IR 05000254/1987019

Insp Repts 50-254/87-19 & 50-265/87-19 on 870802-1003. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Surveillance,Ler Review,Routine Repts,Training,Radiation Control,Outages & Administrative Controls Affecting Quality

ML20235W999
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/15/1987
From:	Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235W986	List: IR 05000254/1987019 ML20235W983 ML20235W991
References
50-254-87-19, 50-265-87-19, NUDOCS 8710190160
Download: ML20235W999 (15)

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V U.S. NUCLEAR' REGULATORY: COMMISSION l REGION III

Reports /No.f50-254/87019(DRP);50-265/87019(DRP)

Docket Nos.l50-254, 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30-Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company-

' Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL- 60690 Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and Inspection At: -Quad Cities Site, Cordova,.IL Inspection Conducted: ' August 2'through October 3, 1987 Inspectors: R. L'. Higgins A.'D. Morrongiello

. Approved By:' M. A. Ring, Chie M /d $7g7 Projects Section 1C Date '

' Inspection Summary-Inspection on August-2, 1987 through October 3, 1987 (Reports N /87019(DRP); 50-265/87019(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced-resident inspection of Operations- ,

Maintenance Surveillance, LER Review, Routine Reports, Training, Administrative Controls Affecting Quality, Radiation Control, and Outage Results: In the areas inspected, three violations (failure to prepare and comply.with approved procedures when operating the reactor - paragraph 3(b)(1)',

failure to comply with approved procedures when performing a surveillance on the reactor - paragraph 3(b)(k), and failure to properly distribute procedure changes - paragraph 9) were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000254 G PDR w__-_________-__

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DETAILS Personnel Contacted

- *R. Sax, Plant Manager .

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• T. Tamlyn, Production Superintendent

• R. Robey, Services Superintendent

• M. Kooi.. Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• D.=Gibson, Quality Assurance Manager

• Denotes.tho.. jresent at.the exit interview on.0ctober 7,198 The inspectors.also contacted and interviewed other licensee and

_ contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio . ' Actions on Previous Items

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-(a) -(Closed) Open. Item 254/86014-01: Potential for Breach'of Secondary Containmen A logic problem' existed.in one of the reactor building access doors which made it possible under certain conditions to breach secondary containment. A modification has been_ initiated which will prevent-such an event from occurring. This item is considered close (b) (Closed)OpenItem 254/85015-01; 265/85017-01: Radiological Controls for Access to TSC were Inadequat A concern was raised that no Rad / Chem personnel were available to ensure that personnel entering the TSC properly monitored themselves upon entering the-TSC or to provide assistance in the event the personnel entering were contaminate The licensee has corrected this problem and now has a Rad / Chem person to ensure that personnel' entering the TSC frisk properly and to assist contaminated people if necessary. This item is considered close (c) (0 pen) Open Item 254/85009-03; 265/85010-03: Suction pressure gauges are not installed on the RHR SW Pumps so that inservice test data can be obtaine These gauges _have been installed on Unit 2 and will be installed on Unit I during the Fall 1987 Refueling Outage. This item remains open pending NRC inspection of Quad Cities' second ten year inservice test progra (d) (0 pen) Violation 254/85027-09; 265/85030-09: Fire Protection Deviations. This item dealt with the lack of fire detection monitors on the refuel floor. These monitors were required as part of the operating license. The licensee has submitted to NRR

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justification as to why these monitors are not needed. While the licensee has received verbal approval not to install the monitors,

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written approval has not been. received. This item will remain open until written approval is receive (e) (Closed) Open Item 254/86017-03; 265/86017-03: Semi-Annual Acting Station Director Training For Control Room Personnel Not Complete Omission of required semi-annual Acting Station Director training for control room personnel was discovered by licensee quality assurance personnel during an audit in late October 1986. A senior licensee representative agreed to complete the required semi-annual Acting Station Director training by December 31, 1986, and to revise the training procedure QEP 520-1 to require semi-annual trainin Inquiries of the Quad Cities Trainina Department personnel verified that the required semi-annual training was completed by December 31, 1986, and has continued to be conducted as required. Visual inspection of QEP 520-1 showed that this procedure has in fact been revised to require semi-annual Acting Station Director trainin This item is considered close (f) (Closed) Unresolved Item 265/87013-02: Apparent Improper Watch Relie QAP 300-2, the Conduct of Shift Operations procedure, has been revised to require the center desk operator to move to the unit of the operator whom he has temporarily relieved. Adherence to this procedure will prevent the apparent improper watch relief noted during the previous inspection period. This item is considered close (g) (Closed) Severity Level V Violation 254/87008-01: Excessive Delay in Notifying the NRC of an ESF Actuatio A Severity Level V Violation was reported in Inspection Report 87008 which involved an excessively slow notification by the licensee to the NRC Emergency Operations Center of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation. 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii) requires that any unplanned ESF actuation be reported to the NRC within four hours of the event. Contrary to this, an unplanned control room ventilation system isolation occurred on May 19, 1987, at 1325 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.041625e-4 months <br /> and was not reported to the NRC until June 4, 1987, at 1630 hour0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br /> The corrective actions to which the licensee committed to avoid further violations entailed developing a list of systems which are to be considered ESF systems and training the personnel responsible for initial NRC notification on the contents of the ESF systems lis The licensee committed to completing both of these actions by September 1, 1987. The resident inspectors ascertained by ,

personally examining the ESF list and the training rosters that the ESF list was prepared and training conducted prior to September 1, 1987. This item is considered close l

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3.. Operations (71707, 93702)

The inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined plant operations. The inspectors verified that activities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initioting any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the limiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and while components or systems were removed from service; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and review of test results were accomplished; quality control records were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials and equipment were properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained as applicable; and adverse plant conditions including equipment malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel errors were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by appropriate management personne (a) Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)  :

During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Standby Liquid Control System and Standby Gas Treatment Syste (b) Summary of Operations Unit 1 At the beginning of the inspection period Unit I was at full powe i Until September 11, 1987, the unit was either at full power, on Economic Generation Control (EGC), or at reduced power in order to ,

perform surveillance or to comply with load dispatcher order On September 11, 1987, the unit shut down for a scheduled refueling )

outage after having operated at power for 179 consecutive day Unit 2 On August 1,1987, Unit 2 scrammed due to a transformer faul I The transformer was replaced and the unit returned to service on i September 5, 198 !

The unit operated either at full power, on Economic Generation  !

l Control (EGC), or at reduced power in order to perform surveillance i l or to comply with load dispatcher orders until the reactor scrammed l

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l at 0547 hours0.00633 days <br />0.152 hours <br />9.044312e-4 weeks <br />2.081335e-4 months <br /> on September 17, 198 The scram was caused by an instrument technician improperly performing surveillance test 11,

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low low reactor vessel. level, when.he failed to repressurize the i sensing line prior to returning it. to service. The unit was

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restarted the same day, achieving criticality at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> and synchronizing to.the electrical grid at 2232 hour0.0258 days <br />0.62 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.49276e-4 months <br /> The' unit continued to operate at full power, on EGC, or at reduced l power to perform surveillance or to comply with load dispatcher orders until 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> on September 28, 1987, when the field breaker for the B recirculation pump motor generator set tripped, causing .the B recirculation pump to trip. Load dropped from 814 MWe i

to 521 MWe. At 1610 hours0.0186 days <br />0.447 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.12605e-4 months <br />, the speed for the A recirculation pump was reduced to minimum, reducing load to 460 MWe, At 1001 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.808805e-4 months <br /> .

on September 29, -1.11, the B recirculation pump was ~ returned to J

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service and the unit was returned to full powe .;

l For the remainder of the report period, the unit.was either at full power, on EGC, or at reduced power in order to perform surveillance J or to comply.with load dispatcher orders. As of the end of the {

inspection period the unit had operated at power for 17 consecutive 4 day (c) Control Room Ventilation Isolation At 1453 hours0.0168 days <br />0.404 hours <br />0.0024 weeks <br />5.528665e-4 months <br /> on August 3, 1987, the smoke detector for the control room ventilation intake alarmed, causing the control room ventila- I tion to isolat No fire was discovered, so it was believed that the smoke alarm was spurious. At the time a severe thunderstorm was in the area. The NRC emergency operations center was notified at 1725 hours0.02 days <br />0.479 hours <br />0.00285 weeks <br />6.563625e-4 months <br /> on August 3, 1987. Control room ventilation was subsequently returned to norma (d) Engineered Safety Feature Actuation At'1212 hours0.014 days <br />0.337 hours <br />0.002 weeks <br />4.61166e-4 months <br /> on August 5, 1987, during the monthly operational test of the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection'(HPCI) pump, a Group IV isolation occurred due to a high steam line differential pressure signal. The Unit 1 HPCI was declared to be inoperabl At 1555 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.916775e-4 months <br /> on August 5, 1987, the NRC Emergency Operations Center was notified. Investigation revealed that the high steam line differential pressure signal was due to a faulty differential pressure detector. The faulty detector was replaced, the Unit 1 HPCI was successfully operationally tested and returned to service at 2005' hours on August 5, 198 (e) Offsite Communications System Inoperative At 1736 hours0.0201 days <br />0.482 hours <br />0.00287 weeks <br />6.60548e-4 months <br /> on August 7, 1987, Quad Cities was notified by the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) via commercial telephone that the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) phone was inoperative. At 1835 hcurs on August 7, 1987, the NRC Emergency Operations Center was notified. At 0645 hours0.00747 days <br />0.179 hours <br />0.00107 weeks <br />2.454225e-4 months <br /> on August 8, 1987, j the NARS phone was repaired and returned to servic l

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.(f): Tornado Warning At 1628. hours on August 8,1987, an Unusual Event was declared when

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Quad Cities'was notified.of a tornado warning in effect until 1730 :l hours. .At 1648' hours on August 8, 1987,'the NRC Emergency Operations Center was notified. 'At 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> on August 8, 1987, 30 minute after.the expiration of the-tornado warning,~ Quad Cities' terminated i the, Unusual Event.= At 1805 hours0.0209 days <br />0.501 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.868025e-4 months <br /> on' August 8, 1987, the'NRC Emergency Operations Center was informed of the termination of the  ;

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'(g)~ Rapid Power' Decrease Due to Open' Fire Spray Valve

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At 0535 hours0.00619 days <br />0.149 hours <br />8.845899e-4 weeks <br />2.035675e-4 months <br /> on August 9, 1987, Quad Cities Unit I was at full j power (approximately 800 MWe) when a condenser pit low level alarm i was received. At 0550 hours0.00637 days <br />0.153 hours <br />9.093915e-4 weeks <br />2.09275e-4 months <br />, investigation revealed approximately 1 foot of water under. the hotwell, with additional water. continuing i to. flow from near the center of the turbine. An immediate power ]

decrease to minimum recirculation flow was. initiated in preparation 1 for a possible reactor scra At 0615 hours0.00712 days <br />0.171 hours <br />0.00102 weeks <br />2.340075e-4 months <br />, further investigation found the source of the water to be a fire protection spray nozzle for turbine bearings 8 and 9 which was~ spraying water on these bearings. No fire was eviden The isolation valve for this fire protection spray nozzle was shut to stop the flow of water. At 0630 hours0.00729 days <br />0.175 hours <br />0.00104 weeks <br />2.39715e-4 months <br />, control rods were inserted to lower power below the turbine trip / reactor trip setpoint so the reactor would not automatically trip in case the turbine had to be tripped. Plant mechanical maintenance personne! did not think there was any damage to the turbine, so power was staLilized at approximately 45% (350 MWe).

At 0815 hours0.00943 days <br />0.226 hours <br />0.00135 weeks <br />3.101075e-4 months <br /> on August 9, 1987, control rods were pulled to return

.to full powe ' The fire protection spray valve began spraying water when a monthly fire suppression test was performed on the fire protection valve for turbine bearings'8 and 9 sometime between 1600 and 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br /> on August 8, 1987. The cause was determined to be a shut. valve to the top of the diaphram on the fire protection valve. Thus when the test was conducted, water pressure on top of the fire protection valve, which was holding the fire protection valve shut, decreased, allowing the fire protection valve to open. Because a tell-tale drain was restricted by debris, and because the spray nozzles were located on the other side of a wall inside of a high radiation area, the equipment operator performing the surveillance did not realize

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that the fire protection system had actuate (h) Inoperative Communications System At 2140 hours0.0248 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.1427e-4 months <br /> on August 16, 1987, the Quad Cities control room was i informed by the Chicago Load Dispatcher that the Illinois Emergency i

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Services and Disaster Administration (ESDA) was unable to contact the. Quad: Cities. control room using thel Nuclear Accident' Reporting System .(NARS) phone. The Chicago Load Dispatcher contacted the telephone company which promptly initiated repairs. At 2309 hours0.0267 days <br />0.641 hours <br />0.00382 weeks <br />8.785745e-4 months <br /> L on August 16, _1987 ~, repairs were completed and the NARS phone was l ' returned to servic (1) Reactor Protection System Actuation On August.17,-1987, at 2109 hours0.0244 days <br />0.586 hours <br />0.00349 weeks <br />8.024745e-4 months <br />, while in cold shutdown, Unit 2- ,

. scrammed on low reactor water level. Prior to the event, reactor vessel level was 40 inches and th~e reactor water clean up system (RWCU) was isolated. The unit operator was attempting to reduce reactor vessel. level to 30 inches. Since the vessel's normal letdown path, the clean up system, was out of service (00S) to -;

repair. leaking . valves, the operator used the suppression chamber test and spray valve and the suppression chamber dump valve to drain water from the reactor vessel. This is specifically prohibited by precaution 9 of QOP 100-5, the Shutdown Cooling Startup and Operation

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procedure, which only allows opening these valves when the unit is defueled or being drained when the reactor vessel is flooded after refueling. The unit operator had no procedure for the evolution he was performing. Water level dropped quickly using this pathway and a low level scram and shutdown cooling system isolation occurred (normal letdown uses a 6 inch pathway while the RHR system pathway chosen uses a 14 inch pathway). Normal vessel level was quickly restored. No rod movement occurred since the unit was in a cold shutdown conditio A temporary procedure specifying how to control reactor vessel level

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with the RWCU was developed and approved the day following the

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event. The licensee has also begun a study to determine if there are other instances of plant evolutions being conducted for which

.there are no procedure Prior to the event, the unit operator was instructed by the Operating Engineer to control water level at approximately 30 inches. Contrary to QAP 200-4, the Operating Engineer Procedure, which requires that direction for day to day unit operation be provided, inadequate directions were provided on how to control water level with the normal letdown path 00S for repairs. The unit operator, after discussions with the Shift Engineer and Shift Control Room Engineer, !

attempted to control level using a valve lineup that has a potential for draining the vessel and is normally used during refuel operations to drain the reactor cavity to the suppression pool. The inadequate directions and attempt at controlling reactor vessel level without 1 a procedure are considered to be a violation as noted in the Appendix (265/87019-01(DRP)).

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gr t o; (j) Assessment Capability On August 28, 1987' Quad Cities Unit 1 informed the NRC via the ENS

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that the. unit's Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) had been out of service for greater that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The reason.the-SPDS~.had been unavailable is.that'the Prime Computer was not functioning. The licensee replaced two boards in the Central Processing Unit and the Prime Computer was returned to service, thus returning the SPDS to operabilit (k) Reactor Scram At 0547 hours0.00633 days <br />0.152 hours <br />9.044312e-4 weeks <br />2.081335e-4 months <br /> on September 17, 1987, an instrument technician, while performing surveillance test 11, low low reactor vessel water level, on Unit 2 failed to comply.with the procedural steps in the surveillance test by not repressurizing the sensing line prior to ;

returning it to service. . This resulted in a reactor scra The failure ~to comply with the procedural steps of the surveillance test is considered to be a violation as noted in the Appendix (265/87019-02(DRP)).

The' plant was stabilized after the scram and a restart was commenced the same day. Criticality was achieved at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> and the main generator was synchronized to the electrical grid at 2232 hour0.0258 days <br />0.62 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.49276e-4 months <br /> (1) Vacuum Breaker problem On September 18, 1987, while performing the torus to drywell vacuum breaker surveillance on Unit 2, one of the vacuum breakers indicated dual positio Under these conditions Technical Specifications require a differential pressure decay rate test to be performed immediately and every 15 days thereaf ter until the failure is correcte During the performance of this test another breaker exhibited dual indication and a third breaker stuck open at 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />, causing a rapid reduction in torus to drywell differential pressure. At 1346

. hours an ENS call was made to inform the NRC about preparations for shutting down Unit 2. After repeated tries the stuck open breaker closed at approximately 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> and by 1703 hours0.0197 days <br />0.473 hours <br />0.00282 weeks <br />6.479915e-4 months <br /> the torus to drywell . differential pressure was restored. At 1755 hours0.0203 days <br />0.488 hours <br />0.0029 weeks <br />6.677775e-4 months <br /> the licensee updated the NRC via the ENS. The licensee believes the problem with the stuck open breaker is associated with a faulty air operator which is only used during surveillance testing. The three vacuum breakers which malfunctioned have been declared inoperable, requiring a differential pressure decay rate test to be conducted at 15 day interval (m) Recirculation Pump Trip At 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> on September 28, 1987, the B recirculation pump on j Unit 2 tripped because of a recirculation pump generator field

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. voltage regulator. failure. Load initially dropped from 814 MWe l

'to 521 MWe, The unit'was_ shifted.into single loop operation and j

' the required surveillance tests for single loop operation'were .

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.The. defective voltage regulator.was. repaired,~and at 1001 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.808805e-4 months <br />.on 4 September 29, 1987, the 8 recirculation pump was restarted and the unit was. returned to two loop operatio (n) Unusual Event'

At approximately 0911 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.466355e-4 months <br /> on September 29, 1987, an Unusual. Event was declared when it was discovered that the seismic. monitor had apparently actuated. No damage was found during an inspection tour-of the facilities.by the licensee. The Unusual Event was terminate '

at 1315' hours. Upon further investigation it was determined that

~t he monitor had not actuated as. originally thought. The person sent to check the monitor misinterpreted _ the status light, erroneously believing that the monitor had actuated. Film taken from the monitor showed only the calibration signals that the Instrument Mechanics inserted into the monito .. Monthly Maintenance Observation.(62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related and non safety related systems and c' omponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in.accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards.and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were

. removed from service; approvals were'obtained prior to initiating the work; activities.were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine. status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Portions of Unit 2 #6 turbine bearing seal wor (2) Portions of setting the limits on a Unit 2 HPCI valv (3) Portions of electrical maintenance trouble shooting and repairing ;

the Unit 1 diesel generator breaker cubicl !

(4) Portions of the installation of new valves on the Unit 2 Joy Air Compresso l

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No violations or deviations were identified; Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing and verified'that testing'was performed.in accordance with adequate procedures, that. test instrumentation was calibrated,'that

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limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the-affected bomponents were accomplished, that test results~ conforme with. Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were ,

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reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing theLtest, and that any deficiencies identified during,the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Portions of the shared diesel generator monthly inspection. (2) Portions of the new fuel receiving inspectio (3)' Portions of the new fuel inspections conducted by Tech Staf l J

(4) Portions of electrical maintenance inspection of the Unit 1 Main Generator brushes and shaft voltage mease9ment (5) Emergency Relief Valve test conducted by maintenance and' witnessed l by Quality Contro (6) Portions of the torus to drywell differential pressure decay rate tes No violations or deviations were identifie ) LER Review (92700) 1 (1) Unit 1-(a) (Closed) LER 87014, Revision 00: Control Room Ventilation Isolation Caused by Chlorine Analyzer Spike During Electrical Stor On July 29, 1987, Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 were in the RUN 4 mode at 98 and 100 percent core thermal power respectively. At l 1554 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.91297e-4 months <br />, a lightning strike on 345 kV line 0403 caused a power fluctuation (voltage and current) that resulted in the chlorine analyzer portion of the control room toxic gas analyzer system to spike above its trip setpoint of 1.0 parts ,

per million (ppm). This resulted in the control room ventilation isolating (switching to 100 percent recirculation).

This is an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuatio The cause of this event was the electrical storm in the plant area at the time. After verification that the toxic gas analyzer (chlorine monitor portion) was undamaged, the control

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'(b), (Closed) LER 87015, Revision 00: -1B Reactor Building and  !

Refuel Floor Radiation Monitors Power Supply Failure 1

'(Capacitor) Causes Safety Feature. Actuatio ,

l On July 31, 1987, Quad Cities Unit I was in the RUN mode at-100_ percent. rated core. thermal power. .At 0526 hours0.00609 days <br />0.146 hours <br />8.69709e-4 weeks <br />2.00143e-4 months <br />, the control' room ventilation system went to the 100 percent recirculation mode, the Reactor Building Ventilation System )

isolated, and the 1/2A Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system i automatically. started as a result of a less of the power supply i to 18 Reactor Building Ventilation and 18 Refuel Floor 1 Radiation Monitors, j The cause of this event was a failed capacitor in the common power supply to the IB Reactor Building Ventilation and IB Refuel Floor Radiation Monitors. The capacitor failed due to normal agin Corrective action for this event was to bypass the IB Reactor l Building and Refuel Floor Radiation Monitors and restore the

affected systems to normal. Investigation identified the failed capacitor in the power supply and it was replaced like

- for lik Following replacement, functional tests were satisfactorily performed on both radiation monitors. The !

monitors were restored to operation at 1520 hours0.0176 days <br />0.422 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.7836e-4 months <br /> on July 31, 198 (c)' (0 pen) LER 87017, Revision 00: High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Invalid System Isolation From Failed Differential Pressure Switc On August 5, 1987, Unit 1 was operating in-the RUN mode at 100 percent of rated core thermal power. At.1212 hours0.014 days <br />0.337 hours <br />0.002 weeks <br />4.61166e-4 months <br /> during -I i

the performance of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) i system monthly operability test a Group IV isolation was received which resulted in closure of the HPCI steam supply valves. The HPCI system was declared inoperable and Technical 1 Specification required surveillance were initiated. The '

isolation was the result of a failed HPCI steamline differential pressure transmitter that detects excessive flow in the steamlin The failed transmitter was replaced like for lik The transmitter was returned to the manufacturer to determine mode of failure. This LER will remain open until the supplemental report is issue (d) (0 pen) LER 87019, Revision 00: Failure of Unit 1 As Found Intergrated Leak Rate Tes _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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On September.14, 1987,- it was- determined that the'"as found" containment leakage would most likely exceed the Technical Specification limit of 0.75 wt. %/ day.and the test was

" terminated. The cause(s) for this failure has not yet been i identified. The-licensee will issue a-supplemental report 1 that-will detail the failures and corrective actio (e) (0 pen) LER 87016,' Revision 00: Leak Rate from all valves and'

penetrations on Unit 1 in excess of Technical Specifications Limit, jj l

On' September.12, 1987, it was discovered during a local leak j rate test that the volume between two main steam drain valves 1 could not be pressurized. , Since the leakage of each valve l could not be determined, it was assumed that the leak rate !

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from all valves and penetrations was in excess of Technical j Specification limits. The licensee will issue a supplemental report detailing the failure mode of these valves and corrective actions taken (this report will also include results and corrective actions for other valves and penetra-tions).

(2) Unit 2 (a) (0 pen) LER 87009, Revision 00: Scram Caused by Turbine /

Generator Load Mismatch Due to a Main Transformer. "C" Phase ,

Faul '

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On August 1, 1987, Quad Cities Unit 2 was in the RUN mode operating at 100 percent core thermal power. At 1422 hours0.0165 days <br />0.395 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.41071e-4 months <br />, a :

reactor scram occurred from a turbine generator load mismatch '

which was caused by a generator trip. The generator trip occurred as a result of an electrical fault in the main transformer "C" phase windings. The main transformer was replaced with a spare. During the event Busses 21 and 22 s tripped from an undervoltage signal and-the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) had'to be started manually ..

when trouble with the push button autostart was encountere The problem may have been that the pushbutton was not held long enough for the system to autostart. This LER will remain open pending the results of investigations for those problem The licensee will issue a supplemental LER documenting the causes for the problem !

(b) (Closed) LER 87010, Revision 00: Unit 2 Scram While in Cold  !

Shutdown When Lowering Reactor Level - Inadequate Procedur l i

On August 17, 1987, Unit 2 was in the SHUTDOWN mode at zero "

percent reactor powe At 2110 hours0.0244 days <br />0.586 hours <br />0.00349 weeks <br />8.02855e-4 months <br />, a low reactor water level scram and Group II and III isolations occurred while lowering reactor vessel water level. The reactor water level was restored above the low level trip point in approximately one minut _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _

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D'

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Part of the cause for this event was determined to be lack of a procedure. At the time of the event, there was no procedure for lowering reactor water level with the reactor watercleanup(RWCV)systemnotavailable. Therefore, when it became necessary to lower the reactor water level, adequate precautions and instructions were not provided and this resulted in the low reactor water level scram. Also contributing to this event were insufficient planning and coordinatio Corrective actions included the development of a procedure to describe the method to lower reactor water level during cold shutdown conditions (with RWCU system not available) and operating personnel will be interviewed to determine if any other operations are performed which may not be controlled by procedures and new procedures will be written as'necessary. In addition, the industry operating experience reports of similar draining events will be reviewed to determine if additional action is neede The lack of direction and the lack of procedues is considered to be a violation (265/87019-01(DRP)) as discussed in paragraph 3(i).

7. Review of Routine and Special Reports (90713)

The inspectors reviewed the Monthly Performance Reports for the months of July and August as well as the Secondary Containment Capability Test repor No violations or deviations were identifie l

8. Training

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On August 24, 1987, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector met with the Manager of the Production Training Center to discuss the status of the 1 plant specific simulator. Photographs of the control room were being taken on that date as part of the bidding process by which the facility chooses a vendor to build the simulator. The Manager of the Production Training Center stated that bids were to be accepted on October 7, 1987, ;

for the construction of the plant specific simulator. The simulator is I scheduled to be operational in January of 199 i

\

The results of the requalification examinations administered in July l l

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showed that five of eight senior operators and four of five operators ;

passed, resulting in the requalification program being assessed as l marginal. This is an improvement over the previous evaluation, which i j deemed the requalification program to be unsatisfactor l l No violations or deviations in the area of training were observed.

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9. Administrative Controls Affecting Quality A temporary revision for procedure Q0A 6900-3, 24/48 VDC System Failure (One or Both Buses), was placed into effect on September 21, 1987. Per

_ _ _ - _ - - _

o

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k i

I procedure QAP 300-27, the Operating Department Procedure Revision Training procedure, the Shift Control Room Engineer is required to fill j out and insert a notice sheet (QAP' 300-T20) into control room copies of i any Q0A which has a temporary change in effect to alert operators of the j existence of this temporary change. The notice sheet was not placed in i the control room copies of QOA 6900-3 until October 2,1987. Had the '

control room operators needed to use Q0A 6900-3, it is possible they may have used an outdated version which had been superseded by a temporary 3 change. The improper documentation of a procedure change is considered i to be a violation as noted in the Appendix (254/87019-01(DRP); i 265/87019-03(DRP)). l 10. Radiation Control (71709)

(

Periodic inspections of plant radiological control conditions were made '

during the inspection period. Isolated instances of minor deficiencies were found and promptly corrected by plant personnel. No violations or deviations were note i'

11. Outages An unscheduled five week outage for Unit 2 began on August 1, 1987, when a fault on the main transformer occurred which resulted in a reactor scram. Work was performed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day to replace the defective main transformer, requiring nearly 4 weeks of intensive effort to complete the replacemen The plant took advantage of the unscheduled outage to perform maintenance ,

and surveillance activities on a not-to-interfere basis with the main !

transformer replacement and the eventual reactor startup. The following are examples of the outage maintenance performed: inspection of the main condenser tubes, repair of the steam jet air ejector flow transmitter, repair of a faulty main steam isolation valve limit switch, environmental qualification modifications to acoustic monitors in the drywell, motor control center butt splices, inspection of penetration splices,

,

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maintenance on electromatic relief solenoid actuator switches and feedwater regulating valve inspection. A chemical decontamination of the fuel pool heat exchangers was also performed during the Unit 2 outag Unit 2 was returned to power operation on September 5, 198 At 0005 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> on September 12, 1987, Unit I was shut down after operating at power for 179 consecutive days in order to begin a planned 12 week refueling outage. Some of the major plant evaluations to be conducted during the outage include the integrated leak rate test, refueling, replacement of all the iew pressure turbines with Brown Boveri turbines, decontamination of the recirculation loops and the RWCU system, connection of line 0405 into the ring bus, test discharge of the station batteries and environmental qualification wor _- _ _ _ _ b

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e

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-(a) Failed Local- Leak ~ Rate -Test - -

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At 1948. hours on September 12,11987, while attempting to perform

~

allocalfleak rate test:of the volume between the main-steam line h Ldrain-valves, the test (pressure could not be: attained because of

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excessive leakage. 'The suspected cause'is'a defective main steam; line drain valve. Both main steam line drain valves will be  !

repaired'or. replaced during the' outage and_the' local: leak rate q

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test'will be repeated prior to reactor startu ,

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,

q

'(b)E _ Recirculation pump Fails To Trip f At 0228 hours0.00264 days <br />0.0633 hours <br />3.769841e-4 weeks <br />8.6754e-5 months <br /> on September 13, 1987, while manually.-shutting off the. Unit i recirculation' pumps with the~ unit in cold shutdown,-the' .)

field breaker for.the_18 recirculation. pump motor generation did not' trip. This. breaker.is required to trip.on an ATWS signa ~ The breaker was subsequently tripped manuall This problem is being followed,by region-based. inspector _!

(c) Failed Integrated Leak Rate Test ,

On September 14,- 1987, Unit 1 failed its integrated leak rate test (ILRT). Technical Specifications require a' leak rate of 1.0 percent by weight of.the containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at 48 psig. The results of the test indicated a leak rate of approximately percent by weight per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The licensee has identified several valves that contributed to this test's failure and these valves will be replaced during.this refuel outage. The ILRT will be performed again at the end of the refuel outage and will be monitored by region-based inspector (d) F_uel Removal From the Reactor Vessel The licensee began to remove the fuel from the Unit I reactor vessel shortly after the outage began and completed removal at 0047 hours5.439815e-4 days <br />0.0131 hours <br />7.771164e-5 weeks <br />1.78835e-5 months <br /> on September 23, 198 The fuel handling department has operated for 13 consecutive' years without a disabling injur (e) Chemical Decontamination The Unit I recirculation loops and RWCU system were c.hemically l decontaminated between September 28 and October 3, 1987, resulting in a significant reduction of drywell radiation dose rate . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the  !

inspection activitie !

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The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar