IR 05000254/1997016
| ML20212G998 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212G990 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-97-16, 50-265-97-16, NUDOCS 9711070257 | |
| Download: ML20212G998 (9) | |
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY -
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
REGION lil Docket Nos:
50-254;50-265 License Nos:
50-254/97016(DRS);
50-265/97016(DRS)
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Facility:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 Location:
22710 206th Avenue North Cordova,IL 61242 Dates:
August 25-29,1997 -
Inspector:
D. Schrum, Reactor Engineer Approved by:
Ron Gardner, Chief, Engineering Specialist Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety
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9711070257 971105 PDR ADOCK 05000254 e
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 -
NRC Inspection Report 50-254/97016; 50-265/97016 This regional inspection reviewed the licensee's fire protection program and several Appendix R issues. The following strengths and weaknesses were identified:
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Pbnt Suncort Control of combustibles and material condition for the majority of the fire protection e
equipment were good (Section F2.1).
Fire brigade performance during a fire brigade drill was good (Section F5.1).
- A violation was identified where the licensee failed to remove or protect combustibles
within 35 feet of hot work (Section F3.2).
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Reliability problems with the diesel fire pumps represented a significant program -
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weakness. (Section F2.2).
A weakness was identified conceming fire brigade drills with an excessive number of
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drill participants who were credited for meeting training requirements (Section F5.1).
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Report Details IV. Plant Sunnort F.2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F.2.1 - Observatloa of Plant Areas a.
Ipsoection Sacoe The inspectors toured the auxiliary and turbine buildings to observe the control of combustibles, fire doors, hose stations, detection equipment, extinguishers, sprinkler -
systems, emergency lights, and housekeeping.
b.
Observations and Findings With the exception of "hotwork", the control of combustibles in the plant was good. This included control of transient combustibles. Flammable liquids were stored appropriately in fire proof cabinets and safety cans. Most wood and plastics used in the plant were l
- fire resistant. Equipment oil leaks on rotating equipment were minimal with oil being
- collected on absorbers and removed before becoming excessive.
The material condition of the majority of the fire protection equipment was good. Fire suppression and detection equipment condition was good, except for the diesel fire pumps. Extinguishers had a current inspection date. Fire brigade equipment was in good condition and in convenient locations in the plant. Most fire doors in the plant self closed and latched.
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Conclusions Control of combustible material in the plant was good, except for hot work. Material condition for the majority of the fire protection equipment was good.
~ F2.2 Diesel Fire Pumos a.
Insoection Scone The inspector reviewed reliability problems with the diesel fire pumps.
b.
- Observations and Findings The diesel fire pumps had a problem with random tripping for several years. The licensee recently identified the problem as a false overspeed trip signal caused by an electromagnetic pulse from the collapse of the electric field around a nearby wire. This design problem was the result of a previous licensee modification to the diesel fire pumps.
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An additional problem ident'fied by the licensas in 1995 was that the diesel fire pumps did not produce adequate pressure and flow for several sprinkler systems. These sprinklers had been listed as impairments since that time. The licensee has been slow to commit resources necessary to add or upgrade the fire pumps to correct this problem, c.
Conclusions Not taking effective corrective actions for diesel fire pump problems was a significant fire protection program weakness.
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F3 Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation F3.1 Surveillance Proaram a.
Insoection Scoce
Inspector review of fire protection surveillances.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
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Fire protection surveillances were accurate and appropriately conducted. For those surveillances reviewed, the fire protection equipment condition appeared to be good.
This included sprinklers, fire dampers, detectors, and fire doors. There was a noted low failure rate for these systems. Emergency lighting surveillances indicated that corrective actions for a previous high failure rate for emergency lights had been effective.
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Conclusions The fire protection surveillance program was accurately implemented.
F.3.2 Hot Work Controls a.
Insoection Scooe The inspectors observed hot work controls dur'ng welding.
b, Observations and Findngs During a tour of the turbine building with a fire protection supervisor, the inspector observed "hotwork" (welding, grinding, cutting activities) not being performed according -
to plant procedures and good work practices Hot work was performed without combustibles removed or covered within 35 feet of welding on the Unit 2 Train B Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (BRBCCW) System Heat Exchanger. The combustibles included a large piece of foam, a plastic foreign material exclusion (FME)
cover,2 plastic buckets, rags, a shirt, plastic items, and garbage container with garbage.
The majority of the materials were in close proximity to the hot work. The repairwork to
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the 2BRBCCW System Heat Exchanger included a 5 'Wcant amount of welding. The hot work permit had been signed verifying that combusucW? had been removed or covered for this area.
This hot work problem was of particular concern because the licensee, in response to previously identified IPEEE concems, had implemented more stringent restrictions for'
cutting and welding operations for high risk areas of the plant. In addition, there were increased controls for issuing transient combustible permits. The BRBCCW System Heat Exchanger was in a high risk zone (2nd Floor Reactor Building). This area had a hot work fire watch and continuous fire watch (15 minutes between observations of areas) Neither fire watch noted the problems with the hot work. Neither ;ndividual knew the expectations for removing combustiMes from hot work locations.
Quad Cities Technical Specification 6.8.1.a required that procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for activities covered in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, included fire protection procedures.
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Quad Cities Administrative Procedure, QCAP 1500-12. " Fire Prevention for Welding and
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Cutting," Revision 5, required: D.8.a.(2). "All combustibles shall be relocated at least 35 l
ft. horizontally from the work site. Where relocation is impractical, combustibles shall be L
protected with flameproof covers or otherwise shielded with metal or fire resistant guards or curtains."
On August 28,1997, the inspector obnerved welding activities in the turbine building that -
did not have combustibles remover' or covered within 35 feet of these activities. Not removing or covering combustibles within 35 feet of hot work was a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a (50-254/265/97016-01(DRS)).
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Conclusions The failure to implement hot work controls was a violation.
F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification FS.1 Fire Briaade Trainina. Fire Briaade Drill. and Critiaue a.
Insoection Scoce The inspectors reviewed fire brigade training and qualification records, and fire brigade critique forms. In addition, the inspector observed a fire brigade drill and critique.
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Findings and Observations The inspector reviewed fire brigade qualifications and associated training records.
Training records indicated that the fire brigade was meeting its quarterly fire brigade training requirements. In addition, onsite fire brigada drill requirements had been met by all brigade members who were listed as qualified. Live fire training for all brigade
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members was being conducted on an annual bases. Also, off-site response drills were performed.
A review of fire brigade critique forms indicated that critiques were thorough and had identified fire brigade drill problems. Associated training for identified problems was used to improve fire brigade performance. The !nspector identified one weakness for fire brigade drills performed in 1997. Many fire brigade drills had 15 to 21 participants.
The majority of the individuals had little participation and training during a drill; however, the individuals were given credit for meeting their fire brigade drill requirement.
- The inspector observed a fire brigade drill in the turbine building. The fire fighting staff appropriately used the pre-fire plans to identify the risks in the area and simulated it,olating the electrical equipment. Five fire brigade members responded in a timely manner to the simulated fire with appropriate fire fighting gear and completed dressing for entering the space. Numerous other plant staff responded to participate in the drill.
One problem noted was that the key for a lock on an Appendix R safe shutdown equipment locker could not be readily located. However, the lock was a break away design and could have been removed,if necessary.
l A critique was held at the end of the fire drill with all of the participants in the drill present. The participants were allowed to give their insights on what they considered as problems during the drill, c,
Conclusions The performance of the fire brigade members was considered good during the drill. The practice of allowing fire brigade participants to take credit for fire brigade drills, even
though the participants did not actively participate in the drills, was a weakness.
F6 Fire Protection Organization and Administration-F6.1 Backloa of Nuclear Work Reauests a
Insoection Scoce The inspectors reviewed the timeliness of the licensee's corrective actions in the fire protection area, b.
Observations and Findings A review of Nuclear Work Requests (NWRs) indicated that the number of NWRs had been reduced during the past year. Fire protection NWRs had been reduced from greater than 200 to 90. Most of the remaining items were not significant and there was a low number of fire protection impairments that required a fire watch. However, one
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significant impairment pertained to sprinklers systems that did not meet flow and pressure requirements as previously identified in Section F2.2 of this report.
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ConclusiqQS few fire protection impairments requiring a fire w n y reduced. There were only a F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues
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[ Closed) Violation 50-2Sy265/95005-06a (DRGr failure to identify and take corrective actions for a hi h fThis violation prevent emergency lighting batteries from disch g
corrective actions to the licensee had taken actions to correctly aim em r ng maintenance, in addition, failure rates. A review of emergency lighting surveill ergencylights and to reduce ELU indicated a low failure rate of ELUs. This violation is lances for the las c osed.
LClosed) ViolatioM54/265/95005-OSb(DRS):
to identify and take corrective actions for poor fire b iThis violation was brigado critiques were ineffective. Th to improve fire brigade performance. e licensee had taken subs during this fire protection inspection, the licensee wa As indicated by the fire brigade drill observed ns problems with the fire brigade performance and with fire bris effective is closed.
gade critiques. This violation LQased) Violation 50-254/26Sj95005-06c IDRS):
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i taking timely corrective actions for a backlog of nu lThis violation was issue impairments. The licensee had taken actions to signifi NWRs and fire protection impairments. In 1995 the numbc e cantly reduce the number of requests and impairments was 256. During this inspection ther of ope few of these items pertained to fire protection impairme t e number was 90. Only a Most of the remaining items were not significant This i ln s that requir
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v o ation is closed.
V. Management MeeEnst Xi Exit Meeting Summary The licensee acknowledged the findings presentedOn A ection results to licensee management.
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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materi l should be considered proprietary. No proprietary informatia s examined dur on was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED L. Pierce, Station Manager -
G. Powell, Radiation Protection Manager --
D. Cook, Operations Manager
'J. Hutchinson, Site Engineering Manager C. Peterson, Regulatory Affairs Manager.
R. Bauner, Regulatory Affairs A Chemick, Regulatory Assurance
.H. Smith, Fire Marshal
. F. Famulari, SQV Director U.S. Nuclear Raoulatorv Commission C. Miller, Senior Resident inspector
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C. Lipa, Senior Resident inspector -
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K. Walton, Resident inspector l-
. D. Schrum, Reactor Engineer B. Ganser, IDNS
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 64704:
Fire Protection Program ITEMS OPENED and CLOSED Ooened 50-254/265/95016-01 VIO Hot work controls
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50-254/265/95005-06a VIO Corrective action for emergency ligt ting 50-254/265/95005-06b VIO Corrective action for Ore brigade drills, 50-254/265/95005-06c VIO Corrective action for backlog NWRs and fire protection Impairments.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED BRBCCW Train B Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water CFR Code of Federal Regulations CST Central Standard Time DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS-Division of Reactor Safety ELU Emergency Lighting (Jnit FHAR Fire Hazards Analysis Report FME.
Foreign Material Exclusion FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FPR Fire Protection Report GL-Generic Letter IPEEE Individual Plant Examination for External Events LCO Limiting Conditicn of Operation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NWR Nuclear Work Request PDR Public Document Room
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QCAP Quad Cities Administrative Procedure RHR Reactor Heat Removal
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