IR 05000254/1988020
| ML20207L105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1988 |
| From: | Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207L102 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-88-20, 50-265-88-20, IEIN-88-055, IEIN-88-069, IEIN-88-55, IEIN-88-69, NUDOCS 8810170184 | |
| Download: ML20207L105 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Reports No. 50-254/88020(DRP);50-265/88020(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-254, 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 I
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
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Post Office Box 767
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l Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 t
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Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL
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i Inspection Conducted: August 7 through September 30, 1988
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Inspectors:
R. L. Higgins A. D. Morrongiello
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Approved By: M. A. Ring, Chief)//2'IMN
/0/)3/r/
Reactor Projects SecVon IB Fite
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Inspection Suninary
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Inspection on August 7 through September 30, 1988 (Reports No.50-254/88020(ORP);
UT-265/8a020(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced resident inspection of Operations,
Maintenance, Surveillance, LER Review, Routine Reports, Temporary Instructions, f
Administrative Controls Affecting Quality, Radiation Control, Information
Notices, Regional Requests Emergency Preparedness, and Security.
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Results:
In tM areas inspected no violations or deviations of NRC
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requirements were identified.
The licensee staff demonstrated adequate
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attention to safety issues.
Plant performance was good:
Unit 1 operated at power throughout the inspection period, accumulating 104 consecutive
days of operation at the end of the inspection period; Unit 2 started up on
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August 15, 1988, and operated at power for the remainder of the inspection
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period, accumulating 48 consecutive days of power operation.
Management
attention resulted in both units being at power with no illuminated
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annunciators on either unit's annunicator panel at the end of the inspection l
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period. There were no ENS phone calls during September.
Significant
i modification to the control room HVAC and lighting systems was carried out
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with both units operating at power, but no mishaps occurred due to the care
with which the construction workers perfonred their tasks and the close i
supervision of licensee management and operations personnel.
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DETAILS 1.
Personnnel Contacted
- R. Bax, Station Manager
- R. Robey, Services Superintendent
- J. Wunderlich, Regulatory Assurance
- M. Miller, Quality Assurance
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on September 30, 1988.
The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspection.
2.
Operations (71707, 93702)
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The inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined plant operations.
The inspectors verified that activities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initiating any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the limiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and while components or systems were removed from service; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and review of test results were accomplished; quality control records were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials and equipment were properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained as applicable; and adverse plant conditions including equipment malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel errors were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by appropriate management personnel, a.
Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)
During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the High Pressure Coolant Injection Systems,
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Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Systems, Core Spray Systems, Residual Heat Removal Systems Standby Liquid Control Systems, Standby Gas
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Treatment Systems Diesel Generators, and Station Batteries, b.
Sunmary of Operations Unit 1
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During the inspection period Unit 1 operated either at full powar, on Economic Generation Control (EGC), or at reduced power in order to perform surveillance testing, respond to load dispatcher orders,
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due to high river temperature and low river flow. As of the end of l
the inspection period the unit has been critical for 104 consecutive I
days, t
Unit 2
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i At the beginning of the inspection period Unit 2 was in an unscheduled maintenance outage to repair a ground which developed on l
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the rotor of the main generator.
The ground was repaired and Unit 2 l
was returned to criticality on August 14, 1988, and reconnected to
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the electrical grid on August 15, 1988.
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For the remainder of the inspection period Unit 2 operated either at full power, on Economic Generation Control (EGC), or at reduced power in order to perform surveillance testing, respond to load dispatcher orders, or comply with environmental limitations on discharge temperature due to high river temperature and low river flow.
As of the end of the inspection period the unit has been l
critical for 48 consecutive days.
(c) Units 1 and 2 Sunner Drought Operational Restrictions t
l Quad Cities must abide by several environmental limits imoosed by
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the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency concerning the effect which circulating water discharging into the Mississippi River l
has on river temperature.
These limits are:
(1) the maximum differential temperature between temperatures measured upriver and l
downriver from the plant is not permitted to exceed 5 degrees F; (2) the maximum downriver temperature is limited to values which
vary according to the month of the year (for the months of July and August this temperature limit is 86 degrees F), and downriver j
tenperature is prohibited from exceeding these values for more than
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a total of 87 hours0.00101 days <br />0.0242 hours <br />1.438492e-4 weeks <br />3.31035e-5 months <br /> and 36 minutes in any 12 month period; (3) the downriver temperature is prohibited from ever exceeding the monthly
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temperature limit by more than 3 degrees F (for the months of July i
l and August this never-exceed temperature is 89 degrees F).
In order to ensure compliance with the environmental limits, Quad
l Cities measures upriver and downriver temperatures and the
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Mississippi River flowrate.
Based upon river flow and upriver temperature the combined capacity of Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 is limited to ensure that the downriver temperature does not exceed any of the environmental limits.
At 9:30 a.m. CDT on August 18, 1988, Quad Cities exceeded the monthly down-river temperature limit for the maximum permissible I
time of 87 hours0.00101 days <br />0.0242 hours <br />1.438492e-4 weeks <br />3.31035e-5 months <br /> and 36 minutes.
Both units would have been forced to shut down had not permission been received from the Illinois EPA on August 17, 1988, granting, for the next 45 days, an additional
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175 hours0.00203 days <br />0.0486 hours <br />2.893519e-4 weeks <br />6.65875e-5 months <br /> of time during which Quad Cities will be allowed to operate in excess of the monthly NPDES down-river temperature limit.
At the end of the 45 day period, or if the additional 175 hours0.00203 days <br />0.0486 hours <br />2.893519e-4 weeks <br />6.65875e-5 months <br /> are
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i used up, both units will be forced to shut down if the down-river monthly temperature limit is exceeded unless the Illinois EPA grants another extension.
During the inspection period Qued Cities exceeded its downriver temperature limit on August 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, accruing a total time of 108 hours0.00125 days <br />0.03 hours <br />1.785714e-4 weeks <br />4.1094e-5 months <br /> in excess of its limits during 1988.
During the inspection period Quad Cities had to derate its units on August 7 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19.
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Fire in the Unit 1 MCC 19-1.
At 2:10 p.m. CDT on August 11, 1988, a short circuit developed in a step down transformer located in MCC 19-1, causing a small fire.
The fire brigade was activated and expeditiously extinguished the
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The Resident Inspector monitored activities of the fire
brigade at MCC 19-1 and the Senior Resident Inspector monitored control room activities.
Plant personnel performed professionally and competently during the event.
(e)
Inoperable Room Cooler Renders Unit 1 RCIC/ Core Spray Inoperable.
At 3:40 a.m. CDT on August 22, 1988, with Unit 1 at 60% power and Unit 2 at 65% power, the Unit 2 equipment attendant noticed the 1A containment spray room cooler fan to have one belt broken and the other belt thrown off the pulley, rendering the RCIC pump and 1A Core Spray pump located in that room inoperable.
At 3:50 a.m. CDT the equipment attendant replaced the helt which was thrown and ran the room cooler fan to demonstrate its operability, thereby returning the RCIC pump and the 1A Core Spray pump to an operable status. The licensee replaced the broken belt during the day shift later that day.
(f) Single Control Rod Scrams Into Unit 1.
At 2:35 p.m. CDT on August 22, 1988, control rod 30-31 (the center control rod) inadvertently scranTned into the reactor.
The rod was declared inoperable and electrically disarmed.
The cause was determined to be a leaking scram outlet valve attributable to a defective scram outlet diaphragm. The scram outlet valve was rebuilt and the control rod successfully tested and returned to service at 1:45 a.m. CDT on August 23, 1988.
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(g) Unit 2 HPCI ! solation, i
At 1:10 p.m. CDT on August 23, 1988, HPCI isolated on a high steam i
line flow signal. The signal was generated when an instrument l
technician was attempting to install an ammeter on the steam line flow transmitter in order to measure the differential pressure when HPCI is running at full flow.
During the installation the
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technician inadvertently brought the transmitter's leads togetner.
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The isolation was irrrnediately cleared and the HPCI steam line j
valving was returned to normal.
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(h) Unit 1 Load Orop Due to Flash Tank 1A3 High Level.
At 7:55 a.m. CDT on September 28, 1988, the level in the 1A3 flash tank reached the high level alarm setpoint, causing the 183, 103 and ID3 heaters and extraction valves to trip and the levels in the moisture separator drain tanks to rise above the top of the indicating range.
The reactor operator manually dropped load by
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reducing recirculation pump speed from 780 MWe to 650 ifde. The reactor operator was able to maintain feedwater temperature by keeping the extraction valves open.
The heaters were returned to
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service and Unit 1 was returned to full power later that day. The Senior Resident Inspector was in the control room and observed licensee actions. The heaters will be kept in manual whenever load
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is greater than 700 MWe to preclude a repetition of this event until the heater level control system can be examined and repaired or modified as necessary.
3.
Mcnthly Maintenance Observation (62702, 62703)
l Statien maintenance activities of safety related and non-safety related systems and components listed below were observed /rtiviewed to ascertain
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that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures,
regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance i
with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
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removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention procedures were foilowed.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of l
outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety l
related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
Portions of the tollowing activicies were observed / reviewed:
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Repair of the Unit 2 main generator ground, b.
Repair of the security card reader for the control room.
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Repair of a Unit I rod drive accumulator.
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Repair of lagging on Unit 1 RHR service water pumps, f
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Modification of the control roon lighting and HVAC.
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Repacking and stroke time testing of the Unit 2 MSIVs.
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Reassembly of the Unit 2 main generator.
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Repair of the recorder for the makeup demineralizer system.
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Repair of various valves in the makeup demineralizer system.
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Installation of conduit in the cable spreading room, k.
Painting in the reactor and turbine buildings.
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Repair of insulation on the Unit 2 diesel generator.
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Alignment of the shaft of the 1A Instrument Air Compressor, n.
Reassembly of the glycol pump, o.
Repair of the outboard seal on the IB reactor feed pump, p.
Alignment of the shaft of the Unit 1 EHC oil pump.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4, Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed Technical Specifications-required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrurrentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, dnd that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
Portions of the following activities were observed / reviewed:
a.
Unit 2 APRM weekly functional checks.
b.
Unit 2 main steam line high radiation weekly functional checks.
c.
Unit 1 cora spray quarterly surveillance, d.
Unit 1 core spray monthly surveillance, e.
Unit 2 source range rnonitor calibration and functional test.
f.
Unit 1 HPCI monthly surveillance.
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Unit 2 diesel generator quarterly surveillance.
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Fire hose monthly surveillance.
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Chimney gas monitor functional check.
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Detennination of the Unit 2 generator insulation resistance, k.
NARS phone functional check.
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ENS phone functional check.
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Modification test of the spliced wires in the standby gas treatment
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system.
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No violations or deviations were noted.
5.
LER Review (92700)
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Unit 1
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(0 pen) LER 87008, Revision 01:
Update of IC Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump Piping in Excess of Allowable i
Stress / Improper Anchor Bolt Torquing.
This item is being followed by a region based inspector.
(2) (Closed) LER 88013, Revision 00:
Unit One A Core Spray Room Cooler Inoperable Due to a Broken Fan Belt Caused by j
Insufficient Preventive Maintenance.
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This event is discussed in paragraph 2.e of this report. The
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failure of the fan belt was due to normal end of life.
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preventative maintenance program had required inspection of the
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room cooler fan belts every refuel outage.
These belts had i
been installed in August,1986, and inspected during the Fall L
1987 Unit i refueling otdage. At that time the belts were
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determined to be acceptable.
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To prevent recurrence of this event, the refuel outage
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l maintenance procedure GMPM 5700-1 (Emergency Air Handling Unit Maintenance and Inspection) has been revised to require i
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replacement of all ECCS room cooler fan belts each refuel
outage.
L' ark requests have been initiated to replace the fan
belts c< all the other ECCS room coolers during the next
available system outages.
This item is considered closed, (3)
(Closed) LER 88003, Revision 00: M0 1-1301-48 Failed to Open i
i During Testing Due to Torque Switch Bypass Limit Switch Setting j
Too Close to the Closed Position.
On January 25, 1988, while performing a valve operability test
on RCIC, the 48 valve did not open from the control room.
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RCIC system was declared inoperable.
The root cause was that the torque switch bypass limit switch was too close to the
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closed position. New criteria that had been established in January 1988 were not used to set that switch. The new
criteria were ured to readjust the switch and no further failures of the 48 valve have been reported.
This item is considered closed.
(4)
(Closed)LER88002, Revision 00: Missed Reactor Core Isolation
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Cooling Low Pressure Functional Test Due to Inadequate Procedure.
I On January 12, 1988, it was discovered that the RCIC low pressure functional test had not been perfomed during the last quarter. Normally each quarter a calibration and functional test are performed.
The calibration test was done; however, the functional test was not perfomed since the trip logic was out-of-service for maintenance during the refuel outage. The functional test was overlooked during startup activities.
The checklist used had only one sign off block labeled "Cal", since the calibration was done this block was signed off. The procedures have been revised to have a block labeled "Cal /Func"
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with sign offs required for each part.
This item is considered closed.
(5)
(Closed) LER 88009, Revision 01:
HPCI Declared Inoperable
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When Oil Pump Motor Breaker Turned Off Due to Perceived High
Temperature.
This revision corrected the LER sequential number which was incorrect in the original LER. No changes to the contant of
the original LER were made.
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This item is considered closed.
(6)
(Closed) LER 88013. Revision 01: Unit 1A Core Spray Room l
Cooler Inoperable Due to a Broken Fan Belt Caused By i
Insufficient Preventive Maintenance.
I This revision corrected the revision nurrber which was incorrect a
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in the original LER. No changes were made to the LER's i
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This iten is considered closed.
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(2) Unit 2
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(1)
(Closed) LER 87016 Revision 01:
Reactor Core Isolation i
Cooling Inoperable - Stean Supply Valve Auxiliary Contact j
Binding.
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This suppl mental LER adds the requirement to lubricate the auxiliarr contact plunger guides to the preventive maintenance p rog rr.;n.
This item is considered closed.
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(2)
(Closed) LER 86007, Revision 03: Update on the Failure of the Unit 2B Core Spray Room Cooler Due to Auxiliary Contact i
Binding.
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This supplemental LER adds the requirement to lubricate the auxiliary contact plunger guides to the preventive maintenance
program.
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(3)
(Closed) LER 88004, Revision 00:
Insufficient Number of
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Operable Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channels Due to Personnel Error.
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i On March 8,1988, the unit was in the Run mode at about 97%
thent,al power. With IRM 15 bypassed, an instrument mechanic
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requested permission to reinstall a repaired power supply for
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a LPRM, Given this information the SCRE gave permission to reinstall the power supply.
The instrument mechanic asked the unit operator to bypass APRM 4 as a protective measure.
Eighteen minutes later
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APRM 4 was taken out of bypass and the power supply was i
reinstalled. The SCRE performing a review of his logs noted that an IRM and its companion APRM were bypassed without a 1/2 l
scram being inserted.
This scram is used to assure that the
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APRNs are reading correctly prior to going into the run mode.
The cause of the event was due to personnel error which involved miscomunication and failure to adhere to procedural requirements which were in effect.
The individuals involved had been adequately trained, there were detailed procedures and operator aids available at the time of the event, but the individuals erred none-the-less. Corrective action included i
counseling the personnel involved and reviewing the event
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with the control room operators and instrument maintenance j
technicians.
The licensee's corrective actions appear adequate in that no
similar occurrences have happened. While this item is closed.
l the resident inspectors will continue to observe licensee
performance in this area.
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No violations or deviations were identified, l
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6.
Review of Routine and Special Reports (90713)
The inspectors reviewed the Monthly Performance Reports for the months of July and August, 1988.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Temporary Instruction Followup (92701)
(0 pen) Temporary Instruction 2515/98, Information of High Temperature Inside Containment /Drywell in PWR and BWR Plants.
Drywell temperature data is being gathered.
This item remains open.
8.
Administrative Controls Affecting Quality (42700)
Several drawings and procedures were checked for adequacy and accuracy.
Errors found were brought to the attention of the licensee and wer2 corrected.
No violations or deviations were noted.
9.
Raoiation Control (71709)
Periodic inspections of plant radiological control conditions were made during the inspection period.
Isolated instances of niinor deficiencies were found and promptly corrected by plant personnel.
The resident inspector observed the radiation protection practices prior to the transfer of a liner to a new cask for encapsulation.
The precautions observed by the station reflected their commitment to the ALARA program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
NRC Information Notices and Bulletins (92701, 92717)
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(Closed) NRC Infomation Notice No. 88-69: Movable Contact Finger
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Binding in HFA Relays Manufactured by General Electric (G.E.)
The licensee is aware of the 10 CFR Part 21 notification issued by G.E.
Prior to their use at this site, HFA relays are inspected and adjusted. Contact finger binding has not been a problem at this site.
(b)
(0 pen) NRC Information Notice No. 88-55:
Potential Problems Caused
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by Single Failure of an Engineered Safety Feature Swing Bus.
A similar condition exists at this site.
The licensee is aware of the potential problems and has initiated a modification to correct
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the problem.
The modification is com scheduled for the next refuel outage)plete on Unit 2 (Unit 1 is
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This issue is being reviewed by regional managerrent.
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11. Rejlional Requests (92701)
a.
(Closed) Improper Starting Resistors.
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A recent problem discovered at the Brunswick Power Station was brought to the licensee's attention.
This problem was one of insufficient torque to open certain HPCI, RCIC and LPCI valves due in part to a resistor which limits voltage to the motor during the l
first two seconds of operation.
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A review of electrical prints at this facility showed no such resistors in the circuit and thus that problem does not exist at l
this site.
b.
(0 pen) Valves with Remote Position Indication Outside the Control i
Room.
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A recent discovery was made at Zion that the valve position l;
indicators in the hot shutdown panel were not tested as part of the l
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IST program as required by ASME Section XI, IWV-3300. Though Quad l
Cities does not have a dedicated het shutdown panel, remote position indicators located outside the control room are required to be
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monitored during a loss of control room habitability.
This i
investigation is ongoing, j
c.
(Closed) Circuit Breakers with Counterfeit Parts, i
A recent discovery of circuit breakers with counterfeit parts was I
made.
Investigation detennined that Quad Cities had purchased 17 of the defective circuit breakers,1 of which was installed as a i
spare circuit breaker in a 125 volt DC cubicle, and the remaining 16
stored in the store room.
The defective circuit breaker was removed from the cubicle and returned to the store room. All of the circuit breakers have been affixe:I with QC Hold cards, d.
(Closed) Load Shed.
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A recent discovery of the inability of the emergency buses to load
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shed should a loss of offsite power occur between 5 minutes and 60
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minutes after the occurrence of a loss of coolant accident was made l
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Investigation of electrical prints determined that no i
j such problem existed at Quad Cities.
l 12. ActiononPreviousitems(93702)
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(Closed)OpenItems 254/85009-03; 265/85010-03:
Suction pressure
gages are not installed on the RHR SW pumps so that IST data can be
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obtained.
Relief request is pending with NRR.
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The resident inspector verified that these gages have been installed on all RHR SW purrps for both units.
l This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Open Item 254/85024-01:
Evaluation of Resolutions to Repair of det Pump No. 7 Sensing Line.
l The licensee has amended technical specifications to reflect actual plant conditions. Jet pump integrity has been and will continue to i
be verified every refueling outage, j
This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Open Items 254/85031-01; 265/85032-03:
Provide Controls for Contractor and Bulk Chemicals.
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The licensee has instituted controls for chemicals.
The resident inspector reviewed the procedure and found it adequate.
This item is considered closed.
I d.
(Closed)OpenItems 254/87033-01; 265/87033-01:
Failure to Comply
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with ASME Requirements.
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The licensee corrected the supports associated with the instrument L
racks on Unit 1 on December 22, 1987. The corrections associated i
with the instrument racks on Unit 2 were completed on May 26, 1988.
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This item is considered closed.
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e.
(Closed) Open Itens 254/87033-02; 265/87033-02:
Failure to Follow Design Procedures and Drawings During Installations on the 5 and 6 Racks.
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These items were associated with the above Open Items "d".
When
informed of the dist epancies associated with these instrument l
racks the licensee promptly reported the occurrence and took prompt
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corrective action to modify both racks on each unit and also
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committedtoreviewin$1censee'sactionsnoviolationwasissu other modifications that also dealt with
hangers. Due to the
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(Closed) Violation 254/87033-03:
Failure to Follow Procedures
Resulting in ESF Actuation.
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The licensee has included in the instrurrent technician's continuing training program specific training on this event and the i
requirements in the procedure.
Since then no other ESF actuations
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have occurred during refilling of the chlorine probe.
This item is considered closed, i
j 13. _ Seismic Monitoring Equipment I
The resident inspector reviewed the results of surveillance tests performed on the seismic monitor for the last year.
The results were
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consirtent with the specified acceptance criteria.
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Fu violations or deviations were noted.
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14. Requalification Examination Audits During the inspection period an audit of licensee-administered simulator t
requalification examinations for reactor operators and senior reactor
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operators was perfomed by NRC Region III Operator Licensing Examiners.
The audit was prompted by poor performance by licensee. Personne'
.,a the simulator which was noted by members of an Emergency Operating rrocedures inspection team from NRC Headquarters.
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The NRC Region III Operator Licensing Examiners reviewed the 4dequacy of the simulator scenarios used, the competence of the c,perators, and the accuracy and validity of the evaluations of the operator's perfomance
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made by licensee training personnel.
The NRC Operator Licensing Examiners were satisfied with the scenario, the perforrsnce of most of
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the operators, and the evaluations made by.icensee training personnel.
Weaknesses in the areas of cormiunications and supervisory skills of
certain operators were observed by the NRC Operator Licensing Examiners
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s and were also observed by the licensee training personnel.
These weaknesses are being adequately addressed in the licensee's
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requalification program.
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No violations or deviations were noted.
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15. Licensing Activities During the inspection period the Senior Resident Inspector assisted NRR by proof-reading the retyped version of sections 3.2 through 3.5 of the i
Unit 1 Technical Specifications.
Discrepancies between the retyped version and the original version were corrmunicated to the Licensing i
Project Manager.
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No violations or deviations were noted.
16.
Erosion / Corrosion Inspection
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During the inspection period an inspection team consisting of one a
individual from NRC Headquarters and one contractor reviewed the
l erosion / corrosion inspection program at Quad Cities.
1he inspection
tean was favorably impressed with the licensee's erosion / corrosion i
j inspection program.
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i No violations or deviations were noted.
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17.
Errergency Preparedness (82301)
j During the inspection period the resident inspectors toured the Emergency I
Operations Facility located in Morrison, Illinois, on August 26, 1988, j
participated in the licensee's practice energency exercise on August 10, 1988 and the NRC-evaluated emergency exercise conducted on August 31,
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1988, and attended the Federal Emergency Management Agency public meeting j
on September 2, 1988.
The emergency exercise is discussed in detail in
inspection reports 50-254/88019(DRSS)and 50-265/88019(DRSS).
f
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18. Local Public Document Room
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The Resident Inspectors inspected the local public document room located in the Dixon, Illinois, Public Library on August 26,15.,.
The library staff was knowledgeable and cooperative and the facilities appeared to be j
adequate.
19.
Securi ty During the inspection period the residents discussed security issues
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with licensee security personnel.
Issues discussed included security precautions to be taken in response to a planned demonstration, the i
expiration of the security guard's agreement with the security contractor, and the potential for a strike by the security guards.
.
All observations and information were conveyed to regional security j
inspectors.
No violations or deviations were noted.
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20.
Enforcerrent Conference
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J An enforcement conference was held on August 26, 1988, during which
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l licensee personnel discussed a Unit 2 power supply wiring error problem f
l with NRC personnel.
The wiring error is discussed in para
'
inspection reports 50-254/88015(ORP) and 50-265/88015(DRP) graph 10.h of The content
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of the enforcement conference is sumarized in inspection report 50-265/88024(ORP).
21.
ExitInterview(30703)
l i
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection
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on Septemb u 30, 1988, and sumarized the scope and findings of the
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inspection activities.
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The inspectors al.,o discussed the likely infomational content of the
I inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
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inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such
documents / processes as proprietary.
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