IR 05000254/1999009
| ML20196E723 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196E718 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-99-09, 50-254-99-9, 50-265-99-09, 50-265-99-9, NUDOCS 9906280403 | |
| Download: ML20196E723 (18) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil Docket Nos:
50-254;50-265 License Nos:
50-254/99009(DRP); 50-265/99009(DRP)
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Facility:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:
22710 206th Avenue North Cordova,IL 61242 i
Dates:
April 21 through May 31,1999 Inspectors:
C. Miller, Senior Resident inspector K. Walton, Resident inspector L. Collins, Resident inspector B. Dickson, Residsnt inspector, Dresden Nuclear Station A. Dunlop, Reactor Engineer R. Lerch, Project Engineer R. Ganser, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety Approved by:
Mark A. Ring, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
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9906290403 990623 PDR ADOCK 05000254 Q
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-254/99009(DRP); 50-265/99009(DRP)
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection from April 21 through May 31,1999.
Operations A Unit i reactor trip due to sensed high scram discharge instrument volume level
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resulted from reactor water cleanup relief valves lifting during startup of the system.
Corrective actions from previous problems were considered poor. Previous occurrences
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of the relief valves lifting in March 1999 received poor apparent cause consideration. An emergency diesel generator start during the reactor trip resulted from bus transfers related to the trip. A related condition had been noted during previous bus transfers, but not corrected (Section 01.2).
Operators failed to properly position the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection discharge
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valve during performance of a surveillance test. This operator error adversely affected the system configuration while in a test mode and was a Non-Cited Violation of NRC requirements (Section 01.3).
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A secondary containment integrity concem was identified when a chemist found a spare
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high radiation sampling system sample line that was not capped. Initial corrective actions to install a temporary plug in the line appeared to be appropriate. Further corrective actions were under review by the licensee and the NRC. The licensee planned to submit a licensee event report on this condition (Section O1.4).
Process computer problems caused a short term failure of the core thermal power
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calculation, and were similar to difficulties experienced in December 1998. The interim i
solution and the longer term conective actions to the recent problems appeared to
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address the physical computer problems. However, control room operator detection and correction of the most recent problems were not initially timely. Untimely operator detection was a repeat issue. Corrective actions from December 1998 did not address j
the untimely operator detection and correction of the computer problem and therefore were not effective in preventing the most recent occurrence (Section O2.1).
Overall, the pre-startup activities were well controlled and conducted in a conservative
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manner (Section 04.1).
However, the inspectors concluded that the licensee drywell closeout inspection was
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performed poorly due to the amount of debris found by the inspectors (Section 04.1).
MaintenRDra Instrument technicians performed a surveillance test on the wrong unit. This was an
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example of poor work control. Thera were no adverse safety consequences to this occurrence (Section M4.1).
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Enaineerino
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- The engineering evaluations associated with the high pressure coolant injection system provided reasonable ascurance that pl ant equipment problems were being adequately evaluated by engineers (Section E2.1).
Problems with low pressure and high pressure pump seals continued, and caused
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additional pump unavailability (Section E2.1).
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Report Details
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l. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
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i On April 21, at the beginning of the period, operators were maintaining Unit 1 in cold shutdown for a planned outage to install a clamp on a jet pump riser in the reactor recirculation system. The licensee retumed Unit 1 to operation on May 1,1999. On May 21,1999, Unit 1 tripped due to a high level signal in the scram discharge Instrument volume. A relief valve lifted in the reactor water cleanup system which j
allowed steam into the scram discharge instrument volume. Operators retumed the unit to operations on May 23 and continued to operate the unit at or near full rated power for
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the mmainder of the period. Unit 2 Operated at or near full power during the period.
The licensee identified several instances of human errors which did not significantly affect safe plant operations. The licensee initiated a human performance improvement program during the period in an attempt to reduce the number and effects of human errors.
01.2 Reactor Scram Due To Reactor Water Cleanuo Relief Valves Liftina a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed corrective actions for a reactor trip on Unit 1.
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Observations and Findinas On May 21,1999, the Unit i reactor automatically tripped from 100 percent power due to a scram discharge instrument volume high level signal. The plant response to the trip was normal. One anomaly which occurred during the electric power bus transfers following the trip involved the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator starting when not required, Approximately 10 minutes prior to the reactor trip, operators had restarted the Unit 1 reactor water cleanup system. Subsequent investigation determined that during the startup of the reactor water cleanup system, relief valves 1-1299-79 and 80 lifted and failed to reseat. This caused flow of reactor water at about 450 degrees Fahrenheit into the reactor building equipment drain tank and into other connections common to the drain tank, including the scram discharge volume vent and drain lines.
Root Cause Report Q1999-01815 indicated that the resulting steam caused the temperature switches, which sense high water level in the scram discharge instrument volume, to actuate, resulting in the automatic reactor trip. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence includoJ implementing procedure changes to clarify reactor water cleanup system venting and to prevent water hammer during system startup, as well es installing temperature indication in the piping downstream of the reactor water cleanup relief valves. Additional corrective actions to change the actuation setpoint of the level instruments to prevent spudous trips due to steam were under evaluation.
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Following root cause determination and corrective action review by the Plant Operations Review Committee, reactor startup commenced at 10:40 p.m. on May 22.
The inspectors reviewed the root cause package presented to the Plant Operations Review Committee. The root cause report identified incomplete or ineffective corrective action for previous events including corrective actions from a Significant Operating Events Report 80-06," Partial Failure of Control Rods to insert," Dresden Licensee Event Report 85-031-00, "High Sc.am Discharge Volume Spurious Water Level Indication Causes Reactor Scram," and Problem Identification Form Q1999-00953 which detailed a March 14,1999, problem with the reactor water cleanup system relief valves, The report identified that actions taken at Dresden to minimize the sensitivity of the thermal switches in the scram discharge volume had not been performed at Quad Cities.
Tne inspectors' review of the root cause report available during reactor startup indicated that some of the issues were not discussed and/or well defined in ue package. Some problems with the root cause are discussed below.
The inspectors noted that the Plant Operations Review Committee review did not require resolution of possible adverse interactions of the reactor water cleanup system with the Unit 1 scram discharge portion of the control rod drive system before reactor startups A possible concem with the piping configuration found at Quad Cities was that drain piping from the north and south scram discharge instrument volumes was I
connected together with other system drains into a common drain header to the reactor building equipment drain tank. The licensee partially addressed this issue in the root cause report as an item which did not have adequate corrective action performed from Significant Operating Events Report 80-06. The Quad Cities review of the response to the report indicated that the Quad Cities instrument volumes each had an independent drain to the reactor building equipment drain tank. However, piping and ingrument diagrams indicated that the drains were connected prior to entering the drain tank and also were connected with drains from other systems such as the reactor water cleanup system. Therefore, the inspectors concluded the Plant Operations Review Committee did not have good documentation prior to reactor startup that adverse system interaction would not effect the scram discharge volumes.
The inspectors also found that the Plant Operations Review Committee review did not address possible problems with the plant response to NRC Bulletin 80-17, " Failure of 76 of 185 control rods to fully insert during a scram at a BWR." This bulletin was written in response to the same concem as Significant Operating Events Report 80-06. Since the piping and instrument diagrams indicated system interactions were possible, the
inspectors found the information available prior to startup insufficient to make a conclusion on the adequacy of the system configuration compared to that stated in the
response to the bulletin. Inspectors could not tell from interviews with plant z
management or the Plant Operations Review Committee review package that sensor j
- information verified that no water from the reactor water cleanup system had entered the j
scram discharge volumes for Unit 1. Inspectors also could not determine whether the water from the reactor water cleanup system would have an adverse effect on the
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required setpoint of the scram discharge instrument volume high level trip.
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Later communications with engineers and reviews of data provided several days after startup supported the position that no significant amount of water entered the scram
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discharge volumes until after the scram signal was generated. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was still reviewing the possible adverse interactions of the connected systems to the scram discharge volume. Inspectors reviewed the information available and found it reasonable to expect that a further problem with the reactor water cleanup system relief valves on Unit _1 would be detected in time to prevent a trip. Based on preliminary information, inspectors also found that previous scram history supported a temporary conclusion that the scram discharge piping would perform adequately in the event it was called upon.
c The root cause report identified that the cause of the relief valves lifting was water hammer due to system startup. However, the report failed to detail the cause of the water hammer. The reactor water cleanup system had been started up many times in the past without similar complications, and only lately had showed signs of relief valves lifting during system startup. Corrective actions focused on ways to change operating procedures during startup and to require operators to monitor piping conditions downstream of the relief valves. Some design concems with the relief valve setpoints and piping configuration were planned for engineering review by July 30,1999.
The inspectors and the licensee identified that the March 14,1999, event in which the reactor water cleanup system relief valves lifted during system startup had insufficient corrective action to determine root cause of the relief valves lifting. Problem identification Forms Q1999-0953, -0957, and -0968 were written to address various details of the event, but nem led to a good root cause determination for the relief valve problem. Problem identification Form Q1999-0953, which received an apparent cause evaluation to address why the relief valves lifted, indicated the relief valves would be changed out, but did not indicate why this would correct the problem. When the relief valves were changed out, the setpoint for the valves was found to be acceptable. This
' information was not factored back into the apparent cause evaluation to re evaluate the root cause. The inspectors considered this apparent cause evaluation te v3 poor, and a missed opportunity to correct the relief valve problem prior to the reactor trip. The problem identification form and subsequent Root Cause Report Q1999-01815 included action tracking items to address unresolved issues concerning the reactor water cleanup system relief vakes and potential interactions with scram discharge volumes.
The inspectors and licensee also identified previous opportunities to address emergency diesel generator anomalies during bus transfers. The inspectors identified similar issues in inspection Report 50-254/97028; 50-265/97028. The licensee listed several missed
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opportunities to correct the problem in Problem Identification Form Q1999-01817.
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Conclusions A Unit i reactor trip due to sensed high scram discharge instrument volume level resulted from res : tor water cleanup relief valves lifting during startup of the system.
Corrective actiors from previous problems were considered poor. Previous -
occurrences oD ne relief valves lifting in March 1999 received poor apparent cause consideration nn emergency diesel generator start during the trip resulted from bus
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transfers relate:, to the trip. A related condition had been noted during previous bus transfers, but not corrected.
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01.3 Valve Out of Position Durina Hiah Pressure Coolant inlection System Surveillance i a.
Inspection Scooe (61726)
' The inspectors observed operators perform a pre-job brief and initiate a high pressure coolant injection surveillance for post maintenance activities.
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Observations and Findinos During the week' of May 17,1999, the licensee removed the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection system from operation for various planned maintenance activities. On May 20,1999, operators retumed the system to service and performed prerequisite Step D.3 of Quad Cities Operating Surveillance Test 2300-05, " Quarterly HPCI Pump Operability Test." During the operability test, control room operators started the pump and noted no apparent flow through the system. The operators secured the pump and aborted the test. The operators discovered that the pump discharge valve was closed.
The required position of the valve was open The licensee documented this condition on Problem identification Form Q1999-01798 and commenced a prompt investigation.
Operators had completed Step D.3 in Quad Cities Operating Surveillance 2300-05, Procedure Field Change 4653, which required that the high pressure coolant injection system be in a standby lineup. However, after completion of this step, operators performed a se,parate test, Quad Cities Operating Surveillance 2300-06, " Quarterly HPCI System Power Operated Valve Test," Revision 14, to stroke time other high pressure coolant injection valves. Subsequently, the operators failed to reposition the discharge valve to its standby position after timing the valves. Operators did not reverify that the system was in a standby lineup after performance of Quad Cities Operating Surveillance 2300-06 and prior to continuing with Quad Cities Operating Surveillance 2300-05.. The inspectors considered this operator error to be the cause of the improper high pressure coolant injechon system configuration, j
Quad Cities Technical Specification 6.8.A.1 requires the licensee to establish and implement procedures covering the activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2 dated February 1978.' Section 1.d of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 references Administrative Procedures for " Procedure Adherence and
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F Temporary Change Method." Quad Cities Administrative Procedure 1100-12, i
Revision 18, " Procedure Adherence Procedure," Step D.1.a.6, required re-verification of applicable initial conditions if the evolution had been suspended for an extended period
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i of time. The licensee's failure to re-verify valve 2-2301-9 was in the open position, an initial condition of Procedure 2300-05 that was suspended for the performance of
~ Procedure 2300-06, prior to performing the remainder of Quad Cities Operating Surveillance Procedure 2300-05, was considered a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.A.1 and the above procedures. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non Cited Violation (NCV 60-266I99009-01) consistent with '
Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Problem Identification Form Q1999-01798. For
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. immediate corrective actions, the licensee retumed the valve to its correct position and completed the surveillance test. Operators were notified of the expectations for implementing partial sections of surveillance tests. The licensee continued to evaluate additional corrective actions.
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During the time of this ' event, the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection system was alresoy considered inoperable, but available due to curveillance testing. Had an accident sigr.al been present during the time the valve was mispositiotied, the 2-2301-g valve could have automatically opened.
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Conclusions
- Operators' failed to proper ly position the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection discharge
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valve during performance of a surveillance test. This operator error adversely affected the system configuration while in a test mode and was a Non-Cited Violation of NRC requirements.
01.4 Secondary Containment Integnty a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to a secondary containment integrity
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- concern. : Reviews included the operability evaluation and the initial corrective acticns to
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restore secondary containment integrity.
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Observations and Findings During a walkdown of the high radiation sampling system on Unit 2, a chemist recognized that a spare 1 inch sample line that connected to the reactor building was not capped, but had duct tape over the opening. An inspection of the reactor building j
' found duct tape on the other end of the sample line. The condition was reported to the
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operations shNt manager who determined that secondary containment integrity was not met. Operators promptly complied with Technical Specification Limiting Condition for
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Operation Action Statement 3.7.N.1 which required that secondary containment integrity be restored within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or the plani be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
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i Maintenance installed a plug in the line as a plant temporary alteration, and the limiting
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. condition for operation action statement was no longer considered applicable. The licensee was planning a permanent fix at the end of the period, and planned to submit a licensee event report on this condition.
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Conclusions
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A secondary containment integrity concem was identified when a chemist found a spare high radiation sampling system sample line that was not capped. Initial corrective actions to install a temporary plug in the line appeared to be appropriate. Further corrective actions were under review by the licensee. The licensee planned to submit a licensee event report on this condition.
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' Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1. Process Comouter Problems Affect Core Therma.1 Power Monitorina a.
Insoection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for the process computer problems which affected core thermal power monitoring.
Observations and Findinas On May 4,1999, the computer program OD-76 for Unit 2 which was used to monitor core thermal power, failed to update. This condition was not detected by operators for approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. During this period, operators recorded core thermal power hourly but did not recognize that the recorded value was not actually changing. Other '
indications of reactor power, including average power range monitors, and computer _
program printouts were available during this period, and were also used by operators to
! monitor power, A similar problem had occurred on Unit 2 on December 7,1998. During 3'
' that event, the licensed thermal power limit was exceeded when the computer problem -
went uncorrected for approximately 3-1/2 hours, in this most recent example, the licensed thermal power limit was not exceeded. However, the failure to recognize the computer problem for 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> was a second example of weak monitoring of reactor power using OD-76.
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Rebooting the computer corrected the problem temporarily.' Interim corrective actions to monitor the problem required operators to specifically request the computer to calculate core thermal power on an hourly basis. Using this method, operators detected two more
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instancer of OD-76 failures over the following 2 days. Thelicensee determined that frequent error messages from the Unit 1 traversing in-core probe system sent to the
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process computer were filling the. computer memory and affecting the ability of OD-76 to run. ' Interim corrective actions were to disable the communication between the traversing in-core probe system and the process computer. A longer term fix was
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planned to change the OD-76 program and to fix the traversing in-core probe system j
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- The cause of the previous occurrence in December was a different computer programming problem, although the effect was similar. Corrective actions from the December event were recently completed for the software issue, but no corrective actions had been taken regarding the untimely. detection of the problem.
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Conclusions Recent process computer problems caused a short term failure of the core thermal power calculation, and were similar to difficulties experienced in December 1998. The interim solution.and the longer term corrective actions to the recent problems appeared
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to address the physical computer problems. However, control room operator detection and correction of the most recent problems were not initially timely. Untimely operator detection was a repeat issue. Corrective actions from December 1998 did not address the untimely operator detection and correction of the computer problem and, therefore,
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!O4- - Operator Knowledge and Performance
! 04.1' - (Unit 1) Ooerations Performance a.
Inspection Scooe (71707) -
- The inspectors reviewed operator performance prior to Unit 1 startup. Some of the
- activities observed included the reactor recirculation loop startup, the control rod drive pump startup and the reactor vessel pressure test.
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Observations and Findinas Overall, pre-startup activities observed by the inspectors were performed well. The operators in the control room and in the field enforced three-way communications,
followed plant procedures, and conducted informative tumovers. The response by
_ operations personnel to equipment problems was also good.
' On April'29,1999,'the inspectors perfonsed a closeout inspection of the Unit 1 'drywell
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after the licensee management determined that the drywell was ready for closure. The inspectors identified various housekeeping concems during this closeout inspection.
The inspection found multiple pieces of wood chips and nails. The inspectors also -
found multiple pieces of duct tape, some measuring approximately 5 - 6 inches in length, and other loose debris ranging from small nuts and bolts to a piece of rubber met -
of about 15 square inches area. The inspectors also identified that a nut was missing off a nut and bolt assembly used to nold a snubber in place. The inspectors also identified a packing leak on the 1-202-4A reactor recirculation suction valve. Following
. the inspection, the licensee removed two bags of debris from the Unit i drywell. The licensee also told the' inspectors that sections of the Unit i drywellin front of the equipment and personnel hatches would be vacuumed to remove material found during
. the closeout inspection. Due to the amount of loose debris and material found during the closeout inspection, the inspectors concluded that the licensee peiformed a poor final drywell closeout inspection.
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Conclusions Overall, the pre-startup activities were well controlled and conducted in a conservative ft
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Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)
08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-265/98004-01: Operators Failed to Properly Rack in an Electrical Breaker. This configuration control event rendered the Unit 2 station blackout diesel generator inoperable for 5 days. In addition, subsequent operator rounds did not detect the deficient condition. As a result of this and other events, the licensee increased the number of overviews of non-licensed operators. The licensee noted a decrease in the number and significance of events but continued to evaluate operator performance.
This item is closed.
' '06.2 (Closed) Violation 50-265/98004-02: Out-of-Service Valves Were Repositioned Contrary to Administrative Procedures. The root cause was determined to be L
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j inadequate control of a vendor technical representative who operated the out-of-service valves. Corrective actions were completed and included visitor control procedure revisions. An effectiveness review was planned to be completed by September 1999.
No other incidents of visitors operating plant equipment or violating out-of-service boundaries occurred since this event.
11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 ' General Comments (62707)
During the ; period, maintenance activities had resulted in a continuing decline in the backlog of non-outage maintenance work requests. In general, maintenance activities were completed in a safe manner and in accordance with work packages and licensee procedures. Instrument maintenance personnel performed a surveillance activity on the
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incorrect unit. Although there was no affect to the unit, there were multiple opportunities to identify and prevent this occurrence.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 Wrong Unit Error Durina Surveillance Testing a.
Inspection Scope (92902)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's prompt investigation for this event and spoke
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i with licensee personnel regarding a surveillance test performed on the wrong unit.
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Observations and Findings
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On April 21,1999, an instrument maintenance supervisor assigned a work crew to perform Quad Cities Instrument Surveillance 0200-08, " Reactor 2/3 Core Water Level Analog Trip System Calibration and Functional Test," on Unit 1. However, the work schedule required that the surveillance be performed on Unit 2. The workers received authorization from operators and completed the surveillance test on Unit 1 with no impact to unit operations. Afterwards, the maintenance supervisor recognized that the surveillance was performed on the wrong unit and documented the deficient condition on Problem identification Form Q1999 01465.
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The maintenance supervisor had pulled the surveillance test procedure from the Unit 1 predefine book while looking for another Unit 1 surveillance test. ' The supervisor assigned a work crew to perform the test on Unit 1 even though the work schedule required the work be done on Unit 2. The supervisor did not review the work package number or the scheduled performance date against the work schedule. The workers
d likewise did not identify the error. Operators reviewed the maintenance activity and allowed the activity to proceed. As a corrective action, the licensee required that
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operators screen maintenance activities to ensure the activities were scheduled appropriately, i
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The inspectors noted this particular event was of minimal safety significance since the test could be done with the existing plant conditions on either unit. However, the
licensee had experienced a number of recent human performance errors at the station (reference inspection Report 50-254/265-99006 and Section 01.3 of this report). In response to these events, the licensee had revisited the need to address human errors on a more programmatic level. The licensee initiated a team to review and reduce human errors, in addition, the increased number of human performance errors resulted in licensee management requiring a site-wide stand down and requiring department heads to conduct a meeting with employees in an attempt to reduce human y
performance errors.
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Conclusions U
instrument technicians performed a surveillance test on the wrong unit. This was an example of poor work control. There were no adverse safety consequences to this
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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1" [QJggd) Violation 50-254/97014-04: 50-265/97014-04: Test Acceptance Criteria Not Properly incorporated into Test Procedure. Quad Cities Technical Surveillance 0240-06, " Unit One (Two) Modified Performance Test 250 VDC Safety-Related Battery" contained inaccurate test acceptance criteria. However, the battery performance was acceptable. The test director had inadvertently entered an incorrect value in the space provided for the acceptance criteria. The licensee's corrective '
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actions were to brief personnel on this issue and to review test procedures to determine other procedures which required the test director to enter the acceptance criteria. For those procedures that required the test director to provide the acceptance criteria, a second independent verification was added to ensure the correct acceptance criteria was documented. This violation is closed.
- M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-254/97026-01: 50-265/97026-01: Failure To Take Corrective Action For Safety-Related 4kV Breaker Failures. Corrective actions for hardened grease which caused a breaker failure, were not completed in a timely manner. The J
licensee replaced or refurbished all breakers that were potentially affected. The NRC conducted an inspection of breaker maintenance which concluded that preventive -
maintenance was adequate and corrective actions for this violation were acceptable.
This violation is closed.
J M8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-254/98004-03: 50-265/98004-03-Standby Liquid Control System harveillance Requirements Not Satisfied. This issue was described in Licensee Event Report 50-254/98009 which was closed in inspection Report 50-254/98013;
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- 50-265/98013. This violation is closed.
M8.4 - (Closed) Violation 50-254/98004-05 Snubber Testing Not Performed in Accordance
With Technical Specification 4.8.F.5. The cause of the failure to perform the required surveillance tests w'tNn the specified frequency was incorrect due dates in the electronic work control system and the failure to identify the incorrect dates. The snubber testing coordinator revised predefine dates and setup an auto trigger function to generate work requests. Other Technical Specification surveillance tests conducted by the engineering department were also confirmed to have appropriate tracking dates.
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ITraining was provided to engineers regarding the Technica Specification due dates and
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M8.5 -' (Closed) Violation 50-254/98003-04i Inadequate Procedures. The inspectors identified two instances of procedures which lacked appropriate criteria, Quad Cities Operating Surveillance 6600-02, * Diesel Generator Air Compressor Operability," and Quad Cities Abnormal Operating Procedure 2300-04, "[High Pressure Coolant Injection) System Auto Trip." These procedures were revised to include the appropriate criteria. This item is closed.'
M8.6 (Closed) Violation 50-265/98009-04 Work Performed on Traverse in Core Probe
. System Without Out-of-Service Hanging. In April 1998, instrument maintenance technicians continued maintenance activities without ensuring out-of-service cards were hanging. The licensee completed a series of corrective actions. This item is closed.
M8.7 - (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-254/98023-00. 50-265/98023-00. Control Room
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Emergency Ventilation System inoperable Due to inaccuracy of Air Flow instrument. In
- October 1998, the licensee failed a control room emergency ventilatior' aystem iast.' A laterinvestigation determined the gauge used to control flow was not calibrated. After gauge recalibration, the test was reperformed satisfactorily. The licansee submitted a design change to abandon the indicator and changed the surveillarce test procedere to
- require using a pitot tube to determine air flow through the system. This item is closed.
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111. Engineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Overwew
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The engineering evaluations associated with the high pressure coolant injection system reviewed by the inspectors provided reasonable assurance that plant equipment problems were being adequately evaluated by engineers.
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 ~ Enaineerina Support of Unit 2 Hiah Pressure Coolant inlection System Problems a.
Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors observed maintenance and engineering activities associated with the
. Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection system. The inspectors reviewed the following engineering documents to determine if engineering was adequately evaluating oouipment problems:
. Operability Evaluation for Problem Identification Form Q1999-01811, Unit 2 High
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Pressure Coolant injection high pressure pump outboard seal leak.
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Temporary Modification 99-2-010; installation of gasket in lieu of O-ring in Unit 2
High Pressure Coolant injection low' pressure pump.
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Observations and Findinas-i During the week of May.17,1999, the licensee removed the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection system from operation to perform planned maintenance activities.
I During the system outage, the licensee completed 47 work activities, including surva!!bnce tests. However, problems were encountered which resulted in the system being unavailable for an additional 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> greater than planned. One reason for the
additional unavailability hours included identification of erosion of the low pressure pump seal face.
Engineers reviewed the erosion condition and planned to implement a temporary j
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modification instead of machining the low pressure nump seal face. In order to repair the erosion, the licensee would be required to m6 chine the seating surface. Machining was not schedu!ed and could not be completed successfully within the allotted time. In lieu of machining the face, the licensee installed a temporary modification which
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replaced an 0-ring with a sealant gasket. The evaluation for the temporary modification adequately addressed that this was not a change requiring a 50.59 evaluation and that the temporary modification would not change how the system would respond during an accident condition. Maintenance workers installed the sealant gasket on the low I
pressure pump.. During subsequent testing, the licensee identified that the temporary modification to the low pressure pump adequately held system pressure.
During subsequent testing,~ the' licensee identified that the high pressure pump seal leaked between 3 and 10 gallons per hour. The licensee evaluated the condition as being satisfactory. The operability evaluation adequately addressed the effect of the
I leak on pump operations. Operators tested and verified that the pump could still deliver rated flow and pressure. Engineers determined the leak would not adversely affect room environmental conditions, and the leak rate was within the bounds provided by the pump seal vendor. Operators approved the engineering evaluation and declared the high pressure coolant injection pump operable.
The evaluations produced by engineers provided reasonable assurance that the pump could continue to be called upon to operate with a seal leak on the high piessure pump and a sealant gasket in the low pressure pump until permanent repairs could be made during a future outage, c.
Conclusions -
The engineering evaluations associated with the high pressure coolant injection system
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provided reasonable assurance that plant equipment problems were being adequately evaluated by engineers. However, problems with low pressure and high pressure pump seals continued, and caused additional pump unavailability.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering items (92903):
E8.1 (Closed) Tl 2515/141: Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readinem of Computer Systems at
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Nuclear Power Plants The inspectors conducted an abbreviated review of Y2K activities and documentation using Temporary Instruction 2515/141, " Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of
- Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." The review addressed aspects of Y2K
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management planning, documentation, implementation planning, initial assessment, detailed assessment, remediation activities, Y2K testing and validation, notification
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activities, and contingency planning. The inspectors used Nuclear Energy Institute / Nuclear Utilities Software Management Group documents 97-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," and 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," as the primary references for this review. Conclusions
- regarding the Y2K readiness of this facility are not included in this summary. The results of this review will be combined with reviews of Y2K programs at other plants in a summary report to be issued by July 31,1999.
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- E8.2 _ (Closed) Violation 50-254/97011-4a: 50-265/97011-04a: Weak Tracking of Cycling of Merlin-Gerin Electrical Breakers, in April 1997 the licensee identified cracking of certain
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phenolic switches on 4160 volt electrical breakers. The licensee performed a temporary repair, tested, and qualified the breakers for limited continued operation. The licensee proceduralized the tracking of the breaker cycling. However, the inspectors identified weaknesses in log keeping and procedures used to track breaker cycling. The licensee implemented corrective actions to address these deficiencies. The breakers had been tested for longer use and the licensee implemented a modification to permanently repair the affected breakers. The licensee initiated a series of tracking items to ensure repairs were completed prior to exceeding testing specifications. This item is closed.
E8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-254/97011-4b: 50-265/97011-04b Modification Requirements Not Translated into Procedures. Licensee Event Report 50-265/96001 documented that the NRC inspectors identified that exhaust vacuum breakers associated with the high pressure coolant injection system could be closed without declaring the system to be inoperable. ' A licensee modification previously identified that with these valves closed, the system would be degraded. However, this issue was not incorporated into operating
' procedures for the system due to poor tracking methods employed in 1991. The '
licensee changed procedures and trained operators and engineers associated with this event. This item is closed.
E8.4 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-254/98201-14: 50-265/98201-14: Pump Concems. This
issue concemed nonconservative inputs and modeling for determining the net positive -
' : suction head for the residual heat removal service water and diesel generator cooling water pumps. Due to the low available margins, the inspectors were concemed that the additional head losses through the separation screens at the crib house and the non-conservative flow rates used in the calculations may challenge the net positive suction head conclusions. The licensee completed Quad Design Calculation 3900-M-0337, * Effects of Screen Blockage on the Water Level in the Residual Heat Removal Service Water Bay," Revision 2, and Quad Cities Design Calculation 1000-M-0131, " Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) Availability vs. Requirements for DGCW and RHRSW Pumps," Revision 2, to address these issues. The analysis indicated that the available net positive suction head was greater than the required net positive suction head for both the residual heat removal service water and diesel generator cooling water pumps under each analyzed flow scenario. This item is closed.
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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary.
~ The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management near the conclusion of the inspection on May 28,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented,
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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' Licensee -
E. Anderson, Radiation Protection Manager G. Barnes, Station Manager W. Beck, Acting Regulatory Affairs Manager J. Dimmette, Site Vice President R. Freeman, Maintenance Manager M. Mcdonald, Operations Manager D. Wozniak, Engineering Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
' Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations T.
IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 92700:
Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities '
IP 92902:
Follow-up - Maintenance IP 92903:
Follow-up - Engineering
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
-Opened I
50-265/99009-01 NCV Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection valve out of position Closed 50-265/99009-01 NCV Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection valve out of position 50-265/98004-01 VIO operators failed to properly rack in an electrical breaker
'50-265/98004-02 VIO valves were repositioned contrary to procedures 50-254/265/97014-04 VIO test acceptance criteria not properly incorporated into test procedure 50-254/265/97026-01 VIO failure to take corrective action for safety-related 4kV
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breaker failures 50-254/265/98004-03 VIO SBLC system surveillance requirements not met 50-254/98004-05 VIO snubber testing not performed in accordance with Technical Specification 4.8.F.5
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50-254/98008-04 VIO procedures; two instances of procedures lacking
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appropriate criteria 50-265/98009-04 VIO work performed on traverse in core probe system without out-of-service hanging 50-254/265/98023-00 LER control room emergency ventilation system inoperable due to inaccuracy of air flow instrument 50-254/265/97011-04a VIO weak tracking of cycling of Merlin-Gerin electrical breakers 50-254/265/97011-04b VIO modification requirements not translated into procedures 50-254/265/98201-14 URI RHRSW and DGCW pumps NPSH
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Tl 2515/141 Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants Discussed None
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