ML20154L946

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Insp Rept 50-265/88-24 on 880826.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Weakness Identified in Verification of Component Operability as Documented in Insp Repts 50-254/88-15 & 50-265/88-15
ML20154L946
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/14/1988
From: Ring M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154L945 List:
References
50-265-88-24-EC, NUDOCS 8809260352
Download: ML20154L946 (22)


See also: IR 05000254/1988015

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U.S. fiUCLEAR REGULATORY C0!411SS!0fi

REGI0fi III

Report tio. 50-265/36024(DRP)

Docket tio. 50-265 License fio. OPR-30

Licensee: Cormonwealth Edison Company

Post Office Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690

Facility fiare: Quad Cities fiuclear Pcwer Station, Unit 2

Meeting Location: Region III Office, Glen Ellyn IL

Meeting Conducted: August 26, 1988

Inspectors: R. L. Higgins

A. D. Morrongiello

Approved By: M. A. Ring, Chief

Reactor Projects Section IB

7 A'/h

Date'

Meting Surrary

Meeting on Aygust 26, 1988 (Report fio. 50-265/88024 (ORP))

Subjects Discussed: Weakness identified in verification of corponent

operability as docurrented in Inspection Reports 50-254/88015(DRP) and

50-265/88015(DRP); and the licensee's corrective actions to upgrade their

surveillance progran.

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DETAILS

1, Attendees

CorronwealthEdisonC_oppany(CECol

D. Galle, Vice President BWR Operations

L. DelGeorge, Asst. Vice President Licensing and Plant Support S5 rvices

N. Kalivianakis, General fianager, BWR

J. 5. Abel, Manager, BWR, Engineering

B. B. Palagi, Superintendent of Analysis,fiuclear Fuel Services

C. E. Beck, BWR Engineering

fi. P. Smith, BWR Licensing Supervisor

I. M. Johnson, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

R. L. Bax, Station ftanager, Quad Cities

G. Spedl, Asst. Superintendent of Technical Services, Quad Cities

J. W. Wethington, QA Superintendent, Quad Cities

S. L. Trubatch, Senior Regulatory Consultant, Tenera

U.S._ fiuclear Recul,atory, Comission

C. J. Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator

W. L. Forney, Branch Chief / Deputy Division Director, Division of Reactor

Projects

M. A. Ring Section Chief

B. Berson, Regional Counsel

B. Stapleton, Enforcement Specialist

R. L. Higgins, Senior Resident Inspector. Quad Cities

A. D. Morrongiello, Resident inspector. Quad Cities

2. Areas Discussed

Mr. Forney stated that the purpose of the reeting was for the licensee to

discuss the corrective actions implerented for the violation identified

in Inspection Report 265/88015(DRf).

Mr. Morrcngiello presented a brief description of the issue which was

docurented in Inspection Report 88015. Attachment 1 is a copy of the

overhcads which were used to take the presentation.

The licensee presented a detailed description of the event, imediate

corrective actions, and Ceco's view of the event's safety significance.

The handouts used for this presentation are included as Attachtrent 2 to

this report. The licensee stated that it was their intention to review

other situations where other devices have two power supplies and an auto

transfer feature, and equiprent with more than one electrical path for

start, stop or control functions, to determine if adcquate testing has

been done. Surveillances will be added or codified where a need to do so

is identified.

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The abeve plan was to be accomplished in three phases. The first phase

consisted of reviewing all safety related schenatic drawings with similar

potential wiring errors, determine which were tested, and for those not

tested include them in the surveillance program. The second phase would

assure that all safety related equipment is being tested adequately under

the present surveillance program. The third phase will be to transfer

Quad Cities lessons learned to Dresden.

The rxeting was concluded with NRC stating that the program described

during the meeting by the licensee appeared to adequately address the

identified concerns. The hRC requested that the lessons learned be

applied to all Corrronwealth Edisen plants and that the resident

inspectors be kept appraised of the program's progress and results.

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ATTACHMENT 1

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_0UAD CITIES BiFORCEFaiT COR;ERBiCE

MOTOR CONTFf1 CBRER TRANSFER CAPABILITY

A_UGUST 26,1988

AGENDA

IfRRDDUCTORY REFARKS E, G GREDl%N

.

TECHNICAL ISSUES A D, ICRFG EIELLO

LICENSEE RESFOsSE C&iGrFJd.TH EDISCli C&PANY

CLOSING CC(TOiTS E. G GPEEN%N

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VAJOR TECHNICAL ISSUE

tDTOR C0hTROL CEhTER 28/29-5 WAS lhCAPAELE OF

AUTCFATICALLY TRANSFERRING fG.ER T0 ITS BACKUP SUPPLY

UPON LOSS OF ITS NDPFAL FGlER SUPPLY, AS STAIED IN

TE FSAR,

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NRC AfMLYSIS

f#MG9BT

STAT!0fi FANAGDEhT FAILED TO PECOGNIZE DE IR.'AllD WAY

THAT TE AUTOFATIC TP#iSFER FEARJFE WAS TESTED,

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EsifEEhlNGANDDESIGN

THE DESIGN OF THE AUTOFATIC TP/ASFER FEATUPE AS ORIGINALLY

PFCf0 SED APFEARED ADE0JATE. (THE FC01FICAT10N TO RBS'E

CC FGlER INTERLOCKS KAS IN PESFESE TO A C0fEEFA THAT LOSS

OF DC F%ER WOULD HAVE PFEVENTED TlE AUTCFATIC TPANSFER),

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INSTALLATION

T1E DJALITY CMTPDL FFCGPR'. THAT WAS If, D:ISTDCE AT THAT

ilE \:AS If2FFECTUAL If, LETECTlfG THE EULh.

_T_ESTif5

TESTlf6 WAS ALWAYS INCE0&TE.

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y_lCLATION

TITLE 10 0F THE CODE CF FEDEFAL FEGULATICliS PART 50,

1 AffD51X A, CESIGri CRITERIC(i 17 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEES,

STATES, IN PART, THAT TFE CtiSITE ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION

SYSTE SHALL HAVE SUFFICIDiT FIICfCAfD TO PEFF0FF. TFE

SAFETY FUf;CT10fiS ASSLElf6 A Slf6LE FAILUFE,

QUAD CITIES FlfiAL SAFETY ANALYSIS FETORT, SECTION

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8,2,3,1, FEOUlFES THAT TfE LFEAERS FEEDIN3 450 \0LT

FDTOR CChTROL CENTER 28/29-5 FFE 450 \0LT BUS 29 WILL

CPD; AlfRPATICALLY AfD TIE EFEAFER FEEDIN3 450 VOLT

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FDTOR COTROL CDTER 28/29-5 FfE 480 \0LT EUS 28 WILL

CLOSE AUTU%TICALLY TO SLFFLY FDIOR WiTFOL CDiTER

28/29-5 FPm DG 1/2 SHOULD DG 2 Fall ECRit6 A LOSS CF

0FFSITE FGER.

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CGiTFAtY TO T)E AUliE, A W! RING EFER WAS DISC 0\EFED C(i

J'R 22, IM6, DilW GLD FFE\Ui7 THE AUTCt% TIC TFANSFER

Cf ThE AC FEED F0F Fi:C 2E/25-5 FFfE R5 29 TO RJS 28 t

[GlfC LC15 CF CffSITE FG,ER CGMFD,T Wilh A FAILUFE OF <

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IG 2. TE!S Wlf.lliu EFJCR Wl15 f7II [CRitG CONSTFLCT10fi AND

R S D:ISTED ThfRGOUT THE LIFE CF THE PLAfiT.

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AUGUST 26. 1938

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] QUAD CITIES ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

COEERING

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j- VERIFICATION OF COMPONENT OPERABILITY

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AGENDA

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  • INTRODUCTION R. L. BAX '

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  • EVENT, DESCRIPTION C. E. BECK

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  • CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

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  • SAFETY SIGNI'ICANCE J. S. ABEL
  • REVIEW OF PRIOR OPPORTUNITIES

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G. F. SPEDL

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LER'S

SURVEILLANCE PRACTICES

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, L. O. DELGEORGE l

  • CONCLUDING REMARKS D. P. GALLE

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EVENT DESCRIPTION

FOUND UNLANDED LEAD IN RHR SWING MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (MCC)

DURING A MODIFICATION TEST.

- DISCOVERED 06/22/88 AT 5:00 PM.

- IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION STARTED.

- REPORTED VIA RED PHONE CALL AT 7:50 PM.

- REPAIRED AND COMPLETED MOD TEST PRIOR TO 9:00 PM.

- ESTABLISHED TASK FORCE.

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  • POWER To LPCI INJECTION VALVES FOR BOTH DIVISIONS AFFECTED.

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  • DISCOVERED BECAUSE NEW MODIFICATION PROGRAM REQUIRES

DETAILED TESTING AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA. '

- WALKDOWN WAS PERFORMED IN PLANNED WORK LOCATION.

  • MOD ACCEPTANCE TEST INCLUDED VERIFICATION OF AUTOMATIC

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TRANSFER OF tie RHR SWING MCC.

  • RHR SWING MCC FAILED TO TRANSFER DURING INITIAL MOD TEST.

STATION PERSONNEL INVESTIGATED, FOUND UNLANDED WIRE.

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ENGINEERINC REVIEW SHOWED THAT THE MISSING WIRE WOULD

l INHIBIT AUTOMATIC TRANSFER. MANUAL ACTION BY THE OPERATOR

WOULD STILL BE EFFECTIVE.

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BREAKER 1951  :

(Simplified for clarity)

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

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  • IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- RELANDED THE CONDUCTOR

- REPEATED MOD TEST: NO FURTHER DISCREPAl.CIES NOTED

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  • SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

- VERIFIED THE WIRE LANDED CORRECTLY ON QUAD CITIES UNIT 1

AND DRESDEN UNITS 2 AND 3.

- QUAD CITIES TO ADD SURVEILLANCE OF LPCI SWING MCC.

  • LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

- ESTABLISHED AN ACTION PLAN IN THREE PHASES TO ADDRESS

ISSUES RAISED BY THIS EVENT.

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- PHASE I 0F THE ACTION PLAN IS ABOUT 75% COMPLETE.

PHASE 11 IS ABOUT 25% COMPLETE. PHASE 111 IS UNDER 7

DEVELOPMENT.

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BASES FOR "ACTION PLAN"

  • TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED WITHIN ONE WEEK OF DISCOVERY OF

CONDITION.

  • EVALUATED REASON WIRING ERROR NOT DETECTED.
  • CONCLUDED THAT ACTION PLAN SHOULD FOCUS ON THREE AREAS:

- DEVICES WITH TWO POWER SUPPLIES AND AUTO TRANSFERS.

- EQUIPMENT WITH MORE THAN ONE ELECTRICAL PATH FOR START,

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STOP OR CONTROL FUNCTIONS.

- QUAD CITIES LESSONS LEARNED TRANSFERRED To DRESDEN.

  • THESE WERE CHOSEN BECAUSE:

- AUTO TRANSFER DEVICES

-- ROUTINE AYAILABILITY TO NORMAL POWER MASKS INABILITY

TO AUT0-TRANSFER.

-- NOT OFTEN CALLED UPON TO OPERATE.

- PARALLEL START /STOP/ CONTROL FEATURES

-- ROUTINE SURVEILLANCES VERIFY ONE PATH, BUT DO NOT

ADDRESS OTHERS, COULD MASK A WIRING PROBLEM.

- QUAD CITIES LESSONS LEARNED TRANSFERRED TO DRESDEN.

-- DRESDEN SAME VINTAGE AS QUAD CITIES STATION.

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STATUS OF ACTION PLAN

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PHASE I UNITS 1 AND 2)

  • PHASE 1 BELIEVED TO ADDRESS ALL EQUIPMENT WITH SIMILAR

POTENTIAL WIRING ERRORS.

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REVIEW SAFETY RELATED SCHEMATIC DRAWINGS, IDENTIt'Y

SAFETY RELATED AUTO-THROW-0VER DEVICES. (27)

COMPLETED

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REVIEW STATION SURVEILLANCES. DETERMINE WHICH

AUTO-THROW-0VER DEVICES ARE PERIODICALLY TESTED. (18)

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CQNPLETED

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FOR THOSE NOT TESTED (9),

-- CIRCUIT INTEGRITY VERIFIED.

-- PERIODIC SURVEILLANCE RECOMMENDATION BY

MID-SEPTEMBER.

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STATUS OF ACTION PLAN

(CONT'D)

PHASE II (UNIT 1)

  • PHASE 11 IS BEING PERFORMED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL

ASSURANCES THAT ALL SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS BEING

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ADEQUATELY TESTED UNDER THE PRESENT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM.

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REVIEW THE SAFETY RELATED DRAWING LIST. OBTAIN COPIES

OF ALL SAFETY RELATED SCHEMATIC (AND SOME WIRING)

DIAGRAMS.

COMPLETED

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REVIEW EACH DRAWING. LIST EQUIPMENT WITH PARALLEL

START /STOP/ CONTROL FEATURES (APPROXIMATELY 175).

COMPLETED

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SEPARATE INTO RELATED CATEGORIES.

COMPLETED

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REVIEW STATION SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE

WHICH DEVICES (OR GENERIC CATEGORIES) ARE ADEQUATELY

COVERED.

SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETION WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY

MID-SEPTEMBER

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STATUS OF ACTION PLAN

(CONT'D)

PHASE III

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PHASE 111 WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES THAT QUAD

CITIES LESS0;1S LEARNED WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO DRESDEN.

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- PENDING COMPLETION OF QUAD CITIES PHASES I & II.

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EVALUATION OF SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

  • WIRING ERROR COULD PREVENT AUTOMATIC RHR INJECTION UNDER

GIVEN SIMULTANEOUS LOCA, LOOP, LOSS OF UNIT 2 DIESEL.

  • SITE SPECIFIC AND GENER4LLY APPLICABLE CALCULATIONS SHOW

PROBABILITY OF THESE SlHULTANEOUS OCCURRENCES LESS THAN

3 X 10-7 EVENTS PER YEAR.

  • SINGLE CORE SPRAY PUMP OPERATION ORIGINAL LICENSE BASIS FOR

PLANT. HOWEVER, TODAY'S APPENDIX X ANALYSIS DOES NOT

ADDRESS THIS CONFIGURATION.

  • EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES WOULD DIRECT OPERATOR TOWARD

RESTORING POWER TO THE RHR SWING MCC.

  • THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH EVENT CONSEQUENCES POTENTIALLY

SIGNIFICANT, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE EXTREMELY LOW, AND

OPERATOR WOULD LIKELY RESPOND PROPERLY.

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REVIEW OF PRIOR OPPORTUNITIES

PRE-0P TESTING SHOULD HAVE AFFORDED OPPORTUNITY FOR

DISCOVERY

- REVIEW OF TEST DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFIED NO APPLICABLE

TESTING.

. LER REVIEW 0F PAST EVENTS

- TWO EVENTS IDENTIFIED AS INVOLVING THIS TRANSFER LOGIC

HOWEVER, NEITHER PROVIDED REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR

OPERATOR TO IDENTIFY ERROR DUE TO MULTIPLE OPERATIONAL

ACTIVITIES WHICH OCCUR DURING THOSE EVENTS.

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- NOTHING ABOUT EVENT WOULD HAVE ALERTED OPERATOR / POST

EVENT REVIEW TO DISCOVER PROBLEM BECAUSE EQUIPMENT

ENERGIZED BY (DEAD) MCC NOT CALLED UPON TO OPERATE.

SURVEILLANCES REQUIRED BY LECH SPEC'S

LPCI LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST

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DIESEL GENERATOR LOOP WITH ECCS SIGNAL TEST

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TESTS DESIGNED FOR COMPLIANCE WITH TECH SPECS NOT

INTENDED TO TEST AUX POWER SYSTEM AS A WHOLE. THEREFORE

DID NOT ADDRESS AUTO-TRANSFER.

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REVIEW OF PRIOR OPPORTUNITIES

(CONT'D)

  • ALTHOUGH UNDERVOLTAGE CALIBRATION / TESTING PERFORMED,

THR0WOVER NOT TYPE OF UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY NORMALLY TESTED

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  • ALTHOUGH SEVERAL MANUAL OPERATIONS PERFORMED WITH CONTROL

SWITCH, CONTROL SWITCH BYPASSED UNLANDED LEAD

  • HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

- NO PREVIOUS LER'S IDENTIFIED ASSOCIATED WITH INITIAL

INSTALLATION WIRING ERROR'S (THIS EVENT IS THE FIRST)

- ONLY ONE DEVIATION REPORT IDENTIFIED WITH INITIAL

INSTALLATION WIRING ERROR (REVERSED POLARITY ON D.C.

CAPACITOR IN FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM)

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- NO LER'S ASSOCIATED WITH INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE IN

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NEITHER PREVIOUS EVENTS NOR TECH SPEC SURVEILLANCES

PRESENTED A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCOVER

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ENFORCEMENT POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

e PROMPT IDENTIFICATION AND REPORTING

- ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION

- LIMITED OPPORTUNITY TO DISCOVER

- PROMPT AND COMPLETE REPORT

! * CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

- PRIOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

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NEW MODIFICATION PROGRAM WORKING

REQUIRED COMPREHENSIVE TESTING

REQUIRED REVIEW 0F TEST DISCREPANCIES

- REVIEW FOR ADDITIONAL UNTESTED COMPONENTS

-- AUTO-TRANSFER DEVICES

-- COMPONENTS IN PARALLEL START /STOP/ CONTROL

CIRCUITS

-- VERIFY COMP 0NE'TS AND CIRCUITS IDENTIFIED IN

REVIEW PERFORM AS DESIGNED

-- ADDITIONALLY, LOOKED AT DRESDEN AUTO-TRANSFER

DEVICES (LPCI SWING MCC)

- ADDITIONAL AUX POWER SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES WILL BE

DEVELOPED IF REQUIRED TO ENSURE OPERABILITY, PENDING

COMPLETION OF REVIEW

- QUAD CITIES LESSONS LEARNED WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO

DRESDEN.

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ENFORCEMENT POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

(CONT'D)

  • PAST PERFORMANCE

- GOOD SALP RATINGS / EXTENDED SALP REVIEW PERIOD

- VIOLATIONS IN PAST THREE YEARS LEVEL IV LEVEL V

DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEMS 0 0

AUX POWER SYSTEMS 0 0

SURVEILLANCES 0 0

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- TWO LER'S IN PAST 3 YEARS RELATED TO WIRING ERRORS

MODIFICATION RELATED

87-01 - D/G GROUND

ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION

88-23 - ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION ERROR (TODAY'S

DISCUSSIONS)

- No LERS ASSOCIATED WITH INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCES IN PAST

3 YEARS.

- CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES GOOD PAST PERFORMANCE

e PRIOR NOTICE OF SIMILAR EVENTS

- NO REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY.

  • MULTIPLE OCCURRENCES

- SINGLE EVENT

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