks receive a minimum briefing and all team-related paperwork can be completed upon the team's retum to the OSC. The procedure also addressed high, medium, and low priority tasks, and stated that teams assigned these tasks will receive a full briefing using the briefing procedure QEP 0400-S05.
The inspector reviewed Corporate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (CEPIP)
3101-01, " Environmental Sample Collection Procedures," Rev.14, dated May 15,1998.
The procedure was adequately detailed, and appropriately specified measuring areas -
where snow was sampled in square feet and depth in inches. The procedure called for sampling, to the extent possible, thirty cubic feet of air, obtaining one gallon of water,
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three gallons of snow, and one quart (946cm ) of grass or soil.
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Conclusions Reviewed sections of the emergency plan and implementing procedures were adequately detailed.
P5 Staff Training and Qualification in EP a.
Inspection Scope (IP 82701)
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_ The inspector reviewed various aspects of the licensee's EP training program. This j
included interviews with selected key emergency response organization (ERO)
- personnel, including a Station Director, Radiation Protection Director, and a OSC Director. The first Quarter GSEP call list was reviewed and a random selection of j
individuals' records compared with training records. A selection of training modules
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was reviewed, as well as training feedback forms and summaries. Drill and exercise records were reviewed.
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Observations and eindinas J
Interviews with three key emergency response personnel indicated appropriate
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knowledge'of procedures and e.mergency responsibilities. Personnelinterviewed i
described their response process in detail. Those interviewed also demonstrated appropriate knowledge of their responsibilities and emergency procedures. During the interviews, personnel commented that the EP program and training were appropriate.
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During interviews, it was noted that the "on duty team" comes to the station for the plan-of-the-day (POD) meeting on Saturdays and Sundays, so as to be conv_ersant with ongoing plant activities and evolutions in case they are called to respond to a plant event. - This appeared to be an excellent mechanism for the duty team to maintain their ai,areness of overall plant operations.
Records and discussion indicated that significant efforts had been expended in proceduralizing and developing the Severe Accident Management (SAM) training modules. These were included in the EP training matrix. Discussion with the EP staff indicated that integrating SAM into the emergency preparedness program in terms of facility modifications, manual generation, training development and conduct had taken considerable resources and time. Training on SAM had been provided.
Records for various drills conducted during 1998, including the semi-annual augmentation drills, medical drill, and High Range Sampling System drill were reviewed. The augmentation drill record was very complete; pass criteria for the drill involved having' minimum staff for the TSC within 60 minutes.
The inspector reviewed procedure, T-EPT-TP, " Emergency Preparedness Training Program," Rev. E, dated May 14,1998, and several lesson plans and identified no problems.
EP Training requirements come from the Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP),
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section 8.2. Corpo: ate requirements for EP training to be accomplished at each station were in the Administrative and Course Management (ACMI), Rev. 8, dated June 26, j
1998, which now included SAMG training. The overall requirement was for annual training, with " annual" meaning anytime within the calendar year following the year i
previously taught. Feedback is provided for in the form of trainee feedback forms, the
"EP Training and tabletop training" form. These forms were then summarized in the EP l
Training Feedback assessment, which rietails sessions held during a period of time, significant comments, instructor recommeridations, and lists actions initiated in i
response to recommendations.
' Attachment D the ACMI is the station GSEP training modules and position titles (training matrix), with modules S-1 through S-61 (modules 50-61 address Severe Accident Management). Procedure QEP-0710-01,"GSEP Position Training
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Requirements," R9v.10, dated October 1997, provides for the station manager to I
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approve the GSF.P organization calllist on a quarterly basis.
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The training trracking system utilized by the EP staff was inadvertently lost last year
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during transition from one computer system to another. The database data was saved, i
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regenerated, and hardcopy training tracking was being maintained in the meantime. A
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review of the first Quarter GSEP call list was made to determine to listed individuals
had been trained within the applicable one year period. Discussion indicated that
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Electrical, mechanical, thermal engineering, electrical engineering, structural engineer,
Post Accident Sampling System Chemist (High Range Sampling System), or
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E instrumentation maintenance personnel do not receive unique, position-specific EP
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training, as their emergency duties are similar to their normal work duties.
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i Station procedure QEP-0710-T02, "GSEP training Matrix" essentially duplicated the j
ACMI, discussed above, but added a provision for nuclear engineers to receive core j-damage assessment training module S-7 in addition to Technical Directors, as per the j-ACMI. While inquiring about qualification tracking for the GSEP call list, the EP
' Coordinatoridentified that this (nuclear engineer) training had been missed in 1998.
Three nuclear engineers were present on the ERO call-out list. Problem Identification Form (PlF)-Q1999-00401 was generated to document this. An immediate Procedure change request was made to delete table T02, and rely only on the ACMI, as was the practice at 6ther stations. Omitting core damage training for the nuclear engineers was above the requirements of the ACMI, and was considered as a minor violation, without any safety significance, which was promptly rectified.
The inspector questioned wether the nuclear engineer should get this training. A revision to QCEPIP 0120-03 was undergoing technical review at the time of the inspection for using the NRC document Response Technical Manual-96 (RTM-96) for rapid core damage assessment. This procedure provided for simple calculations, and j
could be done by the Technical Director or others with his oversight. This procedure i
was partially through the review process, and discussion indicated that training module j
S-7 would be revised when this procedure change is finalized. Additional clarification may be needed in QEP 0120-S03, which has the Technical Director direct the Nuclear
Engineer or Chemist to initiate QEP 0120-02, Core Damage Assessment.
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Conclusions I
The EP training program was effective. Selected key ERO personnel demonstrated competent knowledge of emergency responsibilities and procedures. The site training matrix differed from the corporate matrix, adding a requirement for training of nuclear engineers. This training had inadvertently been missed in 1998. Procedure changes rectified the discrepancy. All other personnel reviewed were qualified for their emergency response positions. Significant efforts had been expended in proceduralizing and providing the Severe Accident Management (SAM) training modules. Drills and training were formally critiqued.
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P6 EP Organization and Administration The EP organization previously reported to Technical and Health Physics Supervisor, then the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM). EP coordinators now report directly to the RPM, a shorter reporting chain. The current RPM has extensive EP experience at another utility.
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. It was noted that the approval of a centralized corporate EOF would reduce the
. responsibilities of the station EP staff regarding EOF maintenance, but a large short-term task would involve removing references to the Morrison EOF from the Generating Stations Emergency Plan Annex and Quad Cities Emergency Plan implementing Procedures and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
Discussion with the EP staff indicated that the number of collateral duties assigned had i_
been reduced subsequent to,~ and in response to, the Quad Cities 1998 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Program Self Assessment, discussed later in this report.
P7 Quality Assurance in EP Activities a.
InsDection Scope UP 82701)
The inspector reviewed the Emergency Planning audit reports for 1997 and 1998. Also
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reviewed was an assessment of the implementation of SAM at the Boiling Water
' Reactor stations.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed Comed Nuclear Generation Group Audit Report Comed-98-03, addressing Emergency Preparedness (EP), the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). This audit, performed during the period March 2 - May 5,1998, was performed at the various
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stations and Downers Grove headquarters. The audit conclusion was that Comed is prepared to respond to an emergency. All the stations and headquarters were found to have acceptable programs and "pe formance has improved." Findings for the separate stations were attached to the audit summary. Three level three audit findings were -
issued to the Quad Cities Station for minor items such as item tracking problems and minor procedural deficiencies. The audit was adequately detailed. Problem Identification Forms had been initiated for each of these items. Corrective actions were
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timely and adequate.. The audit appropriately addressed the adequacy of the offsite interface for each station, and reviewed the interface procedures at the corporate office.
Also reviewed was the " Quad Cities 1998 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Program Self Assessment," dated November 17,1998; In previous reports, such assessments were referred to as " Peer Reviews." This assessment was conducted by four individuals during the period November 4-6,1998. The conclusion of the assessment was that the EP program was "being maintained in an effective state of operational readiness." The
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i assessment determined that the program was largely in a maintenance mode due to a temporary reduction in available staff (illness of one staff member) and other collateral
. duties assigned to the EP staff. The overall assessment was excellent.
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The inspector also reviewed the "1998 BWR Severe Accident Management Guidelines
(SAMG) Program Self-Assessments, dated December 18,1998. The assessment had been conducted by seven individuals, and indicated that the SAM program for Boiling i
Water Reactors (BWRs) was being successfully implemented. it was noted that the i
three BWR stations, Dresden, LaSalle, and Quad Cities, had developed the SAM program together. A data chart showing compilation of Emergency Operating i
Procedures (EOPs) and SAMG system parameters had been developed, and received
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positive feedback from users.
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Conclusions
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. The licensee's 1997 and 1998 EP program audits and assessments were very good, j
and satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t) regarding EP program reviews.
l P8 Miscellaneous EP issues
- P8.1 - (Closed) Inspection Followuo item No. 50-254/9600817: 50-265/96008-17: Untimely minimum staffing of the Corporate EOF (CEOF) for the declared Alert for the May 10, 1996 tomado. event. The licensee provided documentation for 1998 augmentation drills performed for the CEOF The results were as follow-
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ACTUAL DATE INITIATION.
TIME TO TIME TO SUCCESS CALL-IN TIME (HRS)
MINIMUM FULL STAFF STAFF YES 05/14/98 1900 40 MIN.
55 MIN.
YES NO 07/29/98 1928 55 MIN.
60 MIN.
YES YES 08/04/98 0413 68 MIN.-
85 MIN.
NO NO 08/19/98 1910 56 MIN.
96 MIN.
YES NO 08/27/98 1908.
43 MIN.
48 MIN.
YES NO 09/17/98 1905 56 MIN.
56 MIN.
YES YES 10/07/98-1906 57 MIN.
57 MIN.
YES NO 11/16/98 1829 59 MIN.
59 MIN.
YES
- NO-12/08/98 0504 111 MIN.
111 MIN.
NO NO.
12/15/98 0852 34 MIN.
42 MIN.
YES
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On January 29,1999, the NRC approved Comed's request to consolidate all of its near-site EOFs into a single, Corporate EOF (CEOF). This decision was transmitted formally to Comed by latter dated February 9,1999. The NRC will monitor the transition to the centralized EOF and continue to monitor the ability to meet centralized EOF staffing levels and timeliness commitments. This item is closed.
V. Manaaement Meetina X1 Exit Meeting Summary
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j The inspector presented the inspection results to licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on February 5,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings l
presented. The inspector indicated that, overall, the EP program had been maintained in a j
state of operational readiness. Interviewed key emergency response personnel had i
demonstrated competent knowledge of responsibilities and emergency procedures.
The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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' PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED i
t Licensee-l
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?E. Anderson,' Radiation Protection Manager.
W. Beck, Regulatory Assurance Manager
P. Behrens, Superintendent Chemistry.
I K. Bethard, Regulatory Assurance
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G. Boershig, Engineering l
R. Chrzanowski, Nuclear Oversight Manager
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?J. Dimmette, Site Vice President, Quad Cities
M. Field, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
. K Gladrosich, Nuclear Operations
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G; Klone, Operations -
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L. Kreuder, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator j
C. Peterson Regulatory Assurance i
J. Porkis, System Engineering Manager
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J. Sirovy, Nuclear Operations.
i D. Stobaugh, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
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C. Symonds, Operations Training Superintendent M. Vonk, Emergency Preparedness Manager, Downers Grove D. Wozniak, Acting Station Manager NRC L Collins, Resident inspector-1D33 B. Ganser,' Resident inspector -
l INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 11P 82701 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
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50-254/265/96008-17 IFl.
Untimely' minimum staffing of the Corporate EOF (CEOF).
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ACMI Administrative Course Management instruction
'BWR Boiling Water Reactor CAN Community Alert Network -
CEOF Corporate Emergency Operations Facility.
CFR Code of Federal Regulations DPR Demonstration Power Reactor DRS Division of Reactor. Safety.
EAL Emergency Action Level-ERDS Emergency Response Data System EOF'
Emergency Operations Facility EP Emergency Preparedness -
EPIP Emergency Plan implementing Procedure ERF Emergency Response Facility ERO Emergency Response Organization GSEP-Generating Stations Emergency Plan IDNS lilinois Department of Nucluar Safety IFl Inspection Followup item
- JPIC Joint Public Information Center NARS Nuclear Accident Reporting System
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NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NUREG-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual OSC_
Operations Support Center PDR NRC Public Document Room
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PIF Problem identification Form POD
. Plan-of-the-day meeting PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
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REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program RPM-Radiation Protection Manager -
RTM Response Technical Manual SAM-Severe Accident Management
'SAMG Severe Accident Management Guidelines
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SRI Senior Resident inspector TSC Technical Support Center I
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PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
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Quad Cities Nuclear Plant Emerge.ncy Plan, Sections 5.0,5.1.1, Figure 5-2.
j Emergency Plan implementing Procedure (EPIP)
. Siren availability data for calendar years 1997 and 1998, undated '
- Comed Nuclear Generation Group Audit Report Comed-98-03 '
i-Quad Cities 1998 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Program Self Assessment," dated
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November 17,1998.
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1998 BWR Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Program Self-Assessments,
dated December 18,1998.
I Procedures l-j EPIP QEP 0720-S01," Drills And Exercises, Rev. 7,' dated January 1999.
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' QEP 0400-03, " Emergency Teams," Rev. 6, dated April 1997.
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. Technical Support Guidelines Reference Manual, Rev. O, dated November 1998.
j CEPIP 3101-01, " Environmental Sample Collection Procedures," Rev.14, dated May 15,1998.
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. Emergency Preparedness Training program, T-EPT-TP, " Emergency Preparedness Training l
. Program," Rev. E, dated May 14,1998.
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Administrative and Course Management (ACMl), Rev. 8, dated June 26,1998.
Procedure QEP-0710-01,"GSEP Position Training Requirements," Rev.10, dated October 1997.-
Procedure QEP-0710-01, Rev.10, dated October 1997, provides for the station manager to approve the GSEP organization call list on a quarterly basis.
Procedure QEP 0120-01, Rev.13, dated September 1998, " Technical Director implementing
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Procedure QEP 0120-02, Rev. 6, dated July,1997, " Core Damage Assessment".
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Procedure QEP 0120-S03, Rev. 8, dated September,1998. " Technical Director General
' Emergency Checklist".
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