Text

Insp Repts 50-254/87-13 & 50-265/87-13 on 870607-0801. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Surveillance,Ler Review,Routine Repts,Training,Bulletins, Generic Ltrs,Radiation Control,Outages & Licensee Meetings
	ML20238A889
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	08/25/1987
From:	Ring M; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20238A821	List: IR 05000254/1987013; ML20238A818; ML20238A855;
References
	50-254-87-13, 50-265-87-13, GL-84-23, GL-85-03, GL-85-06, GL-85-14, GL-85-3, GL-85-6, IEB-86-001, IEB-86-1, IEIN-85-094, IEIN-85-94, NUDOCS 8708310256
	Download: ML20238A889 (17)
	v • d • e

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _

_ _ _ _

'

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-254/87013(DRP); 50-265/87013(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-254, 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Conducted: June 7 through August 1, 1987 Inspectors:

R. L. Higgins A. D. Morrongiello Approved By:

M. A. Ring, Chief 71 Y

[of

?!26fS7 Projects Section IC Date

~

Inspection Summary Inspection on June 7 through August 1,1987 (Reports No. 254/87013(DRP);

50-265/87013(DRP))

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced resident inspection of Operations, Maintenance, Surveillance, LER Review, Routine Reports, Training, Administrative Controls Affecting Quality, Bulletins, Generic Letters, Radiation Control, Emergency Preparedness, Outages, Regional Requests and Licensee Meetings.

Results:

In the areas inspected, two violations (failura to perform required fire protection inspections paragraph 2(c); and f ailure to urdate procedures

and electrical prints to reflect plant modification.s paragraph 8; and one I

unresolved item (apparent improper relief of the Unit 2 operator by the center desk operator paragraph 2(h)) were identified.

Several areas continued to perform well:

licensing, surveillance, and security.

k DO

G

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

..

.....

..

.-

.

..

.

..

... - - _ - -

-

\\

-

.

DETAILS l

1.

personnnel Contacted

R. Bax, Plant Manager

{

G. Tietz, Assistant Superintendent for Operations

R. Robey, Technical Services Superintendent

M. Kooi, Compliance Coordinator I

D. Gibson, Quality Assurance

Denotes those present at the exit interview on June 12, 1987.

The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspection.

l 2.

Operations (71707, 93702)

The inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined plant operations. The inspectors verified that activities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initiating any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the limiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and while components or systems were removed from service; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and review of test results were accomplished; quality control records were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials and equipment were properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained as applicable; and adverse plant conditions including equipment malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel errors were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by appropriate management personnel.

q i

(a) Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)

'

Ouring plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the High Pressure Core Injection System.

(b) Summary of Operations Unit 1 At the beginning of the inspection period Unit I was at full power.

For the remainder of the report period, the unit was either at full power, on Economic Generation Control (EGC), or at reduced power in

4

_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ -

__

- _ - _

a

- _-__

.

order to perform surveillance or to comply with load dispatcher orders. As of August.1,1987, the end of the inspection period, Unit I has operated at power for 137 consecutive days.

Unit 2 At the beginning of the inspection period Un'it 2 was at full power.

For the remainder.of.the report period, the unit was either at full power, on Economic Generation Control (EGC), or at reduced. power in.

order to perform surveillance or to comply with load dispatcher orders.

On August 1, 1987, the end-of the inspection period, Unit 2 scrammed due to a transformer fault.

Unit 2 had operated at power, for 133 consecutive days, breaking the previous United States record for, consecutive days during which both units at a dual unit BWR site operated at power.

)

(c) Missed Fire Protection Inspections On May 11, 1987, the cable spreading room sprinkler system was

~

taken out of service.

Contractor personnel-were assigned to perform fire protection inspections of the cable room twice per shift in accordance with Technical Specification 3.12.C.2.

On' June' 12, 1987, at 0000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months , the contractor personnel lef t the site when their contract expired. No fire protection inspections of the cable spreading room were performed again from the time the contractor personnel left the site until the omission was-discovered at 1605 hours0.0186 days 0.446 hours 0.00265 weeks 6.107025e-4 months on June 16, 1987, at which time. fire inspections were resumed.

This event is considered a violation (254/87013-01(DRP)).

See also

,

LER 254/87009 of this report.

To preclude a recurrence of this problem the personnel performing the fire protection inspections will be required to check in with the shif t engineer, who will personally ensure that the fire protection inspections are performed.

(d) Ventilation Isolation Due to a Faulty Relay'

.-

At 1755 hours0.0203 days 0.488 hours 0.0029 weeks 6.677775e-4 months on June 24, 1987, the control room ventilation and the reactor building ventilation systems both isolated. The standby.

I gas treatment system, which had the

"A" train.in primary and the

"B" train in standby, did not automatically actuate and had to be manually actuated.

The cause of the ventilation isolations was

determined to be relay 1-1701-1008, which.had become defective.

This relay would cause the standby gas treatment system to actuate only if the "B" train was in primary, which was not'the case at the time of the failure.

The defective relay was repaired, the control room ventilation and reactor building. ventilation were both restored, and the standby gas treatment system was secured at 2355 hours0.0273 days 0.654 hours 0.00389 weeks 8.960775e-4 months on June 24, 1987.

,

-

_-

-

_ __

.

(e) Control Room Ventilation Isolations Caused by the-Chlorine Monitor (1) At 1835 hours0.0212 days 0.51 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.982175e-4 months 'on June 29, 1987, the control room ventilation isolated.due to a toxic' gas trouble alarm which was determined to be caused by excessive moisture in the chlorine gas monitor-

'

housing. The moisture was removed and the control room i

ventilation was returned to normal.

i (2) At 0715 hours0.00828 days 0.199 hours 0.00118 weeks 2.720575e-4 months on July 9, 1987, the control room ventilation isolated when the chlorine gas monitor tripped.

It was at

first postulated that high temperature caused the chlorine gas monitor to trip, but it was later believed that a freon leak from the B compressor which entered the ~ air intake lines to

,

'

the control room may have caused the chlorine monitor to trip.-

<

The freon. leak was repaired and the control room ventilation was returned to normal.

(3) At 1945 hours0.0225 days 0.54 hours 0.00322 weeks 7.400725e-4 months on July 9, 1987, the control room air filtration unit was declared inoperable because of the isolation of the control room ventilation system. A ten hour surveillance was successfully performed on the control room air filtration system and it was returned to service at 0220 hours0.00255 days 0.0611 hours 3.637566e-4 weeks 8.371e-5 months on July 16, 1987.

(4) At 1915 hours0.0222 days 0.532 hours 0.00317 weeks 7.286575e-4 months on July 14, 1987, the control room ventilation system isolated when the chlorine gas monitor spuriously tripped; there was no chlorine present.

It is believed-that high temperature in the room in which the chlorine monitor is-located caused the trip. -The chlorine monitor was reset and the control room ventilation was returned to normal.

,

'

(5) At 1554 hours0.018 days 0.432 hours 0.00257 weeks 5.91297e-4 months on July 29, 1987, a lightning strike caused circuit breaker 8-9 in the 345 KV switchyard 8-9 to.open, i

causing a voltage perturbation.

This voltage perturbation

.l caused a spike on the chlorine monitor which caused the

'

control room ventilation to isolate.

Circuit breaker 8-9 was reclosed, the chlorine monitor was reset and the control room ventilation was returned to normal.

'

(f)

Inoperable Diesel Generator At 1700 hours0.0197 days 0.472 hours 0.00281 weeks 6.4685e-4 months on July 10, 1987,'the load limiter for Diesel Generator 1 was found at its low limit by an equipment operator. While in this condition the diesel generator would have started but would not have loaded had a loss of off site power occurred, thus preventing any safety equipment supplied by bus 14-1 from operating.

j Upon discovery, the load limiter was reset to its normal position.

f Diesel Generator 1 was then started and load tested to ensure it

'

operated properly, at which time it was returned to service.

J Because this was licensee-identified and promptly corrected, no violation was issued.

9

f~

.

To. prevent this from recurring,'a plexiglass cover will_ be installed over the load limiter on all the diesel generators, and the equipment operator's logs will be revised to require the equipment operator once per shif t to verify that the load limiter is set properly.

(g) Steam Jet Air Ejector Isolation Valves Inadvertently Shut At 1350 hours0.0156 days 0.375 hours 0.00223 weeks 5.13675e-4 months on July 21, 1987, Unit I steam jet air ejector.

isolation valves began to shut because valve 1-5499-76 was opened while steam. jet air ejector B was in service.

The valve was opened because of an improper return to service position specified for the valve on the out of service sheet.

Because of exceptionally adept manipulations by a radwaste operator, the Unit 1 operator and the center desk operator, the steam jet air ejector isolation valves were reopened and valve ~1-5499-76 was shut. Had prompt' action not been taken, Unit I would have lost vacuum, resulting in a reactor scram.

Some of the corrective actions which will be instituted by the licensee include a discussion of the incident with the shift engineers, shift foremen and shift control room engineers; a

]

review of the Out of Service procedure for possible revision; and counseling of the individuals involved by the Assistant Superintendent of Operations.

(h) Apparent Improper Watch Relief At 1210 hours0.014 days 0.336 hours 0.002 weeks 4.60405e-4 months on July 22, 1987, an NRC examiner and his examinee i

entered the control room for the purpose of conducting the control l

room portion of the NRC administered requalification oral examination.

The examiner asked the examinee a question which the examinee wanted to answer by using the control panels as an aid.-

The examinee and examiner walked over to the Unit 2 control panels because there was no operator standing there with whom they would interfere.

The

,

examinee queried the center desk operator as to who had Unit 2.

The center desk operator responded that he had the unit, at which time he walked over to the Unit.2 panels.

This event is considered an.

unresolved item (265/87013-02(DRP)).

,

(1) Reduction in Communications Capability On July 22, 1987, at 2235 hours0.0259 days 0.621 hours 0.0037 weeks 8.504175e-4 months , the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) telephone line was discovered to be inoperable during a phone line check between the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Administration (ESDA) and the Quad Cities control room.

Proper notification of this condition was made to the NRC Emergency Operations Center at 2330 hours0.027 days 0.647 hours 0.00385 weeks 8.86565e-4 months on July 22, 1987.

The i

,

NARS phone line was repaired and returned to service at 0845 hours0.00978 days 0.235 hours 0.0014 weeks 3.215225e-4 months on July 23, 1987.

,

___ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ - - _ - -

I

.-

.

(j) Unit 2 High Pressure Core Injection Taken Out of Service At 0120 hours0.00139 days 0.0333 hours 1.984127e-4 weeks 4.566e-5 months on July 25, 1987, Unit.2 High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) was taken out of. service to repair a steam leak on a steam trap.

The steam leak was repaired and HPCI was returned to service at 2305 hours0.0267 days 0.64 hours 0.00381 weeks 8.770525e-4 months on July. 25,.1987.

(k) Ventilation Isolation Due to Faulty Power Supply At 0526 hours0.00609 days 0.146 hours 8.69709e-4 weeks 2.00143e-4 months on July 31, 1987, the control room ventilation and reactor building ventilation systems isolated and the standby-gas treatment system automatically initiated when the IB reactor building ventilation (noble gas) monitor and the refueling floor radiation monitor spiked high. A survey of both areas showed only normal background' radiation levels.

The cause of the spike was determined to be a failed power supply. The failed power supply, the 1B reactor building ventilation (noble gas) monitor and the refueling floor radiation monitor were returned to service.

The reactor building ventilation and control room ventilation systems were then returned to normal, and the standby gas treatment system was secured.

(1) Reactor Scram At 1422 hours0.0165 days 0.395 hours 0.00235 weeks 5.41071e-4 months on August 1, 1987, the Unit 2 main generator tripped, causing the Unit 2 main turbine to trip.

The Unit 2 reactor then scrammed on a control valve fast' closure signal.

Post scram actions were normal except for the following three abnormalities:

(1) bus 21 and bus 22 tripped off of transformer 22, causing all reactor feed pumps to deenergize; (2) a scram discharge volume (SDV) drain isolation valve did not indicate fully closed; and (3) reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) did not inject when started using the auto initiation pushbutton.

The Unit 2 main generator trip was due to a B phase to C phase differential overcurrent fault in the main transformer.

This will require that the Unit 2 main transformer be replaced, which will necessitate that the Unit 2 reactor be shut down for 3 to 6 weeks.

.

i It is believed that the cause of bus 21 and bus 22 tripping off of transformer 22 is a faulty low voltage relay.

Testing showed that the SDV drain isolation valve did in fact shut, but the limit switches needed to be readjusted to properly indicate valve closure.

RCIC did not inject into the reactor vessel when the auto initiation pushbutton was used because the operator did not depress and hold the pushbutton in the depressed position for the required 30 seconds.

j

..

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,.

..

.

....

..

.-..

....

.

... - - - - - - - - -. _ _ - _ - -

..

i

.

At 1522 hours0.0176 days 0.423 hours 0.00252 weeks 5.79121e-4 months on August 1,1987, the NRC Energency Operations

,

Center was notified. At 2100 hours0.0243 days 0.583 hours 0.00347 weeks 7.9905e-4 months on August 1, 1987, the Unit

2 reactor was placed in cold' shutdown with reactor coolant l

temperature being maintained between 120 F and 180 F.

(m) Control Room Operations

'

On July 22, 1987, control room observations were made of activities which, though not NRC violationc, were not in keeping with the highest nuclear industry stanc ards.

Examples of this were i

unprofessional communication by shift operations personnel (not

identifying themselves.or tb;ir job titles when answering phone calls and not announcing tha start of major plant equipment) and impulsive switch manipulation (reversing flow on the. wrong set of RHR heat exchangers). These problems seemed to be due in part to

,

'

a complacent attitude on the part of plant personnel.

At 1430 hours0.0166 days 0.397 hours 0.00236 weeks 5.44115e-4 months on July 23, 1987, a meeting was held between the' Senior

l I

Resident and the Station Manager, Services Superintendent, Assistant l

Superintendent for Operations and the Training Supervisor.to emphasize to plant management the concern the Senior Resident had regarding the possible development of a complacent attitude on the part of some plant personnel.

The plant management acknowledged the concerns expressed by the Senior Resident and agreed.to respond to them. Recent observations of control room activity by the Senior Resident have shown marked improvement. Observations in this area by both the Resident and Senior Resident will continue.

L 3.

Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related and non safety related l

systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain

'

that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

The following items were considered during this review:

the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to= service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls

were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of

'

outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety

'

related equi nent maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Portions of the service water strainer backwash valve repair.

,

!

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

- -...

.

..

.

...

..

....

. - - - -

.

(2) Portions of the retrieval of a broken flushing line from the 1A traveling screen pit.

(3) Portions of safe shutdown pump repair.

i (4) Portions of LPRM card troubleshooting.

'

N.o violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with

adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed

{

with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were

{

reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and

]

that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

]

The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Quarterly surveillance of Unit 1 core spray pumps.

(2) Low low reactor water level surveillance on Unit 2.

(3) MSIV trip timing checks on Unit 1.

(4) HPCI monthly and quarterly surveillance on Unit 1.

(5) Diesel generator monthly load test on Unit 1.

(6) RHR quarterly and monthly surveillance on Unit 1.

(7) RCIC monthly and quarterly surveillance on Unit 2.

(8) 2C RHR service water pump vibration surveillance.

(9) Power operation surveillance on Units 1 and 2.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

LER Review (92700)

(1) Unit 1 (a) (Closed) LER 87010, Revision 00:

Control Room Ventilation

,

Trip Due to Power Loss to Toxic Gas Analyzer - Design Deficiency and Late Notification - Personnel Error.

This LER was discussed in Inspection Report 254/87008(DRP).

_ _ _ _ _

-

_ _ -__

.

(b) (Closed) LER 87009, Revision 00:

Cable Spreading Room and i

Unit.1 Cable Tunnel Sprinkler Systems Out of Service for Enhancements to System.

i On May 26,1987, at 0590 hours0.00683 days 0.164 hours 9.755291e-4 weeks 2.24495e-4 months , Quad Cities Units 1 and 2

'

were both in the RUN mode at 100 percent core thermal power.

At this time the Cable Spreading Room sprinkler system was out of service for system enhancements and exceeded the 14

)

day reporting criteria.

On June 3, 1987, the Unit 1 Cable

{

Tunnel sprinkler system exceeded its 14 day reporting criteria

due to being out of service for similar enhancements. The

!

cause for these sprinkler systems being out of service for i

greater than 14 days was that the original system design did

,

not meet National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code

.

requirements.

The scope of the work required was more than J

could be completed in 14 days.

Significant improvements are l

being made to these sprinkler systems based on a review performed by Professional Loss Control (PLC), Incorporated.

This review was based on Appendix R concerns and NFPA code requirements.

According to Technical Specifications, when the cable spreading i

'

j room sprinkler system is inoperable, a fire watch must be established and a fire inspection conducted twice per shift.

On June 12, 1987, at midnight, the contract fire watch contract expired.

This information wts not passed on to shift personnel who assumed that these contr6 personnel were still performing l

their dedicated area fire inspections.

1 On June 16, 1987, at 1605 hours0.0186 days 0.446 hours 0.00265 weeks 6.107025e-4 months , it was discovered that there were no contract fire watch personnel and a dedicated fire

'

watch was established.

The fact that no fire watch was established on June 12, 1987, at midnight is considered to be i

l a violation as noted in the Appendix (254/87013-01(DRP)).

(c) (0 pen) LER 87011, Revision 00:

Residual Heat Removal Support l

Embedment Plate Beyond Design Stress - Improper Anchor Strap l

Spacing.

l On June 12, 1987, Quad Cities Unit I was in the RUN mode at

!

95 percent power.

At 0930 hours0.0108 days 0.258 hours 0.00154 weeks 3.53865e-4 months , the corporate Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) informed the Station that an l

embedment plate with Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system pipe l

support attachments was loaded beyond the Final Safety Analysis l

Report (FSAR) design limits.

However, the plate and supports were within operability limits.

Per 10 CFR 50.72, a one hour notification was made to the NRC at 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months via the r

Emergency Notification System.

The cause for this degraded embedment plate was improper anchor strap spacing due to misinterpretation of the design drawings during fabrication.

Corrective action for this problem is to

_ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ - - _ _ _ _.

t-k i

<

(:y{,i c

.

'

,

i reinforce the embedment plate by drilling-an expansion bolt'

y'

through the plate and into the concrete.

In addition, walkdowns and evaluations are continuing to identify any other degraded embedment plates.

This item is being tracked by region based. inspectors.

(d)

(Closed) LER 87005,_ Revision 00: Unit.1 Turbine Trip Reactor-Scram Due to Moisture Separator High Level.

On March 17, 1987, Quad Cities Unit I was at 92 percent core-thermal power. At 1102 hours0.0128 days 0.306 hours 0.00182 weeks 4.19311e-4 months , a reactor scram occurred due to.

turbine stop valve closure,.i.e., a turbine trip. The turbine trip was caused by a high level in moisture separators 1C and 10.

The level control valve LCV 1-3508A from the 18 Moisture Separator Drain Tank (MSDT):to the 101 high pressure feedwater heater was stuck open. When this valve was isolated for.

repairs, the two other LCVs.from the 18 MSDT to the 102 and-103. heaters and the emergency drain valve failed to compensate for this action. This caused a _high level in two moisture

..

'

separators which resulted in the turbine trip and. reactor scram.

The cause for this event was attributed'to the level. controllers being out of adjustment.

Contributing causes were equipment failure (stuck valve) and inadequate preparation and planning.

prior to isolating LCV 1-3508A. A program will be developed-to track setpoint changes to level control valves on this and other systems. The stuck LCV was freed and stroked success-fully several times.

The licensee has written a procedure to track set points associated with feedwater level controllers. The procedure-also establishes lock wiring of'these.valtes to prevent unauthorized adjustments.

(e) (Closed) LER 87012, Revision 00:

Reactor Building'and Control l

Room Ventilation Isolation Due to Relay Coil Failure Attributed

'

to Age.

On June 24, 1987, Quad Cities Unit I was in'the RUN mode at 91 percent core thermal power. At 1755 hours0.0203 days 0.488 hours 0.0029 weeks 6.677775e-4 months , the Reactor.

,

Building Ventilation system isolated and the Control. Room.

J Ventilation system changed to.100 percent recirculation for no apparent reason.

Subsequent investigation-revealed that relay armature 1-1701-1008 was failing.

It appears that as the relay coil started to fail it caused i

the relay armature to vibrate rapidly which created a buzzing sound.

The vibration caused a contact to open and resulted in actuations of the Reactor Building and Control Room ventilation isolation system. This relay is a part of the Reactor Building Ventilation system process radiation monitoring system.

-

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _._

,

_

- - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _,

.

The cause for this event was determined to be relay coil failure due to age. The relay coil was replaced like for like and tested satisfactorily at 2355 hours0.0273 days 0.654 hours 0.00389 weeks 8.960775e-4 months on the.same day.

Both ventilation systems involved were restored to normal by 0015 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months on June 25, 1987. Modification M-4-1(2)-85-17'has already been initiated to replace all similar relays in the 901(2)-40 and 41 panels with a suitable replacement.

(f) (Closed) LER 87013, Revision 00:

Control Room Ventilation I

Isolation Due to Chlorine Monitor Problems Caused by Defective i

Procedures or Corrosion.

On June 29, 1987, Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 were both in the RUN mode at 100 percent core thermal power.

At 1835 hours0.0212 days 0.51 hours 0.00303 weeks 6.982175e-4 months , the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning l

(HVAC) system automatically changed to the 100 percent-i recirculation mode (isolated).

Similar events occurred on

July 9 and July 14,1987 at 0715 hours0.00828 days 0.199 hours 0.00118 weeks 2.720575e-4 months and 1915 hours0.0222 days 0.532 hours 0.00317 weeks 7.286575e-4 months I

respectively. Appropriate NRC notification via the Emergency l

Notification System (ENS) was completed for each event.

The events were caused by either a defective functional test procedure (June 29 and July 14) which allowed residual chlorine to remain in the probe vicinity or corrosion caused by the caustic electrolyte solution used in the probe (July 9). A significant contributing cause was the elevated temperature and humidity present in the analyzer panel.

Corrective actions for these events-include the following:

removal of the moisture and residual chlorine in the probe vicinity and replacement of the corroded probe. A new functional test procedure is being developed to prevent further chlorine contamination.

The Technical Staff and Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) are considering the installation of a Control Room HVAC room cooler or panel cooler. A setpoint change is also being considered.

,

'

The resident inspectors have on several occasions mentioned our concerns regarding the number of ESF actuations connected with the Chlorine Monitor.

The resident inspectors will monitor the licensee's progress towards resolvino this problem.

(2) Unit 2 (a) (Closed) LER 87007, Revision 00:

Reactor Water Cleanup System Valve Closure Due to Lightning Causing Electric Bus Trip.

This LER was discussed in Inspection Report 265/87008(DRP).

I (b) (Closed) LER 85009, Revision 01:

2B Core Spray Room Cooler Inoperable Due to Drive Belt Failure Caused by Sheave Deficiency.

-

i

________m._____

_ _ - - - _ -

--_---A---.--

,

..

.

..

....

..

...

_ - - - _,

a

.This revision contained no information which was not already known by the resident inspectors.

(c) (Closed) LER 86007, Revision 02:

Failure of the Unit 28 l

Core Spray Room Cooler Due to Auxiliary Contact Binding.

On April 9, 1986, at 2155 hours0.0249 days 0.599 hours 0.00356 weeks 8.199775e-4 months , Unit 2 was in the RUN mode operating at 100 percent of rated thermal power.

It was found that the 28 Core Spray Room Cooler would not run in either the Manual or Automatic mode.

The 28 Core Spray System and the Unit 2 RCIC system, which are located in the same room, were declared inoperable due to lack of. room cooling capability.

Technical Specification surveillance tests were immediately initiated because of the inoperable equipment.

l The event was caused by the pitting and burning of the contacts of the motor control center contactor that supplies power to the 2B Core Spray i'com Cooler motor.

Only a very low current would pass through the~contactor due.to the very high

resistance caused by the pitting of the contacts.

-

It appeared that auxiliary contacts were hanging up and not'

allowing the breaker contactor to fully close.

This poor

..

electrical contact then caused the pitting and burning of the i

contacts.

I l

The failed contactor was replaced using General Electric

'

contactor part number CR105K012AAA. The auxiliary contact was also replaced with General Electric auxiliary contact kit model number CR106C. The 2B Core Spray Room Cooler. motor's

!

insulation resistance was measured satisfactorily as well as l

phase checked. All connections were tightened as well.

The drive belts for the room cooler were also replaced as preventive maintenance. The 2B Core Spray Room Cooler was

,

then satisfactorily tested and returned to. service at 1910 l

hours on April 10, 1986, 21 hours2.430556e-4 days 0.00583 hours 3.472222e-5 weeks 7.9905e-6 months after it was declared

l inoperable.

The 2B Core Spray System and RCIC System were i

subsequently declared to be operable.

This auxiliary contact is a common component of all 480 volt motor control center (MCC) contactors in use at the station.

The station has experienced binding of auxiliary contacts in I

the past. A list of problems attributed to this type of

'

auxiliary contact or similar types was compiled and submitted in a report to the Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) for evaluation.. Based on the evaluation results, further corrective actions may be identified. This item will L

be tracked under Action item number 26518086007.

(d) (Closed) LER 87005, Revision 00: Unit 2 Generator / Turbine Trip / Reactor Scram Due to the Spurious Actuation of.the Transformer Sudden Pressure Relay.

l

. - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

-

,.

.

..

....

.

.....

... ---.

-

.

This LER'was discussed in Inspection Report 265/87004(DRP).

The sudden pressure relay was sent to the Technical Center

'

for testing.

Tests conducted by the Technical Center did not demonstrate any problems with this relay.

However, OAD has been monitoring the output of the sudden pressure. relay on the main transformer.

The resident inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's efforts in this area.

,

(e) (Closed) LER 86014, Revision 01:

Leak Rate From All Valves and

.

Penetrations on Unit 2 in Excess of Technical Specification l

Limit.

On October 11, 1986, Unit 2 was shutdown for the end of cycle 8 refueling and maintenance outage. 'At 0300 hours0.00347 days 0.0833 hours 4.960317e-4 weeks 1.1415e-4 months on October 12, 1986, while performing refueling outage local leak rate testing, the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves, except the Main' Steam Isolation Valves, was found to be in excess at 293.75 SCFM (0.60L,).

The equipment that had excessive leak rates was repaired and leakage was reduced to the Technical Specification allowable leakage.

The cause of the equipment failure was normal wear.

Further discussions regarding this.LER can be found in Inspection. Reports 254/86016(DRS) and 265/86016(DRS).

Other than those violations mention in the referenced inspection reports, no violations or deviations were found.

(f) (Closed) LER 87008, Revision 00:

Unit 2 Cable Tunnel Sprinkler Systems Out of Service for Enhancements to System.

On June 30, 1987, at 0835 hours0.00966 days 0.232 hours 0.00138 weeks 3.177175e-4 months , Quad Cities Unit 2 was in the RUN mode at 99 percent core thermal power. At this time the Unit 2 Cable Tunnel sprinkler system was out of service for system enhancements and exceeded the 14 day reporting criteria.

The cause for this sprinkler system being out of service for greater than 14 days was that the original system design did not meet National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

Code requirements. The scope of the work required was more.

than could be completed in 14 days.

Significant improvements were made to this sprinkler system based on a review performed by Professional Loss Control (PLC), Incorporated. -This review was based on Appendix R concerns and NFPA code requirements.

Corrective action for.this situation was to. continue the system enhancement modification so that work was completed in a timely

,

manner.

All necessary backup fire suppression equipment was placed in the area and inspections were performed as required.

Also, full coverage smoke detection was available in the area.

The system enhancements were completed on July 7,1987, at 1600 hours0.0185 days 0.444 hours 0.00265 weeks 6.088e-4 months .

.13

_ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _

_

,

.

.....

.

..

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

6.

Review of Routine and Special Reports (90713)

The inspector reviewed the Monthly Performance Reports for the months of May and June.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Training On June 22, 1987, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector met with members of the Quad Cities training staff to discuss the status of the plant specific simulator. The simulator specifications are to be let out for bid at the end of 1987.

The simulator should be ready for use in 1991.

The Senior Resident Inspector recommended that the simulator be located at the Quad Cities site.

On July 2,1987, the Senior Resident Inspector monitored a requalification class given on the recirculation pumps.

'

On July 13, 1987, the Senior Resident Inspector observed Quad Cities personnel being administered an NRC simulator requalification examination on the Dresden simulator.

l l

No violations or deviations in the area of training were observed.

8.

Administrative Controls Affecting Quality Long term corrective actions regarding the Scram Discharge Volume were completed on both units on May 1, 1985.

Unit l's electrical drawings and procedures were updated to reflect this.

However, neither the 24/48 VDC Battery load electrical print nor the 24/48 VDC System Failure procedure were updated for Unit 2.

Failure to update these procedures is considered to be a violation (265/87013-01(DRP)).

One violation was identified.

9.

Bulletin Followup (92703)

(Closed) IE Bulletin 86-01: Minimum Flow Logic Problems that Could Disable RHR Pumps.

During a review of IE Information Notice 85-94, " Potential for loss of l

Minimum Flow Paths Leading to ECCS Pump Damage During a LOCA," the l

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant discovered that a single failure under certain accident sequences could result in all RHR minimum flow bypass

!

valves being signaled to close, stopping flow through the RHR pumps and potential for pump damage in a few minutes.

This event could disable RHR functions including low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), head spray, drywell spray, shutdown cooling, torus spray, and suppression pool cooling. As a result of the loss of suppression pool cooling over a long period of time, core spray pumps could ultimately lose net positive suction head and also be unavailable.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _

-

.

i

,

F.CR icgic chmur; e.rn'mida to proclude 1.his problem on Unit ? during s

its last refueling outage. Changes to Unit 1 logic will be made during g

tha fall 1987 re:Tualing outage. Thi: bulletin is considered closed.

Fr. violations or dr'viaticas were Identi f f ts, l

J 10.

Generic l.etters (92/03)

.

(a) (Closed) Generic Letter 85-06:

QA Guidance for i.TWS Equipment i

Not Safety' Related.

i On June 1,1984, the Commission approved publication of a final j

rule, 10 CFR 50.62, regarding the reduction-of risk from anticipat'ed

transients without scram (ATWS) events for light water cooled nuclear power plants (49 FR 26036). At the same time, the Commission directed the staff to complete and issue in the form of a gener.c letter explicit quality assurance (QA). guidance for non-safety-related equipment encompassed by the ATWS rule.

,

All ATWS equipment (SLCS, ARI, and RPR) is safety related at this site and procedures and equipment lists have been revised to reflect this.

(b) (Closed) Generic Letter 85-14:

Commercial Storage at PWR Reactor Sites of Low Level RA Waste.

% this time Commonwealth Edison has no intentions of storing waste r^ferred to in this generic letter at Quad Cities.

(c) (Closed) Generic Letter 85-03:

Clarification of Equivalent Control Capacity for Standby Liquid Control Systems.

This modification will be completed during the fall 1987 refuel outage for Unit 1.

(d) (0 pen) Generic Letter 84-23:

Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs.

The licensee has sent its proposed plan to reduce level indication errors caused by high drywell temperatures to NRR for evaluation.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11.

Radiation Control periodic inspections of plant radiological control. conditions were made during the inspection period.

Isolated instances'of inadequately marked

. radioactive contamination areas and open yellow bags of-low level

,

radioactively contaminated materials stored outside of designated contaminated areas were observed.

These observations were noted to radiation chemistry supervision and to plant management, and the deficiencies were promptly corrected.

No violations or deviations were noted.

, - -

,

e j

o

,

12.

Emerg1 rqpared;mst i

P The residents monitored the conduct of two emergency drills, une conducted and evaluated by the licensee and INPO, and one conducted by the !Icensca and evaluated by the licensee and the NRC. During the second emergency drill, the Senior Resident monitored the extraction and analysis of a simulated highly radioactive sample obtained from the uff gas system.

(See also Inspection Reports 254/87012(DRSS) and 265-87012(DRSS)).

No deviations or violations were noted.

13. Outages

The residents attended several planning meetings conducted by the l

licensee to coordinate and schedule activities which are to take place

]

during the Unit I refueling outage scheduled to begin on September 14, l

1987.

l No violations or deviations were noted.

14.

Licensee Meetings

"

On July 20, 1987, a meeting between licensee management and NRC Region III management was held to discuss the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) 6 Board Renort, which covers the period from October 1, 1985 through March 31, 1987.

Licensee personnel expressed no disagreement of the performance ratings received in the SALP 6 Board Report.

(See also the SALP 6 Board Report, Inspection Reports 50-254/87001 and 50-265/87001.)

15.

Regional Requests Region III management requested the inspectors to ascertain whether high ambient temperatures in the plant were causing a deleterious effect on plant equipment. One area of concern discovered by the inspectors was the toxic gas chlorine monitor on the intake duct for the control room ventilation system.

High ambient temperatures had caused the chlorine monitor to spuriously trip on several occasions, each time resulting in a control room ventilation isolation.

(See also paragraphs 2(e)(2) and 2(e)(4) of this report). The licensee is in the process of redesigning the ventilation system for the room in which the chlorine monitor is located to moderate the high ambient temperature so that spurious trips i

I of the chlorine monitor are avoided.

The resident inspectors will follow the redesign of the ventilation for the chlorine monitor, as well as investigate other areas in which high ambient temperature may be of

concern.

i No violations or deviations were noted.

16 s

i

.

_

---_-__--__-U

k-

my-

~

4,

,

l';

,j

,

j ; !

'-

aw j

'

t

f

\\

'

-

l

~*

1. f,

..cl t. In torv 199

>

l i he inspictors met pith licensens representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

{

throughout the br.poett.on pericd and at the conclusion of the inspection

on July A!,194/f.iad stimmarized the scope and fir, dings of the inspect. ion j

octivities.

I The inspectors also dfscussed the likely informational content of the inspect. inn report with regard to documents or prtNesses reviewed by the l

inspecters during the inrpw. ion..

The ligensee old not identffy any

!

'

such docs.ents/ processes as prn;;rietary.

,

\\

l l

/

{

l l

l

)

!

l

'

l

'

!

,

1

I

!

i l

______..__.______._._____.____.______________.._______j

v t e Inspection Report - Quad Cities - 1987013
80 \| 81 \| 82 \| 83 \| 84 \| 85 \| 86 \| 87 \| 88 \| 89 \| 90 \| 91 \| 92 \| 93 \| 94 \| 95 \| 96 \| 97 \| 98 \| 99 00 \| 01 \| 02 \| 03 \| 04 \| 05 \| 06 \| 07 \| 08 \| 09 \| 10 \| 11 \| 12 \| 13 \| 14 \| 15 \| 16 \| 17 \| 18 \| 19 \| 20 \| 21 \| 22 \| 23 \| 24 \| 25 \|
1987 Quarterly Integrated 1Q (0) 2Q (0) 3Q (0) 4Q (0) Assessments Mid Cycle End of Cycle 31(0) 7(0) 8(0) 9(0) 10(0) 11(0) 12(0) 13(0) 14(0) 15(0) 17(0) 18(0) 19(0) 20(0) 21(0) 22(0) 24(0) 25(0) 27(0) 28(0) 29(0) 30(0) 31(0) 32(0) 33(0) 40(0) Security Operator Exams Emergency Planning Other

IR 05000254/1987013

Text

REGION III

Navigation menu

Search