ML20137C259

Insp Repts 50-254/85-27 & 50-265/85-30 on 851001-1207. Violations Noted:Failure to Comply W/Tech Spec Requirements Re Fire Detection Equipment on Refuel Floor & Inadequate Corrective Actions Re Part 21 Rept

ML20137C259
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	12/31/1985
From:	Boyd D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137C216	List: IR 05000254/1985027 ML20137C212 ML20137C231 ML20137C259
References
50-254-85-27, 50-265-85-30, NUDOCS 8601160256
Download: ML20137C259 (18)

See also: IR 05000254/1985027

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY :COMISSION-

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REGION III -

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Reports No. 50-254/85027(DRP); 50-265/030(DRP)

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Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30

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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

Post Office Box 707

Chicago, IL 60690 t

Fay.ility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 s ,

i Inspection Conducted: October 1 through December 7, 1985

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Inspectors: A.L. Madison

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! A.D. Morrongiello.  ?,

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l N. A. icholson, ~

Approved By: D. C. Boyd, Ch' f .. /2 -iV- h-

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l Reactor Projects Section 2D. . Date

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! Inspection Summary: '

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i Inspection on October 1 through December 7, 1985 (Reports No. 50-254/85027(DRP);;

i 50-265/85030(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, 6nannounced insp'ection by the resident inspectors

of actions on previous inspections findings; operations; radiological controls;

j maintenance / modifications; surveillance;housekesyt,ngprocedures; fire

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protection; emergency preparedness; security; qualityl assurance; quality

control; administration; routine reports, LER review; bulletin followup;- .

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regional requests; training; and independent inspection. The Jnspection

. involved a total of 399 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors, -

including 79 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

, Results: Two violations were identified. The first involved failure to

l ' comply with technical specification requirements concerning fire detection

equipment on the refuel floor. T.he second involved inadequate review and

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corrective actions concerning a 10 CFR Part 21 report on Ruskin fire dampers.

Overall, the licensee's performance has improved in' operations and remained

steady in all other areas.

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PDR ADOCM 05000254i

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

• N. Kalivianakis, Station Manager

• D. Bax, Production Superintendent

• T. Tamlyn, Technical Services Superintendent

T. Lihou, Technical Staff Supervisor

R. Roby, Assistant Superintendent Operations

• N. Griser, Senior Quality Assurance. Specialist

• B. Strub, Compliance Coordinator

The inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee

personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined the areas

stated in the inspection summary and acccmplished the following inspection

modules.

37700 Design Changes and Modifications

42700 Plant Procedures

61726 Monthly Surveillance Observations

62703 Monthly Maintenance Observations

65051 Low Level Rad Waste Storage Facilities

71707 Operational Safety Verification

71710 ESF System Walkdown

90713 Review of Periodic and Special Reports

92700 Onsite Review of LERs

92702 Violation Followup

92703 IE Bulletin Followup'

92705 Followup - Regional Requests

92706 Independent Inspection

93702 Onsite followup of Events

2. The inspectors verified that activities were accomplished in a timely

manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed

as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were

in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and

industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initiating

any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the limiting

4 conditions for operation were met during normal operation and while

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components or systems were . removed from service; functional ~ testing and/

or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems

to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and review of ',

test results were' accomplished; quality control records and logs were

properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials, and equipment were

properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained as applicable;

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, and adverse plant conditions including equipment malfunctions, potential

fire hazards, radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations,

and personnel errors were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient

and. proper corrective actions and reviewed by appropriate management

personnel.

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Further, additional observations were made in,the following areas:

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. 'a. Action 6n Fr'evious Inspection Findings ? >

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(1) '(Closed) Open Item'(254/84023-03; 265/84021-02(DRP)): .

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Confirtsatory Action Letter Item,6. 761s item remained open '

l pending the licensee's respotise/to ther report including the .

i violation and long term corrective actions. Areas'of concern- '

were Shift Control-Room Engineer (SCRE) responsibilities and

, authority and operators, remaining at the controls during

. off-normal events at the,other unit.

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The' licensee conducted extensive training and discussions with

i all SCREs and operators and updated their training program to

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inc?ude lessons learned. -Also, the licensee revised applicable

procedures to reflect the 'need for operators to remain at the

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cdntrols until' properly relieved and the' responsibilities of .

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the SCRE until relieved by the Shift Engineer. (SE) during

i f off-normal' events. . The inspectors._ reviewed the licensee's

actions, the revised procedures, and interviewed several

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, operators and SCREs to determinar adequacy.of long term

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corrective actions. The licens'ee's' actions were determined

e to be acceptable and no further concerns.were identified. No

further actions are required. "

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(2) (Closed) Open Item'(254/85002-03 and 265/85002-03): No

procedure for independent verification to beiperformed on

release of equipment-from service. This item was used to

track the implementation of procedures,that wodld address

independent verification of equipment ~' status when equipment

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was removed from service and when it was returned to service.  ;

The licensee has changed the appropriate proceoures to~ address.

this item. The inspectors reviewed these changes and found

them adequate. No further actions are required. .

) (3) (Closed) Violation'(265/85007-01(DRP)): . Failure to Report

Scram While Shutdown. On March 28,'1985, Unit two was. shutdown.

1 / for refueling. A reactor scram signal from Main Steam Line

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High Radiat. ion was initiated by Radiograph ~ in the vicinity-of

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the detectors.o The licensee failed to report this-event as

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, require'd by 10.CFR 50.72(G)(2)(ii) due to a misinterpretation

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e of the requirement of a ." preplanned sequence of events."

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Discussion with the inspectors clarified the requirements and

the licenseelrevised applicable procedures to ensure continued- '

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compliance. 'No further~ actions are required.. - , 6 'D

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(4) '(0 pen) Unresolve'd Item'(254/850Df03; 265/85019-02(DRP)):-

, =< 1 Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Trips'and Challenges to Standby *

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. Gas Treatment. The licensee has continued to investigate-

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d this concern and additional spuric0s trips have ' occurred,

p , providing. additional-opportunity to' isolate this; intermittent

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problem.

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One potential resolution was identified in Unit 2 LER 85-012,

Revision 01. It was determined'that the practice of calibrating

the instruments in the' shop rather than in place was contributing ,

to setpoint drift.. A procedure-change to QIS35-l',." Reactor  ;

Building Fuel-' Pool Radiation Monitoring Calibration and _

Functional Test Data Sheet".was submitted to eliminate this

possible source.

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.- Also, the Instrument Maintenance Department has' discovered a

. higher than normal induced voltage on the IB Fuel Pool Monitor.-

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It is currently planned to reroute the signal cable for this  :

l monitor to avoid high' noise areas. This reroute is_ expected

to-be completed by August 30, 1986. Further testing will be

-performed to determine the necessity of additional modifications.

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No violations or deviations ~ were identified. l

-i b. Operations

, As part of the licensee's ongoing efforts to improve station '

performance, a " quiet time"'from 2

15 p.m. to 3:15 p.m. has been

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instituted in the control room. This time period has been identified

by past events as having a greater potential for confusion or

j miscommunication due to shift change and the increa' sed activity

l associated with that. The " quiet time" or restriction of activities

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.._is expected'to reduce this. potential. Also, the station has' initiated-

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an afternoon planning meeting _ similar to_ the routine morning meetings

to help coordinate the afternoon and evening work activities. .

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(1) Unit One

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On' November 11, 1985, while running the'1/2 Emergency Diesel

Generator (EDG) operability surveillance,-the output breaker. '

to Bus 13-1 would not close. Since the surveillance was being

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run as required for "A" Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)

outage, an Unusual Ever.t was declared at-.2145. The breaker was .

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tested again (several times) and operated properly. The Unusual  !

! Event was terminated at 2150. .Further . investigation by the *

licensee was inconclusive and no' reason for the apparent failure

- could be identified.

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i On. November 24, 1985~at 1725, the 1/2 EDG was again deciared

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inoperable when' it failed 'to ~ close~ 'on- Bus 113-1. Since the'ID

Residual Heat Removal-(RHR) Service Water pump was also out of'

, service, an Unusual! Event was declarediand the Unit. began to._ '

' shut down.' The AssistantlSuperintendent for: Maintenance,Lthe;

Master Electrician,. Electrical' Engineers from Operational-' ' ' ' ,

-Analysis Department (OAD) and: Technical-Support worked

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' 'throughout the night and determined that the'HACR-1' relay-(this;. ,

~ prevents closing the outputtbreaker when not electrically - .

. synchronized and is not'used during; emergency actuation) had-

ipoorly crimped. wires which may produce poor: electrical- J

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connection and resulted in this intermittent problem. The l

wires were recrimped and the breaker tested satisfactorily.

Following a two hour operability run, the 1/2 EDG was declared 1

operable at 0850 on November 25 and the Unusual Event was

terminated.

The HACR-1 relay wire crimping problem had been previously

identified by the licensee as potentially generic to j

Commonwealth Edison (CECO) only. These relays are

manufactured by Commonwealth Edison for use at all their

facilities. Since the relay is not electrically in use j

during emergency actuation of the EDG, it is not considered

safety related and thus no 10 CFR Part 21 report was issued.

However, a notice was issued to all CECO facilities which

required 0AD to check and verify adequate crimping on all

similar relays. Apparently, this was not accomplished at

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Quad Cities. Subsequent to the November 24, 1985 event, the

licensee verified adequate crimping on all EDGs at Quad Cities

Station. Pending determination of the reason _why these relays

were not checked, this item will be tracked as an Unresolved

Item (254/85027-01; 265/85030-01(DRP).

Following the termination of the Unusual Event, the licensee

continued to investigate the 1/2 EUG to verify that the

intermittent problem had been resolved. Additional problems

were encountered and at 1025 on November 25, an Unusual Event

was again declared. Since'it appeared that the 1/2 EDG was

never operable, the start time of the Unusual Event was

conservatively set at.1725 on November 24. Thus, with power

reduced to 100 MWE, Unit One was scrammed at 1230 in order to

comply with the Limiting Condition of Operation which required

cold shutdown in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

It was determined that the problem was an intermittent fault in

the " fully racked in switch" on the diesel out'put breaker.

Following repairs to the 1/2 EDG output breaker and thorough

testing, the Unit was returned to operation on November 26, 1985.

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Unit Two

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On October 3, 1985, while at full power, it was discovered at'

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approximately 1840 that the 28_RHR and 28 Core Spray (CS) room-

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cooler. fan belts were broken. At 1900 an Unusual Event was

declared and a controlled' shutdown wa's~ initiated.- The belts

were replaced, the room coolers were tested operable,- and the

Unusual Event was terminated at 2210.

At 0510 on October 10, 1985, Unit 2 EDG output breaker tripped

during routine surveillance. 'The breaker was reset and tripped

again at 0518. This time indicating a ground on control power.

i Concurrently, the containment cooling valves for RHR were out of

service for Environmental Qualification (E.Q.) modifications;

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therefore, at 0536~an Unusual Event was declared. The-valves

were immediately returned to service and the Unusual Event was

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secured at 0537. The problems with the EDG were then  ;

! investigated and repaired.

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At 2246'on October 15, 1985, Unit 2 experienced a reactor scram ~  ;

from 100% power. While performing routine. surveillance,Lan

3 instrument mechanic committed an' inadvertent valving error on-a

Yarway. .This caused a pressure transient on the entire instrument-

rack which in turn caused a low low level scram and a Group I,.

II, and III isolation. All systems functioned as expected. The ,

licensee lected

e to proceed to cold shutdown and perform E.Q. >

modifications in the drywell as well as repairs to the Reactor :  ;

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Water Cleanup pumps and Reactor' Building Equipment Drain pumps

and preventive maintenance to the unit output transformer. 'The-

Unit returned to service on October 24, 1985. -

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On November 7, 1985, the inner seal for'the~28 recirculation .

. pump failed. The licensee' decided to place'. Unit 2 in cold i

shutdown and to effect repairs rather than rely on the outer-

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seal for an extended period. The unit was returned to service

on November 9. ,

During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down

the accessible portions of the High Pressure Coolant Injection

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Systems, the Residual Heat Removal systems, and the Core Spray .

Systems and performed the applicable portions of Inspection <

Procedures 71710 "ESF System Walkdown".

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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c. Radiological Controls I

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(1) The radiation protection department received information about.

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a situation at the Cooper Nuclear. Station. At that station dose

rate levels between the~ reactor and the fuel pool at an elevation I

corresponding to the. head-flange area were approximately 280R/hr.

l The resident inspector accompanied a health physics' technician

to investigate whether or.not a.similar condition existed at i

Quad Cities. -The survey revealed'that the situation does not-

i exist at this site.

(2) The licensee-is building.an onsite Interim R'dwaste a Storage  ;

Facility (IRSF) for low level radwaste storage in anticipation.

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of the closure of the burial sites on January.1,- 1986, authorized ,

) by 1980 Congressional legislation. An inspector reviewed the- *

blueprints and toured the IRSF. :The IRSF .is a generic CECO

design,'similar to those under construction at the Zion'and ,

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, LaSalle stations, and is located within the protected area for

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access and radiological controls. Processed containers, meeting. 4

DOT and NRC shipping limits will be transferred from the radwaste' .

processing area to the IRSF by truck. .As an ALARA meosure, the; '

, -containers will.be positioned in the IRSF storage vault by;

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remotely operated crane; no personnel' access to the vaults' has -

been designed. Licensee representatives estimate storage capacity

at approximately four years with low level processed resin being ,

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the primary component. No dry active waste.will be stored in

i. the IRSF; other alternatives. are being evaluated. Projected "

completion date for the IRSF is January 2,'1986.

{ The IRSF is a poured concrete-structure building in accordance

with the Uniform Building Code. In accordance with current NRC-

guidance for onsite low level storage facilities the111censee

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i has conducted a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation of safety issues

associated with the IRSF. This evaluation, pending' final

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approval, was reviewed by an inspector. The evaluation will be

further reviewed pending additional generic guidance from NRC'

rad waste staff. This review will be tracked as an Open Item

(254/85027-02,~265/85030-02(DRSS)).

The licensee is currently developing operational and radiological

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surveillance programs for the IRSF. In response to the

inspector's comments, the licensee agreed to: (1) establish a. *

monitoring program for airborne activity, waterborne activity,  ;

and general radiation fields in the IRSF (0 pen Item:(254/85027-03; J

265/85030-03)); (2) evaluate the possibility of hydrogen and.

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gaseous generation from spent resins, and determine the-need for- r

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monitoring (0 pen Item (254/85027-04;'265/85030-04)); (3) establish

an inspection program of container integrity on a routine basis

(0 pen Item (254/85027-05;- 265-85030,-05));- and.._(4) evaluate the -

use of grating positioned directly on-the-concrete floor to

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minimize condensate accumulation on contair ers (0 pen Item

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(254/85027-06; 265/85030-06)).

i d. Maintenance -

The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Observed repacking of Olit 1 drywell sample pump.

(2) Observed installation of Unit 2. Instrument Air Compressor heat- *

exchanger.

i- (3) Observed installation of temperature control-valves on Unit'~1

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and 2 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System (RBCCW).

-(4) Observed replacement of the Unitil~and 2 Instrument Air

Compressor Motor.

(5) Observed removal-of Unit 2 RBCCW-pump motor for-bearing

, replacement.

-(6)- Observed trouble shooting of Unit ~2 Scram Discherge. Volume-

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level, alarms.

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(7) Observed testing of various valves following E.Q. modifications

for Unit I and 2.

(8) Reviewed E.Q. modifications of drywell components for Unit 1

and 2.

(9) Reviewed corrective maintenance on 1/2 EDG.

Via Generic Letter 85-15, " Equipment Qualification", the Commission

promulgated a deadline of midnight, November 30, 1985 for the

completion of all modifications to comply with Environmental

Qualification concerns. Throughout the year, the licensee has 3

diligently worked to comply with this requirement and has taken ~

several small outages for this purpose as well as extending planned

and unplanned outages. Aggressive management attention combined

with good planning and the cooperative attitude of the maintenance

staff resulted in the completion of all modifications on November 29,

1985. ,

The inspectors have noted an improvement in interstation communication

with the CECO organization as evidenced by problems with E.Q. wiring

of Limitorque valve motors at Zion station being immediately '

communicated to Quad Cities for resolution. Also, problems at Quad

Cities station are transmitted to other CECO stations through several t

formal and informal communication channels. However, one recent event ,

at LaSalle County station was not' communicated to Quad Cities although

the problem may have been applicable. ,

LaSalle station experienced a problem with Mobil Vaprotec light oil  ;

used in their Reactor Core Isolation Cooling turbines and switched  ;

to Gulf Crest 32 with a special additive. While Quad Cities uses  ;

Mobil Vaprotec light oil in RCIC and High Pressure Coolant Injection -

(HPCI) turbines, this information was not comniunicated by LaSalle

station. Quad Cities has not experienced a problem in the past with

this oil, but, when informed by the resideat inspectors of this

potential, the maintenance staff did commit to investigate the issue

further. Resolution of this concern will be tracked as an Open Item *

(254/85027-07; 265/85030-07). No problems ~have been identified to '

date however, this is evidence that further improvements in

Corporate communication channels are required'to ensure that- ,

experiences at other stations are incorporated into the .

activities of Quad Cities.

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No violations or deviations were identified. I

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e. Surveillance

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The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Observed performance in the field of high reactor pressure

scram surveillance for Unit 2. i

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(2) Observed control. room portions of pump and valve operability

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check for RHR on linit 2.

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(3) Observed performance in the field of low low level scram

testing for Unit 1. i

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(4) Observed control roo,a portions of operability testing of

. the 1/2 EDG.

(5) Observed control room portions of pump and valve functional

testing for Unit 2 core spray.

(6) Observed tip traces for Unit 2 and subsequent APRM adjustments.

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f. Procedures Reviewed

QAP 500-15 Conduct of Maintenance Revision 1

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QAP 500-13 Environment Qualification Program Revision 2 1

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-QAP 300~5

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Shift Change for Shift Control

Room Engineer / Shift Technical' Advisor Revision-5 *

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l- QAP 300-7 Shift Change for Nuclear Station [

Operators ~ Revision 7 - i

QAP 900-S2 New Control Rod. Receiving Inspection . Revision 3

QMP-100-3 Fire Prevention for Welding and l

Cutting = Revision 5-

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QMP 100-S1 Welding and Cutting Permit- Revision 3

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, Q0P 1100-1 Standby Operation'of Standby Liquid . .

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i Control System Re'ision

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j QOP 1100-2 Injection of Standby Liquid Control Revision 4 _  !

QAP 300-2 ' Conduct of Shift Operations  : Revision 16 l

g. Review of Routine and Special Reports- '

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The inspectors reviewed the monthly performance reports for Units-1: 1

-and 2 for the months of September and October.-

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No violations.or deviations were identified.

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i. LER Review

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4 .(1) (Closed) LER 85-016; Revision 00: ~ Refuel floor monitor spike l

j and start of standby gas treatmeht., - <

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On September 5, 1985, Unit 1 was in the RUN mode at approximately .)

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100 percent of !sted core thermal power. At 1348 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.12914e-4 months <br /> the 1

Control Room received a spurious high alarm and trip of the IB i

Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor. The Reactor Building Ventilation 1

isolated and the Standby Gas Treatment initiated. No abnormal '!

radiation levels were. discovered and these systems were manually-  :

reset at 1350 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.13675e-4 months <br />. The cause of this trip was probably.

electrical noise interference. The Instrument Maintenance *

Department has discovered a' higher than norma 1' induced voltage

on the IB Fuel Pool Monitor. 'It is currently planned to reroute

the signal cable for this monitor to avoid high noise areas.

This reroute is expected to be completed by August 30, 1986.

The' ongoing problems with Fuel Pool Radiation Monitors has been

addressed in previous ~ LERs and . Inspection: Reports. This LER.is

considered closed, however, the~overall concern and ultimate

resolution is being tracked by Unresolved Item (254/85017-03;.

265/85019-02(DRP)).

(2) (Closed).LER 85-017,.Revisio'n 00: ' Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

Discharge Valve would not open.

On October 15, 1985, Unit One was in the RUN mode at 90 percent

of rated core thermal-power. During the performance of-

surveillance QOS 1300-3, " Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Motor

Operated Valve Operability Test", it was discovered that the RCIC

pump. discharge valve would not open from the Control Room after

it was closed. RCIC was, therefore, declared inoperable. It

was found that the main contactor in the breaker for the motor-

operator for the valve was dirty and would not close completely,

thereby failing to supply power to the motor. After the breaker-

was reset, the valve was successfully cycled three times and

RCIC was declared operable.

The buildup of dirt on the main'cantactor was the result of

using the lubricant on the main contactor's pivot point. The

lubricant collects dirt which= increases the; viscosity of the

mixture to a value that prevents the main breaker from working:

properly.' The use of this lubricant was a recent change to the

surveillance procedure and had not been:used on other breakers.

-This practice has been discontinued as a result-of this event.

No further actions are required.

Unit 2

'(1) -(Closed) LER 84-013 Revision 00: Missed Service Water Grab

Samples. This. item remained open pending revisions to the

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sampling and administrative review procedures to ensure

continued comp 1iance. eAdequate revisions were implemented and

reviewed by-the inspectors.- No further actions are required.

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3 (2) '(Closed) LER 85-012, Revision 00 and 01: On December 1, 1984,

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' Unit 2 was operating'at approximately 99 percent core thermal

power. At 9:25 a.m., the Reactor Building Fuel Pool Channel iB'

Area Radiation Monitor ~ tripped, isolating the Reactor Building

Ventilation and starting the. Standby Gas Treatment System. A- ' '

. check on both channels of the Fuel Pool' Area Radiation Monitors

1

did not indicate any abnormal radiation levels. The Reactor

i. Building Ventilation and Standby Gas Treatment were returned.

to normal. The Instrument Maintenance Department found that-the l

trip setpoint of the iB' Radiation Monitor-was at 35 mr/ hour I

t

rather than the normal'setpoint'of 100 mr/ hour, allowing normal. ,

instrument noise to trip the monitor. Corrective action was to l

recalibrate and functionally test the monitor. The cause of-the

setpoint being set at 35 mr/ hour w'as'dtfe to the instrument being

I

calibrated in the Instrument Maintenance shop rather than-in

place. The variations in using two different power supplies and

j physical movement contributed to the set ~ point drift.

i

A search through two previous sets of calibration data for this

specific instrument revealed that its' calibration"setpoint had '

drifted abnormally during'the last several months. A procedure

c.hange to QIS 35-1, " Reactor Building Fuel Pool Radiation

i Monitoring Cal.ibration and Functional. Test Data Sheet" was

.

submitted to have the Trip Unit calibrated in place, using the~  ;

normal power supply.

The ongoing problems with Fuel Pool Radiation Monitors has been-

'

addressed in previous LERs and Inspection reports. _This'LER is

! considered closed, however, the overall concern and ultimate

F resolution is being tracked as Unresolved Item (234/85017-03; i

265/85019-02(DRP)).

l (3) (0 pen) LER 85-018, Revision 00: Low Condenser Vacuum Set Point

Drift.

!

g~

On August 26, 1985, at 11:55 a.m., Unit 2 was operating-in the

RUN mode at approximately 98-percent core thermal power. ~During.

.

the performance of " Low Condenser Vacuum Calibration",'QIS 19-1, 1

i the setpoints'of. Pressure Switches PS-2-503A and PS-2-503C were

'

found to have drifted to 20 8 inches Hg vacuus:and 19.4 inches

Hg vacuum, respectively. :he switches were recalibrated'to

j within Technical Specifications.

.

. There have been 13 previous occurrences of-~setpoint I driftEfor-

,

this type of switch. -Therefore, the licensee is investigating-

-

enginee*ing solutions-or possible replacement of these switches,

with more stable switches.~ ~Pending final resolution, this LER

will' remain open.

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i

i. . . .

. .

l (4) _(Closed) LER 85-019, Revision 00:.. Main Steam'Is'olation Valve 1

p Closure Times and Initiation of Orderly Shutdown. -i

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'

2

'

- On September 8, 1985, Unit 2 was operating at 72 percent of

rated core thermal power. At'0225 hours0.0026 days <br />0.0625 hours <br />3.720238e-4 weeks <br />8.56125e-5 months <br />, while performing Main

'

Steam Isolation Valve Closure Time Testing (QOS 250-4), valves

'

A0 2-203-1B,:2-203-1C, and 2-203-10 had closure times of 2.72

. seconds, 2.89 seconds, and 2.80 seconds, resputively. Table ,

4-

3.7.1, of the Technical Specifications, requires a closing time:

!

of 3 to 5: seconds. At 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br /> a Unit 2 Reactor shutdown

commenced per Technical Specification 3.7.D.3. A Drywell. entry

was made to adjust to the closure stimes; the three valves were

4 retested satisfactorily and the Reactor shutdown was terminated

at 300 MWe, at 1314 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />4.99977e-4 months <br />.

i The cause was the speed control valve adjustment on the

hydraulic control cylinder drifting aut of adjustment. There'

. have only been four previous occurrences of'a similar nature

.

,

during the lifetime of_ Unit 2, therefore no further corrective

j action is planned or required at this time.

F (5) (Closed) LER 85-020, Revision 00: Unit 2 Condenser 5 foot ,

Circulating Water Pump Trips Out of Service.

'

!

!

{ On August 26, 1985, Unit 2 was operating ~at 97 percent of rated

, core thermal power. The Equipment Operator was performing QOS'

'

i 030-3, " Condenser Pit High Level and 5 Foot Trip Circuitry

Test". The test is performed by putting a pencil =into the'

opening of the level switch chamber and actuating the level

switch. While the test is being performed, the circulating-

water pump high level trip test- switches are open to disabia the

circulating water pump trips. -During the-test,.the pencil that

.

was used to actuate the switch broke off inside the 3 foot

.

level alarm switch. A work request was then written for the .-

l Electrical Maintenance Department to remove;the_ broken pencil.in

the level alarm switch.

'

On September 16, 1985, an~ Electrician reported to the Shift

'

!

< Engineer for permission to work on the~1evel alarm switch. The

! Shift Overview Superintendent.(SOS), observing their discussion,

! suggested that they disable the trips while' removing the pencil

,

so that the electrician would'not accidentally trip the circulating '

- water pumps. The Shift Foreman suggested if they were_ going to

i disable the trips, they should take them out of. service for the

Shift Engineer so they would not forget to-return them to service.  !

I The Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) completed the out of

service process and all,four-pump trips were taken out of

service. This action,- however, did not affect the operability-

,

- of the 3 foot alarm switches.because their circuitry.is

i

'

physically separated from that of the.5 foot pump trips. The

Electrician was.given permission'to go~to work at:1345. hours.on

l September 16, 1985, and the job was completed at 1415-hours on

L the same. day. He then informed the Unit 2.0peratorr.that the

l

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job was completed, but the pump trips were not. returned to

service until 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />'on September'17, 1985, when the

situation was identified by the licensee during normal

supervisory reviews. .

t-

Technical Specification 3.5.H.2 requires the condenser pit..

i

i

water level switches to trip the condenser circulating water

pumps and alarm in the Control Room-.if the water level in the

condenser pit exceeds a level of.5 feet above the pit floor.

If a failure occurs in one of these trip and alarm circuits,

the_ failed circuit is required to be immediately placed in a

j trip condition. Reactor operation is permissible for the-

following seven days'unless the circuit is sooner made. operable,

'

or an orderly shutdown must be initiated and the Reactor.must

be-in a Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

>

The switches were taken out of service, and the pump trips were

disabled. More than one switch was taken out of service but

they were not placed in a trip condition, and a seven day clock ,

'

was not started contrary to Technical Specification 3.5.h.2.

!

L The cause of this deviation is that the Shift Foreman, Shift

Engineer and Shift Overview Supervisor involved in the initial

'

l discussion were more concerned with preventing an inadvertent

circulating water pump trip and did not consider the Technical'

'

! Specification requirements. The fact that the testing procedure ' '

, required that the trips be disabled while the Equipment Operator

is under the hotwell was a contributing factor in the decision

j to disable the pump trips.

!

i The people involved in the decision'were not familiar with the .  ;

circuitry of the pump trips. The 3. foot alarm switch is physically

separated from the 5 foot pump' trips. Therefore, it was'not

! necessary to remove the 5 foot pump trips to work on the 3_ foot

i level alarm switches. There.are four pump trip switches, of-

1

which two are needed to energize the pump trip relays. -

The SOS stated that he never meant for the Shift Engineer to .

l - disable all of the pump' trips. If:he had been familiar with the

'

i electrical prints, he would have known that the knife. switches- '

are-in the trip logic from the relay's energized contacts and ,

not in the level switch circuit.

!' The.only person not directly involved in the initial decision-

who~ could have provided an independent check of the out-of-service. '

4 - decision was_the day shift SCRE. However,'he failed to check the-  ?

I Technical Specifications for violations. j

~

'

. The 1500-2300 Shift Engineer was not made' aware during the. shift

i . change with the 0700-1500 Shift Engineer that all of the trip.

circuits were disabled. Consequently, the 2300-0700 Shift-

,

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4

12

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.

L Engineer _was also not aware of the circulating pump trip out ofL

1. service. This was the contributing cause of~not having the_ pump 'i

! trips returned to service'in a timely manner.

A meeting was held with the Production Superintendent,-Assistant

Superintendent of Operations,- Operating Engineers, Shift

Engineers, Shift Control. Room Engineers, and Shift Foremen to--

discuss this' specific' event in detail and this information was

included in operator training and retraining lessons.

[ Several past errors have happened at shift changes when there is

! increased activity. This activity _is mainly.from maintenance, ,

either returning the day's work to service or requesting.

l equipment out of service fur the'next day. Several steps were

j taken to reduce this activity.

4 .

'Ar. afternoon meeting was initiated at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> between the

! maintenance schedulers and the Operating Engineers. ' Equipment'

l- returned to service and requests for the next-day's'out of

service take place in thir. meeting.- ,

Station personnel have.been directed not to disturb,.the

Operating personnel involved in a shif; .hangc during the

period from 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br /> to 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br /> unless absolutely

i .necessary. The Communication Center personnel should be

i available to provide information needed.

~ '

. .

This event could have been prevented if the pencil used.to

i- actuate the level switches had not broken off. ~A metal bolt"

! has been installed and attached by a chain to the switch,!so-

i

that-it can be inserted and not broken off--inside the switch.

l Additionally,procedurechangeshave'beenaccomplishedt$

provide cautionary notes to QOS 030-3 and other similar

i procedures to prevent repetition of this event. Because this

event was identified by the licensee during normal supervisory

reviews and because of the subsequent prompt and extensive ^

j. corrective actions taken, no violation was issued. -

.

(6) (Closed) LER 85-021, Revision 00: Unit 2 Scram-Low Level'

.

Indication During Testing.

!.

At 10:45 p.m., on October 15, 1985, Unit 2-was operating in:-the

"

RUN mode-at approximately-100 percent'of rated core thermal

. power. Instrument Maintenance personnel were performing

! " Low-Low Reactor Water' Level Calibration",.when the Instrument

! Mechanic noticed leakage from an instrument _ tap.: The. leakage

U

. indicated that one of the isolation valves on a level indicating-

j. switch was-leaking.- When he~ attempted to tighten the low side

! valve on the switch, the Instrument Mechanic mistakenly cracked

! :the valve open. He immediately reclosed theivalve. .This action

j caused a pressure-transient on the instruments connected to this-

l

!

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_ . . . . _ _ _ _

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instrument line. A Reactor scram and Group I,.II, and III

Isolation resulted from.the transient. This event has been

reviewed with the Instrument Maintenance Department as part of

f their training.

. Also,.the station is pursuing continuing efforts to replace the

,

presently installed diaphram-type instruments with analog

i devices, wherever possible. These analog devices are much-less

susceptible to transient pressure spikes. No further actions

are required at this time.

!

'

(7) (Closed) LER 85-022, Revision 00: Relay Block Dropout causing

{ three quarter Scram Signal While Shutdown

i

"

On October 24, 1985, at 12:36 p.m. Unit 2 was in the SHUTDOWN-

, mode. Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) Closure Monthly' Scram

!

Sensor Functional Test, were blocked closed per procedure to

i make it appear as if the condenser was under a. vacuum, because

! low condenser vacuum can also cause MSIV closure. Further along

'

'

in the test, a one-half scram on the +A' Channel was being reset

when the block on a relay fell out. This caused a one-half

scram on the 43' Channel. This one-half scram on the +B'

i Channel combined with the half-reset one-half scram on the +A'

} Channel resulted in a three quarter scram. -The other half'of

l the one-half scram on the +A' Channel was immediately reset

leaving only.a one-half scram on the +B' Channel.

I This is the first occurrence of this type, therefore, no-further

j actions are planned or required at this time.

i No other violations or deviations were identified.

4

1. Bulletin Followup

'

(1) (Closed) IEB 80-07:. BWR Jet Pump Assembly.

Nureg/CR-3052 concerning closeout action of.IEB 80-07 was-

4

prepared by Parameter Inc. under' contract to the NRC. -The NRC

i staff has reviewed the report and concluded that the generic

aspects of jet pump integrity have.been adequately addressed by

!. licensee corrective measures. The resident inspectors verified

l' that approved procedures were in place to ensure continued

i surveillance as follows:

'(a) Individual jet pump flow readings are taken prior to unit

j startup from a cold condition, and after starting a -

recirculation pump with the reactor.at rated temperature

I

and pressure.

(b) Pursuant.to. the.. Technical Specifications,' recirculation

i pump speed and pump' flow are compared' daily tofthe

l characteristic established speed / pump flow curves.' lIf the.

!'

'

'

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.

'

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'

'14

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.

.

_ comparison is greater than 10%, a test is performed which

compares the indicated total core flow to the total core l

flow value derived from the established power / core flow . t

curve. If this comparison is greater than 10%, a jet pump l

problem exists.

(c) A daily test is performed similar to item b. above, except .I

that recirculation pump speed and jet pump loop flow are  !

compared to the characte 'stic established speed / loop flow  !

curves. If this comparison is greater than 5%, a jet pump

problem may exist.

(d) A daily-jet pump surveillance-test is performed when the-  !

reactor mode switch is in RUN. Individual jet pump' flow l

readings are recorded. Normalized flow values are  !

calculated by dividing each jet pump flow reading by the j

average jet' pump flow for the corresponding recirculation '!

loop. These normalized values are compared against the  ;

range of characteristic values.for each jet pump. If a  ;

normalized value falls outside this; characteristic range,  ;

there may be a jet pump problem. +

,

The inspector also. verified that visual and ultrasonic  :

examinations were performed at every refueling outage of the

jet pump beams. Approved procedures are in place to ensure  !

continued compliance. The licensee does not intend to replace l

any beams'with the new type. '

No further actions are required.  ;

-,

2. (Closed) IE Bulletin 80-25 Operating Problems with Target Rock- .

Safety-Relief Valves at Boiling Water Reactors i

s

While Utility personnel responded acceptably on March -17,-1981, ~l

indicating that (a) no corrective action was required for- l-

'

Actions 1 and 2, (b) modifications were initiated for the

installation of a relief valve on the drywell pneumatic ~ supply l

header and (c) an annunciator would be changed, verification of ,

b and c was incomplete or not fully' documented.' The resident- *

inspectors have verified that the modifications.have been ,

completed and that the annunciator change was complete. Dates "

of the completions were for Unit 1 March 4, 1983'and for Unit 2 1

January 14,~1982. No further actions are. required.

No violations or deviations were' identified.

j. Fire Protection

(1) From September 20 to October 21, a routine . unannounced safety:

_

~

inspection in the fire protection area'was conducted by DRSS at

Dresden Units 2 and 3. -Areas included in the' inspection were-

the adequacy of the facilities' Fire Protection program

_

,

15

.

x

.. . = -

. -- - .-

- - .

. ..-

t

j- .

t

implementation, addressing LERs, and previous Open Items.

.

'

During the course of the inspection it was noted that several-

deficiencies were present. Specifically the deficiency

c consisted in a failure to comply with a Condition of the License

in the area of fire detection. DRSS, concerned that a similar

'

problem could exist at Quad Cities,= notified the resident- .

, inspectors of the situation. The resident inspectors confirmed - L

that a_similar deficiency existed in that the refuel. floor did

' -

not contain fire _ detection equipment listed in the Safety

Evaluation Report (SER) as required by Technical Specifications.

4 This is a violation as noted in the Appendix (254/85027-09;

,

265/85030-09(DRS)). ,

j An enforcement Conference was held in theLRegion III' offices on

November 19 at which time the licensee identified additional

' discrepancies. -At Quad Cities,'these discrepancies _-included

cable separation concerns and protection'of~ electrical

distribution panels from falling debris. The licensee will- 1

submit an updated report. listing each discrepancy and the.

I corrective actions taken or planned. These actions will be  ;

followed by the resident inspectors. ,

r

2

(2) The Ruskin Manufacturing Company, in a letter to Quad Cities t

i dated November 6, 1984, under a potential 10 CFR Part 21,

i indicated that test methods originally used by Ruskin may not

i have accurately depicted actual field conditions for dampers

'

installed inshie ducting. In addition,.Ruskin stated such 3

dampers may also fail to close under actual flow conditions'and ,

l recommended that Ceco test the dampers for operability.

4

l

Ceco's Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) performed

an evaluation and determined.this condition was not applicable-  :

i to Quad Cities as documented on SNED inter-company meno dated ,

j January 17, 1985.~  ;

A review by a Headquarters NRC inspector'during a special.

' inspection of the control room HVAC system indicated the . ,

existence of at least one damper (No. CECO 1/2-9472-01) which

j was required to close under flow due to"its interface with area- ,

smoke detectors and the control room air supply system.

I

The failure to properly and accurately evaluate 'the. original t

issue raised by Ruskin is considered a violation as noted in the

Appendix (254/85027-10; 265/85030-10(DRP). .

-

No other violations or deviations were identified.

k. Regional Requests  ;

Region III_ observed over the course of three inspections of~  !

preoperational testing of the Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS)-

'

that the involved licensees.were not adequately. implementing the

'

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16  :

N ~ -. . . . . - _ . - - - -...-- - . .. .. -.-a.--

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.

testing requirements.of Regulatory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Programs

for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants." Review of the SLCS ,

preoperational-test at LaSalle, Perry, and Clinton indicated that

testing of the air sparger sub-system was being done improperly.

The testing methodology being employed failed to demonstrate that the

sodium pentaborate solution was being adequately mixed after sitting

for a period of time or that the sampling methodology to be used to

satisfy Technical Specification surveillance requirements would yield

valid results. Review of'preoperational tests performed at Quad

Cities confirmed that similar tests have been performed. The

licensee is reviewing this situation to determine appropriate actions .

to take. Resolution of this issue will be tracked as an Unresolved

Item (254/85027-11; 265/85030-11(DRP)).

1. Independent Inspection

(1) Recent LERs at other stations have identified several instances

where loose electrical connections have been the cause of

'

'

reactor scrams or other safety system challenges. The

inspectors reviewed the issue with licensee maintenance-

personnel. The licensee has committed to review electrical and

inst.ument surveillance procedures and implement changes to.  ;

require periodic checks for loose electrical connectors. This- ,

will be traced as an Open Item (254/85027-12; 265/85030-12(DRP)).

(2) A design deficiency was identified at the Trojan Station in the

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. Should an RHR pump fail on

demand such that the motor breaker closes.but the pump fails to.

provide flow (e.g. , sheared shaft), its associated mini-flow

recirculation valve would open and provide an alternate. flow _ ,

path from the redundant RHR train and starve some of the flow to,

the reactor coolant system. Thus, less water woulu be pumped

into the reactor coolant system than intended during the .

injection ' phase of a large break loss of coolant accident.  ;

b

The inspectors reviewed the RHR system at the Quad Cities

station and ascertained that a similar. design-deficiency did

not exist., ,

s

l (3) During an audit at the Maine Yankee station,.the licensee ,

discovered that pressurizer pressure transmitters, pressurizer '

i level transmitters, and steam' generator level-transmitters > 2

!'

were not installed in accordance with manufacturers

!- recommendations in that the conduit seal assemblies did not-

l .

.have thread sealant applied and may not have been properly.

! torqued. Also E.Q. requirements were not factored into.

,

periodic surveillance procedures. These deficiencies could1

,

invalidate the environmental qualification of the transmitters. I

~ The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions at Quad Cities-

and verified that thread sealant was.used during installation

l-

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I -

- 17

,

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and that manufacturers recommendations for surveillance-

requirements were considered. These requirements have~been

incorporated into existing surveillance procedures.

(4) While investigating the cause of failure-of threaded oipe joints

in the fire protection system at Comanche Peak station, the

licensee discovered the presence of Microbiological Induced

Corrosion (MIC), a chemical form of corrosion caused by the

presence of microbes in stagnant water.

To prevent a similar situation at Quad. Cities, licensee procedures

require a system flush twice_per year and a flow test.each year to

verify no degradation. A flo'w test was recently performed and no

indication of piping degradation was found.

No violations or deviations were-identified.

3. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action

on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. 'The open items disclosed

during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2.c, 2.d and 2.e.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in

order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of

noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed'during the

inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2.b and 2.k.

5. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted.in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the. inspection

on December 6, 1985, and summarized the scope and findings of the

inspection activities.

The inspectors also discussed the'likely informational content of.the

inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the-

inspectors during the inspection. _ The licensee _ did not identify any-such

documents / processes as proprietary.

10

.