IR 05000254/1988010

Insp Repts 50-254/88-10 & 50-265/88-11 on 880418-29.No Violations Noted.Major Areas inspected:safety-related Piping Weldments,Components & Supports Selected from Plant Mod Packages & Inservice Insp Plan

ML20195G700
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	06/06/1988
From:	Harris R, Kerch H, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195G690	List: IR 05000254/1988010 ML20195G684
References
50-254-88-10, 50-265-88-11, NUDOCS 8806280106
Download: ML20195G700 (10)

Text

. _ _ . . ._ _ _ . . _ _ -

,

'

'

. .

-

.

-

.

,

t

.

I .

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION <

'

REGION I-Report N /88-11

'

, Docket N /50-265 License N OPR-29/0RP-30 Licensee: Commenwealth Edison  !

P.O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Facility Name: Quad Cities Inspection At: Moline Illinois Inspection Conducted: April 18 through April 29, 1988 l Inspectors: b A I s\ b 2- b 4 HT W. Ker(hF Sintior Reactor Engineer date~ .

,

UsH. Harris, NDE Technician / bE ' date c?S

<

Approved by:

. R. Strosnider, Chief, Materials, and

[/[/85 date

"

Processes Section, EPB, ORS, Region I

.

Inspection Summary and Conclusions: A routine announced inspection conducted on April 18 through April 2 9, 198 (Report No. 50-254/88-10,50-265/88-11).

Areas Inspected: A routine, announced inspection was conducted at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2. Included in this independent measurements

"

,

inspection were safety-related piping weldments, components and supports selecte'd from plant modification packages and the inservice-inspection olan.

-

Specific areas inspected were selected from the Anticipated Transient Wii.hout

Scram (ATW3), Atmospheric Containment Atmospheric Dilution (ACAD), Residual

Heat Removal (RHR), Feedwater (FW) and Condensate System All inspections were performed to applicable codes, standards and procedures.

1

k

0806280106 880621

' PDR ADOCK 05000254

Q DCD

. - _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ . , _, _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . - . _ _ , . _ - _ ~ _ _ . . . - , _ , _ _ _ .

__

'

. .

,

Summary and Conclusions The quality of the piping welds, pipe hanger modifications and piping support welds inspected was goo However, five unresolved items were identifie These items involved (1) documentation of visual weld inspections; (2)

incomplete ultrasonic inspection data packages; (3) lack of weld inspection reference points required by Section XI of the ASME Code; (4) improper application of ASNT experience requirements for nondestructive examination personnel; and, (5) failure of a nondestructive examination personnel qualification procedure to include ANSI 45.2.6 experience requirements (all examination personnel were found to possess adequate experience despite the procedure deficiency). These items indicate a weakness in the nondestructive examination program administered by the Commonwealth Edison Safety Material Analysis Department. This weakness appears to be the result of inadequate staffin The inspection team noted that Quad Cities is the cleanest BWR facility of its vintage that they have inspecte ,

j e

,

. - _ .

.-

, ., - . _ . . . _ , , _ . - _ , . . .

'

.

'

.

.

Details 1.0 Persons Contacted 30703 Commonwealth Edison

• 0an Gibson, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• Tom Tamlyn, Project Superintendent

• J. Ford, Assistant QC Supervisor

• Gary Tagatz, Inservice Inspection Wesley W. Witt, level III Curtis Smith, Quality Control Supervisor Gary Spedl, Technical Services Charles Norton, Quality Assurance Engineer Richard I. Bax, Station Manager Mack Turczynski, Site Engineer Rich Roby, Services Superintendent Michael Brown, Quality Assurance United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission D. H. Danielson, Section Chief RIII

• Kaven 0. Ward, Reactor Inspector RIII

' Denotes those attending the exit meetin The inspector also contacted other administrative and technical personnel during the inspectio '

2.0 Independent Measurements - NRC Nondestructive Examination and Quali_ty Records Review of Safety Related Systems During the period of April 18 through April 28, 1988 an onsite independent measurements inspection was conducted at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3. This inspection was conducted by NRC regional-based inspectors and contracted Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) personnel. The purpose of this inspection was to verify the adequacy of the licensee's nondestructive examination program during plant modification. This was accomplished by duplicating, as near as possible, those examinations required by code and re a'ations, and evaluating the results. The examinations performed , the NRC were selected from the following modification packages and system MODIFICATION PACKAGE SYSTEM M0-4-1-85-036 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR)

MO-4-1/2-87-072 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS)

M0-4-1-86-016 MISSILE SHIELD DOORS (MS0)

MO-4-1-86-031 ATMOSPHERIC CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC DILUTION (ACAD)

. _ ._ - . _ . - . - -

s  :

. .

-

.

'

4  ;

.

3.0 Nondestructive Examination Liquid Penetrant Examinations (57060) t Twenty (20) safety related pipe weldments and adjacent base material (1/2 inch on either side of the weld) were examined using the~ visible dye ;

penetrant technique per NRC procedure NDE-9, Rev. O in conjunction with '

the licensee's procedure NDT-0-2, Rev. 5. Included in this sample were ASME Class 2 weldments from the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Syste Results: No violations were identifie Magnetic Particle Examination (57070)

Two (2) safety related pipe weldments and adjacent base material (1/2 inch on either side of the weld) were examined using the dry magnetic particle-technique per NRC procedure, NDE-6, Rev. O in conjunction with licensee's procedure NDT-8-1, Rev. 2. Included in this examination were ASME Class 2 carbon steel pipe weldments selected from the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Syste Results: No violations were identifie Thickness Measurements for Erosion / Corrosion Approximately one hundred and sixty (160) thickness measurements were ,

taken at six different areas to determine if wall thinning had occurred

~

due to erosion / corrosion. This was accomplished by laying out a 1 or 2 inch grid (determined by pipe size) on the area to be examined and

,

recording the thickness measurements obtained by the use of a NOVA D-100 thickness gauge. The areas selected included, one 10 inch 90 degree elbow i to pipe component, one 10 inch pipe and one 6 x 8 inch reducer pipe located in the Condensate Syste Results: No violations were identifie j Visual Examination (55155)

Twenty two (22) safety related pipe weldments and adjacent base material (1/2 inch on either side of the weld) were examined in accordance with NRC procedure NDE-10, Rev. O, Appendix A, site procedure NDE/VE-7 Rev. associated site QC Documentation, and drawings. The examinations were performed specifically to identify any cracks or linear indications, gouges, leakage, or arc strikes with craters or corrosion, which may infringe upon the pipe minimum wall thickness. Mirrors, lights and weld gauges were used to aid in the inspection and evaluation of these I weldment Results: No violations were identifie . . .. _ .

.

'

-

.

- .

.  ;

.

!

Visual Examination Hanger / Support .

A visual inspection of welds, hangers, support components and attachments {

was conducte Included in this inspection were items selected from the ;

Atmospheric Containment Atmosphcric Dilution (ACAD) and the Anticipated .

Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Systems. The inspections were conducted in f accordance with NRC Procedure NDE-10, Rev. O, and the licensee's applica'le c drawings, and visual inspection records contained in the '

modi fication packages (M0-4-1/2-87-072 and MO-4-1-86-03 Spe:i fic . ;

attributes looked for were loose or broken members; corrosion; missing, i damaged or wrong parts; excessive clearance and gaps; and improper  !

installation. Weldments were inspected in accordance with the Nuclear !

Construction Issues. Group (NCIG 01) Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria (VWAC). Specific attributes looked for were cracks, weld. size, incomplete :

fusion, overlap, underfilled craters, weld profiles, undercut, porosity, '

weld length and location; arc strikes.. surface slag or spatter. Those :

component- 'nspectec after protective coatings had been applied could not :

be evaluat. for cracks or fusion type defects, t

!

R ihe inspector reviewed licensee modification packages M0 4-1-86-031 :

and Mo - 11/2-87-07. These modification packages _ indicated that visual .

inspection of structural welds were to be performed using the attributes :

and acceptance criteria in the Nuclear Construction Issues Group Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria (VWAC) for structural welding at Nuclear power .

Plants. The licensee indicated these inspections were performed using the i VWAC criteria. However, the results of the insoections were not recorded !

in appropriate detail. The inspection data sheets only indicated if the ,

weld was found acceptable or unace table and did not provide sufficient :

information to confirm that all the VW\C attributes had been evaluate The licensee indicated that'tbty were committed to inspections performed '

in accordance with VWAC and the results of all future VWAC inspections wi r ;e properly recorded (sce section 3.0 Paragraph 3.2.3 of the VWAC ;

di aent). This is an unre _,ved item pending licensee action and NRC :

re.fe (50-254/88-10-01) ,

Ultrasonic Examination (57080) '

The inspector selected two (2) safety related 10 in. pipe weldments for i independent ultrasonic inspection. Those welds selected were ASME Class 2 carbon steel weldments from the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)

Syste The ultrasonic examinations were performed using a Krautkramer USL-48 flaw detector in accordance with NRC procedure NDE-1, Rev. O,  ;

Commonwealth Edison procedure NDT-C-2 and associated ultrasonic test data report Instrument calibration (linear verification) was performed using NRC procedur? NDE-2 Rev. A distance amplitude correction curve (DAC)

was constructed using the licensee's calibret ion standard no. 99933QC. To ensure repeatability of ultrasonic examinations, instrument settings and search units (transducers) wera matched as near as possible to those indicated by the licensee's ultrasonic data report Results: No viol Ations were identifie . - - . . - . . -

--

. __ . - . - - -. . .~-. . -. - - - . - - . _ --

s

. .

. .

.

4.0 Review of Site NDE Procedures and Manuals The-following procedures were reviewed for compliance to the licensee's FSAR commitments and applicible codes, standards and specification *NDT-D-2 Rev. 5 LIQUID PENETRANT

• NDT-C-2 Rev. O THICKNESS MEASUREMENTS

• NDT-C-2 Rev. 15 ULTRASONIC INSPECTION (PIPE WELDS)

• NDT-B-1 Rev. 2 MAGNETIC PARTICL *NDT-C-37 Rev. 1 ULTRASONIC INSPECTION (WELD OVERLAY)

• NDE/VE-7 Rev. 0 VISUAL INSPECTION 1-1-0 Certification of Inspection and NDE personnel

• QA Manual

• GE procedure QC-2 Rev. 4 Qualification and certification of NDE and visual personnel Results: No violations were identifie .0 Inservice Inspection (ISI) (7305;)

The ins?ector reviewed the outage cycle ?. Spring of 1988 ISI program and the ISI 10 year pla A sampling of Inservice Inspection documentation packages including magnetic particle and ultrasonic examination reports were reviewed. The examination reports were reviewed to verify compliance with ASME Section XI Cooe requirements for accuracy of the documentation and evaluation of examinrtion dat Results: During this inspection the licensee's Safety Material Analysis Department (SMAD) had accepted the ultrasonic data for recirculation weld 02A-510. The licensee's ultrasonic data examination report stated that the indications detected in the subject weld during this outage had not changed in dimension since it was evaluated-in the previous outage. Based-on evaluation of the licensee's record of inspection, the inspector could-not determine that the indications had grown since the previous outage examination Further investigations revealed that the ISI contractor (GE) had copies of the 1986-87 outage ultrasonic examination results that included ultrasonic indication plots for this weld with all indications marked as to type and location. The inspector compared this information with the ultrasonic indication plots of the 1988 autage and concluded that the indications had ne dimensional changes since the last outage. How-ever, the indication plots required in order to perform this evaluation l were supplied by the contractor (GE) and were not included in the licensee's-insevice inspection report of recor The inspector also identified deficiencies in data recoided on licensee's u!trasonic examinstion data sheet, Form NDT37. This form is inadequate

,

to er.sure accurate and consistent recording of ultrasonic dat I l

. . -. .. . - - -. . .

.

'

i .

!

For example, Form NDT37 for weld number 20AS10 had.several incorrect data ,

entries. Reference for indication number 1 under the section entitled "In Axial Length" had-a recorded value of 0.60. However, the inspector de '

termined that this value actually was the "W" location dimension rather than the form required axial total dimension. Indication number 78 unctr the section entitled "Ind. Circ. Length" had a recorded value of 71.2".

^

This was found to represent the location in inches from the reference point at which the-inspection _ began. The information recorded on the form was not what the form required. Based on the above inspection findings, the present form requires clarification to ensure proper data entr These deficiencies in the licensee's ISI documentation are considered an unresolved items pending Licensee action and NRC review (50-265/88-11/02).

During this inspection the NRC inspectors also determined that the site ISI program requirement and ASME Section XI, Appendix III, Supplement 2 cre not being met in that a reference system has not been established for the inspection starting point', direction of the examinations and she location of the' center line.of the welds, _ This item is unresolved pending licensee action and NRC review (50-265/88-11/03).

Review of reactor vessel relief request NGCR-1 and NOCR-2 indicated tha relief was being requested for-one too many circumferential welds in request NOCR-2. All drawings reviewed indicated a total of six circum-ferential we.ds, including one circumferential weld in the beltline

.'

region. The licensee stated the relief request would be corrected during_

the n(xt change. The inspector had no further questions in regard to this ite .0 Personnel Qualification / Certification (57900)

Nondestructive examination and visual examination qualification and certificatica records for personnel from site quality control and two site contractors were reviewed. The acceptance standards used for the inspection were SNT-TC-1A (1980), ANSI 45.2.6 (1973) and ASME Sections XI (1980) and site procedure Commonwealth Edison Personnel Personnel records and Commonwealth procedure 1-1-0 Revision 24 were ,

'

, reviewed. Several proolems werc. disclosed. One of the problems identi- '

fied relates to improper use of the SNT-TC-1A 25?; rule in Commonwealth procedure 1-1-0 Revision 2 The SNT 25% rule is to be applied to initial training of full time NDE personnel in two or more NDE methods at the same time. The Commonwealth Edison procedure permitted the use of the SNT 25?s rule for other than full time NDE personnel qualification. One individual was certified using the 25?s rule when the majority of his work time was spent on QC activitics not involving actual application _ of NDE. _ Thus, the Commonwealth Edison NDE personnel could fulfill the procedure requirement without satisfying the ASME required minimum experience. The inspector provided copies to Commonwealth Edison (SMAD) of SNT-TC-1A interpretations with recTrd to the 25?4 rule for qualification and certification of full-

!

l

- - - - '

___ _ _ _ . . . _ __ __ _ . _. -. _

..

-

.

~

-

time nondestructive examination personnel. The intent of SNT-TC-1A is clear. Actual performance of work in the method is required for '. hat time to be claimed as work experienc The subject was discussed at length during the inspection and at the exi This item will be carried as un-resolved pending licensee-review of their qualification and certification of personnel in the use of the 25% rule, within Commonwealth Edison nuclear progra Results: This item-is unresolved pending the licensee's review of all NDE certification records to determine where the 25% rule was used and NRC review (50-265/88-011/04).

General Electric (GE)

Twenty-one GE personnel NDE qualification and certification records were reviewed and found satisfactory. Four GE personnel qualification and certification visual records were reviewed. The GE personnel met the ANSI 45.2.6 (1973) experience requirement. However, GE procedure QC-2 Rev. 4 does not meet the ' ANSI 45.2.6 1973 experience requirement-in that it re-quires thres months rather than four years experience. Also, Commonwealth Edison procedure 1-1-0 Rev. 24 does not properly address the experience requirement of ANSI 45.2.6 (1973). Specifically, procedure 1-1-0' requires only one year of experience for a high school graduate to qualify for level II certification while ANSI 45.2.6 requires four years experienc Commonwealth Edison informed the inspector that the visual section of procedure 1-1-0 Rev. 24 was undergoing rewrite ar.d that-the requirements of ANSI 45.2.6 would be me Results: This item is unresolved pending Comaonwealth Edison review of their procedure 1-10 Revision 24 and determination if unqualified personnel have signed off ASME inspection (50-265/88-011/05)

Morrison Construction Company Two visual personnel qualification records were reviewed and found acceptabl Results: No violation was identified 7.0 Staffing Commonwealth Edison's Safety Material Analysis Dept (SMAD) has three NDE

_

Level III's and three NDE Level II's assigne Their duties consist of monitoring Commonwealth Edison NDE procedores, supplying review perscnnel at the 12 Commonwealth Edison nuclear plants during outages and responding to all the othee reactive NDE needs at-these nuclear plants plus the NDE requirements for Commonwealth Edison fossil facilities. The deficiencies  !

in the NDE program noted above, indicate that the SMAD staffing level may l not be adequate to effectively support the NDE. program need j i

)

- , . ~ . - . , , - - - - , . - . . . - . - - .- .. . . . . - - , - - . - .

.

-

. - ,

.

8.0 Attachments Attachment No. 1 is a tabulation of specific pipe weldments examined and result .0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptacle items or violation Unresolved items are discussed in paragraphs 3.0, 5.0 and .0 Management Meetings (30703)

Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection at the entrance interview on April 28, 1988. The findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the exit interview (see paragraph 1 for attendees).

At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector. The licensee did not indicate that proprietary information was involved within the scope of tnis inspection, i

I

l l

-

e ',. l

.

-

DATE 5/5/08 INDEPENDENT MEASUREMENTS PLANT 80UAD CITIES PAGE_1_OF_1_ PROGRAM ATTACHMENT NO. 1 l

)

WELD / ISO CLAEd MT THIC UT PT VI EROSION / CORROSION

'

1-3406-ED-1 2 N/A AC N/A N/A N/A ACCEPTABLE 1-3205-B-3 2 N/A AC N/A N/A N/A ACCEPTABL B- 6 2 N/A AC N/A N/A N/A ACCEPTABLE  !

2-3304-ED-2 2 N/A AC N/A N/A N/A ACCEPTABLE 2-3205-ED-3 2 N/A AC N/A N/A N/A ACCEPTABLE 2-3304-D-10 2 N/A AC N/A N/A A ACCEPTABLE FW-2A 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM A FW-3A 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM A FW-4A 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM A FW-5A 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM A FW-6A 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM A FW-2B 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM B/C 4

. FW-3B 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM B/C FW-4B 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHR9W ROOM B/C FW-5B 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM B/C FW-6B 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM B/C FW-2C 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM B/C l l

FW-3C 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM B/C FW-4C 2 N/A N/A .N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM B/C l

FW-5C 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM 5/C FW-6C 2 N/A, N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM B/C

,FW-2D 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM D FW-3D 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHPSW ROOM D ,

'

FW-4D 2 N/A N2A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM D FW-5D 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM D FW-6D 2 N/A N/A N/A ACC. AC RHRSW ROOM D FW-2331-1 2 AC N/A ACC. N/A AC HPSI ROOM !

FW-2339-1 2 AC N/A ACC. N/A AC HPSI ROOM

!

..-.<