IR 05000254/1985012

Insp Repts 50-254/85-12 & 50-265/85-13 on 850401-0531.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint/Mods,Surveillance, Housekeeping,Procedures & Fire Protection

ML20127H405
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	06/12/1985
From:	Chrissotimos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127H345	List: IR 05000254/1985012 ML20127H343
References
TASK-1.A.2.1, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-2.K.3.16, TASK-2.K.3.21, TASK-2.K.3.24, TASK-2.K.3.35, TASK-TM 50-254-85-12, 50-265-85-13, NUDOCS 8506260323
Download: ML20127H405 (15)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-254/85012(DRP); 50-265/85013(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. OPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Namc: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Conducted: April 1 through May 31, 1985 Inspectors: A. L. Madison A. D. Morrpngfello_

Approved By: is 41ii5s, M d f- B T Reactor Projects Section 2C Date /

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on April 1 through May 31, 1985 (Reports No. 50-254/85012(DRP);

50-265/85013(DR))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannoun'ced inspection by the resident inspectors of actions on previous inspections findings; operations; radiological controls; maintenance / modifications; surveillance; housekeeping; procedures; fire protection; emergency preparedness; security; quality assurance; quality control; administration; routine reports; LER review; TMI items; regional requests; Headquarters requests; and independent inspection. The inspection involved a total of 542 inspector-hours onsite by two MRC inspectors, including 50 inspector-hours onsite during offshift .

Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Minor areas of concern were identified in operations surveillance, Quality Assurance, and procedure Overall, the licensee's performance has remained stead O

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DETAILS

. 1. Persons Contacted

• Kalivianakis, Superintendent D. Bax, Assistant Superintendent for Maintenance T. Lihou, Technical Staff Supervisor R. Roby, Senior Operating Engineer

• N. Griser, Senior Quality Assurance Specialist The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees, including shift engineers and foremen, reactor operators, technical staff personnel, and quality control personne * Denotes those present at the exit interview on May 31, 198 . Routine Inspection The resident inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined the areas stated in the inspection summary and accomplished the following inspection modules:

37701 Facility Modifications 42700 Plant Procedures 61701 Surveillance 61726 Monthly maintenance observations 62703 Monthly maintenance observations 71707 Operational safety verification 71710 ESF system walkdown 71711 Review of plant operations 90713 Review of periodic and special reports 92700 Onsite review of LERs l 92701 TMI Action Items 92702 Onsite followup of Events 92703 IE Bulletin followup 92704 Headquarters Requests

92705 Regional requests 92706 Independent inspection 93702 Onsite followup of events The inspectors verified that activities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initiating any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the Ifmiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and while components or systems were removed from service; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning :omponents or

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systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and

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. review of test results were accomplished; quality control records and logs were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials, and equipment were properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained as applicable; and adverse plant conditions including equipment malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards,. fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel errors were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by appropriate management personne Further, additional observations were made in the following areas: Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item 254/84-14-01 Improper Installation of Steam

. Jet. Air Ejector Valves. This item was addressed in IE Report No. 254/85-02 and dispositioned as an example of an item of noncompliance. As such, no further actions are required.on this Open Ite (Closed) Open Item 254/84-23-02 and 265/84-21-01 Revise QGP 2-4

" Shutdown From Power Operations To Hot Standby" and QOP 207-2'

" Declaring Rod Worth Minimizer Computer Inoperable." These changes were required due to difficulties experienced on October 25, 1984~and the scram that resulted on Unit 2. QGP 2-4 was revised to allow hot shutdown to include having the Main Steam-Isolation Valves open and thus facilitate pressure contro .QOP 207-2 was revised to eliminate the confusion experienced by operators'on October 25, 1985. Both revisions were reviewed by the resident inspectors and found to be acceptable. No further actions are require (Closed) Open Item 265/84-10-01 JumperMo'dificationToStandby Gas. Treatment System Heaters.. This item was= addressed.in IE Report 265/85-02 and dispositioned as-an example of an item of noncompliance. 'As such, no further actions are required on this Open Ite (Closed) Unresolved Item 254/85004-01 and 265/85004-02 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Room Cooler This item tracked resolution of the concern for HPCI room cooler fan environmental qualification requirements. The room coolers must be operable to ensure' operability and thus the concern. However, it was determined that the postulated line break that would cause a harsh environment for the fans is a HPCI line break. Therefore, HPCI would be inoperable and there would be no need for the room coolers. Since the normal environment for the fan is mild, this equipment need not be environmentally qualifie No violations or deviations were identifie .

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1- - Plant Operation Unit 1 was in operation and Unit' 2 was shutdown for refueling at

the beginning of the report period. On May.7, 1985 two contractor

, employees were injured when an electrical cable they were using came into contact with the Unit 2 345 Kilovolt power line, which 1- was providing offsite power to Unit 2. The Unit 2 auxiliary transformer tripped, causing a loss of offsite power to Unit 2

. and a voltage transient on Unit 1. The voltage transient on Unit 1 caused the isolation of several feedwater heaters and a loss of air to the feedwater~. regulating valve. The Unit 1 operator responded to the loss of feedwater heaters by reducing recirculation flow,

_ thus. reducing powe However, the loss of air to the feedwater

. regulating valve prevented its automatic response and the reactor F Lutomatically scrammed when reactor water level reached the scram setpoint. ~During the event, the Emergency Notification System (ENS)

phones lost power. Recent changes due to the breakup of the AT & T ,

and also due to system upgrades (replacing old wires with fiber

optics) have placed ENS in a configuration not in conformance with p the licensee's response to IE Bulletin 80-15. The licensee agreed to revise this respons '

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At present the ENS phones receive power from the Instrumentation Bus -:a very reliable source. However, as recent events point out,

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this power source can be lost. Therefore, a single source of power

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for this system is unsatisfactory. The licensee has committed.to installing a new phone system which'will have a backup battery supply. This backup battery will also supply the ENS phone Completion of these modifications will be tracked as an open' item

(254/85012-01(DRP) and 265/85013-01(DRP)).

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l Power was restored to Unit 2 by the 1/2 emergency diesel generator and by a cross-tie to the Unit 1 auxiliary transforme Repairs to

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i the transformer were completed May 8, 1985, and normal power was restored to Unit 2.

Unit I remained shutdown to facilitate replacement of the station i 125 volt batteries and modifications to the 1/2 emergency diesel generator to comply with Appendix R commitments. Unit 1 returned to power on May 17, 198 On May 22, 1985, while. performing the monthly operability test, the 1/2 diesel generator was declared inoperable due to a problem in the

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diesel ~ generator cooling water pump circuitry. A modification had been performed on the 1/2 diesel generator to allow for switching between power sources for the cooling water pump as part of

. Appendix R commitment Panels were obtained from the Hatch C of El Paso, Texas. 'These panels contained thermal overloads and a fuse as an integral part of the circuitry. The problem with this circuitry was that neither the fuse nor the thermal overloads were annunciated in the control room. When these protective devices operated, the control room did not know that the cooling water pump had trippe n l

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Later that day, while performing Core Spray logic tests, the Unit 2 diesel generator started as required but tripped'due to loss of control power. An Unusual Event was declared. The 1/2 diesel generator was tested and declared operable thus terminating the Unusual Even The Senior Resident Inspector questioned the operability of the 1/2 diesel generator and the ifcensee responded by jumpering out the thermal overload device and'the fus The Hatch Co. panels containing thermal overloads was considered a potentially generic item of concern and was forwarded to Region III for actio At 1800 on May 30, 1985 Unit 1 experienced a scram from approximately 100% power. A shift foreman was placing the Turbine Steam Chest pressure instrument back in service which caused vibration on the instrument rack. This rack also contained main steam line low pressure instrumentation which, when shocked, caused a Group I isolation and the Main Steam Isolation valve closure resulted in a scra During scram recovery, the unit experienced a second scra This came from low vessel level when the MSIV's were reopened to reduce reactor pressure. No ECCS systems were called upon and all systems operated as expecte Both units were shutdown at the close of this report perioc'.

During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down the

. accessible portions of the Core Spray Systems and the Residual Heat Removal Systems and performed the applicable portions of Inspection Procedure 71710 "ESF System Walkdown."

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No-violations or deviations were identifie ' Maintenance The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Observed installation of Electrical Switchgear for Appendix R modifications on Unit 2 emergency diesel generato (2) Observed and reviewed overhaul of Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection system turbin (3) Observed preparations for weld overlays on recirculation system piping for Unic (4) Observed and reviewed installation and testing of Unit 2 Scrci-Discharge Volum (5) Observed Mechanical Maintenance installing Temperature Control Valve on RBCC .

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(6) Observed Instrument Maintenance installing new control for TCV on RBCC (7) Observed Mechanical Maintenance repairing discharge valve of Unit 2 CRD pum (8) Observed Instrument Mechanical repairing LLRT gauge (replacement of diaphragm in pressure regulator).

(9) Observed Mechanical Maintenance and factory representatives working on new Target Rock safety relief valv (10) Observed Mechanical Maintenance repairing TBCCW pump and installation of sam (11) Observed Electrical Maintenance installing new battery racks for Unit 2 125 VD (12) Observed in house leak rate test of one Electromatic Relief Valv (13) Observed Mechanical Maintenance and factory representative inspecting Unit 2 diesel generato During Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) the 28 and 2D outboard MSIV's showed leakage in excess of the allowable leakage. The resident inspector observed the MSIV seats and disc after disassembly and they appeared to be free of an foreign matter and no cracks were visible on the surfaces. The 28 MSIV repairs consisted of lapping the main seat and disc and the pilot valve seat and disc. This MSIV was retested and failed. The process was repeated and the valve still failed. The main disc was replaced and the valve passed the LLR The 2D MSIV repairs consisted of lapping the main seat, pilot seat and disc and replacement of the main disc. The valve was reassembled and successfully teste d. Surveillance The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Reviewed Reactor Vessel Low Low Water level functional test Unit 2 and Unit 1 (2) Reviewed testing of newly installed analog trip system, Unit (3) Reviewed high drywell pressure functional test for Unit l (4) Observed preparations for and recovery from integrated leak l

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rate testing for Unit l

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(5) Observed Local Power Range Monitor calibrations on Unit (6) Observed one channel of Core Spray Logic testing on Unit (7) Observed rod scram timing on Unit (8) Observed 25% of RHR logic test on Unit (9) Observed 50% of Auto Start SBGTS tests on Unit (10) Observed Electrical Maintenance performing surveillance on various EQ breaker On May 17, 1985, Unit 2 experienced a Group II isolation signal due to surveillance activities. While 2A drywell radiation monitor was inoperable for repair purposes, surveillance of the newly installed analog trip system was performe Again, on May 18, 1985 with the 2A drywell radiation monitor still inoperable for repair purposes, surveillance was performed on high Drywell Pressure instrumentation causing another Group II isolation. These unnecessary challenges of plant safety systems could have been avoided with proper communication and planning by the operations department. Operations personnel, by being fully aware of plant and equipment status should be able to foresee the results of surveillance testing and take actions to prevent unnecessary safety system actuations. The inspectors communicated this concern to licensee plant management and will continue to observe this area for improvemen e. Procedures Reviewed The following procedures were reviewed:

QAP 200-13, Revision 10 Station Housekeeping Organization

,0AP 200-S2, Revision 1 Individual Housekeeping Surveillance QAP 200-S3, Revision 1 Fire Protection and Housekeeping Discrepancies QAP 200-S4, Revision 1 Periodic Fire Inspection Report QAP 200-S5, Revision 1 Housekeeping Inspection Report QAP 200-S6, Revision 1 Housekeeping Inspection QAP 200-T3, Revision 1 Housekeeping Zone Descriptions and Designations QAP 900-4, Revision 1 Traceability Tag Procedure QAP 1900-3, Revision 15 Station Access Control

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'QAP 1900-T9, Revision :1

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Possession of a Firearm Within the'

Station Protected Area QMP 800-21, Revision 1- Disassembly, Repair, and Reas'sembly of Safety-Related Butterfly, Ball, and Check Valves with Pneumatic or

' Hydraulic Actuators QMP 800-S16, Revision 1- Safety-Related Butterfly, Ball, or Check Valve and Actuator Checklist QMP 800-T22, Revision 1 ' Butterfly, Ball and Check Valve Shaft Scribe Orientation QMP 100-S11', Revision 2 Request for'Limitorque Valve Torque Switch Setpoint Change QAP 900-5,. Revision 1 In-Plant Radiography--Required Notifications and. Actions

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QAP 1900-10, Revision 10 Security Identification Badge / Key-Card Assignment and Control QFP 100-1, . Revision 1 Master Refueling Procedures QFT 100-4, Revision 4 Refueling Interlock Check (Checklist Included)

QMP 800-22, Revision 2 Target Rock Safety / Relief Valve Removal and Installation QMS 100-1, Revision 6 Monthly Fire Inspection QMS'100-52, Revision 8 Unit 1 and Unit 2 "R" Area Monthly Fire Inspection Check Sheet Quality Assuranc During a Quality Assurance (QA) audit in October, 1984,-it was determined by the Licensee that the vendor of electrical switchgear, Hatch Inc. of El Paso, Texas, had not submitted approved welding-procedures and other documentation to assure quality. In April, 1985, acceptable' documentation was submitte However,.a review-by the on-site Q.A. manager identi'fied that while the' documentation was for Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) the cabinets had actually

'been welded using Gas Metal Arc Welding (GMAW). Further-investigation at the vendor's facility determined that Hatch, Inc.,

management personnel were unaware of the actual procedures >being .

used for arc welding in their sho ~

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The licensee then reviewed the vendor's procedures for GMAW and

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contacted the four welders involved in cabinets supplied to Quad Cities to certify them to GMAW standards. This involved considerable effort in that two of the welders no longer worked for Hatch. All four welders passed certification testing and the procedures were found acceptabl A sample of the cabinets had been " Shaker" tested by Wyle Labs and found adequate for Seismic qualifications. All other cabinets at Quad Cities Station were compared to these samples by drawing weld maps and comparing weld dimensions. Further, vendor Quality Control (QC) inspections were reviewed for adequacy (the QC inspector had performed 100% inspection) and the QC inspector was interviewed by the licensee to verify his qualification Region III dispatched a specialist to review the licensee's

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actions and inspect the cabinet welds. The welds were found adequate and the cabinets were released for use at the station.

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These particular cabinets were being installed as safety-related and were required to meet seismic qualifications as part of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R upgrade modifications being made to the emergency diesel generator The second problem is one of communications. These cabinets s,hould have been placed on hold pending resolution of QA concerns. However, due to lack of adequate communication, the personnel who performed the receipt inspections for these cabinets were unaware of these concern Thus the cabinets were accepted and installe Fortuitously, none of the cabinets were ever put into operatio Formal mechanisms are in place to ensure proper communication of QA concern Therefore, no specific corrective actions are required by

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the ifcensee. However, the licensee was cautioned by the resident inspectors and agreed that better communication must be maintained in the futur No violations or deviations were identifie g. Review of Review of Routine and Special Report The inspectors reviewed the monthly performance report for Units 1 and 2 for the months of March and April, 198 No violations or deviations were identifie h. LER Review (1) (open) LER 85005, Revision 0 and Revision 1: Unit 1 Fuel Pool Monitor Trip *

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This report documents several spurious. trips of the 1A fuel pool monitor caused by electronic noise. Difficulty in isolating the cause of the noise accounted for the number of spurious trips. Troubleshooting by the Instrumen Maintenance department continues - as yet no specific cause has been found. This LER will remain open pending satisfactory repair of the monito ,

(2)- (open) LER 85012, Revision 0, Unit 1: 1A Fuel Pool Monitor Trip.-

Refer to above LER (3) (open) LER 85014, Revision 0, Unit 1: 1A Fuel Pool monitor

. Trip (refer to LER 85005).

(4) (closed) LER 85002, Revision 0, Unit 2: High Pressure Ccolant Injection Inoperabl On January 29, 1985, Unit 2 was operating at 100 percent thermal power. At 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br /> it was discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System's Motor Gear Unit.(MGU) failed to stay at its High Speed Stop. HPCI was declared inoperable and the required Technical Specifications surveillances were initiated. A jumper was placed on the HPCI's MGU.* HPCI was then declared operable and HPCI operability tests were performed. During these operability tests, HPCI injection valve, M0 2-2301-8,.would not open when .

it was given an OPEN signal from the Control Room. HPCI was declared inoperable again. At 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> a Generating Station

. Emergency Procedure (GSEP) Unusual Event was declared when th decision was made to shutdow The cause of the MGU failure was traced to a failed capacito The cause of the valve failure was found to be a broken torque switch. The problems were repaired and the GESEP Unusual Event-was terminated at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> on January 30, 1985. No further actions are require (5) (open) LER 85006, Revision-0, Unit 2: Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) fail Local Leak Rate Tests (LLRT).

This report documents the failure of MSIV's A0-2-203-2B and D to pass LLRT. -When the causes for failure have been determined-and repairs have been completed, a supplemental report will be issued. This LER will remain open pending receipt of that supplemental. repor (6) (open) LER 85008, Revision 0, Unit 2: Linear Indications on

. Reactor. Rec'irculation System Welds.

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This report documents the finding of crack indications during normal In-Service Inspection (ISI). The cause is postulated as being intergranular stress corrosion cracking. Further analysis were performed and repairs (weld overlay) were accomplished. A supplemental report will be issued after all reviews are complete This LER will remain open pending receipt of that supplemental repor (7) (closed) LER 85009, Revision 0, Unit 2: 2A Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Tri On March 20, 1985, Unit Two was shutdown for the End of Cycle Seven Refueling and Maintenance Outage. At 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br />, the 2A Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor spiked above its trip setpoint of 100 mr/ hour, isolating the Reactor Building Ventilation starting the Standby Gas Treatment Syste The 2A Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor tripped because of the transfer of the Steam Dryer from the Reactor cavity to the Dryer-Separator storage pit. Radiation levels in the area around the Reactor cavity were monitored continuously and were not excessiv Since the Reactor Building Ventilation System and the Standby Gas Treatment System performed as designed, the safety consequences nf this occurrence were minima The cause of this occurrence was procedural inadequac Maintenance procedure QMP 300-3, Steam Dryer Removal, did not require Maintenance Department personnel to notify Operating Department personnel that they were beginning to transfer the Steam Dryer. Because of this, Operating Department personnel were not aware that the transfer was in progress at the time of the tri This resulted in an unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (Standby Gas Treatment System). Procedure QMP 300-3 has been revise No further actions are require (8) (closed) LER 85010, Revision 0, Unit 2: Reactor Scram and Late Notification to NR This event was discussed in Inspection Report 265/85007 and was dispositioned as Violation. As such, no further action is require (9) (open) LER 85019, P.evision 0, Unit 2: Leak Rate of All Valves and Penetrations Exceed Technical Specification This report documents that the combined leakage of all valves and penetrations was found to be excessive during normal local leak rate testing. Repairs and further testing was accomplished and a supplemental report will be issued to document this upon completion of all reviews. This LER will remain open pending receipt of the supplemental repor No violations or deviations were identifie .

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, :(1) (closed) Item I.A.2.1 Upgrading of Reactor Operator and i Senior Operator Trainin NRR has-issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated April 12, f -1985 accepting the licensee's submittal to comply with this requirement. The resident inspectors have verified that the

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licensee's program does correspond to this submittal. 'No

! further actions are require (2) (closed) Item II.B.4 Training For Mitigating Core Damage NRR has issued a SER dated April 12, 1985 accepting the licensee's submittal to comply with this requirement. The resident inspectors have verified that the licensee's program ( does correspond to their submittal. No further actions are required.

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l (3) (closed) Item II.K.3.16 Challenges and Failures of Relief Valves l- In a letter dated November 14, 1984, NRR accepted the licensee's

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proposed actions concerning this item. The resident inspectors

have confirmed that the licensee's program conforms to their

! submittal. No further actions are required.

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L (4) '(closed) Item II.K.3.21 Restart of Core Spray and Low Pressure L - Coolant Injection Systems.

L l In~a letter dated October 26, 1984, NRR agreed that no

[ modifications were warranted for Quad Cities station in

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response to this item. No further actions are require (5) (closed) Item II.IK.3.24 Adequacy of Space Cooling for HPCI and RCIC System I In a letter dated August 13, 1982, NRR found the licensee's .

submittal acceptable. The resident inspectors have verified that the ifcensee's program complies with their submitte No further actions are require (6) (closed) Item II.IK.3.35 Effact of Loss of A-C Power on Pump t Seal In a letter dated December 1, 1982, NRR agreed that no m.odifications were warranted at Quad Cities station in re'sponse to this item. No further actions are require No Violations or deviations were identifie ..

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8: Regional Requests

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(1) A problem was discovered at Byron station concerning the Main

~ Steam Isolation Valve actuators. A request was made to determine if similar configurations existed at Quad Citie The resident inspectors confirmed that actuators similar to those used at Byron were.not in use in-any applications at- ,

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(2) A request was received to inspect the licensees program

. concerning station. battery operation and maintenance. The licensee's program was found to be acceptable with two minor exceptions:

a) No' post-maintenance testing is performed after cell jumpering or cell replacement. The ifcensee has agreed to change their procedures to reflect this requiremen b) ~ ~The station procedures for weekly and quarterly

< surveillances do not require the batteries to be on a float charge as part of the initial' conditions. This has '

been a station practice in the past and the licensee,has

. agreed to change their procedures to reflect this '

requiremen '

L These procedure changes will be tracked as an Open Item i (254/85012-02(DRP) and 265/85013-02(DRP)).

No' violations or deviations were identifie Followup on Headquarters Requests l

(1) A request was received for information to support Regional >

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efforts in followup of Generic Letter 83-28. The requested i information was promptly supplie .

j' (2) A request was made of the resident inspectors to determine i the' licensee's response to a recent safety issue concerning

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mispositioned control rods. The inspectors verified that procedural requirements had been written'and implemented to ensure that'a nuclear engineer was present during' scheduled control rod movements, to identify the conditions under which

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the rod worth minimizer may be bypassed, to prohibit the use

. of scram timing equipment except for testing and emergencies,

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and to provide guidelines on the appropriate use of

" emergency-in" mode'of rod insertion and notch override switch-

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U in continuous' withdrawal. The inspectors also verified that

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training had been provided for operators in the proper movement

. of. control' rods, the consequences of improper movement, the

consequences

of operating with a mispositioned rod, the function of the Rod Worth Minimizer, and the scram test l- switche i

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(3) A request was made to inspect the licensee's actions concerning General Electric (GE) Service.Information Letter (SIL) No. 402

"Wetwell/Drywell Inerting."

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The concern was that introduction of cold nitrogen via the inerting system could cause cracking in vent system pipin A review and evaluation of the design of the Quad Cities station inerting system determined that the potential for introduction of cold nitrogen in to the suppression chamber was minimal. The temperature of nitrogen entering containment is monitored and alarms in the control room on a low temperature of 50 degrees A review of past performance determined that the inerting system has been very reliable. Procedures were also found to be adequate, however, precautions were added to alert operators to the problems of introducing cold nitrogen into the syste In response to I.E. Bulletin 84-01 both Unit suppression chamber vent header were visually inspecte No abnormalities were foun ,

Additionally, leakage tests are performed during each refueling outage and repairs are performed as necessar No violations or deviations were identifie . Independent Inspection (1) A report from Wolf Creek station reported that a security officer, acting in a data management capacity, had entered a command into the security computer for an emergency evacuation. He believed the computer would reject the comman It did not. Subsequently, a trainee in another location verified the command as authentic without being fully cognizant of the results of his actions. This resulted in unlocking doors in the protected and vital area The security officer immediately recognized his error but, did not know the cancellation code, resulting in a delay in locked condition restoratio A report of equipment at the Quad Cities station determined that a similar event was possible. As a result, Security personnel are being retrained on computer procedure Additionally, the licensee has had the practice of assigning no trainees to computer console duty. All operators receive 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of training firs l

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(d) A report from South Texas Project identified fabrication interference on sway struts manufactured by NPS Industrie It was determined that similar struts suppifed by NPS Industries were installed at Quad Cities station. However, their freedom of movement was verified during installation and during a reinspection in June, 198 Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the ifcensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or ifcensee or both. The open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs Ib and l . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. The unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph l . Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 31, 1985, and summariz i the scope and findings of the inspection activitie .

The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar t *

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