IR 05000254/1990014

Insp Repts 50-254/90-14 & 50-265/90-14 on 900805-0915. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ler Review,Regional Request,Followup on TMI Action Items,Operational Safety Verification,Esf Sys & Monthly Maint Observations

ML20059N685
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/04/1990
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059N681	List: IR 05000254/1990014 ML20059N680 ML20059N683
References
50-254-90-14, 50-265-90-14, NUDOCS 9010170141
Download: ML20059N685 (14)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:.. .- ., - - , , i '~ - '- . g c* . ;, - ' , . . - J// -U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AV

REGION III

. Reports No. 50-254/90014(DRP);50-265/90014(DRP) , Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 . ' Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL-60515- " Facility Name:- Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 , ' Inspection At: Quad Cities Site,-Cordova, Illinois ' Inspection Conducted: August 5 through September 15, 1990

Inspectors: T. Taylor a J. Shine R. Bocanegra D. Jones , C. Miller Approved B 'Ys', C OCT 0 4 W n Reactor Projects Section IB Date . - L i Inspection Summary . 15,1990 (Reports No.

L-Inspection from August 5 through September . 50-254/90014 (DRP); 50-265/90-014 (DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety' inspection by the resident and - g regional inspectors of licensee action on previously identified items; licensee; event report review;. regional request; follow-up.on TMI action items; L operational safety verification; engineered safety feature systems; monthly .. l.

maintenance observation; monthly surveillance observation; training.

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effectiveness; report review; events; refueling-activities; and meetings and

' ! other activities.

. . Results: Of the areas inspected two violations, and one unresolved item were identified. The violations concerned surveillance acceptance criteria and an y L: unauthorized design change.

The following is a brief summary of inspection j findings'and area status.

' l L Plant Operation , . i !- " 1) =During the inspection period station management. performed extensive evaluations of identified problem areas, initiatives for improvements were identified and management has made a strong commitment to improve overall station performance.

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, 2I The inspectors performed a review of licensee performance concerning e Technica1' Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs). One - . problem area was' identified for the Standby Liquid Co,ntrol' systems ' concerning entrance of-LCOs during surveillance activities.;.Further < revi.ews for other systems are being conducted requiring more~ detail from the licensee.

(UNR 254/90-014-03; 265/90-014-03(DRP), Section-7.)

. 3) Closed LER 254/90016-LL: Failure of 1/2. Fire Pump to Start on Low: Fire Header Pressure or Manually.

Cause of failure was defective pilot-starter control relays.

] - Maintenance and Surveillance v 1)- Overall the licensee maintenance and surveillance programs are considered adequate although recent concerns about control of work practices and' procedure adherence have been identified. The Resident Inspector staff , continues to monitor the,11censee's activities.

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The inspectors identified a violation concerning an absence of required , acceptance criteria in the LPCI surveillance procedure for the monthly LPCI pump operability run.

During a previous maintenance team inspection ' other instances of a lack of acceptance criteria were identified.

,i Corre'etive actions for previous findings did not address a review of all surveillance procedures for adequate acceptance criteria.

', -(NV4 254/90-014-01(DRP), Section 6.c.)

3) A review of the Reactor. Water Cleanup System piping analysis discrepancy was performed. The discrepancy concerned a proper analysis to document , FSAR design criteria.

Reviews by licensee and an NRC review of licensee analysis agreed that the as-built piping system meets the FSAR criteria.

' .(Section 4.a.)

4) (Closed) Notice of Violation (254/89-026-018) for a procedure inadequacy.

The procedure ~ used for the division battery discharge test failed.to , properly sequence the realignment of the batteries.

Corrective. actions , were reviewed and were determined to be adequate.

(Section 2.b.)

i ' Engineering and Technical Support 1) 1 Technical staffing levels continue to increase.

Licensee management has made a strong commitment to increase staffing and experience in order to , provide better onsite engineering support.

2).

Review of a potential division separation issue identified'a violation for an unauthorized design change. The licensee had installed a terminal strip and' associated wiring to correct auxiliary centacts from ECCS component circuits to one terminal board. The terminal board was used as a test ' panel for the ECCS simulated Automatic Actuation and Diesel Generators Auto - start surveillance. The installation was performed without the required 10 CFR 50 Appendix B reviews and approvals.

(NV4 254/90-014-02(DRP), Section 10.)

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l-Radiological Controls- ' 1) Performance in this area continues to be strong. The licensee.is evaluating an NRC identified concern about the excessive number of roped off contaminated areas and plans to direct resources to' eliminating as . many of the areas as possible.

2) New fuel for-the November refuel outage arrived on site. The resident- . inspectors monitored the fuel receipt and inspection activities.' No

, problems were identified.

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Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) i

• N. J. Kalivianakis, General Manager, BWR Operations i
• R. L. Bax, Station Manager.

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• R. A. Robey, Technical Superintendent

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• G. F. Spedi, Production Superintendent

! R. Stols, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

, L J. Swales, Assistant Superintendent - Operations R J. Fish, Master Mechanic

• J. Sirovy, Services Director
• T. Tamlyn,. ENC Site Manager
• D. Craddick, Assistant Superintendent - Maintener.ce B. Tubbs, Operating Engineer - Unit 1

- J. Kopacz, Operating Engineer - Unit 0

• B. Strub,: Operating Engineer - Unit 2 M. Kooi, Operating Engineer - Admin

. J. Wethington, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• D. Gibson, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

- J..Dierbeck, Technical Staff Supervisor D. Bucknell, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor , -C. Smith,-Quality Control Supervisor ,' l .K.. Leech, Security Administrator B. McGaffigan, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning o l-J. Hoeller, Training Supervisor

• T. Barber, Regulatory Assurance
• R. Bajema, Chief Steward-
• D. Edwards,. Chief Steward

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• Denotes those attending the. exit interview conducted on

g September. 14, 1990.

The inspectors also talked with and interviewed-several other licensee

L-employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, l operations departments, electrical, mechanical and instrument maintenance

groups, and contract security personnel.

! 2.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702) l a, .(0 pen) Unresolved Item (254/89-024-06; 265/89-024-06) " Lack of

Guidance in Licensee Procedures in Regard to Minimum Pathway Leakage ' Calculations Especially for Four and Six-Valve Penetrations."

i Several discussions were-held between the licensee and the inspectors as to how.the minimum pathway leakage should be calculated for multiple ( valve penetrations. The inspectors were given a draft revision of the corporate directive, and the changes were discussed with the licensee in a meeting held in the licensee's corporate offices on July 30, 1990.

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.,_ - , at The inspectors agreed that the revisions being made to-the corporate

directive would resolve _the concerns of the unresolved ~ item, once the-revisions were. incorporated into the licensee's procedures.. This unresolved item'is being left open pending the revision and review of , the licensee's site procedures.

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(Closed) 254/89-026-Olb " Unit 1 Reactor Scram While' Shutdown."' This' Notice of Violation (N0V) was issued for a Unit I reactor scram while shutdown. _ The out of service ' procedure for preparing a battery.

discharge test did not properly sequence the realignment of the ' l ' batteries'.-:This resulted in neutron instrumentation panels simaltaneously de-energizing, resulting in the loss of power to both ,, divisions of.the intermediate range monitors and a reactor scram. By lette* dated February 8,1990,-the licensee responded to the NOV.

. Correcitye actions taken to prevent further noncompliance included ! tailgate session: to review the event with operating personnel, and . technical staff. The Battery Discharge ' Test Procedure and the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Essential Service Bus procedures were - reviewed for adequacy, and an additional caution was placed in the battery discharge test procedure.

Based on a review of the corrective actions taken this item is considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

l 3.

Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700) Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to-prevent recurrence

had been or would be accomplished in accordance with. Technical Specifications (TS): . . t The following reports of nonroutine-events were reviewed by-the inspectors. = Based on this review it was' determined that the events were of minor safety significance, did'not represent program deficiencies, . were properly reported, and were properly _ compensated for. -These reports ' arr. closed: (Closed) LER 254/90-016-LL: Failure of 1/2A Fire Pump to Start on Lo,: Fire Header Pressure or Manually. This item is discussed further in Section 5.a of this report.

^ (Closed) LER 254/90-003-00: Unit I diesel generator inoperable due to governor mi,sadjustment with 1/2 diesel generator out-of-service.

(Closed) LER 254/89-026-00d: Control Room HVAC isolation due to dried.

out chlorine probe.

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inadvertently lowered due to personnel error.

} ~ n (Closed) LER 254/89-024-01: Unit 1 turbine trip due to high reactor i . water level signal caused by undetected tripped level-switch.

' (Closed) LER 254/89-022-00: Unit 1 HPCI inoperable due to inadvertent i , deluge system actuation.- ! , (Closed) LER 254/89-018-00: Potential single failure of the diesel-i generator voltage regulator which could result in a loss of all but one emergency core cooling system loop.

, (Closed) LER 254/89-016-00: New fuel assembly dropped in fuel pool when refuel bridge fuel grapple-released due to-personnel error and lack of , , procedure guidance.

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(Closed) LER 254/89-011-00: Unit I diesel generator fire protection system inoperable due to plugged solenoid valve exhaust port causing failure of damper to close.

l (Closed) LER 254/89-009-00: Unmonitored release of laundry water due to l.

corroded piping caused >by design error.

t !' 's (Closed) LER 265/87-012-01: While testing suppression chamber to drywell ' vacuum breakers, the 2-1601-33E stuck open for 50 minut'es.

, (Closed) LER 265/88-011-00: Unit 2 reactor scram occurred due to L.

uncertainty of mode switch position when^ moving it from REFUEL to STARTUP/ HOT STANDBY.

, l-(Clos'ed) LER 265/88-020-01: Emergency core cooling system initiation signal received during improper valving sequence on reactor water level.

Linstrumentation due to an inadequate procedure.

(Closed) LER 265/89-001-00: Reactor scram due to failure of master trip.

y . solenoid valve.

W In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the' licensee's Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection period. This.was done. in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance, potential trends, etc.

DVRs were also reviewed for proper , ..S . initiation and disposition as required by the applicable procedures and the , QA manual.

f No violations or deviations were identified.

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, - .. ,- - -- . ... ' i - i . . , . , .t 4.j Operational Safety Verification (71707) '- , During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements-and that the 11censee's management control system was effectively carrying , out its responsibilities for safe operation. This'was done on a sampling.

basis through routine direct observation of_ activities and equipment, tours , of the facility, interviews and discussions with: licensee personnel,_ independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), corrective action, and review of-facility records.- On a sampling basis the inspectors verified, on a daily basis, proper control room staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of , plant activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS); including compliance with LCOs, with emphasis on engineered safety features (ESF) and ESF electrical alignment and valve positions; monitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnormalities; verified status of various lit annunciators for ooerator understanding, off-normal , condition, and corrective actions being taken; examined nuclear instrumentation-(NI) and other protection channels for proper operability; i reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal conditions; i verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent, and other managers; and observed the Safety -Parameter Display System (SPDS) for operability, a.

Reactor Water Cleanup System piping Analysis Discrepancy On August 0, 1990, the licensee's offsite engineering group informed , the station that a discrepancy existed in the piping analysis for l reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system lines.1-1202-6" and 2-1202-6".

' The current configuration did not have a proper analysis to document satisfaction of FSAR criteria. The concern was discovered by ABB Impell through an _ interface with Nutech on a weld overlay issue, as . the two companies possessed dissimilar design basis analyses. - ABB Impell was requested to merge the two analyses for the Unit'l-RWCU line.

During the merge of the two analyses it became apparent that minor, . unrelated modifications had been performed on the RWCU line since the orQinal ABB Impe11 analysis (79-14, pursuant to TMI) was performed.- The licensee informed the resident staff of the discrepancy in a timely manner. The issue was discussed with regional technical personnel concluding-that no further action was warranted at the time, pending the results of the. merged analysis. ABB Impell completed the qualification of the RWCU lines including interfaces with Sargent and Lundy and Bechtel. The calculations show that the piping systems meet FSAR i

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7' ...., y ,' ~ @ i j[[[ t - - "N' criteria for their as-built conditions. ABB Impell is in the process ofJ '! updating the-affected drawings and piping analysis data sheets. The' " licensee has revised procedures since these modifications, and has ,,

initiated a piping design document control. system to help. prevent , recurrence. The-inspectors have no further questions regarding this- ' , matter at this time.

' M , . During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made_ note of general, plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities.

S in progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of shift'tu'rnovers, f, general safety items, etc. The specific areas _ observed were: % ' i 4t W ' b.

Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems k/ ' Accessible portions of ESF systems and components were inspected to.

. verify: valve position for proper flow path; proper alignment of power , ,O m supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actuation on an-G initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if required ' ' by TS or FSAR; and the operability of support systems essential to qv system actuation or performance through observation of instrumentation (t^ and/or proper valve alignment. The. inspectors also visually inspected

components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling _ water supply, etc.

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Radiation Protection Controls The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics procedures for dosimetry,--protective clothing, frisking, posting, etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, & operability, and calibration. The licensee is evaluating an NRC j identified concern about the excessive number of roped off t contaminated areas and plans to direct resources to eliminating-as , many of the areas as possible, " d.

Security 'The inspectors, by sampling, verified that persons in the protected area-(PA) displayed proper badges and had escorts'if. required; vital: areas-were kept locked and alarmed, or guards posted if required; and , personnel. and packages entering the PA received proper search and/or ' - monitoring.

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Housekeeping and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection, protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign matter and general protection.

P The inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers, f shiftly logs and surveillances, daily orders, maintenance items, various ! chemistry and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review - results, overtime records, QA and/or-QC audit results and postings required per 10 CFR 19.11.

- No violations or deviations were identified.

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. Monthly. Maintenance Observation (62703) y Station maintenance activities affecting the safety-related systems and.

, components. listed belcw were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were > conducted in accordance.with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical- { Specifications.

The.following. items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from'and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating.

i the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were: performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records _were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified - personnel; parts and mater.ials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were. reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is-assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

< The following-maintenance activities were observed and reviewed: a.

Unit 0 > ECCS Pump Motor Preventive Maintenance 1/2 A SBGT Flow Control Valve Work HPCI/RCIC Test Return Line Repair l Repair of Diesel Fire Pump Relays .

On August 9, 1990, the licensee reported that both diesel fire pumps j 1:> were' inoperable.

The 1/2B fire pump was out of service-(005)-to repair "< l the discharge header relief valve. Water pressure dropped as expected when the licensee began filling and venting a new section of the fire main. The 1/2A fire pump received an auto start. signal on low pressure, but failed to start. ' Operators' attempts to manually start the diesel' fire pump remotely and locally failed. A backup fire suppression water system was established as required by Technical Specification 3.12.B.3.

The cause of.the 1/2A diesel fire pump failure was attributed to defects' .i in the two redundant pilot starter control relays.

The mode of failure ' for the relays was different.

In the past, the relays-were not on a preventive maintenance schedule, but as part of.the corrective actions,- the licensee will now replace relays on both diesel fire pumps at three- ' year intervals. This event and corrective actions are addressed in LER 254/90-016.

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Unit I t Reactor Water Cleanup Recirc Suction Valve Repair

3 C Electromatic Relief Valve Repair / Troubleshooting-

, i Turbine Control Valve Fast Acting Solenoid Valve (FASV) Repair ( ' The licensee replaced the FASVs with new Vicker valves on August 11, 1990,_while Unit I was shut down for'other unrelated' maintenance, however control valves (CVs) No. 2 and No. 3 failed to fast close during post maintenance tests.

Electrical Maintenance worked on the electrical circuitry, corrected the problem, and-the' i valves passed the surveillance test.

Previously, on May 28, 1990 and again on July 15, 1990, the' licensee.- , L experienced problems with Unit 1 Vicker CV FASVs as described in NRC " . lL report No.; 50-254/90-012(DRP). The licensee has committed to-

replacing the Vicker FASVs at the next refuel outage with Parker-l. Hannifin FASVs.

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Unit 2 e QEMP 400-3, Recirc MG. Set Brush Replacement While In-Service WR Q75962 RHR Pump Discharge Pressure Switch Replacement-l.

No~ violations or deviations were. identified.

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Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726) l The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical l Specifications during the inspection period and verified that -testing was I performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test,-and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel..

The inspectors also. witnessed portions of the following test activities: , ' a.

Unit 0 00S' 4100-1, Monthly Diesel Fire Pump Test QOS 6600-1~ 1/2 Diesel Generator Monthly Load Test , ,

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Unit-1 H U-QCOS'1400-4,-Monthly Core Spray Operability Test QOS -1000-2, Residual Heat Removal System Pump Operability QOS 1100-6, SBLC Demineralized Water Recycle Test With Flow i Indicator , ! 'c.

Unit 2 QOS 6600-5, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Flow Rate l ' Test QOS 2301-1, HPCI Monthly and Quarterly Test i e , Test Control Deficiency Technical Specification (TS)-Sections 4.5.A.3 and 4.5.A.I.C require that a monthly " Pump Operability" surveillance be performed on the

LPCI mode of the RHR system.

Section 3.5.A.3 of the Technical R Specifications-(TS) requires that the LPCI mode of the RHR system -

shall be' operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

Section 1.M of the TS states that a component shall be operable when-it is capable of performing its design _ function.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI states that required testing performed to demonstrate that components will perform satisfactorily in service must be performed with written procedures which incorporate requirements and-acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents.

Monthly surveillance procedure,-QOS 1000-2, Revision 12, Residual' Heat Removal System (RHRS) Pump Operability was utilized to satisfy TS surveillance requirements 4.5.A.3 and 4.5.A.I.C, but contained no . acceptance' criteria to validate the operability of the pumps. The failure of the test procedure to identify and incorporate pump operability acceptance limits is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test. Control (254/90-014-01(DRP)). The quarterly T.S. surveillance flow rate test procedure does include acceptance criteria and has not identified any operability problems to date. The inspector's concern was that with the present. monthly , surveillance procedure the pump could be inoperable and possibly go undetected until the quarterly surveillance was performed.

The test control deficiency was identified during an NRC review of licensee corrective actions pursuant to declaring the 2D LPCI pump inoperable on August 1, 1990, s As a result of maintenance on the system, a new pump operability acceptance baseline'was established on' April 29, 1990. On August 1, 1990,- a quarterly flow rate test was performed which indicated that the pump was' in the required action range and the pump was declared inoperable.

' Subsequent licensee reviews identified that the baseline established on April 29, 1990 was in error and that the pump was actually in an operable condition. -The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was exited on August 5, 1990.

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. - , . -. - ,, y , , . ' . . -( ,; , - - .. ' , . ' ' A more timely discovery of the erroneous baseline data could have been made if the monthly surveillance test procedure had contained pump operability. acceptance criteria.

One violation was. identified.

i 7.

'LCOs and System Operability (71707) During this report period the resident inspectors have been reviewing .various system operations for operability relative to the licensee entering i and exiting LCOs for surveillance activities.

The concern is that i surveillance activities that render a system or component incapable of performing its design function need to be properly. identified.

For situations in which the Technical. Specification minimum system requirements ' for operability are affected, the inspectors are concerned with the LCOs' i and declaration of system inoperability. A problem with the Standby.

Liquid Control system operability during surveillance activities in which ' the poison tank is isolated has been identified. Review of this surveillance has also identified problems with log entries identifying performance of this. surveillance. Other systems and surveillances remain ,. l to be evaluated.

This issue is considered an unresolved item (254/90-014-03;265/90-014-03(DRP)). i One unresolved item was identified.

! 8.

Training Effectiveness (41400, 41701) The. effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of the , licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response to events which occurred during the inspection period.

Personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed - L which indicated any ineffectiveness of training.

No-violations-or deviations were identified.

9.

Report Review (71707) , During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for July 1990. The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification-6.9.1'.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.

- The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Report for i July and August 1990.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Events (93702) '

~! Unauthorized Desian Change On August 29, 1990, the licensee discovered that the station was , potentially outside the design criteria for divisional: separation for a test panel installation involving the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS).

The affected systems included Residual Heat Removal (RHR),. Core , Spray (CS), and all three emergency diesel-generators-(EDGs).

The problem ' stemmed from wcrk done under a March 8, 1978 work request-(WR 1232-78)that' . connected ECCS and EDG auxiliary contacts to a single-terminal strip behind , the 901-5 panel. The terminal strip served as a test point to attach a- " multi pen recorder each refueling cycle to perform surveillance procedure QTS 110-1, " Emergency Core Cooling System Simulated Automatic Actuation and

Diesel Generators Auto-Start Surveillance." The modification.was also done , on Unit 2.

The connections were made using twisted wire pairs instead of 14 gauge SIS wire which is approved for panel wiring. The modification did not affect the remote shut down panel.

The licensee promptly eliminated the potential divisional separation

problem by clipping and taping the test wires at both ends on both units.

' The resident inspectors discussed the separation issue with Region III and NRR personnel and concluded that licensee's actions appeared to be ' appropriate and no further action is deemed necessary at this time, j During the inspectors' review of the separation issue, it was identified that the terminal strip and associated wiring was an unauthorized design change.

Subsequent to the unauthorized design change the following activities occurred during the Unit 2 refueling outage: on February 13,- 1990, a Deviation Report (DVR 90-007) was initiated to report that a-contractor had inadvertently shorted a twisted wire pair while working , behind the Unit 2 control room 902-8 panel, causing the feed breaker from bus 23 to bus 12-1 to trip, resulting in a loss of power to bus 23-1, 1' bus 28,'the off gas filter building transformer 20, and the "A" Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus. The Essential Service System (ESS) ' Uninterruptible' Power Supply (UPS) transferred to DC power and the Instrument bus transferred to reserve power. This caused a reactor building vent and control room vent isolation, Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT)_ automatic initiation, half Group 1, 2, and 3 isolations, 2A Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) pump. trip, 1B instrument air compressor trip, 2A fuel pool pump trip, various reactor building and ' turbine building fan trips, and loss of power to various drywell and torus vent valves.

In May 1990, in response to the DVR, the licensee replaced all the twisted wire pairs on Unit 2 with panel wiring and routed the wires through wireways, but failed to consider replacement of wiring on the Unit I side. The licensee also missed the opportunity to recognize the ' unauthorized design change and potential divisional separation problem due , to inadequate review of the work package which failed to identify the wiring change as a modification. A modification review,should have identified the test terminal strip as an unauthorized design change.

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,e . ,. . . " The unauthorized installation of wiring from the ECCS auxiliary contacts to the terminal strip without proper reviews is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, " Design Control" (254/90-014-02).

One, violation was identified.

11. New Fuel Inspection (60710) New fuel arrived at the station during September in preparation for the Unit I refueling outage scheduled for November 12, 1990. The inspectors observed portions of fuel receipt and inspection activities.

The inspectors verified that these activities were performed by qualified licensee personnel, that adequate rad protection measures were in place, and that complete work packages were at the job site.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Meetings and Other Activities (30702) Management / Plant Status Meeting A meeting was held on September 14, 1990 between the Station Manager,.the Vice President of BWR Operations, the General Manager of BWR Operations, the Region III DRP Branch Chief and Section Chief, and members of each of their staffs. The purpose of the meeting was for the licensee to provide information relative to licensee initiatives for improved performance, and Zion Diagnostic Evaluation Team (DET) inspection issues.

No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Unresolved Items An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a deviation, or a violation. An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 7.

14. Exit Interview (30703) The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on September 14, 1990.

The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietaty in nature.

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