05000311/LER-1982-132, Forwards LER 82-132/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-132/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20070C202
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/24/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20070C203	List: 05000311/LER-1982-132, Forwards LER 82-132/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8212140079
Download: ML20070C202 (3)

LER-2082-132, Forwards LER 82-132/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3112082132R00 - NRC Website

text

a O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station November 24, 1982 .

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Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-132/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-132/03L. This report is required within-thirty (30). days of the occurrence. j Sincerely yours, l

,5 H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:kspft CC: Distribution i

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Report Number: 82-132/03L Report Date: 11-24-82 Occurrence Date: 11-06-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

No. 2A Vital Bus - De-energized.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports82-417 and 82-425.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - RX Power 82% - Unit Load 910 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On two separate occasions, at 1125 hours0.013 days <br />0.313 hours <br />0.00186 weeks <br />4.280625e-4 months <br />, November 6, 1982, and at 0901 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.428305e-4 months <br />, November 15, 1982, spurious actuations of No. 2A Safeguards Equipment Control (SEC) Cabinet resulted in the de-energization of No. 2A Vital Bus. In each case, 4KV Infeed Breaker 22ASD opened, and Breaker 21ASD failed to close. In both instances, No. 2A Emergency Diesel Generator started but did not load.

Safety related loads energized off the bus tripped; a rod control non-urgent failure and containment ventilation isolation were received.

With the loss of the vital bus, on both occasions, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.2.la was entered. The Control Room Operator took appropriate action to restore necessary vital loads by starting redundant equipment. In both cases, redundant safety equipment was operable throughout the occurrence.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Spurious actuation of No. 2A SEC Cabinet in both instances apparently resulted from noise in the system control circuitry. Several similar occurrences have been noted in the past (See LER's 02-063/03L, 82-031/03L and 82-019/03L).

ANALYSIS OF OCCURREtLCE:

The operability of AC power sources insures that power will be available to supply safety related equipment required for safe shutdown of the facility and mitigation of accidents considered in the PSAR. As noted, redundant safety related equipment was operable, and the incidents involved no risk to the health and safety of the public.

The occurrences constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and were reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

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LER 82-132/03L -y ,,

ANALYSIS _OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) -

Action Statement 3.8.2.la dequires: '

With less than the reghired complement of AC bussA operable or energized, restore ,the inoperable buses to operable and energized status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ce be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in pold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: ,

d ,.

On the first occasion, at 1140 hours0.0132 days <br />0.317 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.3377e-4 months <br />, November 6)+198,2, after no flags were found locked in, Breaker 22ASD was reclosed., No. 2A Vital Bus i was re-energized and Action Statement 3.8.2.la was terminated.

Similarly, at 0904 hours0.0105 days <br />0.251 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.43972e-4 months <br />, November 15, 1982, the breaker was reclosed, the vital bus was re-energized, and the action statement was terminated for the second time. '

In both cases, following restorationsof the vital bus;'No. 2A SEC Cabinet was reset End was satisfactorily tested. In each instance, No. 2A Diesel Generator was stopped and the safety equipment was-returned to a normal configuration.

f Design Change Request 2ECl387 has been issued to install noise '

suppression circuitr'y in the SEC System; installation is scheduled to be completed during the next refueling outage." A ~ commitment to submit a Supplemental Report upon completion was made in LER.

82-019/03L. Installation of noise suppression devices in Salem Unit. .

No. 1 SEC System has apparently reduced problems with spurious

&ctuations. .

FAILURE DATA: -

Not Applicable i

Prepared By R. Frahm

'Gederal Manager -

SORC Meeting No. f&-1P6 '/

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