IR 05000254/1988019
| ML20207J729 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1988 |
| From: | Ploski T, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207J727 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-88-19, 50-265-88-19, IEIN-87-058, IEIN-87-58, NUDOCS 8809280096 | |
| Download: ML20207J729 (23) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSJON
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REGION III
Reports No. 50-254/88019(ORSS); 50-265/88019(ORSS)
J Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 t
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 l
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i Chicago, IL 60690
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Facility Name:
Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
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t Inspection At:
Quad Cities Station, Cordova, Illinois
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Inspection Conducted:
August 30 through September 2, 1988 Inspectors:
T.
05Ki jdVaa I
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I H. N t fAs/dtB___.
Date l
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Approved Py:
Wil m
Chief JA4Ata
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Emergency Preparedness Section Date l
l Inspection Summary
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Inspection on August 30 through September 2. 1988 (Reports No. 50-254/8801S(ORSS);
No. 50-265/88019(DRS M
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Areas Inspected:
Rout'ne, announced inspection of the Quad Cities Station's i
annual exercise (IP 82301), involving seven NRC representatives.
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Results:
Corrective actions were adequately demonstrated for both Open Items
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from the 1987 exercise.
During the 1988 exercise, one Weakness and four Open
j Items were identified.
The Weakness was the failure to recognize conditions
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t warranting an Alert declaration.
The Open Items related to performance i
problems of Emergency Operations Facility staff with respect to:
failing to
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l involve appropriate TSC staff in a discussion with State officials on the j
j TSC's Protective Action Recommendation; acquiring field survey measurement t
data from the States' survey teams; recognizing the degraded performance of t
a plant system which affected the release's composition; and maintaining full l
awareness of protective actions being implemented by offsite officials.
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l DETAILS l
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Persons Contacted L
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NRC Observers and Area,s Observed
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R. Higgins, Control Room (CR)
i T. Ploski, CR, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support
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Center (OSC)
i A. Morrongiello, OSC, Inplant Teams M. Smith, TSC J. Jamison, Onsite Medical Drill, OSC, Inplant Teams W. Snell, Emergency Operations facility (EOF)
J. Strasma, Joint Public Infor. nation Center (JPIC)
b.
Licensee Representatives
- R. Bax, Station Manager
- R. Robey, Services Superintendent
- G. Spedl, Assistant Superintendent - Technical Services
"G. Tietz, Assistant Superintendent - Operations
- G. Price, Maintenance Supervisor
- D. Gibson, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- J. Struvy, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor
- J. Wethington, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- J. Kopacz, Technical Staff Supervisor
- J. Neal, Training Supervisor
- J. Golden, Supervisor of Emergency Planning
- M. DiPonzio, Emergency Pbnning Supervisor
- C. Brown, GSEP Coordinatot'
- P. Skiermont, GSEP Coordinato=
- K. Schmidt, GSEP Training Instructor
- T. Gilman, Emergency Planning S gervisor - Lead Controller
- J. McMillan, Lead Radiation Protection Foreman
- T. Houtenga, Shift Foreman
- D. Craddick, Master Electrician
- R. Venci, Health Physicist
- A. Scott, Quality Assurance Engineer
- D. Bucknell. Technical Stcff Engineer R. Haight, Lead CR Controller M. Roudts, CR Contro11er R. Carson, Lead TSC Controller K. Klotz, TSC Controller G. Spedi, TSC Evaluator L. Literski, Lead OSC Controller T. Markwalter. OSC Controller P. Vitalis, OSC Controller T. Lechton, EOF Controller K. Watson, EOF Controller M. Whitemore, EOF Controller M. Evans EOF Controller
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l G. O'Neill, EOF Evaluator M. LePage, Lead JPIC Controller R. Hajek, JPIC Controller
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- Indicates those who attended the September 1, 1988 exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 92701)
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(Closed) Open Item No. 50-254/A7012-01 and No. 50-265/87012-01:
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the 1987 exercise, several inplant teams were not dispatched from the
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Operational Support Center (OSC) in a timely manner and then did not j
proceed on their assigned missions in a timely manner.
As indicated in
Section Se of this Inspection Report, over 20 inplant teams were l
dispatched from the OSC during the exercise.
The inspectors did not i
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identify any instances where an inplant team was inappropriately delayed
from leaving the OSC after being briefed, or any cases where an inplant
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team did not promptly proceed on its assigned task once it had left the
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OSC.
This item is closed,
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(Closed) Open Item No. 50-254/87012-02 and No. 50-265/87012-02:
Ouring the 1987 exercise, Technical Support Center (T5C) and Emergency
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Operations Facility (EOF) staffs did not adequately interface when
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i demonstrating short-term recovery planning activities.
As indicated in i
Sections 5b and 5d of this report, TSC and EOF staffs independently i
conducted thorough recovery planning discussions.
Representatives from
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i both facilities then participated in a cenference call during which both i
facilities' lists of action items were compared and further refined.
This item is closed.
l (Opea) Open Item No. 50-254/87900-01 and No. 50-265/87900-01:
Followup
on NRC Information Notice No. 87-58.
At present, the Shift Engineer (SE)
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or Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE), both of whom are onshift at all
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times, would continually maintain communications with the NRC upon
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request by NRC Duty Officers.
However, the licensee still planned on
having an additional Engineering Assistant (EA) onshift at all times.
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addition to this individual's normal duties, the EA would be used to r
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assist the SE and SCRE in notifying offsite officials of emergency
i declarations, including maintaining communications with NRC personnel l
upon request.
The selection and training program for these EAs was still l
in progress.
This item remains open.
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(Closed) Open Item No. 50-254/88006-01:
The licensee should revise
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appropriate administrative procedures to ensure that the GSEP Coordinator
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is always included in the review chain for proposed EPIP changes.
Administrative Procedure QAP 1100-T1 was revised in July 1988 to indicate I
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that the GSEP Coordinator, as the onsite emergency technical expert, is
one of a number of mandatory reviewers of all proposed EPIP changes.
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This item is closed.
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3.
General (IP 82301)
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A daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan
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(GSEP) and Quad Cities Annex to the GSEP was conducted at the Quad Cities i
Station on August 31, 1J88.
The exercise tested the licensee's, States',
j and counties' capabilities to respond to an accident scenario which included a simulated, major radioactive release.
The attachments to this d
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report consist of the licensee's scope of participation and exercise
objestives, plus a scenario narrative summary and approximate timeline.
This was a full scale exercise for the State of Illinois, a partial scale
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exercise for the State of Iowa, and a full scale exercise for Rock Island l
and Whiteside Counties in Illinois and for Scott and Clinton Counties in j
Iowa.
4.
GeneralObservations(IP82301J
a.
Procedures I
This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E
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requirements using the GSEP, Quad Cities Annex, and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (te!Ps) of the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency organizations.
b.
Observers Licensee observers conitored and critiqued this exercise, as did seven NRC evaluators.
State and county responses were evaluated and critiqued by FEMA Regions V and VII for Illinois and Iowa, respectively.
FEMA Regions V and VII will issue separate reports documenting their findings.
Coordingig c.
The licensee's response was generally coordinated, orderly, and timely, if scenario events had been real, actions taken by the licensee's emergency organization would have been sufficient to allow State and local officials to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safety.
d.
Critique The licensee held prr.liminary critiques following the exercise.
The NRC critique was held on September 1, 1988.
A public critique was held in Port Byron, Illinois on September 2, 1988, at which time NRC and FEMA Regions V and VII evaluators summarized their preliminary findings regarding the licensee's and offsite support agencies'
exercise performances, respectively.
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5.
Specific Observations (IP 82301)
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a.
Control Room (CR)
After a reviev of relevant Technical Specifications and abnormal i
operating procedures, the Shift Engineer (SE) in charge of CR
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activities correctly declared an Unusual Event at 7:55 a.m. when he l
conservatively decided to simulate decreasinD Unit 2 power at a rate
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j of 75 MWe per tour.
The power reduction was ordered due to a crack
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in the core spray suction line to the torus, which was caused by the chain of a lifting rig snapping during core spray pump motor
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replacement.
A worker was supposedly injured, but not contaminated.
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The States of Illinois and Iowa,
and the NRC Operations Center, were adequately informed of the t
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Unusual Event declaration within the regulatory time limits.
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Between the time of the maintenance accident through 8:30 a.m.,
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CR personnel were kept adequately informed of the response to the
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simulated injury, the damage resulting frcm the cracked core spray l
l suction line, and the unsuccessful attempts to isolate the torus l
j leak. While the SE and Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE) did a
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good job in analyzing the affects of the torus leak on Unit 2 and
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l nearby Unit 1 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) components, they failed to properly evaluate this leak with respect to the
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l Station's Emergency Action Levels (EAls).
As a result, exercise r
controllers issued a contingency message at 8:15 a.m. directing the l
j SE to declare an Alert for Unit 2 due to the loss of primary
containment integrity when it was required.
The failure of CR
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l Weakness.
(50-265/88019-01)
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Shortly before the 8:15 a.m. contingency message had been issued, the future Station Director (50) and Operations Director arrived in (
the CR to be briefed on plant conditions.
Their presence did not i
inhibit the timely completion of initial notifications of State and
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NRC officials following the Unit 2 Alert declaration.
As these l
notifications were in progress, decisionmakers' attention refocused on the affects of the Unit 2 torus leak on nearby Unit 1 ECCS equipment.
The SE and 50 conservatively decided to commence a
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Unit 1 shutdown due to cegraded Unit 1 ECCS capability.
To better j
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ensure that State and NRC officials were adequately informed that t
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both Units were now being shut'Jewn due to the Unit 2 torus leak, an i
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Alert was declared for Unit 1 at 8:40 a.ta.
There was some later
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confusion regarding this second Alert declaration, as it became
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known that the same EAL that was earlier used to classify an Unusual
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Event on Unit 2 was now associated with 8:40 a.m. Ale.t declaration l
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for Unit 1.
However, the second Alert declaration was appropriate
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i per procedural guidance, as CR decisionmakers sought to better I
ensure that offsite officials would not mistakenly conclude that the Unit 1 Alert was being downgraded to an Unusual Event.
Initial
offsite notifications for the Unit 1 Alert declaration were i
corrpleted in a timely manner, i
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Illinois and Iowa officials were initially notified of all three emergency declarations over the dedicated Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS).
The current NARS message form, which has been developed in coordination with State officials, does not include a methodology for informing offsite officials of the relevant EAL.
Nevertheless, offsite officials asked the CR communicator for the code number of the relevant EAL following each of the three emergency declarations.
As evident from the apparent confusion following the second Alert declaration, the NARS form and/or guidance for completing the form is not sufficient for the rare situation at a two-unit site where one EAL or emergency class is correct for one unit, at the same time that a different EAL or emergency class is relevant for the other unit.
After the first Alert declaration at about 8:15 a.m., the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC) were activated by the onsite emergency organization in accordance with procedures.
Additional communicators promptly arrived in the CR and had established dedicated communications lines with both facilities by 8:35 a.m.
However, in the haste to formulate and transmit an onsite Public Address (PA) system message to activate both facilities, the broadcasted message only referred to the TSC.
However, emergency responders correctly began activating both facilities since the message indicated that an Alert had been declared.
As the exercise progressed, a non-licensed operater was effectively utilized in the CR to periodically compile Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) data and report these data to TSC and OSC staffs. When assembly of all onsite personnel was ordered after the Site Area Emergency declaration, an individual who was told to sound the assembly siren exhibited uncertainty before correctly choosing to activate the plant evacuation alarm in lieu of the plant fire alarm.
LFter, there was brief confusion in the CR regarding which EAL had been selected by the TSC's 50 for the General Emergency declaration.
In addition to the Exercise Weakness, the following items should be considered for improvement:
The NARS form should be revised to include provisions for
describing plant conditions associated with an emergency declaration, and to more clearly address those rare situations where one EAL or emergency class may be applicable for one unit while a dif ferent EAL or emergency class is applicable to the second unit at a multi-unit plant site.
The appropriate procedure should be revised to include a
pre-formatted PA announcement to ensure that the TSC and OSC are activated following any Alert or higher emergency declaration,
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Technical Support Center (TSC)
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Following an initial briefing in the CR and a final telephone
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conversation with the SE, the 50 took command and control of onsite l
emergency response activities from his TSC workstation roughly 34 minutes after the first Alert declaration.
By this timo the j
TSC had been fully staffed with pe*sonnel who assumed tteir j
responsibilities in an efficient manner.
They demonstrated adequate
familiarity with their recently upgraded procedures and thorough
knowledge of their responsibilities during this exercise.
Status boards were effectively used throughout the exercise to display various types of information and to trend plant parameters f
relevant to the scenario.
The 50 and his technical directors
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frequently caucused to establish task priorities and to share ideas I
and recently acquired information.
TSC and OSC staffs were kept j
adequately informed of the results of these discussions and other
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scenario events by PA announcements made by the SD and his l
directors, j
i At 9:18 a.m. and at 10:21 a.m., the 50 correctly classified l
j degrading plant conditions as a Site Area Emergency and a General
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i Emergency, respectively.
The 50 approved initial notification i
l message forms prior to message transmittal by a dedicated l
l communicator to Illinois and Iowa officials using the Nuclear i
Accident Reporting System (NARS).
Notifications of NRC officials
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were simulated by having another comunicator telephone a response l
cell of exercise controllers at a remote location.
Initial
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notifications of State and simulated NRC officials were accurately (
completed within the regulatory time limits following both
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j reclassificaticns.
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The Protective Action Recomendation (PAR) associated with the
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j General Emergency declaration was formulated in accordance with (
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A key factor in this PAR was the continued loss of primary l
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containment integrity.
After issuing this PAR, TSC decisionmakers
were unsuccessful in their repeated attempts to contact State
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officials to better eisure that the rationale for their recomendation
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was understood, and to ascertain what protective actions the States i
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Meanwhile, State officials had established l
contact with Protective Measures staff in tha Emergency Operations
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Facility (EOF) to discuss the TSC's PAR.
However EOF personnel had (
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response efforts and did not fully understand the TSC's rationale
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the PAR discussion with the States. EOF staff misread procedural j
guidance end agreed wiQ the State of Illinois recomendation that the PAR be changed.
However, upon learning that Iowa officials had already accepted and begun implementing the TSC's PAR, the State of Illinois and EOF both agreed to leave the recomendation as issued.
The EOF latwr agreed with the TSC's PAR when shown their error in l
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misreading the procedure.
The failure to involve personnel, who i
correctly understood the rationale behind the PAR, in discussions
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with State officials on this recommendation is an Open Item.
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(50-265/88019-02)
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Assembly of all onsite personnel was ordered after the Site
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Area Emergency declaration.
Accountability was achieved
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I within 30 minutes of the sounding of the assembly siren.
The order l
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to simulate the evacuation of nonessential onsite personnel was r
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J 9:45 a.m.
A number of factors contributed to this delay, which was
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fortunate in that the simulated evacuation began minutes after a
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i squall line had passed over the Station and after the first t
j unconfirmed report of elevated release rates was received in the TSC.
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Pending confirmation of the release, the 50 conservatively ordered a i
change in the site evacuation route to avoid the possibility of i
evacuees encountering a plume.
Brief delays also occurred while
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TSC staff responded to a loss of offsite power and finalized
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additional manpower needs from assembled personnel awaiting i
l evacuation.
These few delays resulted in nonessential personnel a
remaining sheltered onsite until the squall line had passed.
The
d revised evacuation route was appropriate.
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Once the Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO) had assumed command and control from the EOF, TSC staff remained well informed of:
revised offsite PARS; the activities of the Station's field survey (
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J teams under EOF staff's direction; and other decisions emanating
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TSC staff kept adequate logs of their activities and l
kept their EOF counterparts adequately informed of onsite emergency j
response activities, j
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Following a 48-hour time jump in the scenario, the 50 led his key
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aides in several lengthy discussions to determine whether they could J
recommend to the MEO that the onsite situation could be reclassified as being in Recovery mode, and to compile a l
comprehensive list of onsite recovery action items.
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j recommendation and action item list were adequately discussed with
key EOF staff prior to exercise termination, k
I Based on the above findings, one Open Item was identified.
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Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams The scenario began with an onsite medical drill.
A technician i
involved in replacing a cure spray pump motor was supposedly injured
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when the chain on the lifting rig snapped and struck him.
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maintenance task also involved opening of a pathway to the secondary i
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contatament structure by the removal of several plugs, which were sis.ulated by wooden mockups for this exercise.
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The accident location and victim's condition were accurately reported to the CR.
A correct decision was made to request an
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ambulance.
This call was simulated, while plant security was
notified that, had the accident been real, an ambulance would soon
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be arriving.
While the victim's medical and contami-'ation status l
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were being evaluated, with frequent updates reported to the CR, j
other emergency responders began work to restore secondary
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containment integrity by moving the wooden mockups with a chain and hoist.
This task was accomplished at about 8:20 a.m. and was i
reported to the CR.
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j First aid treatment and handling of the victim was appropriate and j
timely.
Concern over possible radiological contamination did not unduly slow the medical treatment and transport of the victim to an onsite location where the ambulance would have gone.
Lacking a t
cervical collar, the first aid team did a good job of stabilizing I
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the victim's head and neck during transport.
The team demonstrated l
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proper techniques for minimizing the potential spread of j
contamination.
The victim and the backboard used to transport him
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j were determined not to be contaminated by the time he was carried
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from the accident scene, roughly 20 minutes after the simulated
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j accident took place.
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The OSC became fully operational within about 30 minutes after the
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Alert declaration.
The OSC Director. OSC Supervisor, and their
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administrative support staff successfully met the challenges of
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briefing, equipping, tracking, and debriefing over two dozen teams I
j that they dispatched in a timely manner during the exercise.
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Inplant teams were adequately briefed on their assignments, optimum
routes to and from the job site, known enroute and job t,ite radiological conditions, exposure limits, and estimated times to complete their assignments.
Briefings incorporated relevant ARM and j
h radiological survey information.
Teams wore protective clothing
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articles and were issued adequate dosimetry in accordance with l
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Radiation Work Permits.
Briefings and debriefings were documented on proceduralized forms.
Simulated exposures for individual team
l members were adequately tracked and documented on standard forms.
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Teams were given hand-held radios and were instructed to report their progress to the OSC, particularly if their task would take longer than had been estimated.
Inplant teams demonstrated good understandings of their assignments and proper techniques for i
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minimizing their simulated exposures and spread of contamination, Late in the exercise, one team used a torch to cut a section of pipe t
i placed oti the roof of the 1/2 diesel generator building as a mockup (
of the diesel's supposedly damaged exhaust line.
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f OSC status boards were ef fectively used to track which persons had beeri assigned to what inplant teams, and also which persons having
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specific types of expertise were still available in the OSC for
j future assignment.
Another status board was used to list a f
chronology of scenario events to suppiement frequent PA
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announcements from the TSC which were clearly audible in the OSC.
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communicator was used to maintain a dedicated line to CR personnel to keep them informed of inplant team assignments and other information.
Collection and analysis of a reactor coolant sample and a containmer.t air sample were adequately demonstrated.
The team demonstrated good familiarity with sampli collection procedu'*es and equipment, and proper concere for minimizing their exposures and for contamination control.
The t a wore appropriate protective clothing articles and self-con ined breathing apparatus.
Counting of the liquid sample in the TSC's lab was done with the counter's lid open because the sample bottle was too tall.
Had sample activity been very low or simulated background radiation levels higher, the sample count could have been invalid.
The technician who operated the counting equipment demonstrated proper concern for minimizing his simulated radiation exposure.
Although he used tongs when handling the samples and other potentially
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contaminated materials, he did not also wear gloves.
Based on the above findings, tnis portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for
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improvement:
Liquid sample collection bottles should be of an appropriate e
size to permit clos'.ng of the counter's lid during counting operations.
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Personnel working in the TSC's sample ccanting labs should wear
gloves to further reduce the potential for spreading contamination.
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Emergency Operations facility (EOF)
Adequate access control was quickly established at the E0F.
Arriving emergency responders were granted access without undua l
delays before proceeding to begin assuming their responsibilities in l
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a coordinated and efficient manner.
The Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO) verified that he had the required staff before
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informing the TSC's 50 that he was ready to anume overall command and control of the licensee's response efforts.
The transfer of
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command was prudently delayed while TSC completed activities associated with the 50's General Emergency declaration at 10:21 a.m.
The transfer of command was then announced in the TSC and EOF at
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10:40 a.m.
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EOF engineering staff adequately monitorea and evaluated changing onsite conditions.
Status boards were effectively used to trecd critical plant parameters and to display other information relesant to the scenario.
The MEO and his key aides also gave verbal briefings
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to EOF sta'f to supplement status board information.
However, while a status board was promptly updated to indicate the General Emergency i
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declaration, a verbal announcement of thfs important decision did not occur until about 20 minutes after the declaration had been made.
Representatives of the W tes of Illinois and Iowa were present in the EOF, had easy access to statt, board information, and could hear PA announcements.
Emergency classifier + ion and PAR information was available over the NARS.
However, transfer of sufficiently detailed, hardcopy plant parameter data to the Iowa Emergency Operations Center (EOC) vis slow to get initiated.
When informed of the State's need for adoittonal data, a.i EOF staff member identified himtelf as the appropriate contact for providing these dsta to the EOC.
Facsimile machine transmittal of the requested typ n of plant 6ata began about 45 minutes after the Stata liaison first made the EOC's informatten needs known.
Subsequent data transmittals were accomplished in a routine and timely ma,inor.
TSC staff activated, briefed, and dispatet.ed two offsite survey teams shortly after the Alert declaration. Given current wind direction conditions, both teams were initfally sent. to Iow?.
Prior l
to a 10:00 a.m. squali line passage and resulting loss of offsite
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power and Unit 2 SCRAM, Unit 2 release ratas remained within
l Technical Specification limits.
Thus,.nilhtr team encountered I
G normal radiation levels as they drove along lowa roadways between fixed survey points prior to 10:00 a.m.
The scenario postulated that the Unit 2 SCRAri also resultea in sufficient pipe movement to burst a pene: ration seal in the core spray system's room, which in turn caused this flooded roon and the Unit 2 torus to rapidly drain.
Unit 2 fue) Jamage then significantly increased, and the Reactor Building's Standby Gas Treatment System's (SGBTS) filtering efficiency also became degraded.
Thus, between about 10:15 a 'a. and 11:30 a.m.,
radioactive release rates were well above nurmal, and included a higher percentage of radiciodines than c uld nnrmally he anticipated.
While plant systems became degraded and monitored re* w r ates increased dramatically, the wind direction grad.ually 'M ftus from southerly to southwesterly.
The TSC's environs staff ( 4.d p monitored these shifting wind direction cond'tlons fo1 N.irig the squall line's passage and ordere.1 one, and later both of the Station's field survey teams from Iowa into Illinois.
However, both teams generally remained five to ten miles frois the Station in Illinois and did not locate the plume prior to the orderly transfer of control of the teams to the E0F's environs s(6ff at 10:55 a.m.
The licensee's field teams finally confirme; the presence of the plume arouno noon, b,* which time release rav 3 hed significantly decreased.
By now, the licensee's teams br/ oegun their searches closer to the Station.
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The States of Iowa and Illinois also had survey teams within the Emergency Planning Zone during the release.
However, the capability of the licensee and States to share reports from their teams in a timely manner was not adequately demonstrated during this exercise.
On at least one occasion, the licensee's protective measures staff were first informed of some measurements taken several hours earlier by State teams when a public information staff member heard these data being discussed by the State spokesporson during a media briefing in the adjacent Joint Public Information Center (JPIC).
The licensee's inability to acquire and evaluate measurements made by the States'
field survey teams in a routine, timely manner is an Open Item.
(50-265/88019-03)
Even when reports of abnormally high radioiodine measurements became available to the E0F's protective measures staff, there was an apparent reluctance to believe these data, based on the false assumption that the SBGTS was operating at its typically very high filtering efficiency.
The insufficient interfacing between protective measures and engineering staffs regarding the performance of plant systems which adversely affected the radioactive release's composition is an Open Item.
(50-205/88019-04)
The TSC's initial PAR was to evacuate within a two mile radius of the Station, and to shelter within downwind sectors from two to ten miles.
The "seek shelter" portion of this recommendation was revised by EOF staff to to "evacuate" at about 11:25 a.m.
Protective measures staff did a good job in monitoring current and forecast wind direction shifts so that additional downwind sectors between two and ten miles of the plant were appropriately added to the
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evacuation recommendation.
The HE0 approved all PAR revisions issued from the EOF, which were transmitted over the NARS in a timely manner.
However, until corrected by an Illinois representative in the EOF, some rnbers of '5e E0F's protective measures staff
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mistakenly assume that the state of Illinois had previously implemented sheltering in downwind sectors adjacent to those being evacuated.
State officials did not implement this optional recommendation in this exercise.
However, the licensee's i
l misconception on which areas had previously been sheltered did not adversely impact subsequent PAR formulation by EOF staff.
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Nevertheless, the failure of E0F staff to maintain an adequate awareness of the status of all protective actions being implemented by offsite officials is an Open Item.
(50-265/88019-05)
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Following a 48-hour time jump in the scenario, EOF staff compiled a number of onsite and offsite recovery action items.
The HE0 correctly
decided to reclassify the situation es being in Recovery per emergency plan criteria.
EOF and TSC key staff then compared their action item lists and refined them during a conference call.
In addition to the three Open Items, the following items should be
considered for improvement:
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Emergency reclassification decisions should be promptly
announced within emergency response facilities.
The licensee should clarify the plant technical information
needs of Iowa E0F staff, and should ensure that provisions are in place for the routine and timely transmittal of such
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information.
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Joint Public Information Center (EOF)
The new JPIC, located in the same building as the E0F, is well laid out and represents a substantial upgrade over the previously used JPIC workspace, which was a portion of a nearby garage. The building has separate entrances for emergency personnel and the
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media.
The news briefing area is weli r,1gned with a stage and
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podium for the spokespersons, seating.or about 100 media
representatives, and raised positions and electrical outlets at the rear of-the room for camera equipment.
Workspace for licensee and State spokespersons and their staffs was adequate, but would likely become congested if also utilized by Federal agencies' public information representatives.
Additional workspace for licensee and NRC pablic information staffs is also availabir in the EOF position
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of the building.
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Prior to JPIC activation following the Site Area Emergency
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declaration at 9:18 a.m., media inquiries were routed to public affairs staff at the licensee's corporate offices.
However, this l
staff issued no press releases and indicated that no new information
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was available between about 9:30 a.m. and 10:20 a.m.
They assured an NRC evaluator that JPIC staff would issue a news announcement at about 10:45 a.m.
However, the first news briefing at the JPIC did not begin until 11:10 a.m., roughly 50 minutes after the General Emergency declaration.
News media roleplayers began arriving at the
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JPIC at 10:25 a.m.
Whi'ie adequate press kits containing background i
information were made available, no new information on scenario
events was provided until the 11:10 a.m. briefing.
In addition to the 11:10 a.m. briefing, licensee, Illinois, and Iowa j
spokespersons conducted press briefings at about 12:30 p.m. and I
3:00 p.m.
Another licensee representative also conducted a background information briefing following the initial press briefing.
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Licensee spokespersons did a good job of coordinating their presentations with Statn counterparts prior to each press briefing.
Licensee spokespersons kept well informed of changing scenario events, were responsive to the media's questions, and made good efforts to respond in layman's terms versus technical jargon.
The licensee's
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briefings were based, to a large extent, on the written news
{
anncuncements made available to the media shortly before each i
briefing.
These hardcopy announcements had been approved by
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i appropriate EOF staff.
However, information flow to the media was
not always timely.
For example, a 48-hour time jump in the scenario
j took place at 1:45 p.m.
However, the subsequent press briefing began
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On several occasions in between briefings, no member of the licensee's public information staff was available in the briefing area to respond to media inquiries.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
,
Public information staff in the licensee's corporate offices
should have updated information available for the media during the time period while JPIC staff are preparing to assume their responsibilities.
JPIC and EOF staffs should make additional efforts to provide
updated information to the media in a more timely manner, A qualified licensee representative should remain available in
,
the media briefing area at all times.
6.
Exercise Scenario and Controller Actions (IP 82301)
The exercise objectives and the scenario package were submitted in
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accordance with the established schedule.
The objectives addressed the concerns identified during the 1987 exercise.
The licensee was
responsive to the staff's technical questions on the scenario.
No examples of improper controller actions were identified.
The chief controller's decision to issue the 8:15 a.m. contingency message for an Alert declaration was appropriate, as it appeared unlikely that CR personnel would soon make that declaration.
The lack of simulation involving inplant teams was noteworthy.
Team members donned protective clothing and were issued dosimetry in accordance with Radiation Work Permit instructions developed by participants during the exercise.
Reactor coolant and containment air samples were not only l
collected, but they were also analyzed to some extent.
Mockups of plugs I
covering a pathway between the Turbine Building and Secondary Containment, and a mockup of a diesel generator exhaust line were positioned near the actual locations of these items to provide additional realism for inplant teams who had to perform work on these items.
Three licensee personnel also roleplayed NRC Site Team representatives to provide E0F staff with another interface problem, as the roleplayers attempted to gather information.
The licensee has completed a significant upgrade to the Station's Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, a task begun in January 1988 in response to a number of NRC and self-identified concerns.
The onsite emergency organization demonstrated good familiarity with these upgraded procedures during this exercise.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
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7.
Exit Interview (IP 307038)
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On September 1, 1988, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives identified in Section 1 to present the preliminary inspection findings.
The licensee agreed to consider the itehls discussed and indicated that none were proprietary in nature.
Attachments:
1.
Licensee's Scope of Participation j
2.
Licensee's Exercise i
Objectives 3.
Scenario Narrative
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Summary and Timeline
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QUAD CITIES NUCIZAR POWER STATION
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CSEP EXERCISE August 31, 1988 S_ COPE OF PARTICIPATION The August 31, 1988 Quad Cities CSEP Exercise is c daytime event to test the capability of the basic elements within the Commonwealth Edison Company GSEP. The Exercise vill include mobilization of CECO personnel and resources adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergency.
The Exercise is an integrated event and involvement will be required by State and local agencies in both Iowa and Illinois.
Commonwealth Edison vill participate in t',e Quad Cities Exercise by activating the on-site emergency response or;aniration, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Joint Public Ir. formation Center (JPIC) as appropriate, subject to limitations that may beuome necessary to provide for safe, efficient operation of the Quad Citien Station and other nuclear generating stations.
The Quad Cities Relocation Center and the Corporate Command Center vill not be activated for this *aercise.
Personnel for the TSC and other on~ site participants will be on-site at Quad Cities by 0730, the start of the Fr.ercise. Tha Exercise shift vill receite the initial scenario information and respond accordingly.
The "Exercise" Nuclea-Duty Person will be notified of simulated events as appropriate on a real-time basis.
The "Exercise" Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the recovery grot:p will be prepositioned close to the Morrison EOF to permit use of personnel from distant locations.
Comonwealth Edison vill demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but will not actually incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for she Exercise.
Commonwealth Edison vill arrange to provide actus1 transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent spec.ifically prearranged for the Exercise.
Commonwealth Edison vill provide unforeseen actual assistance only to the extent that the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Company.
0026Q/1/vjm QUAD CITIES GSEP 8-31-8f l
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Revision 2
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OUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATLQ3 1988 GSEP BKKRGISJ August 31, 1988 OBJJ GILVES
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PRIMARY _qMEfeTIVES:
Demonstrate the capability to implement the Comunonwealth Edison Generating Stations Emergency Plan to protect the public in the event of a major accident at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
Demonstrate this capability during the daytime hours to qualify as a daytime Exercise in accordance with NRC guidance.
SUPPORTING OILIECTIVES:
1)
Incident Asses 8tLALand Classification a.
Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident conditions, to determine which Emergency Action Level (EAL)
has been reached, and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with CSEP procedures.
.I 2)
Notification and Communication a.
Demonstrate the capability to notify the principal offsite organizations within fifteen (15) ainutes of declaring an accident claasification.
b.
Demonstrate the capability to notify the NRC as soon as practical but within one (1) hour of the initial incident.
- (CE)
c.
Demonstrate the capability to contact pertinent organizations that would normally assist in an emergenc;',
but are not participating in this Exercise (e.g.,
Murray & Trettle, General Electric, etc.)
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d.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely j
information so that reports may be made to the Emergency l
News Center for Press releases.
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Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up information/ updates to the State and NRC in a timely and
ongoing manner.
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0001Q/1/vju QUAD CITIES GSEP 8-88
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May 2, 1988
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1988 OUAD CITIES GSEP EXERCISE DAT17hYE11 (cont'd)
f.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain un open-line of coassunication with the NE upon request.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate information to other in-plant facilites in a timely and efficient manner.
3)
RadioloaicaLAssessment a.
Demorstrate the capability to conduct in-plant radiation protection activities relative to the specific Exercise Scenario situations.
- (OSC)
b.
Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to implement proper contamination control provisions.
- (OSC)
c.
Demonstrate the capabil.\\ty of the Operations Support Center to implement proper Health Physics practices includispa exposure pre-planning and dosimetry issuance for OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched from the OSC.
- (050)
d.
Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to track and document personnel exposures for OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched from the OSC.
- (OSC)
e.
Demonstrate the ability to calculate Offsite Dose Projections.
f.
Demonstrate the ability to elke Protective Action Recommendations.
g.
Demonstrate the capability of Field Teams to conduct field radiation surveys.
h.
Demonstrate the capability to collect and analyze samples utilizing the PASS System in accordance with procedures and proper contamination control techniques and utilizing necessary equipeent and communication methods under adverse conditions.
- (OSC)
1.
Demonstret-the carability to handle a medically injured and radioactively contaminated victim.
(Station participation only - no transport to hospital.)
- (OSC)
Page 2 of 4 0001Q/2/vjm QUAD CITIES CSEP 8-88
Revision 2
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M*y 2, 1988
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1988 OUAD CITIES CSEP_ EXERCISE OBJECTIVES:
3)
Radiolonical Asgssment: (cont'd)
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Demonstrate the capability to dispatch OSC Teams in a timely (as event dictates) manner.
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k.
Demonstrate the ability of Maintenance Teams to provide a briefing on job status during turnover of an incomplete job.
- (OSC)
4)
EmerAencY Facilities:
a.
Demonstrate the capability to achieve the emergency organizatien and staf f the Emergency Response Facilities in -
accordance with procedures during the daytime.
b.
Demonstrate the capability to record and track major plant status and protective action recosamendation information relative to changing plant exercise events using status boards.
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c.
Demonstrate the capability to track and document, on status board'J and logs, dispatched Operations and Maintenance Team activities and in-plant job statuses.
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5)
EacIgency Direction _ and Control a.
Demonstrate the ab)11ty of the CSEP organization to manage and direct a simulated emergency Exercise.
b.
Demonstrate the ability of the Directors to manage their e:nergency response facilities in the implementation of CSEP.
c.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate and prioritize Maintenance and Operating activities during abnormal and emergency plant operation.
d.
Demonstrate the capability to assemble and account for on-site personnel.
Page 3 of 4 0001Q/3/wja QUAD CITIES CS67 8-88
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_1988 OUAD CITIES GSEP EXERfdj]
OBJECTIVES:
6)
Of fsite Aaency Coordination a.
Demonstrate the capability of CECO to coordinate the direction of the emergency response and exchange information with the State, offsite station emergency response personnel and local consnand centers (as applicable) via CECO liaison personnel, consuunicators and station personnel.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to discuss protective action recosseendations with the State agencies.
- (EOF)
7)
Public Information Demonstrate the ability of the JPIC Coordinator or designee a.
to mar. the JPIC at all times and respond to press requests.
- (JPIC)
b.
Demonstrate the ability of CECO to eLordinate and exchs -
event information for press conferences with the Jcape agencies.
- (JPIC)
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c.
Demonstrate the ability to prepare timely (within 90 minutes of occurrance)
accurate press releases or conferences during site and general emergency phases.
- (JPIC)
d.
Demonstrate the ability to utilize visual aids and other resources to support the briefing information.
- (JPIC).
8)
Sh2rt Ranae Plannina a.
Demonstrate the capability to identify the resources and requirements necessary to stabilize the plant and enter a recovery phase.
Page 4 of 4 0001Q/4/wja QUAD CITIES CS3P 8-88
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QUAD CITIES 1988 CSEP EXERCISE
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AUGUST 31, 1988 HARRATIVE SUMMARY INITIAL CONDITIONS (0730 - 0745)
Prior to the start of the exercise, the following conditions exist. Both units are operating at close to full power, 800 Mwe. Unit One (U-1) is operating normally with no apparent problems. Unit Two (U-2) has been operating with some known fuel damage.
1-131 Levels on the RCS samples for the gast four days have shown elevated values up to 2.5 uCi/cc I-131.
Due to ALARA considerations because of elevated contact dose and volume of normal RCS samples, dilute samples from the HRSS are being pulled. The station has received a letter from GE suggesting ramp down rates not to exceed 75 Mwe/hr so as not to increase the already identified core damage. The station has been monitoring the U-2 RCS by use of 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> surveillances, the last having been pulled at 0500. Analysis of this sample is not yet available. The U-2B Core Spray pump burned out three days ago.nd the old rotor is in the process of being removed at this time.
The unit is 2 days into the 7 day clock for the Core Spray pump being out of service and 30 minutes into the 90 minute clock for the break in secondary containment to remove the old rotor.
ALERT (0745 - 0915)
While raising the old Core Spray pump rotor, the chain on the lif ting rig snaps. The loose chain strikes a nearby worker, injuring him to the point that an ambulance will be necessary.
The man's injuries will prevent a thorough contamination survey to be done so he will be considered to be contaminated until arrival at the hospital (transportation from the station will be simulated). The falling pump rotor strikes the Core Spray suction line cracking it at the isolation valve. The room rapidly fills with water drained from the U-2 Torus until an equilibrium is reached and the draining slows to indicate leakage from the room. About two feet will have been lost from the U-2 Torus. Antleipated Station actions at this time should include activation of the TSC/OSC, response to the injured man, replacement of the hatch to restore secondary containment and an accelerated shutdown of U-2 following the GE recommended ramp down rate.
SITE / AREA (0915 - 1015)
Containment Rad levels will rapidly increase due to the accelerated shutdown being performed. A level of 400 R/hr will be achieved at 0915 causing the site-area declaration to be declared based on EAL 16.
At 1000 a rapidly moving storm front moves in causing high winds to be generated.
Damage from this includes loss of transformer 22 and all offsite power to the unit.
Debris is blown onto the % Diesel Generator exhaust and it cannnot auto-start.
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AUGUST 31, 1988 NARRATIVE SUMMARY (COPrr'D)
E1IE/.Ak.
CONT'D (0915 - 1015)
At this point, the EOF should begin activating and Assembly / Accountability should be initiated. A PASS sample should be requested. The environment in the HRSS building will be adverse due to some line leakage causing airborne problems. Protective clothing and respirators and/or supplied air will netd to be used.
G_EERRhla (1015 - 1345)
Containment Rad levels exceed 2000 R/hr shortly after the unit scram which occurs with the loss of offsite power. This causes the declaration of General Emergency based on EAL 16. The scram causes enough pipe movement in the plant to burs 7 the penetration seal in the Core Spray room and rapidly drain both the Core Spray room and the U-2 Torus. Approximately 60 minutes later, levels climb to 12000 R/hr. The computer use of ED-24 will be unavailable due to the infiltration of the program by an unauthorized person who has changed access codes. This will cause the use of Table 6.3-1 to make protective action recommendations and cause a recommendation of (E),(E), E).
Due to the loss of offsite power, the plant will also lose HRSS and SPING because these systems are not on ESS busses and will have to be picked up to be operational. The SPING and computer can be returned anytime after our evacuation recommendation is made. Stand-by Gas Treatment System filters will degrade which will result in a release of Iodine to the environment.
Field samples will indicate projected doses cf SR at 5 miles. The State of Illinois monitor will detect Iodine effluen* re* ease from the stack.
An additional maintenance problem will occur after the unit 2 diesel has been running for 90 minutes. A low level alarm will come up on the diesel's daytank because the transfer pump is burned out.
REC 0 VERI (1345 - 1515)
A 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> time jump will occur to enable various facilities to utilize their recovery planning.
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OUA0 C1f!ES STATICN 1989 GSEP EXERCISE TIME L:%E
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GRDUND ALERT EMERGENCY EMERGENCY RECOVERY 8et ES (90 MINS.)
(60 MINS.)
(210 MINS.)
(90 MINS.)
. -30 f0 7 - 15 T = 105 i = 165 T = 375 i = 465 (0700)
(0730)
(0745)
(0915)
(1015)
(1345)
(1515)
EAL *10.8. 3.e EAL *16.a EAL #16.a.
TERMINATED SUMMARY OF EVENTS PRICR TO T = -30 GROUNO RULES O!SCUSSED T = -30 UNIT 1 AND 2 ARE AT FULL POWER. UNIT 2 MAS HIGH LEVEL I-131.
(07C0)
SBGT IS RUNNING.
CORE SPRAY PUMP 28 MOTOR IS ut!NG LIFTED FOR REPAIRS.
GE LETTER MAS LIMITED RAMP RATES DUE TO SMALL AMOUNTS OF CORE CAMAGE.
RCS ACTIVITY SAMPLES BEING DONE AT 4 HOUR INTERVALS.
T = 15 CS ROTOR FALLS CAUSING CS SUCTICN LINE IN CS ROCM TO BREAX.
(0745)
$!GMAL MAN IS INJURED WHEN PUMP FALLS.
T='
ACCELERATED SHUTDOWN IS STARTED DUE TO LOSS OF PRIMARY (CBC; CCNTAINMENT.
SOME PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE OCCURS.
CONTAINMENT RA0!ATION STARTS TO INCREASE.
T = '05 CONTAINMENT RA0!ATION LEVELS RISE TO 400 R/HR.
(0915)
SMALL DESIGN BASE NOBLE GAS LEAKAGE BEGINS.
T = 135 HR$$ SAMPLES ARE PULLEO.
(0445)
T = 150 THUNDERSTORMS WITH LOCALIZE 0 HIGH WINOS HIT THE STATION.
(10C0)
TRANSFORMER 22 !$ LOST 00E TO LINES DOWN.
UNIT SCRAMS. SWITCHOVER FAILS.
ExMAUST OF X OG IS CRIMPED BY WINOS PREVENTING START CF THE OG.
PENETRAf!0N SEAL FAILS & CS ROCH AND TORUS STARTS TO CRAIN.
T = 163 CONTAINMENT RA0!Af!ON REACHES 2000 R/HR.
(1015)
T
CONTAINMENT RA0!ATION REACHES 12,000 R/HR.
)
CS ROCM AND TORUS !$ ORAINEO. REACTOR BUILo*NG RA01ATICN
$ TARTS TO INCREASE ORtMATICALLY. NOBLE GAS RELEASE STARTS.
T
100!NE RELEASE OFFSITE BEGINS THROUGH $9GT WITH OEGRA:10 FILTERS.
(1)*5)
STATE OF ILLINOIS STACK EFFLUENT MCN! TORS BEGIN TO DETECT 100!NE.
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T = 240 LOW LEVEL ALARM 15 RECE!VE0 ON U-2 OG DAYTANK.
(1130)
T = 37$
T!ME JUMP FOR RECOVERY CETERMINATION.
(1345)
T = 465 EXE#CISE TERMINATES.
(1515)
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