IR 05000254/1989018

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Physical Security Insp Repts 50-254/89-18 & 50-265/89-18 on 890814-18.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Security Program Plans,Audits,Protected & Vital Area Physical Barriers & Detection & Assessment Aids
ML20246K594
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/24/1989
From: Creed J, Kniceley J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246K591 List:
References
50-254-89-18, 50-265-89-18, NUDOCS 8909060012
Download: ML20246K594 (4)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

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qI REGION III

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, Reports No., 50-254/89018(DRSS); 50-265/89018(DRSS)

Docket Nos.:50-254 50-265 Licenses No...DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company-Post Office' Box 767 Chicago,.ILo60690

.._ . Facility Name: Quad Cities. Nucle'ar Generating Station, Units 1;and 2'

y Inspection At: Quad Cities, Site, Cordova, Illinois Inspection. Conducted! August'14-18, 1989 Type of Inspection: Unannounced Physical Security Inspection

'Date of Previous Security Inspection: January 9-13, 1989 Inspector: hWb

' Jimes R. Kniceley M

.J Date fM M Physical Security Inspector uh h N T-ApprovedBy:pamesR. Creed, Chief Date

, Safeguards'Section Inspection Summary

. Inspection on August 14-18,1989 (Reports No. 50-254/83018(DRSSh No. 50-265/89018(DRSS)) .. Areas Inspected: Management Support, Security Program Plans, and Audits; 1 Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids;

, Protected and Vital Access Control of P:.rsonnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm l

Stations and Communications; Power Supply; Testing, Maintenance and

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Compensatory Measures; and Security Training / Qualification.

l Results: The~ licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined. Licensee management attention and involvement are

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evident. Emphasis 'on superior performance of safeguards activities has

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resulted in performance which exceeds regulatory requirements.

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i DETAILS

- 1.- ~ Key Persons Contacted'

.In addition to key members of the licensee's staff listed below, the

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inspector interviewed other licensee employees and members of the security organization. -The asterisk (*) denotes those 'present. at the .

Exit Interview conducted on August 18, 198 R. Bax, Station Manager, Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

  • R. Robey, Services Superintendent, CECO
  • D. Gibson, Regulatory Assurance _ Supervisor, Ceco
  • D.; Kunzmann, Regulatory Assurance, CECO
  • F. Wil11 ford, Nuclear Security Administrator, CECO
  • K. Leech, Station Security Administrator, CECO
  • Holland, Assistant Station Security Administrator
  • K. Hungerford, Assistant Site Manager, Burns International Security Services, Inc. (BISSI)
  • S. Williams, Site Manager, BISSI R. Higgins, Senior Resident l Inspector, NRC Region III Entrance and Exit Interviews (IP 30703) At the beginning of the inspection, Mr. R. L. Bax, Station Manager was informed of the purpose of this visit and the functional . areas to be examined, The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in 1Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on August 18, 1989.- A general description of the scope of the inspection was provide Briefly listed below are the findings discussed during the exit intervie (1) The licensee representatives were advised that no violations, deviations, or unresolved items were noted. Security management actions to improve / upgrade the security system were noted which include continuing preparation for the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) which is' scheduled for November 198 The licensee's representatives had no' questions pertaining to the inspectio . Programs Areas ~ Inspected Listed below are the core inspection areas which were examined by the inspector within the scope of these inspection activities in which no l

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violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified. These areas were reviewed and evaluated as deemed necessary by the inspector to meet the specified " Inspection Requirements" (Section 02) of NRC Inspection Manual Inspection Procedure 81700 as applicable to the security plan. Sampling reviews included interviews, observations,

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' testing'of equipment, documentation review and, at' times, drills or exercises that provide independent verification to meet security

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/, commitments. The. depth and scope of activities were conducted as deemed

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appropriate and necessa'ry for the program area and operational status of the security syste ~

Numbe Program-Area and Inspection Requirement Reviewed 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors Management Support: (02.01a) Degree of Management Support; (02.0lb) Change.to Security Plans Properly Reported and do not Reduce Security Effectiveness; (02.01c) Program and Corrective Action System for-Annual Audits; Qualifications and Independence of Auditor Protected and Vital Area Barriers: (02.02a) PA and VA Barriers Meet Commitments and Ptovide Required Penetration Resistance; (02.02b) Isolation Zones Adequately Maintained; (02.02c) Detection Aids Functionally Effective, Meet Commitments, and no vulnerabilities to Avoid Detection (02.02d) Assessment Aids Functional and Effective and Meet Commitment Access Control-Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles:

(02.03a) Positive Access Control to include: Proper Identification; Required Personnel Screening *

Completed; Compliance with Fitress For Duty Commitments; Immediate Measures to Prevent Access when Person is Terminated or Transferred For Cause; Unauthorized Names Not Added to Access List / Computer Program; Adequate Search Upon Entering PA; Badges Displayed; Visitors Escorted; Emergency Access to Vital Equipment; VA Access is Duty Related; (02.03b) Packages Searched and Properly Authorized; Controls for Containment Access; (02.03c) Vehicles Properly Authorized, Searched, and Controlled; Access to Vehicle Gates Controlle Alarm Stations and Communications: (02.04a) Alarm Stations Adequately Equipped with Alarm, Surveillance and Communications; Continuously Manned and Independent Functioning Capability; (02.04b) No CAS Interfering Operational Activities; (02.04c) Alarm Stations Have Continuous Communication Capability with Guards and LLE P_ower Supply: (02.05a) Secondary Power Source for Alarm and Communication Systems; (02.05b) Emergeacy Ingress and Egress During Loss of Power.

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. Testing, Maintenance-and Compensatory Measures; (02.06a) Adequate Installation, Testing and Maintenance L ,

of Security Equipment;;(02.06b) Compensatory Measures.-

Implemented and Effectiv Training and Qualification: ~(02.07a) Officers

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Trained,. Equipped, and Qualified; (02.076) Officer Possess J.dequate' Knowledge and Ability to Perform Duties; (02.07c) Responses and Consistent with Plans and Procedure. Requirements; Safeguards Capabilitie in SCP are Available, Effective, and Functional; L(02.07d) Required Armed Response 'and Supervisor (s)

Available; (02.07e) Nonsecurity Personnel are Trained,,

Equipped, and Qualified for Assigned' Security Tasks)

(i.e., escort duties, etc.).

Physical Security Program-for Power Reactors (IP 81700):

~ In preparation for the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER)

which is scheduled for November.13-17, 1989,- the licensee continues to evaluate'and initiate corrective actions for RER. findings which have been identified at other utilities. Station Security-Management is pro-active and their management attention and involvement are readily evident and place emphasis on superi sr performance. Examples of this superior performance include the installation of back-up protected and vital area-' alarm functions which are operated by a dedicated security computer should the-primary and secondary computer fai " ' Management involvement and support for security is excellent. There is consistent evidence of prior planning and sssignment of proper priorities towards installation and repair of security related equipmen The licensee identified numerous security system upgrades which they preferred to have inplace prior to the RER inspections in November 198 In order to complete the reconfiguration and installation of the necessary equipment upgrades, management needed to fully support and dedicate technical and maintenance personnel to assist the security departmen Interviews with site senior management personnel showed that security has received and will continue to receive adequate resources to upgrade and improve their security progra !

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