05000311/LER-1982-097, Forwards LER 82-097/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-097/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20063P245
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 09/29/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20063P246 List:
References
NUDOCS 8210130219
Download: ML20063P245 (3)
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LER-2082-097, Forwards LER 82-097/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3112082097R00 - NRC Website
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0 PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station September 29, 1982 Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 l 631 Park Avenue King.of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REFORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-097/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-097/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

l Sincerely yours,

/

H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks CC: Distribution l

'8210130219 820929 P,DR ADOCK 05000311

'" PDR The Energy People

%-2189 (20MF 1181

Report Number:- 82-097/03L Report'Date: 09-29-82 Occurrence Date: 09-10-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Missed' Surveillance - Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-272.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 .Rx Power 80% - Unit Load 850 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On September 10, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator observed that Surveillance Procedure SP (0) 4.4.7.2.d, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Water Inventory, had not been performed within the time interval of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> plus 25% as required by the Technical Specifications. Steady state conditions, which are re-quired for satisfactory performance of the surveillance procedure, could not be obtained due to changes in Xenon reactivity following routine power escalation. The previous RCS water inventory had been performed at 0418 hours0.00484 days <br />0.116 hours <br />6.911376e-4 weeks <br />1.59049e-4 months <br />, September 7, 1982; at 2218 hours0.0257 days <br />0.616 hours <br />0.00367 weeks <br />8.43949e-4 months <br />, September 10, 1982, the surveillance interval, including the 25%

allowance, elapsed and Action Statement 3.4.7.2.a was entered.

Operator surveillance of the containment sump pump and containment radioactivity monitors was increased, and RCS leakage was demonstrated to be within specification limits.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the occurrence was that Surveillance Requirement 4.4.7.2.d does not make allowance for routine, unavoidable fuel poison transients which preclude performance of the surveillance.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The reactor coolant leakage detection systems are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.

O

LER 82-097/03L e ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

The boundary is one of several design features (others include the fuel cladding and primary containment) which prevent the release of radioactive fission products to the environment in the event of core damage. As noted, RCS leakage was demonstrated to be within limits indicating the integrity of the pressure boundary was maintained. Furthermore, no degradation of redundant design features occurred. Therefore, no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved. The. occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specifi-cation 6.9.1.9.b.

Action Statement 3.4.7. 2 requires :

With any pressure boundary leakage, be in at least hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. With any RCS leakage greater than Technical Specification limits, isolate or reduce the leakage within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, RCS leakage was within specification, in compliance with the action statement. Operating conditions stabilized and the RCS water inventory was immediately performed. The results confirmed that RCS leakage was within specification, and at 1650 hours0.0191 days <br />0.458 hours <br />0.00273 weeks <br />6.27825e-4 months <br />, September 11, 1982, Action Statement 3.4.7.2 was terminated.

License Change Request 82-14 has been submitted to change Technical Specification 3.4.7.2 to eliminate the water inventory requirement during non-steady state operation.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By R. Frahm //t GeneraY Mansger -

'~'

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. 82-87

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