IR 05000254/1989010

Insp Repts 50-254/89-10 & 50-265/89-10 on 890402-0513.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiological Controls,Maint/Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness,Security & Engineering/Technical Support

ML20247H544
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	05/22/1989
From:	Harrison J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247H532	List: IR 05000254/1989010 ML20247H527
References
50-254-89-10, 50-265-89-10, NUDOCS 8905310261
Download: ML20247H544 (14)

Text

_ -.

.

.

-

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-254/89010(DRP);50-265/89010(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-254, 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Conducted: April 2 through May 13, 1989 Inspectors:

R. L. Higgins

,

A. D. Morrongiello l

D. E. Jones T. M. Ross R. Bocanegra M. E. )arker

$4@

Approved By:

J. J. Harrison, Chief

_06!

6'l Reactor Projects Section IB Date l

Inspection Summary

Inspection on A)ril 2 through May 13, 1989 (Reports No. 50-254/89010(DRP);

50-265/89010( DR )))

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced resident inspection of Plant Operations, Radiological Controls, Maintenance / Surveillance, Emergency Preparedness, Security, Engineering / Technical Support and Safety Assessment / Quality Verification. Additionally, the inspectors closed tamporary instruction (TI) 2515/100.

Results: During the inspection period Unit 1 experienced two manual scrams, one unplanned shutdown, and was disconnected from the electrical grid on two occasions, and Unit 2 experienced one automatic scram. One of the Unit 1 manual scrams was necessitated by a malfunctioning EHC system and the otner was required when an electromatic relief valve would not reseat during surveillance testing.

The Unit i unplanned shutdown was caused by a steam leak from a reactor head vent line which was discovered during a drywell inspection in conjunction with a reactor startup. Turbine control valves spiking open was the cause for the two instances in which Unit I was disconnected from the electrical grid. The automatic scram on Unit 2 occurred during weekly testing of the master trip solenoid when a faulty master trip solenoid caused a turbine trip which in turn caused a reactor scram.

%[3kbbbkb

@4 Q

- _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

_

_

._. - _ _ _ _ _ _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

__

.

,l

.

.

.

.

The overall radiological performance was good even though the number of

!

personnel contaminations exceeded the goal, as evidenced by the fact that the total radiation exposure was less than budgeted, despite extensive and unanticipated maintenance activities in the drywell. No personnel contam-

^1 nations occurred as a result of the work in the drywell.

Satisfactory performance continued to be made towards the completion of the reactor feedwater hydrogen addition, the Unit 2 battery modification, the Unit 2 B RHR service water discharge piping replacement, and the control room heating and ventilation modifications.

The 2C RHR service water pump impeller was replaced and installed backwards. This error was discovered by the licensee during post maintenance acceptance testing and was expeditiously repaired.

For most of the inspection period both units were at or near full power with only two or three illuminated annunciators on either unit.

Plant cleanliness and material condition remained noteworthy. At the end of the inspection period Unit I had operated at power for 7 consecutive days ano Unit 2 had operated at power for 37 consecutive days.

.

_-_-___ _ _-__-____ ____

i

'

l

-

.

,

.

.

DETAILS

1.

Personnel Contacted

• R. Robey, Technical Superintendent

• D. Gibson, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• T. Barber, Regulatory Assurance

• J. Wethington, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• R. Stols, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

• Denotes those present at the exit interview on May 12, 1989.

The-inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspection.

2.

Action on Previous Items (92701)

a.

(0 pen) Open Items 254/87900-01; 265/87900-01: Adequate Personnel on Shift for Continuous Communication With the NRC.

Engineering Assistants (EAs) have been trained on emergency communications responsibilities and are on shift at all times.

The current staffing level is not deemed adequate, necessitating that four EAs fill a five shift rotation. This item will remain open until there are six EAs, one assigned to each operating crew.

b.

(0 pen) Open Items 254/89010-01; 265/89010-01: Humid, Corrosion-Inducing Environment in the RHR Service Water Pump Vaults.

I The RHR service water pump vaults are enclosed spaces with no ventilation.

The atmosphere is humid and conducive to corrosion.

This item will remain open until a method is in place which provides ventilation to the RHR service water pump vaults and moderates the corrosion-inducing environment.

c.

(0 pen) Open Items 254/89010-02; 265/89010-02:

Inadequate Instrument Air Capacity.

The service air compressors routinely supply compressed air to the instrument air system because the capacity of the instrument air compressors is insufficient to satisfy the demand. This item will remain open until the capacity of the instrument air compressors is increased sufficiently such that the service air compressors need

to supply air to the instrument air system only during emergency I

conditions.

3.

Plant Operations a.

Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined plant operations. The inspectors verified that all

__ __-__-_ - _ _

-_-

. _ _ _ _ _. _ _

_ _ _ _.

. _ _

.-

- -

i

.

.

t

activities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed as applicable; and that procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards. Additionally, the inspectors verified that approvals were obtained prior to initiating any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the limiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and while components or systems were removed from service; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; and independent verification of equipment lineup and review of test results were accomplished. Also verified were quality control records for being properly maintained and reviewed, and parts, materials and equipment for proper certification, calibration, storage, and maintenance as applicable. The inspectors conducted frequent tours of plant facilities to search for the existence of adverse plant conditions such as equipment malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel errors.

The inspectors' review ensured these issues were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by appropriate management personnel. No violations or deviations were noted.

b.

Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)

During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down some of the accessible portions of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Core Spray (CS),

Residual Heat Removal (RHR), RHR Service Water, Standby Liquid Control (SLC), and Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) Systems. The inspectors also walked down the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)

and the Station Batteries. An isolated instance of mislabeled valves was discovered on the diesel generator cooling water pump coolers.

No violations or deviations were noted.

c.

Sunnary of Operations Unit 1 Unit 1 operated either at full power, on Economic Generat. ion Control (EGC), or at reduced power in order to perform surveillance testing or in response to load dispatcher orders, until April 12, 1989, when an EHC problem caused the turbine control valves to throttle shut and the turbine bypass valves to automatically open to control pressure.

The turbine control valves continued to shut even after all of the bypass valves were open, causing reactor pressure to increase and necessitating a manual scram.

The EHC system was repaired and the reactor was restarted on April 15,1989, but a steam leak on the reactor head vent pipe necessitated that the licensee abort the startup and repair the leak. The licensee repaired the leak and restarted the reactor on

_

_ _ _ - -

_.

.

.___

_ _ _ ___

_

_ _ _ _

- _ - _ _ _ _ -

I

k

-

-

-

.

.

April 16,1989. While testing the D electromatic relief valve on

'

' April 17, 1989, it failed to reseat, necessitating a manual scram.

The malfunctioning electromatic relief valve was replaced and the reactor was restarted on April 18, 1989. The reactor operated normally until April 27, 1989, when the turbine control valves were

,

l observed to be periodically spiking from their 65% open position to

'

the full open position. On April 30, 1989, and on May 7, 1989, the

!

licensee disconnected.the main generator from the electrical grid l

while leaving the reactor critical and attempted to repair the EHC system. On each occasion the main generator was reconnected to the electrical grid later in the day, but the spiking continued.

The licensee plans to disconnect the main generator from the electrical grid in the near future to perform additional EHC system repair.

At the end of the inspection period the unit had operated at power for 7 consecutive days.

Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at full power, on EGC, or at reduced power in order to perform surveillance testing or in response to load dispatcher orders, until April 6,1989, when the turbine _ tripped during surveillance testing of the master trip solenoid, causing an automatic reactor scram. The faulty master trip solenoid was replaced-and the reactor was restarted later that day. At the end of the inspection period Unit 2 had operated at power for 37 consecutive days.

d.

"0nsite Followup of Events At Operating Power Reactors (93702)

(1) Unit 2 Reactor Scram At 3:20 AM CDT on April 6, 1989, with Quad Cities Unit 2 near 100% power, surveillance test Q0S 5600-4, the weekly turbine-generator test, was being conducted. The "A" master trip solenoid light would not extinguish when the "A" master trip solenoid was tested, no matter how long the master trip solenoid test switch was held in the "A" test position. At 3:32 AM, the master trip solenoid test switch was placed in the

"B" test position, at which time a turbine trip and reactor scram occurred.

Post scram actions were normal, except for the occurrence of a group I isolation signal (MSIV isolation) which reset immediately.

It is believed that the group I isolation signal was caused by low main steam line pressure due to the turbine bypass valves opening immediately after the scram. The scram was reset at 3:41 AM and the MSIVs were reopened at 3:42 AM. The NRC Emergency Operations Center was notified at 4:04 AM CDT.

The turbine trip was caused by a faulty master trip solenoid.

The turbine trip caused the reactor scram. The licensee replaced the faulty master trip solenoid on April 6, 1989.

___:_---__:__--___

. _. -.

_

_

_.

_

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -.

.

.

.

-

,..

(2) Unit 2 Reactor Startup.

Control rod withdrawal began at 10:00 AM on AprilL6,1989, to restart Unit 2 after a reactor scram caused by a turbine trip due:to a faulty master trip solenoid. Reactor criticality was

,

achieved at 2:45 PM on April 6, 1989, and the main generator-was synchronized to the electrical grid at 1:20' AM on April 7,1989.

(3) Unit 1 Reactor Scram

,

At 11:33 PM CDT on April 11,.1989, the Unit-1 turbine control.

'

valves and bypass valves started to cycle open and closed.

The instrument' technicians adjusted the-bypass valve close bias and the bypass valves remained closed. At 3:17 AM on April 12, 1989,. the~ turbine control valves and bypass valves cycled.again, and the bypass. valve close bias was again

adjusted to keep the bypass valves closed.. At 10:40 AM on

~!

April 12, 1989, the turbine control valves and bypass valves

.

again started to cycle, causing all of the bypass valves to-

!

>

fully open while the control valves continued to go closed.

The reactor operators reduced power in an attempt to control reactor pressure, but were forced to manually scram the reactor at 11:36 AM on April 12, 1989.

The cause of the problem with the control valves and bypass'

valves was determined to be circuit board A64 within the

.

l maximum combined flow limit circuit. The licensee replaced

this defective circuit board and performed other maintenance,

including the replacement of-the pilot valve for. the C

<

electromatic relief valve.

(4) Unit 1 Reactor Startup Centrol rod withdrawal to restart Unit 1 began at 6:41 AM on April 15, 1989.

Criticality was achieved at.10:51 AM on i

April 15, 1989.

(5) Unit 1 Reactor Shutdown At 4:10 PM on April 15, 1989, during a reactor startup, the I

licensee discovered a steam leak on the reactor head vent pipe.

A reactor shutdown began at 5:15 PM and the reactor was

manually scrammed at 5:30 PM. The leak from the reactor head l

Vent pipe was due to a faulty weld. The weld was cut out and

the pipe was rewelded on April 16, 1989.~

(6) Unit 1 Reactor Startup j

Control rod withdrawal to restart Unit 1 began at 1:13 PM on April 16, 1989.

Criticality was achieved at 2:50 PM on April 16 1989.

j

.

,

1

l

L___-_-____-__-____________-___

_ _ _. _

_ - - _ _

- - - _.. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _____ ___ ___-__ _ ___-_____ ___ _ ___-_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

__

__

.:

.

.

.

..

(7)

U_ nit 1 Reactor Scram On April 17, 1989, Unit I was at 10% power in the midst of a plant startup from an unscheduled maintenance outage which began on April 11, 1989, when a malfunctioning EHC system necessitated a manual scram.

During the outage the EHC system was repaired and other maintenance was performed, including the replacement of the pilot valve for the C electromatic relief valve. Because its pilot valve was replaced, the C electromatic relief valve had to be tested during the startup.

Since one electromatic relief valve had to be tested, the licensee decided to test all five relief valves (1(A) target rock aM 4(B-E) electromatic) and satisfy the six month surveillance requirement at the same time.

Relief valves A, B, and C were tested successfully. At 3:27 AM, electronatic relief valve D opened but would not shut. The licensee tried several times to shut it, but was unsuccessful.

At 0:30 AP.he licensee initiated a manual scram in accordance with the procedure for a stuck open relief valve.

At 3:37 AM the licensee declared an Unusual Event, and at 3:47 AM the licensee notified the NRC Emergency Operations Center.

The plant's post scram response was normal except for the stuck open electromatic relief valve, which caused the reactor cool down rate to be 150 degrees F during the first hour after the scram, exceeding the cool down rate Technical Specification limit of 100 degrees F in any one hour. Torus water temperature increased from 70 degrees F to 100 degrees F, but was lowered by the licensee through the use of torus cooling.

Shutdown cooling was initiated at 7:02 AM, and the plant i

entered cold shutdown and terminated the Unusual Event at 7:52

AM on April 17, 1989.

The licensee replaced the D electromatic relief valve, and the pilot valves for the B, D and E electromatic relief valves on April 18, 1989. The cause of the 0 electromatic relief valve i

sticking open was determined to be a small piece of weld material plugging an r.rifice in the valve disk.

(8) Unit 1 Reactor Startup At 8:36 AM on April 18, 1989, control rod withdrawal began to restart Unit 1, and reactor r.riticality occurred at 11:57 AM.

At 9:20 PM on Apri 18, 1989, the B, D and E electromatic relief valves were tested successfully and properly reseated at the conclusion of the test. The main generator was connected to

!

the electrical grid at 1:20 AM on April 19, 1989.

(9) Unit 1 Turbine Control Valve Spiking At 8:30 AM CDT on April 27, 1989, with Unit I near 100% power.,

the reactor operator noticed that the turbine control valves i

l

L _ ____

_ - _

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _

__._- _______-_-_-___ _ _

.

.

,.

.

..

were spiking.from'their 55% open position to the full open position, and reactor ptcssure and steam pressure were simultaneously showing small magnitude spikes in the downward

. direction. The instrument technicians installed a recorder in order to detect the source of the spikes.

On April 28, 1989, the instrument technicians placed the B pressure regulator in control in an effort to prevent any further spiking, and the-licensee made preparations for disconnecting the main generator from the electrical grid in order to perform corrective maintenance'on the EHC system.

The licensee disconnected Unit 1 from the electrical grid at 1:05 AM on April 30, 1989, and replaced the control valve amplifier.-

The Unit 1 main generator.was reconnected to the electric,al grid at 3:41 AM on April 30, 1989. Unit 1 power was increased to 100% on May 1, 1989, and additional control valve spiking occurred. Unit 1 power was lowered to 90% power, which reduced control valve spiking to an imperceptively small magnitude.

The licensee removed the Unit 1 main generator.from the electrical grid a second time at 5:00 AM on May 7,1989, replaced the load gate amplifier, and reconnected the main generator to the electrical grid at 4:45 PM on May 7, 1989.

Power was increased to 100%, and control valve spiking was again received on May 8, 1989.

J The licensee determined the malfunction to be in the A pressure regulator. The licensee has increased the gain on the B pressure regulator and simultaneously decreased the gain on the A pressure regulator.

Periodic spikes continue to be generated on the A pressure regulator, but because of the gain adjustment these spikes do not affect turbine control valve position. The licensee intends to disconnect the main generator from the electrical grid in the near future and replace the defective A pressure regulator.

4.

Radiological Controls (71707)-

The licensee continued to demonstrate noteworthy performance in the area of radiological controls, despite having 25 personnel contaminations when the prorated goal was 18 or less. Unanticipated maintenance activities involving *,he replacement of one electromatic relief valve and tnree electromatic relief valve pilot valves, and the repair of a leaking head vent pipe, were performed in the Unit i drywell. There were no personnel contaminations associated with any activities in the drywell, and the personnel exposure was less than budgeted despite these and other additional unanticipated maintenance activities. The licensee's performance, and the attention showed by management to further reduce personnel contaminations and exposure, is indicative of strong management l

support for the ALARA program.

l l.

No violations or deviations were noted.

'

l L

-

- _ _ _ _.. - - _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ - _ - _. - -. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -.. _

- - - - _

i

~

1.

.

.

'

..

5.

Maintenance / Surveillance a.

Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related and non-safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain thtt they were conducted in acccrdance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

The following items were considered during this review:

the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable. Additional items reviewed included verification that functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; and activities were accomplish by qualified personnel. Also, the inspectors verified that parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention procedures were followed. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to the maintenance of safety related equipment which may affect system performance.

Portions of the following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Replacement of the 2C RHR service water pump.

,

(2) Repair of the Unit I drywell pneumatic compressor.

(3) Repair of malfunctioning Unit 1 EHC instrument cards.

(4)

Inspection of the 20 RHR. service water pump circuit breaker.

(5) Reinforcement of the A SBGT system instrumentation supports.

<

(6)

Installation of tt ? control room ceiling and HVAC modifications.

l (7) Construction of the Unit 2125 volt battery racks and conduit.

(8)

Installation of feedwater hydrogen addition equipment.

(9) Repair of the Unit I hood spray bypass valve motor operator.

.

On April 3, 1989, the licensee took the 2C RHR service water pump

!

out of service in order to replace the impeller. The 2C RHR service water pump had been barely meeting its operability criteria, so the licensee decided to replace the impeller in order to improve the l

pump's performance. A similar modification had been performed on

the 1A RHR service water pump, significantly improving that pump's performance.

j

!

J

-_

,_

_ _ _

__- --

_

F.

.;

.

7,

.

,

On April 25, 1989, the 2C RHR service water pump was reassembled-with the-new impeller in place. An operability test was conducted during which the pump's motor tripped on overcurrent after 30

.. seconds. Several more operability tests were run with similar results.

Investigation by the licensee revealed no problem'with the pump's motor.

Another operability test was'run with the pump's discharge valve nearly throttled shut. This time the pump ran without-tripping.

The discharge valve was then slowly opened in order to increase

' flow, but the current drawn by.the pump increased beyond the pump's-nameplate current rating even though the pump's-flow remained-significantly below the. operability requirement. The licensee then shut off the pump and disassembled it.

Investigation by the licensee revealed that the pump's impeller had been installed backwards. The licensee reinstalled the impeller and successfully performed the operability test on April 27, 1989.

The licensee does not know why the impeller was installed improperly or why quality control personnel did not notice the improper installation. The licensee has begun an investigation to determine the root cause of the problem and corrective actions to avoid similar problems in the future.

No violations or deviations were noted.

b..

MonthlySurveillanceObservation(61726)

The inspectors observed' surveillance testing required by the-Technical Specification and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that. test instrumentation was calibrated, and that limiting conditions for operation were met.

Additionally, the inspectors observed / verified the removal and restoration of the affected components, and that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements.

Also, the inspectors verified that the results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

Portions of the following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Unit 2 main steam line high flow surveillance.

(2) Unit 1 electromatic relief valve surveillance.

(3) Unit I diesel generator surveillance.

(4) Unit 2 RHR service water operability surveillance.

(5) Unit 1 master trip solenoid surveillance.

-

,

- - - - - _ - - _

_

__

_

.

L j

.

e

'

,

(6) 1/2 A standby gas treatment system flow rate surveillance, i

. No violations or deviations were noted.

6.

LargencyPreparedness(82301/71707)

During the inspection period the inspectors participated in evaluating the licensee's emergency preparedness exercise (see inspection report 254/89007;265/89007). Additionally, the inspectors observed one of the licensee's emergency preparedness table top exercises, and

.

inspected the Quad Cities Technical Support. Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F).

No violations or deviations were noted.

Securi_ty (71707)

7.

t During.the inspection period the inspectors toured the plant and the Central Alarm Station to assure that security programs were being properly implemented. The inspectors verified that security barriers were in place, security dors were operable, the security force was alert, personnel correctly displayed their identification badges and visitor access was being properly controlled. No violations or deviations were noted.

- 8.

Engineering / Technical Support a.

Installation cnd Testing of Modifications (37828)

During the inspection period the resident inspectors monitored several inajor plant modification including, installation of reactor feedwater hydrogen-addition equipment and controls on both Units 1 and 2; modification of the control room lighting and heating, ventilation and air conditioning; installation of a temporary battery; and installation of new discharge piping for the Unit 2 RHR service water system. All modifications were being constructed with minimal problems or disruption of plant activities. No violations or deviations were noted.

b.

Licensed Operator Requalification During the inspection period the Senior Resident Inspector closely followed the licensee's preparation for the NRC-administered licensed operator requalification examinations. Any contradictions between the licensee's assessment of the examination development and the NRC's assessment were brought to the attention of the NRC's chief examiner. No violations or deviations were noted.

c.

Simulator Duririg the inspection period the Senior Resident Inspector visited the facilities of Singer-Link, the vendor constructing the Quad Cities simulator. During this visit the Senior Resident Inspector

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. - - _ _ _ _ _ -.

r

.

.

.

-

.

inspected the simulator and found it to replicate the control

!

panels for Quad Cities Unit 1.

The vendor appeared to be making satisfactory progress in meeting the schedule for the simulator's

'

construction.

9.

Safety Assessment / Quality Verification a.

Evaluation of Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation (35502)

(1) Quality Assurance During the inspection period the Senior Resident Inspector accompanied licensee Quality As3urance personnel during several inspections of plant components and activities.

The personnel performing these inspections appeared knowledgeable and conscientious. The Senior Resident Inspector also attended the exit meeting held at the conclusion of an inspection conducted by the licensee's corporate Quality Assurance organization.

The exit meeting was conducted in a professional manner and the findings which the corporate quality assurance personnel discovered during the inspection were relevant, accurate, and communicated to the station personnel in a professional manner.

(2) Quality Control During the inspection period the Senior Resident Inspector observed quality control personnel inspecting portions of the following activities:

(a) Fabrication and installation of the Unit 2 temporary 125 volt battery racks and conduit.

(b) Repair of the Unit I turbine hood spray bypass valve motor

operator.

(c) Installation of the control room ceiling and HVAC modifi-cations.

In all instances the quality control inspectors were thorough and conscientious. One possible instance of quality control

.

i error occurred when the 2C RHR service water pump impeller was installed backwards. The role which quality control personnel played in this error, if any, is currently under investigation by the licensee.

'

b.

In-Office Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (90712) and Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events At Power Reactor Facilities (92700)

During the inspection period the resident inspectors reviewed incidents such as scrams, rSF actuations and component failures which occurred at other plonts. The resident inspectors informed

l

_ _ _

_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

-

.

,

.-

<

<j.

.

I the licensee of-the. details of all' events which potentially had applicability to components or activities at Quad Cities.

e (1)LERReview (a)L (0 pen).LER 265/89001-LL: Reactor Scram Due to Failure of.

. Master Trip Solenoid Valve.

Thiseventwasdiscussedinparagraph3.d.(1)ofthis report.

It will remain open until the surveillance procedure, QOS 5600-4, is revised:to include' appropriate cautions if portions of the test do not work properly.

,

(b)

(0 pen) LER 254/89003-LL: Manual Reactor Scram in Response to Erratic Main Turbine Valve and Bypass Valve Operation.

This event was discussed in paragraph 3.d.(3) of this report.. It will remain open until' the bypass ' valve opening bias potentiometer is replaced and until this

'

,

event is' included in the lessons learned portion of license requalification training.

(2) Diesel Fuel Oil Reliability During the ir.spection period the Resident Inspector obtained data concerning the type and characteristics of the fuel oil

used at Quad Cities in response to an event which. occurred at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. This information was provided to regional staff.for their review.

(3) On-Site Hydrogen Storage Facilities During the inspection period the Senior Resident Inspector ascertained the quantity and location of hydrogen stored at Quad Cites in response to an event which occurred at the Trojan

,

Nuclear Power Plant., This information was provided to the regional office for inclusion in a stc.tus report that was provided to NRR for their review.

c.

lemporary Instructions (Closed)TemporaryInstruction(TI) 2515/100, Pro and Handling of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) per Receip(t, Storage, Fuel Oil 255100).

The inspectors completed the inspection of the required items in this TI. All items, including the seismic qualification of class l

1E equipment, have been appropriately addressed by the licensee.

TMs item is closed.

!

d.

Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)

During the inspection pariod the Senior Resident Inspector attended On-Site Review Committee meetings on several occasions.

In each

[

p

,

.

e-4

>

'

.

..

.

-

-

.

.

instance the committee was properly staffed, adequately addressed the relevant issues, and demonstrated adequate concern for reactor safety. On-Site Review Committee meetings which addressed.the following subjects were observed:

~

>

(1) Service water radiation monitor inoperability.

(2) Revision'I to LER 254/87006, HPCI inoperability..

(3)

Failure of the 2C RHR service water pump to meot its

'

operability requirements.

A.,

(4) Unit ~2 automatic scram which occurred on April 6. 1989.

<(5) Unit'1 manual scram which occurred on April 12, 1989.

(6) Unit 1 turbine control valve spiking.

(7) Unit 1 steam leaks.

No violations or deviations were noted.

10. Management Meetings - Entrance and Exit Interviews (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 12, 1989, and sunmarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.

The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to dccuments or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.

e

L______________