ML20246G164
| ML20246G164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1989 |
| From: | Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Phyllis Clark GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8908310237 | |
| Download: ML20246G164 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000219/1987099
Text
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MG 211989
Docket No. 50-219
GPU Nuclear Corporation i
ATTN: Mr. P. R. Clark '
President
4
1 Upper P,ond Road
Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 {
Centlemen:
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Subject: SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP) FINAL REPORT ,
NO. 50-219/87-99 (
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This letter transmits our final SALP Report for the Oyster Creek facility for
the period October 1, 1987 through January 31, 1989. The final SALP
Report (Enclosure 1), our earlier transmittal letter (Enclosure 2), SALP {!
meeting attendees (Enclosure 3), and your response to the SALP Report ;
(Enclosure 4) are enclosed and will be placed in the Public Document Room. j
Thank you for your letter of June 15, 1989, wherein you presented, as a
followup to our May 8, 1989 meeting, a detailed response to the SALP Report and
a description of some of your actions subsequent to the end of the SALP period.
No changes ware made to the SALP Report after our review of your response.
Overall, the facility has been operated in a safe manner. Your site and
corporate management continues to display a strong commitment to nuclear
safety. The performance at Oyster Creek, however, remains inconsistent in
some areas. Although adequate, the level of performance in some areas,
particularly in Radiological Controls, was less effective than in the previous
SALP cycle. We acknowledge the initiatives and changes which you have made to
improve the overall performance in the area of Radiological Controls. We will
continue to monitor your progress in improving performance. Additionally, we
look forward to meeting with you again in September to discuss the progress of
the Radiological Controls programs which you have initiated and the conclusions
you have drawn from the assessments of the INPO Evaluation team, the special
INPO assistance team and GPU Nuclear's task force.
In summary, the report, our meeting, and your response letter resulted in a
constructive assessment of the performance at Oyster Creek and provided a
thorough understanding of the extensive corrective actions and improvements
undertaken since January 15, 1989.
Your cooperation is appreciated.
Sincerely,
Original Signed By:
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Thomas T. MartiQ
g William T. Russell
Regional Administrator
0FFICIAL R- ORD
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COPY OY SALP 87-99 - 0001.0.0
890G330237 89082J 08/03/89
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- Enclosures: .
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13 Systematic Assessment of' Licensee Performance. (SALP) Final Report
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.No;.350-219/87-99 .
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2. . NRC: Letter, W. T. Russell to E. E. Fitzpatrick dated April 17, 1988
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3.7 May'8, 1989 SALP Management Meeting Attendees.
4. GPU:-Letter from P..R. ClarkTdated June.15, 1989
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- cc w/encis: _ .. .
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E. E.'Fitzpatrick; Vice President and Director _.
.M. Laggart :BWR Licensing Manager
Licensing Manager, Oyster Creek :
Chairman Carr.
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Commissioner Roberts -
Commissioner Bernthal
y Commissioner Rogers
> K. Abraham;; PAO, RI (19 copies)
Public Document. Room (PDR)-
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear, Safety Information . Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
' State'of New Jersey
, bcc w/encls:
.J., Taylor,EDO(Acting)-
-
W.' T. Russell, RI-
.T. Martin, RI.
M. Knapp,
.B. Boger,'RI-
.
RI
W. Kane,'RI
S. Collins, RI-
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<;SALP: Management Meeting Attendees
. Branch. Chief,'DRP
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o enc 1)
DRP;Section Chief
M. Conner, DRP
A.'Dromerick, Project. Manager, NRR
J. Dyer,.EDO-
'J. Lieberman, 0E
- W.' Oliveira, RI
D. Holody,.RI
LE. Kelly, RI .
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,;c ENCLOSURE I-
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
>
REGION.I
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
FINAL REPORT
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50-219/87-99
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GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES NUCLEAR CORPORATION
4 v OYSTER CREEK N!: CLEAR GENERATION STATION
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ASSESSMENT-PERIOD: OCTOBER I,'1987 - JANUARY 31, 1989
BOARD MEETING DATE: MARCH I4, 1989
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I. Introduction................. ............................... ........ 1
I.A Background.................................................... . 2
1.8 Licensee Activities............................................. 2
I.C Direct Inspection and Review Activities... ..................... 3
'II. Summary of Results................................ ................... 5
I I . A O v e r a l l S umm a ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 5
II .B Facility Performance Analysi s Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 6
II.C Unplanned Shutdowns, Plant Trips, and Forced Outages........ ... 7
III.
Criteria............................................................ 8
IV. Performance Analysis............................. ........ .......... 10
IV.A Plant Operations............... ........................... 10
IV.B Radiological Controls...................................... 14
IV.C Maintenance / Surveillance................... ............... 18
IV.D Emergency Preparedness..................................... 22
IV.E Security...................... .......... ................. 24
IV.F Engineering / Technical Support....-.......................... 26
IV.G Safety Assessment / Quality Verification..................... 29
SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES
A. Investigations and Allegations Review........... ..... ..............SD/S-1
B. Escalated Enforcement Actions....................... ................SD/S-1
C. Con fi rmato ry Acti on Le tte rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SD/S-1
D. Licensee Event Reports. .............................................SD/S-1
TABLES
Table I - Enforcement Activity
Table II - Listing of LERs by Functional Area
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I, INTRODUCTION
The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Per formance (SALP) program is an integrated
agency effort to collect and evaluate available agency insights, data, and other
l information on a plant / site basis in a structured manner in order to assess and
better understand the reasons for a licensee's performance.' Unacceptable perform-
ance is addressed through NRC's enforcement policy and tio implementation of this
policy should not be delayed to await the results of a SALP. Compliance with NRC
rules and regulations satisfies the minimum requirements for contir.ued operation
of a facility; the degree to which a licensee exceeds regulatory requirements is
a measure of the licensee's commitment to nuclear safety and plant reliability
The SALP process is used by the NRC to synthesize its observations of and insights
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into a licensee's performance and to identify common themes or symptoms. As such,
the NRC needs to recognize and understand the reasons for a licensee's strengths
as well as weaknesses. _The SALP process is a means of expressing NRC senior man-
agement's observations and judgements on licensee performance. It should not be
limited to focusing on weaknesses, and it is not intended to identify' proposed
resolutions or solutions of problems. The licensee's management is responsible
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for ensuring plant safety and establishing effective means to measure, monitor,
and evaluate the quality of al' aspects of plant design, hardware, and operation.
TW SALP process is intended tr further NRC's understanding of (1) how the licen-
see's management guides, directs, evaluates, and provides resources for safe plant
operations, and (2) how these resources are applied and used. As a result, em-
phasis is placed on understanding the reasons for a licensee's performance in
identified functional areas and on sharing this understanding with the licensee
and the public. The SALP process is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to
provide a rational for allocating NRC resources and to provide meaningful feedback
to the licensee's management.
An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met on March 14,
1989, to review the observations and data of performance, and to assess licensee
performance in accordance wi+h Chapter NRC-0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee
Performance." This guidance and evaluation criteria are summarized in Section III
of this report. The Board's findings and recommendations were forwarded to the
NRC-Regional Administrator for approval and issuance.
This report is the NRC's assessment of the licensee's safety performance at Oyster
Creek for the period October 1,1987 to January 31, 1989.
The SALP Board for Oyster Creek was composed of:
SALP Board
Board Chairman
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W. Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
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Members
L S. Collins, Deputy Director, DRP
M. Knapp, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS) (part time)
T. Martin, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Projects Branch No. 1, DRP
R. Gallo, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS (part time)
C. Cowgill, Chief, Reactor Projects Section IA, DRP
J. Wechselberger, Senior Operations _ Engineer, NRR (voting for Senior Resident
Inspector)
J. Stolz, Director, Project Directorate 1-4, NRR
A. Dromerick, Project Manager, NRR
W. Johnston, Deputy Director, DRSS (part time)
Other
W. Baunack, Project Engineer, DRP
D. Lew, Resident Inspector
E. Collins, Senior Resident Inspector
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I.A Background
Oyster Creek is a GE BWR/2 with a Mark I containment. The Construction Permit was
issued in December 1964 and commercial operation commenced on December 23, 1969
at 1600 Megawatts thermal.
This unit was delivered to Jersey Central Power and Light Company for operation
as one of the first GE " turnkey" reactor plants. Later, the unit's licensed power
was increased to 1930 Megawatts thermal.
The nuclear steam supply system differs from later model BWRs in that it uses 5
reactor recirculation pumps and the reactor vessel has no internal jet pumps. The
emergency core cooling systems consist of two low pressure core spray systems, 2
isolation condensers for heat removal, and an automatic depressurization system.
I.B Licensee Activities
At the beginning of the assessment period, the plant was shut down in accordance
with a confirmatory action letter. This letter was issued as a result of a safety
limit violation which occurred on September 11, 1987. On November 6, 1987, a let-
ter permitting restart was issued to the licensee. On November 20,1987, the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers initiated a strike against the util-
ity. Management personnel assumed the duties of bargaining unit personnel and
preparations for plant startup continued. Reactor startup occurred on November
22,, 1987 and the turbine was placed on line on November 24, 1987. The startup and
subsequent plant operation were conducted by supervisory personnel.
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On December.11,1987, the. strike was settled. Returning workers were trained and
reoriented before resuming normal duties. Plant operation continued at full power
with only minor power reductions for surveillance or maintenance until July 9,.
1988.when, following main steam isolation valve (MSIV) surveillance testing, no
steam flow was indicated in the "A" steam line. A shutdown was initiated and the
plant was. placed in cold shutdown on July 10, 1988. This terminated a 229 day
continuous run.
Subsequent investigation of the catse of no steam flow in the "A" steam line re-
vealed an MSIV stem failure. Folic..ing MSIV repairs a plant startup commenced on
August 9, 1988, and the generator was placed on the line on August 12.
On August 28,1988, the "8" isolation condenser started " steaming" following a six
day out of service period for maintenance. On September 2, 1988, a plant shutdown
was initiated dee to both isolation condensers being declared inoperable. One
isolation condenser was inoperable due to maintenance; the other due to a manual
vent line valve being found in the closed position. The shutdown was terminated
after the vent valve was opened and noncondensibles were calculated to have been
purged on September 3, 1988.
On September 26, 1988, following a surveillance of the "A" isolation condenser it
also began to " steam". On September 29, following an evaluation of isolation con-
denser conditions, both condensers were declared inoperable, and a plant shutdown
was' initiated. Cold shutdown was achieved on September 30, 1988. Following the
shutdown a decision was made to commence the Cycle 12 Refueling Outage which was
originally scheduled to begin on October 15, 1988. The plant remained shut down
for the remainder of the SALP period.
On May 1,1988, a new Vice President and Director of Oyster Creek was appointed.
The previous Director of Oyster Creek was appointed Vice President and Director
of a new GPUN division encompassing corporate-wide training and education and
quality assurance programs.
I.C Direct Inspection and Review Activities
Three NRC resident inspectors were assigned to the site. One new resident was
assigned in January,1988; the third resident was assigned in July 1988. Addition-
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ally, two temporary resident inspectors were assigned for a period of six weeks
l each. The total inspection time for the assessment period was 8569 hours0.0992 days <br />2.38 hours <br />0.0142 weeks <br />0.00326 months <br /> (resident,
region and headquarters based) with a distribution in the appraisal functional area
l as shown with each functional area. This equates to 6427 hours0.0744 days <br />1.785 hours <br />0.0106 weeks <br />0.00245 months <br /> on an annual basis.
Special inspections included the following:
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Special team inspection to assess the safety significance of freezing condi-
tions identified in the reactor building on January 6,1988 (January 25-29,
1988).
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The annual emergency preparedness exercise was held on May 11-12, 1988.
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Special-team inspection to review the circumstances and. events leading up to
'a subsystem of the containment spray / emergency service water being returned
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to service exceeding operability acceptance criterion (July.11-15,1988),
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Regulatory Effectiveness Review conducted July 18-22, 1988.
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Special team inspection to review licensee's evaluation and response to a main
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steam isolation valve broken stem (July 18-22,1988).
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Emergency Operating Procedure inspection conducted September 6-15, 1988.
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Augmented Inspection Team inspection to review the circumstances, events'and
licensee response to a situation where both emergency condensers were.inoper-
able (October 5-13,1988).
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Safety System Outage Modification Inspection conducted October 17 through
November 4, 1988 and November 28 through December 16, 1988.
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II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
II.A Overall Summary
Overall, inconsistent performance was again noted at the facility. . Improvements
were made in the plant material condition, the number of forced outages were
significantly reduced and there were no plant trips. In addition, the number
of operator errors was reduced. In contrast, however, performance in the areas
of Security and Radiological Controls degraded during the period.
The site and corporate management have undertaken many new initiatives to improve
the performance of the facility both in the area of safety and plant performance.
GPUN maintains a policy for its employees which stresses a high standard of
integrity and procedure adherence and a concept of safety before schedule. This
policy is well understood but inconsistently applied at the lower levels of
the organization.
Licensee programs to surface and correct deficiencies are in place but, are not
fully effective. A preliminary' safety concern program has evidenced problems
in' bringing issues to closure and providing feedback to individuals. Interfaces
between operators and their management have not worked well to resolve identified
deficiencies. Communications problems between the operations department and
support. organizations have also been noted.
In the Radiological Controls area, weaknesses were identified that contributed
to a decline in the program's effectiveness. Those weaknesses include ineffective
root cause analysis, incomplete control and planning of radiological operations,
incomplete corrective actions on identified problems, and lax worker attitudes.
The licensee has made significant progress in reducing the maintenance backlog
at the facility and instituted changes to further enhance maintenance effectiveness.
A new training program for maintenance technicians and a shift to a computerized
maintenance control system have been implemented. Rework remains a problem at the
facility and problems were identified associated with implementing the maintenance
control program.
In the area of Technical Support, the licensee has actively responded to
previous SALP concerns. These efforts have resulted in an enhanced root cause
analysis of engineering support and a reduction in the engineering work backlog.
Some examples of insensitivity to emerging and long standing technical problens
still exist. Communications between site and corporate engineering were weak at
times and as a result the licensee's engineering resources were sometimes not
effectively used. The difficulties encountered in correcting some of the long
standing problems are due in part to issues resulting from the age of the plant,
the volume of issues to be resolved, and an ill-defined plant design basis.
Development of a sound design basis for the plant is an essential element
central to attaining substantial overall improvement in facility performance.
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- In summary, the licensee remains committed to establishing and implementing
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programs to support safe, efficient operation of the facility. .' Full
application and integration of these initiatives is hindered by'the age and
design of the facility. ~ These equipment and material issues continue to
challenge personnel performance and stress the licensee's organization.
II.B Facility' Performance Analysis Summary.
This SALP report incorporates the recent NRC redefinition of the assessment func-
tiona' areas. Changes include combining the previously separate Maintenance and
Surveillance areas and addition of the Safety Assessment / Quality Verification area.
The Safety Assessment / Quality Verification section is largely a synopsis of obser-
vations in other functional areas. Additionally, the Fire Protection, Licensing,
Refueling / Outage, Training, and Assurance of Quality areas nave been incorporated
into the remaining functional ' areas as appropriate.
Rating Rating
Last This
Functional Area Period * Period ** Trend
A. Plant Operations 3 3 Improving
B. Radiological Controls 2 3 --
C. Maintenance / Surveillance *** 2/2 2 --
D. Emergency Preparedness 2 2 --
E. . Security 1 2 --
F. Engineering / Technical Support 3 2 --
G. Safety Assessment / Quality Verification # 2 --
H. Licensing Activities 2 # --
I. Training & Qualification Effectiveness 2 # --
J. Assurance of Quality 2 # --
October 16, 1986 to September 30, 1987
October 1, 1987 to January 31, 1989
Previously addressed as separate areas of Maintenance and Surveillance.
- Not addressed as a separate area.
NOTE: It is important to note that a. major revision of the SALP Manual Chapter
has been made which combined some areas and made changes to the attri-
butes in the functional areas. Therefore, a direct comparison of the ,
functional area grades cannot be made between the previous SALP and the
current one. ,
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II.C Unplanned Shutdowns, Plant Trips, 'and' Forced Outages
POWER . ROOT- FUNCTIONAL
DATE- LEVEL DESCRIPTION CAUSE AREA
7/9/88 40% During testing one MSIV Main Steam. N/A
failed to close. The series isolation
MSIV was closed and disabled ' valve (MSIV).
until the operability of stem had sepa-
the affected valve could be rated.from the
established. After several pilot poppet.
attempts, the MSIV appeared Root cause for
to close and open within the the shear fail-
normally expected stroke ure of the MSIV
times. After attempting to stem has not
open both MSIV's, no steam been determined.
flow was indicated in the "A"
steam line. A shutdown of
the reactor was initiated to
determine the cause of no
steam flow.in the "A" steam
eine header and make appro-
priate repairs.
9/29/88. 99% An evaluation of thermal During main- N/A
profiles of the isolation tenance of
condenser piping concluded Isolation Con-
that water was present in ' denser valve
the steam piping. Due to steam lines
the potential for severe filled with
water hammer upon system water.
initiation, both isolation
condensers were isolated
and declared inoperable
and the reactor was shut
down.
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III. CRITERIA'
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Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas, depending upon
whether the facility is in a construction, preoperational, or operational phase.
Functional areas normally represent areas significant to nuclear safety and the
environment, Some functional areas may not be assessed because of little or no
licensee activities or lack of meaningful observations. Special areas may be added
to highlight significant observations.
The following evaluation criteria were used, as applicable, to assess each func-
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tional area.
1.. Assurance of quality, including management involvement and control;
2. Approach to the identification and resolution of technical issues from a
safety standpoint;
3. Responsiveness to NRC initiatives;
4. Enforcement history;
5. Operational and construction events (including response to, analyses of,
reporting of, and corrective actions for);
6. Staffing (including management); and
7. Effectiveness of training and qualification program.
However, the NRC is not limited to these criteria and others may have been used
where appropriate.
On the basis of the NRC assessment, each functional area evaluated is rated into
to three performance categories. The performance categories used when rating lic-
ensee performance are defined as follows:
Category 1. Licensee management attention and involvement are readily evident and
place emphasis on superior performance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities,
with the resulting performance substantially exceeding regulatory requirements.
Licensee resources are ample and effectively used so that a high level of plant
and personnel performance is being achieved. Reduced NRC attention may be appro-
priate.
Category 2. Licensee management attention to and involvement in the performance
of nuclear safety or safeguards activities are good. The licensee has attained
a level of performance above that needed to meet regulatory requirements. Licensee
resources are adequate and reasonably allocated so that good plant and personnel
performance is being achi2ved. NRC attention may be maintained at normal levels.
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L Category 3. Licensee management attention to and involvement in the performance i
of nuclear. safety or safeguards activities are not sufficient. The licensee's
performance does not significantly exceed that needed to meet minimal regulatory
requirements. . Licensee resources appear to be strained or not effectively used.
NRC attention should be increased above normal levels.
The SALP Board may assess a functional area to compare the licensee's performance
during the last quarter of the assessment period to that during the entire period
in order to determine the recent trend. The SALP trend categories are as follows:
Improving: Licensee performance was determined to be improving near the close of
the assessment period.
Declining: Licensee performance was determined to be declining near the close of
the assessment period and the licensee had not taken meaningful steps to address
this pattern.
A trend is assigned only when, in the opinion of the SALP Board, the trend is sig-
nificant enough to be considered indicative of a likely change in the performance
category in the near future. For example, a classification of " Category 2, Im-
proving" indicates the clear potential for " Category 1" performance in the next
SALP period.
It should be noted that Ca'.egory 3 performance, the lowest category, represents
acceptable, although minimally adequate, safety performance. If at any time the
NRC concluded that a licensee was not achieving an adequate level of safety per-
formance, it would then be incumbent upon NRC to take prompt appropriate action
in the interest of public health and safety. Such matters would be dealt with
independently from, and on a more urgent schedule than, the SALP process.
It should also be noted that the industry continues to be subject to rising per-
formance expectations. NRC expects licensees to use industry-wide and plant-speci-
fic operating experience actively in order to effect performance improvement. Thus,
a licensee's safety performance would be expected to show improvement over the
years in order to maintain consistent SALP ratings.
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I V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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IV.A Plant Operations (2840 Hrs., 33%)
IV.A.1 Analysis
The previous SALP rating in this area was Category 3. Improvements were noted in
onshift'decisionmaking, emphasis on shift teamwork, control room professional en-
vironment and operator action to control water level transients. Special NRC in-
spection findings were generally positive; concluding that a competent organization
with strong management and effective programs were in place. However, the special
inspections also observed a lack of promulgation of management goals to lower level
personnel to ensure understanding of risk importance and a more inquisitive ap-
proach to non-routine plant conditions. Positive observations were contrasted with
safety significant events indicating inconsistencies in program application and
personnel performance. Additional assessment concluded that equipment challenges
added to a decrease in the operators performance. Procedural conflicts fostering
a graded approach to compliance, schedule pressure and housekeeping problems, all
contributed to a conclusion of overall inconsistent operational performance.
During the current SALP cycle, senior operations management was changed and the
new managers encouraged an increased emphasis in identifying problems for resolu-
tion. Improved periodic meetings were held with shift management to develop a bet-
ter understanding of problems and to unify operations management. Senior site
management has continued to emphasize cooperation and teamwork through periodic
meetings of all key site management personnel to resolve problems and increase
communication among divisional representatives at the facility. Other positive
attributes include major evolutions by operational plans specifying organizational
responsibility, restart certifications, senior corporate management review of re-
start readiness, and implementation of the INP0 sponsored HPES process. Senior
site management took a niajor step in reenforcing the concept of safety before
schedule, when, with the direct involvement of the site director, refueling e:rors
were dramatically decreased. Refueling activities were delayed to facilitate ex-
tensive training sessions for operators, core engineers, and operations management
to discuss the " error-free" refueling plan, refueling operations and the concept
of safety before schedule. The reactor refueling was subsequently conducted with-
out error.
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The plant continuously operated for 229 days. This was due in part from increased
attention to plant equipment problems. This is in direct contrast to the past when
numerous reactor scrams and unplanned shutdowns have impacted plant performance.
Recently the plant implemented a modification to help control reactor water level
following post plant trips; this been an identified problem in previous SALP re-
ports. Other positive Jicators of current plant performance are the reduction j
in temporary procedure changes exceeding the 14 day technical specification appro-
val limit, increased personnel in operator training programs and periodic meet-
ings between the site director and the QA organization to effect resolution of
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quality issues. In addition, the licensee has established an Operations Coordina-
tions office to alleviate some of the administrative burden from the shift super-
visor during outages. This is perceived as positive; however, early in the outage,
shift supervisors were at times concerned about effective communication regarding
outage activities.
Operators have shown improvement by a professional attitude toward their duties
and proper control room decorum; however, some distractions are still noted.
One particular bright spot has been the determination of a few operators to
identify and report potential significan?. equipment and system problems and to
correct long standing facility problems. Operators and operations personnel in
general are responsive to inspector concerns and are open in their communications.
Conditions are not conducive to promoting cooperation and teamwork between
operators and operations middle management. Likewise, lack of support to the
operators by operations middle management was noted. This was evidenced by
certain equipment being allowed to remain out of service for long periods, as
in the case of the reactor building heating and ventilation problems that lead
to freezing in the reactor building despite operator complaints, and isolation
condenser steam line temperature anomalies not being addressed. Operations
management did not adequately respond to QA findings associated with the contain-
ment spray / emergency service water system, and this eventually led to a plant
problem. Also, the acceptance by operations management of modified systems for
operation without a formal turnover of the completed modification has resulted
in system operation without complete documentation.
A strike occurred immediately before returning the plant to power operation in the
fall of 1987. The NRC determined that the licensee's strike plans were comprehen-
sive and appropriate to address the situation. Management personnel assigned to
perform operator duties during this time were thorough and knowledgeable in plant
operstion and startup activities. Management plans to transfer operation of the
plant to union personnel after the strike were also considered highly effective.
The licensee has initiated a number of programs to improve worker attitudes and
increase productivity since the conclusion of the strike.
During this SALP period, operator license examinations were successfully admini-
stered to five SRO and 3 RO candidates. It was noted that control room staffing
consisted of only a five shift rotation.
Operations have improved in specific areas, which may be attributed to self initi-
ated actions as well as significant input from internal license and regulatory
organizations. Although the plant operated continuously for 229 days, power re-
ductions were required to repair plant equipment problems. Some long standing
equipment problems still persist. These include intermediate range monitors,
control rod drive hydraulic control units, safety relief valve acoustic monitors
and thermocouple and various secondary equipment problems.
NRC observations indicate that, although daily planning meetings effectively com-
municate plant and maintenance status, there are interface problems at the working
level between the Operations Department and support organizations. Examples of
conditions that resulted from this are: worker contamination from poorly planned
post maintenance testing of the offgas system, the loss of secondary containment
during isolation condenser maintenance, overlapping stack gas monitor tagouts which
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resulted in making the monitor inoperable ind the removing of a station battery
and the opposite train diesel from service simultaneously, thus, making both
diesels unable to respond in the event of a loss of offsite power.
Operations understanding of the technical specifications and the design basis and
evaluating plant conditions against these requirements is a weakness. Examples
include operations attempt to startup the plant in an action statement with an
inoperable offgas sample pump and three control rods made inoperable due tc in-
' adequate operator response to low gas pressure alarms.
Station procedures are generally good, but have been key contributors to two major
events during this SALP period. Placing the isolation condensers in a questionable
. condition and potentially exceeding a limitir, condition for operation with the
containment spray / emergency service water system were direct results of poor pro-
cedures, In the first case, a long standing procedure deficiency became evident
and in the second, a poor modification process resulted in tne proced:re problems.
Also, during the freezing reactor building temperature inspection, ir.odequate pro-
cedure reviews were discovered. In this case, the system procedure had been re-
vised 13 times over a 20 year period without detecting that the control room reac-
tor building temperature gauge referred to in the procedure was never installed.
Other examples include operator confusion from the conflicting instructions for
equalizing pressure across the MSIVs and minimum battery room air temperature pro-
vided by different procedures, and an unspecified action in response to a refueling
cavity seal leak alarm.
Operator errors have decreased since the last SALP, and, overall, improvement in
this area has been seen. However, there were some errors during the plant opera-
tion. During reactor defueling numerous operational errors occurred that resulted
in the direct involvement of the Site Director to bring about a positive change.
There was one instance of a lack of command and control during the MSIU stem fail-
ure in which a half trip was not inserted promptly. Also, logging of some events
was not timely such as the isolation condenser initiation which was not logged or
reported until some time after it occurred.
During this SALP period, a special inspection was performed of the Emergency
Operating Procedures (EOPs). This inspection concluded that the E0Ps were tech-
nically sound, that the operators understood their fundamental technical principles,
and that the operators were able to execute the E0Ps. The overall quality of the
emergency operating procedures is considered to be a strength. The team did ob-
serve an unfamiliarity with the " hands-on" use of the procedures and flow charts.
This unfamiliarity is considered a training deficiency.
Operator attitude was a concern identified during the E0P inspection as well as
during defueling. The E0P inspection identified an attitude of overconfidence as
well as a tendency to minimize the significance of the E0Ps. Likewise, in response
to the number of errors which occurred during the defueling, operators displayed
an attitude that this performance was no different than that of the previous years.
Manage nent did take corrective action to improve refueling performance.
_ - - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - -
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In conclusion, operations has shown improvement, including a reductinn in operator
errors. Senior site management has made efforts to build cooperation and teamwork.
Operations middle management has not aggressively supported operators by correcting
identified QA concerns, addressing operator questions and concerns, and improving
middle management and operator cooperation and teamwork. Plant material condition
continues to improve as evidenced by a long operational period. The initiative
shown by several operators to correct long standing facility problems is encourag-
ing. Procedure weaknesses still exist and contributed to plant events.
IV.A.2 Conclusion
Category 3, Improving. I
.
IV.A.3 Recommendation
None.
l
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IV.8 Radiological Controls (560 Hrs. , 6.5%)
!
IV.B.1 Analysis i
Drevious SALP
The last SALP rated this area as Category 2. Weaknesses noted included: incomplete
pre-job briefing of workers; ineffective root cause analyses following radiological ,
incidents; lack of emphasis and followup of quality control functions performed '
by Radiological Engineering; and poor ALARA effort and ineffective goal setting
and goal tracking. Strengths included an adequate staff with good qualifications,
good facilities and equipment, training, posting, and access control.
Current SALP
Four special inspections were conducted in this area during the current SALP period,
in addition to the routine reviews by the resident inspectors.
Overall, the licensee's radiological control program remains adequate. However,
continuing weaknesses were identified that contributed to a noticeable degradation
in program effectiveness. These weaknesses include (1) deterioration of control
and planning of radiological operations, (2) incomplete corrective action on iden-
tified problems, (3) continued examples of ineffective root cause analysis, and
(4) a lack of aggressive action to reduce collective worker exposure.
Control and planning of radiological work is generally adequate, but instances of
poor performance were noted. Appropriate actions to address deteriorating radio-
logical conditions were not taken in some cases. As an example, a control rod
manipulator was used to facilitate the removal of control rod drives from the
reactor. This resulted in an increase in the rate at which the drives were removed
and sent to the drive maintenance and rebuild area. However, the effects of this
increased rate on radiological conditions in that area were not adequately consi-
dered. As the backlog of control rod drives in the rebuild area became excessive,
the area became highly contaminated. The contamination subsequently spread outside
the rebuild area to other areas of the reactor building. The problem was compounded
by the lack of experience and incomplete training of the workers in the rebuild
area. Although the workers had been put through mockup training, the pace of the
training was rapid, and many were not trained on the actual work performed in the
rebuild area.
Although the licensee continues to demonstrate an ability to identify problems,
the corrective action program was at. times ineffective in achieving desired im-
provements and preventing recurrence. ine following are examples of this problem.
--
Improper priority assignments to radiological control problems were observed.
For example, high radiation area doors which were required to be locked were
found unlocked due to their poor mechanical condition. Although corrective
action was proposed, it was not completed because of the low assigned job
priority and subsequent cancellation of the work orders. This resulted in
continued instances where high radiation area access control was compromised.
- _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ -
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e --
~ Investigation following the' occurrence of radiological 1Lincidents is prompt .
n ~ _but the depth of review conducted'is frequently limited in scope:and effec-
'
tiveness. : As an' example, disturbances in the ventilation flow pathways in
the Augmented Offgas system building produced airborne' contamination in the'
building. ' Following a number of: personnel contaminations, the licensee com-
mitt'ed.to samplingithe air for radioactive. gas.in~ case of such incidents.
' However,ithe. sampling is;still not being done in a systematic and controlled
manner. . The-lack of' timely performance of air samples was identified.during
the~ previous'SALP period. In the'past this' weakness'could have. led to situ-
ations where_ the-licensee was not able to adequately assess the expost ce that-
workers were receiving _from_ airborne contamination. :The licensee was'not
_
responsive and did not acknowledge the concern, and this. weakness still re-=
mains. Another identified weakness has been the failure to perform appro-
-
priate surveys in areas with non uniform radiation fields. This program-
weakness. recurs despite licensee's corrective l actions implemented to date.
--
One;of the principal reasons for the failure of corrective actions is that
investigations 'onducted
c by the licensee'following an_ incident do not identify
. root-causes'but instead concentrate on immediate'and sometines superficial
factors. The critiques rarely address problems that result from poor super '
visory practices or poor planning, and tend to concentrate on errors. committed
by the worker and by first line supervisors. In the control rod rebuild room
incident mentioned above, important and. key contributing factors were.not
considered in..the critique, including failure;to anticipate a, potential over-
load.of the work area, a lack of clear and adequate = procedures to control the
work, 'and poorly trained technicians with little or no experience .in covering
this type of work. . In another incident, a technician and his supervisor
removed some temporary shielding in.accordance with instructions from radio-
-
logical engineering causing an increase in the' dose rate in the area and un-
knowingly createa conditions that classified the area as a' locked high radi-
ation. area. The critique of the incident failed to point out that, among the
~
'
root' causes _of the incident were improper surveys in a non-uniform radiation
field, incomplete supervisory shift briefings, and. problems with the tagging
and tracking system for temporary shielding.
--
Engineering evaluation in response to NRC concerns has generally been thorough
and professional when the problem in question was internal to the Radiological
Controls organization on site. This is contrasted by situations in which the
evaluations had to be performed by some departments other than Radiological
Controls which were poor in quality, excessively brief and unsubstantiated,
and reluctantly given. One example was in connection with the licensee's
request to permit occupancy of the upper levels of the drywell during fuel
movements. In response to an NRC concern regarding radiological safety in
the upper elevations in case of a fuel drop accident, the licensee proposed
a fence, but did not supply adequate supporting calculations on fence strength.
Subsequent calculations were brief, with no stated assumptions. Also, as part
of this evaluation, the licensee proposed mechanical stops to limit the range
of horizontal movement of the refueling bridge. However, the stops were not
installed because of an oversight, and defueling proceeded without these stops
until detected by licensed operators while testing the fuel handling bridge.
- _ _ _ . - -_ - - -
_ __ __ --. _
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4
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!
. Lack of aggressive action to reduce collective worker exposure can be found in.
examples of a lax attitude towards adherence to radiological controls procedures. (
For example, personnel, including maintenance and quality assurance, have been
observed on several occasions entering posted contamination areas and ignoring
entry requirements, such as the use of proper protective clothing. One individual
repeated this infringement of the rules immediately after his attention was drawn
to that fact.
Performance in the area of ALARA remained consistent with that. observed during
the previous assessment period. The cumulative exposure for the current outage
to date is over 1500 man-rem despite an outage goal of 900 man-rem. This goal is
still' high in comparison to the national average due to a high in plant source term,
plant design and the scope of work in the outage. Compared with previous outages,
more efforts to reduce exposure were taken during this outage, however, a lack of
progress in long range source term reduction was evident. Source term reduction
initiatives included decontamination of many areas of the plant and several highly
contaminated systems and the use of shielding in the drywell. Job planning, how-
ever, still needs improvement. An exposure reduction plan has recently been de-
veloped by the licensee in an effort to identify the areas in which exposure re-
duction methods can be effectively used. According to this plan, implementation
of the recommended measures should produce a realistic two year rolling average
during 1990-1992 of 470 man-rem. Some items recommended in the plan were imple-
mented during the current outage, but to date, no specific timetable was published
to implement the major recommendations in the plan to achieve the desired collec-
tive dose reduction and to achieve parity with the rest of the industry.
Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Control
One inspection of the licensee's radioactive effluent control program was conducted
near the end of the assessment period. The licensee has in place an effective pro-
gram for controll.ing radioactive effluent releases from the site. The licensee
is meeting Technical Specification requirements with respect to radioactive ef-
fluent sampling, analysis, surveillance, and reporting requirements. The required
reports are complete and thorough. A noted strength of the licensee's radioactive
effluent control program is the attempt to minimize the release of liquid radio-
l active effluents from the site. During the third quarter of 1987 and for the
period January 1,1988 - May 31,1988 no liquid effluent releases were made from
the site.
Quality assurance audits of the gaseous and liquid radioactive effluent areas were
thorough and of sufficient technical depth to adequately assess program capabili-
ties and performance. In addition, Operational QA surveillance activities were
of excellent technical depth and were conducted by an individual with appropriate
technical expertise.
Chemistry Control
The area of chemical measurement has improved during this assessment period. In-
itially several analytical results (chloride, sulfate, silica, iron, and boron)
were in disagreement with the criteria used for comparison. These results were
L
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17
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possibly due to high laboratory room temperature, high reagent water temperature,
and an. inadequate pipet calibration technique. With special attentionsto control
of these problems, all: analyzed results were in agreement with the standards.
Currently, the licensee is upgrading the room temperature control system which is
indication of the management attention to the chemical measurement program.
Training was of high quality as reflected by the technical depth and also for ap-
'
placability in the chemistry laboratory. Quality assurance audits of the chemistry
program were thorough and of sufficient technical depth to adequately assess pro-
gram performance.
In summary, the licensee's effluent controls program remains effective and labora-
tory chemistry control improved. Nonetheless, a number of problems persisted during
this period which reflect a decrease in.the Radiological Controls program effec-
tiveness. . Job planning and control were weak in some areas; incident evaluation
and corrective action were incomplete and did not always identify the root cause
of a problem. ALARA planning suffered from the lack of aggressive source term
reduction and resulted in elevated collective exposure.
IV.B.2 Conclusion
Category 3.
IV.B.3 Recommendation
Licensee: Perform prompt self-assessment of third party review to assure problems
are fully identified and corrective action plan developed.
NRC: Follow up self-assessment with review and appraisal.
.
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IV.C Main'tenance/ Surveillance (2653 Hrs., 31%)
,
.IV.C.1 ' Analysis
The previous SALP rated both areas of maintenance and surveillance as-Category 2.
In the area of Surveillance / Inservice Testing, strong administrative control and
strong procedures were noted. Concerns were expressed regarding a lack of aggres-
siveness in root cause analysis of some surveillance identified problems, and that
communications between plant departments required improvement. In Maintenance,
plant impacting reliability and maintenance associated equipment problems indicated
a need for improvement in the overall quality of work performed, and a need for
improvement.in communications between groups. _Also noted were significant steps
taken by the licensee to improve overall performance including: personnel changes,
a critical self-assessment, establishment of committees to review problems, im-
provements in post-maintenance testing, and efforts to reduce work backlog.
During this SALP period, the licensee has demonstrated responsiveness to NRC con-
cerns and resolve to improve the performance of plant maintenance. The maintenance
program at Oyster Creek remains generally effective and the licensee has imple-
mented several major initiatives to build a more effective maintenance program.
The Oyster Creek surveillance program continues to be effective, characterized by
strong administrative controls.
Two areas that remain weak are maintenance rework and surveillance which fre-
quently fail. Examples of rework have occurred, including valve leaks at control
rod drive hydraulic control units, main steam isolation valve (MSIV) work, inter-
mediate range neutron monitors, and recirculation pump speed control. In each case,
corrective maintenance was performed, which failed to correct the deficiency. In
addition, surveillance test repeat failures have been main steam isolation valve
slow closure test stroke times too long, snubber and hanger deficiencies, and
reactor pressure switches out of tolerance. In some cases, equipment age is a
factor in these recurring deficiencies and the licensee has implemented major
modifications to improve or upgrada equipment. In other cases, however, rework
items are a result of ineffective root cause determination and rework identifica-
tion and correction program.
During an unplanned outage, July 1988, the licensee repaired a temperature problem
on a reactor feed pump, speed control on the recirculation pump, safety relief
valve thermocouple, intermediate range neutron moni ,rs, and a hydraulic control
unit. In each case the problem reoccurred during L.,e subsequent startup. The
licensee has programmatic controls in place to address rework, but these have not
been used. The licensee has taken several additional steps to address this area.
This includes a Human Performance Evaluation Program to aid in root cause identi-
fication, the establishment of a goal of no restart errors as a result of 12R work
and a formalized administrative control procedure for post maintenance testing.
The effectiveness of these measures to address rework concerns has not been as-
sessed.
_ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
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lThe licensee has'significantly re'duced it's maintenance backlog' and comm'itted to
achieving 100% equipment operability. As a result of this effort, the licensee
-is performing a greater quantity and more complex work.during plant operation.
The licensee made errors in coordinating some activities which resulted in equip-
ment inoperabi'lity. . Examples _ of- this problem are 'a' major bus outage:and overlap-
ping maintenance resulting in loss of stack gas' sample flow. In these cases, there
was a lack of understanding of the effect of the' maintenance activity on plant
equipment. This resulted, in part, from a lack'of communication between work force-
and plant' operations. "The. licensee has recognized the need for better.communica-
tion between departments and strengthened the Plan of the Day status meeting.and
'has added other daily planning meetings. Generally, these meetings are effective
at surfacing plant problems and identifying who is. responsible for-corrective
action. '
- In addition to the coordination ~of major maintenance efforts, work control'has
shown rome weaknesses. Examples include: . snubber repair in progress and the snub-
bers not being declared inoperable, inadvertently boring into the drywell shell,
secondary containment boundary'wo'rk degrading containment integrity, and diesel
generator. overhaul and testing. These examples demonstrate the need to continue
to reinforce that work activities must be planned, approved and' effectively con -
trolled by the written work documents.
The licensee has undertaken several major initiatives to improve maintenance The.
first was a reorganization of the maintenance division.- This fundamentally changed
the functional structure from one of " area supervisors to one of " work discipline"
.
supervisors. In addition, the licensee has implemented changes to the work man -
agement system to computerize and simplify the job order generation process. The
effectiveness of this change has not been assessed, however, during implementation
of the new computerized system, some inadequate work control occurred. Also, a
Short Form Job Order was revised to change the scope to implement a modification
to a plant cooling water system, and it was not treated as a modification.
Another licensee initiative is increased training for workers and development of
a craft training facility. The licensee has also effectively used mockups.for
major maintenance tasks such as the feedwater line freeze seal and torus to drywell
vacuum breaker repairs.
The licensee preventive maintenance program remains generally effective. It is
a specific area of focus of licensee attention to implement measures to better
identify specific preventive maintenance needs and more effectively track and pre-
dict equipment failures. These licensee initiatives are aimed at addressing long
term equipment performance and includes the Life of System Maintenance Program
(reliability centered maintenance). This has been implemented in a limited manner
on the service and instrument air system.
The licensee continues to implement a strong surveillance test program. Some areas
that require more attention are valve control during surveillance testing, accept-
ance of out of specification results, and that the test program include appropriate
l
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20
plant equipment (e.g., air accumulators and underground electrical cables). Sur-
veillance test valve control is also assessed in the Operations area. In addition,
NRC inspection noted a minor weakness in Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) con-
trol.
In general, the quality and accuracy of the maintenance and surveillance procedures
are good. The licensee is active in identifying and correcting weaknesses as they
arise. One specific area of observed weakness in surveillance testing is valve
position control. Situations have occurred where the same individual performed
the line up and the verification, procedural direction as to "as-left" positions
were not clear, and procedural direction for valve positions was in error. Two
of these situations resulted in equipment being misaligned and led tn erroneous
surveillance test data on the containment spray heat exchangers and inability to
vent the isolation condensers. These valve dispositions have occurred, in part,
due to the incompleteness of incorporating plant modifications into surveillance
test procedures; and in part due to a lack of specific direction for valve positions.
The licensee is generally effective at identifying and addressing test
discrepancies and establishing acceptance criteria, however, several examples
of inadequate acceptance of test results have been seen. Out of specification
results have been accepted without explanation (MSIV closure), acceptance
criteria have been changed without a safety review (containment spray heat
exchar.gers AP), IST out of specification problems without appropriate action
(liquid poison), and questionable baseline data methodology (emergency service
water). While generally effective, licensee performance shows the need for
increased attention in the area of establishing acceptance criteria, and
effectively evaluating test results.
The licensee has recognized the need for improvement in jumper control and also
the need to evaluate and improve the testability of systems. On a system by
system basis, the licensee is evaluating permanent design changes to improve
testability. This outage, a modification was implemented on the core spray
system to eliminate the need to lift leads and use jumpers. The licensee
initiative to improve the testability of systems demonstrates their commitment
to improve long term surveillance performance.
In conclusion, the licensee has in place generally effective maintenance and
surveillance test programs. Significant progress has been made in reducing
maintenance backlogs and a strong surveillance test program is being
maintained. While some areas of weaknesses have been seen in both areas, the
licensee is responsive to NRC concerns. Improvements have been seen in the
areas of interdepartmental communications and the plant material condition.
Some areas where weaknesses have been identified are: the identification and
evaluation of maintenance rework items and surveillance repeat failures and the
administrative control of the work management system. Overall performance in
the areas of maintenance and surveillance has improved.
IV.C.2 Conclusion
Category 2.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ .- _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ .______._______2
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IV.C.3 Recommendation
. Licensee: Provide NRC with schedule for implementation of reliability centered
maintenance control.
E: None.
,
1
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f.3 .
ENCLOSURE 2
.
, ./ UNITED STATES
y S NUCLEMt REQULATORY COMMLSSION
I' E REGION I
'
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
. ***** BONG OF PRUSSLA. PENNSYLVANIA 16408
.
Docket No. 50-219 MR 11 W
GPU Nuclear Corporation
ATTN: Mr. Eugene E. Fitzpatrick
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
'P. O. Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 08731
Gentlemen:
Subject: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report No.
.50-219/87-99
The NRC Region I SALP Board conducted a review on March 14, 1989, and evaluated
the performance of activities associated with the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station. The results of this assessment are documented in the enclosed SALP
report, which covers the period October 1,1987 to January 31, 1989. We will
contact you shortly to schedule a meeting to discuss the report.
At the meeting, be prepared to discuss our assessment and any plans you have to
, improve performance. 'In particular, be prepared to discuss your plans yith
respect to programs to identify and correct deficiencies in the areas of
Radiological Controls, Security,-and Plant Operations in light of the problems
'identi fi ed. Continued inconsistent performance at the plant is a concern to
us.
Following our meeting and receipt of your response, the enclosed report, your
response, and summary of our findings and planned actions will be placed in the
NRC Public Document Room.
Your cooperation is appreciated.
Sincerely,
liiam T. Russell
Regional Administrator
Eq:losure: NRC Region I SALP Report No. 87-99
.
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GPU Nuclear Corporation 2
1
l
APR 171989 1
, cc w/ encl:
1 M. Laggart, BWR Licensing Manaaer
Public Document Room (PDR)
Chairman Zech
Commissioner Roberts
Commissioner Carr l
1
i Commissioner Rogers
l
l Commissioner Curtiss 5
L K. Abraham, PAO, RI (27 copies)
local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
State of New Jersey
bcc w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encl)
J. Taylor, DERO
l W. Russell, RI
M. Knapp, RI
T. Martin, RI
SALP Board Attendees
R. Brady, RI
J. Lieberman, OE
W. 011veria, DRS
} D. Holody, ES '
G. Kelly, DRP
E. Conner, DRP
Section Chief, DRP.
- Robert J. Bores, DF
- SS
l
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ENCLOSURE 3
1 ,
SALP MANAGEMENT MEETING
OYSTER CREEK.
MAY 8, 1989
L
l
GPUN ATTENDEES
G. Busch, Oyster Creek Licensing Manager, GPUN
P. Clark, President,.GPUN
l C. Clawson, Director, Communications, GPUN
l R. Coe, Training and Education Director., GPUN
C. Comerford, Administrative Support Manager, GPUN
-
D. Croneberger, Director-Engineering Projtets, GPUN
B. DeMerchant, BWR Licensing Engineer, GPUN
L C. DePinto, Rate Analyst, GPUSC
l D. Distel, PWR Licensing Engineer, GPUN '
P. Fiedler, Director, Quality and Training, GPUN
I, Finfrock, Jr., Chairman, GORB, GPUN
E.' Fitzpatrick, Director, Oyster Creek, GPUN
R. Heward, Jr., Director, Maintenance, Construction and Facilities, GPUN
J. Hildebrand, Director, Radiological & Environmental Controls, GPUN
R. Keaten, Director, Quality Assurance, GPUN
.
E. Kintner, Executive Vice-President, GPUN
J. Knubel, Nuclear Security Director, GPUN
K. Kutch, Senior Staff Analyst, GPUN
V. Laggart, Manager,' BWR Licensing, GPUN
R. Long, Director, Planning and Nuclear Safety, GPUN
R. McGoey, Manager, PWR Licensing, GPUN
- K. Neddenien, Senior Media Representative, GPUN
E. O'Donnell, Director, Corporate Planning, GPUN
W. Runtie, Manager, Rate Affairs, GPUN
M. Slobodien, Radiological Controls Director, Oyster Creek, GPUN
L. Sullivan, Jr., Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Director, GPUN
P. Wells, Safety Review Engineer, GPUN
R. Wilson, Director, Technical Functions, GPUN
NRC ATTENDEES
R. Bellamy, NRC Region I, Chief, Facilities Radiological Safety & Safeguards
E. Collins, Senior Resident Inspector, NRC
C. Cowgill, NRC Region I, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 4B
J. Durr, Chief (Acting) Projects Branch I, NRC
A. Dromerick, NRR, Division of Projects 1/II, Project Manager
W. Kane, NRC Region I, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
D. Lew, Resident Inspector, NRC
J. Stolz, NRR, Division of Reactor Projects I/II, Projects Cirector
PUBLIC ATTENDEES
R. Ebright, NJ-D.E.P. - Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
M. Jacobs, NJ-D.E.P. - Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
M. Van Ess, Neclear Engineer, N.J. Board of Public Utilities
I
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[ ENCLOSURE _4
GPU Nuclear Corporation
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arsip any, New Je sey 07054
201-316-7000
TELEX 136-482
Writer's Direct Dial Number:
June 15, 1989
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Respcnse
Ref'erence: Letter dated January 25, 1989, P. R. Clark to USNRC
As discussed with you at our meeting held in Parsippany on May 8, 1989,
this letter' and its attachment provides our response to the Systematic
Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) report.-
! As stated during our meeting of May 8, 1989, we believe the value of the
SALP prccess lies in the dialogue it promotes and the identification cf areas
where improvements can be made. Attachment I provides our. response by
functional area and summarizes key elements of our efforts for further
improvement.
GPU Nuclear believes substantial . improvements have been made particularly
in the latter part of the previous SALP period, and welcomes a mid-period
review during the current period.
Very truly yours,
-
W
P. R. Clark
President
GPUN
PRC:BDe:dmd
Attachment
0773A l
.(cc's on next page)
-8906230136 890615 Il[fj
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GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of General Public Utihties Corporation
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-cc: Mr. William T.: Russell, Administrator
Region l-
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1475 Allendale Road.
.. King of Prussia,:PA '19406
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.Mr. Alexander W. Dromerick, Project Manager
U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Division of Reactor Projects 1/11
'
.Washington,.DC L20555
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NRC Rbsident Inspector .. .
Dyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
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ATTACHMENT I
Functional Area: Plant Operations
GPU Nuclear believes we have made. substantial improvements particularly
since the end of the SALP period. The SALP cited in'a positive sense on-shift
decision making, improved materiel . condition, no plant trips, fewer operator
et rors, control room professionalism, operator action to control transients,
our emphasis on cooperation and teamwork, and others. In our view, the SALP
commented favorably on two key items - the emphasis placed en safety befero
schedule and our error-free plan approach. These are two concepts _that we are
continuing to stress as fundamental philosophies. All of the items the SALP
noted as positive will continue to be built upon and strengthened during the
current,SALP period.
With regard to secondary equipment problems, actions have been taken to
address this concern. Plant Materiel conducted a survey of various plant
personnel' to understand what plant equipment problems were thought to be
significant. The equipment problems and concerns from that servey along with
the Materiel Condition Report (Phase II) conducted during this SALP period,
were consolidated into a Materiel Condition Issue (MCI) List. The MCIs were
distributed to senior management for review and comment and then finalized.
The list has been divided into segments to be worked on based on availability
of the equipment. Development of action guidelines and assignment of actions
to address the issues is underway as part of the Plan for Excellence discussed
during the SALP meeting on May 8, 1989.
The SALP also noted a five-shift rotation. During the summer of 1988 GPU
Nuclear institut -l a " pipeline" in which a continuous supply of control room
operators are in training. It is anticipated that a six-shift rotation will
be established in early 1990.
The concern regarding procedural weaknesses is being addressed. Action
was initiated immediately following the isolation condenser vent valving error
to correct the method of determining that valves had been returned to their
proper position following testing. In addition, GPUN has formed a Procedure
Compliance Task Force to work on a wide ranger of procedural problem areas.
l The Oyster Creek site has also independently looked at specific Oyster Creek
procedural problem areas. As an initial step, standard guidance is being
developed in the form of Writer's Guides to ensure consistency and good human
factors practices. Additionally, actions have been or are being initiated to
L address procedural problems. For example, Plant Operations now has
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responsibility for plant procedures which affect Operations. Licensed
personnel are responsible for performing biennial review of these procedures,
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Alliconcerns related' to Plant Operations identified in the SALP will be
reviewed as part of the ongoing Operations Self-Assessment. GPU Nuclear
intends to complete 'this assessment including any needed' revisions to the Plan
for Excellence action plans by October 1,1989. The results of this .
assessment will be available for NRC review.
L
i In conclusion, NRC's recognition of our improving trend in operations is :!
appreciated. GPU . Nuclear is especially committed to improving performance in
.this area. GPU Nuclear personnel are anxious to demonstrate that performance
similar to the record setting 229 day run during the last cycle can be
repeated. It is our intention to operate the plant safely, in accordance with
, the regulations, in accordance with sound judgement and good practices, and in
accordance with our procedures.
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Functional-Area: Radiological Controls 1
The four: areas of- concern addressed'in the Radiological _ Controls portion
of the SALP are.(1) control and planning of radiological operations, (2)
incomplete corrective. action on identified problems, (3)- continued examples of l
ineffective root.cause analysis, and.(4) lack of. aggressive action to reduce
collective worker exposure. Items 2 and 3 appear to be essentially the same
.
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from the details of the report'and our response is divided into-sections
corresponding to items 1, 2 and 3, and 4.
While we acknowledge the deficiencies and areas needing improvement, and
have undertaken actions to respond, we believe performance did not degrade as
stated in the SALP Overall Summary, but in. fact improved.
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- CONTROL AND PLANNING 0F RADIOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
GPU Nuclear recognizes.that there were instances in which planning and
control of radiological work was less than desired. The items cited in the-
SALP report were largely self identified through the various internal controls
processes within the Radiological Controls program at Oyster Creek.
Each of these occurrences was the sublact of an internal Radiological
Investigative Report or a Rad 4.ological Awareness Report and critigt.e to
identify and correct root causes. The events did occur however and are
examples of _less than adequate planning and control. -
GPU Nuclear has five specific actions underway to improve the planning and
execution of radiological work. They are as follows:
o A task force appointed by the Office of the President of GPU Nuclear will
perform an assessment of and make recommendations to improve the execution
.of work with regard to radiological control practices of the workforce. We
know that the actual conduct of work in radiologically controlled areas is
most oft 3n the cause of the types of problems noted in the SALP report.
The-task force charter specifically charges it to specify actions to be
taken in the field at the work site, in the planning, supervision, and
management of work so as to optimiza adherence to the work practices set
forth in the GPU Nuclear Radiation Protection Plan.
-o A continuation of our approach to incorporate radiological and safety
reviews in the Long Range Planning process, including:
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Oversight by Techn'. cal Functions Radiological Engineer of
modifications and upgrades as they are developed by the engineering
staff.
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-Corporate Radiological Engineering participation in the Long Range-
Planning process to insure that due. consideration is given to the
radiation protection aspects of the work and budgeting process. >
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Senior Management review'of exposure control activities through a
Corporate Dose Oversight Group.
o' The Radiological Controls ~ Department has conducted a management self
assessment to-identify areas and specific tasks for improving the conduct
of work in radiologically controlled areas. The report of this group is
now under evaluation. Major areas addressed in the.self assessment
include deployment of radiological controls staff during outages, proper
,
methods for the conduct of critiques to gain maximum information and
benef;L, techniques to improve supervision within GPU system personnel and
contractors.
o A Fjeld Radiological Engineer is assigned to enajor work contractors to
support outage job planning and execution.
o Depicyment of GPU Nuclear Radiological Controls Technicians has been
adjusted to provide more intense oversight on major tasks. This is
designed to improve job knowledge, assure consistent approach to control
measures, and improve accountability.
INCOMPLETE CORRECTIVE ACTION ON IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS AND INCOMPLETE ROOT CAUSE
ANALYSIS.
GPU Nuclear concurs with the SALP assessment that our investigations,
critiques, and analyses did not always identify and correct root causes.
Actions were taken in the last quarter of 1988 to use staff members trained in
a variety of recognized investigative techniques to conduct and analyze
critiques of problem activities so as to identify root causes. Some of'the
.
techniques utilized include Kepner Tregoe, MORT, and INP0'c Human Performance
Evaluation System (HPES). GPU Nuclear has issued a new procedure for
conducting critiques and investigations that formalizes these techniques.
Although efforts in this area require more emphasis, considerable progress has
been made in root cause analysis that will be apparent during the next
evaluation period.
Two specific actions are underway to improve the root cause analysis and
corrective act*ons. They are as follows:
I
o Continuation of application of the GPU Nuclear corporate procedure for
investigations and critiques.
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o Events related to radiological protection issues will have critiques
performed by an independent assessor. j
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LACK OF AGGRESSIVE ACTION TO REDUCE COLLECTIVE WORKER EXPOSURE
Collective dose at Oyster Creek is well above the average for United
States Boiling Water Reactors. GPU Nuclear recognizes this and continues to !
take action to reduce collective dose. We will continue to pursue long term l
dose reduction promulgated in the Oyster Creek Dose Reduction Plan. A
schedule of activities, including specific milestone dater., is being developed
for each operating cycle in conjunction with the long range planning and GPU
System budgeting efforts. The fact that collective dose in 1988 exceeded the
goal is not due to a lack of action to control and minimize dose but rather to
the greatly expanded scope of the 12R outage. Within the original and
expanded scope of the activities in the SALP period, many dose reduction
actions were taken.
The issue of recirculation loop decontamination as a primary means for
dose reduction at Oyster Creek is well understood by GPU Nuclear, GPU Nuclear
remains committed to performing system decontamination for dose reduction
purposes based on factors such as anticipated savings of dose, cost, impact on
materials, and life of plant systems. A chemical decontamination of part or
most of the clean up system and reactor recirculation loops will be performed
prior to or during the 14R outage and may be performed as early as the 13R
outare.
It is recognized that the collective dose at Oyster Creek continues to be
a sigr.ificant challenge. Realistic expectations are that we will continue to
invest more effert in plant maintenance and modification to maintain industry
standards than with more recently completed plants. Thus, even with
aggressive efforts at dose reduction, it is expected that collective dose at
Oyster Creek will probably continue to exceed the industry average but can be
significantly reduced from past experience.
.
ACTION ON NRC SALP RECOMMENDATION
The SALP recommendation in the Radiation Protection section was that GPU
Nuclear perform a self-assessment of a third party review of the Radiation
Protection Program to assure that problems are fully identified and corrective
action plan is developed. Oyster Creek will receive a regular INPO Evaluation
from June 5-16, 1989. Furthermore, we expect INPO to provide us with special
assistance in improving our radiological protection program in the third
quarter of 1989. We plan to assess the results of the INPO Evaluation and
Assistance team, the special INPO assistance team, and GPU Nuclear's task
force discussed earlier. It is our intention to have the Task Force report
reviewed by an outside independent third party to ensure that findings and
corrective actions are adequately addressed. This action h e verted to occur
before the end of the third quarter of 1989. GPU Nuclear will keep the NRC
apprised of the results of the assessments so that progress can be tracked in
our program for improving radiation protection at Oyster Creek.
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LThe two' areas we would like to . address'in the Maintenance portion. of. this
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functional. area are: 1) rework / recurring maintenance and 2) GMS2:
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Implementation. . In. addition, general comments regarding our maintenance
program are: also provided.
REWORK / RECURRING MAINTENANCE
T The Oyster Creek' Work. Management System guideline A000-WMS-7100.01,
" Control of Rework and Recurring Maintenance" is the programmatic document used
for the. identification, root _cause analysis, implementation of corrective
actions,.and reporting of' rework items. Rework is defined as reperformance of
work'to correct previously assigned work scope which was incorrectly or
inadequately performed;by MCF craft personnel. Recurring Maintenance is the-
result of circumstances other than inadequately. performed repair or
installation and is usually the result of inadequate design, aged equipment,
wrong; application, improper operations, etc. The primary objective of the
program-is :to. minimize the occurrence of rework and recurring maintenance by
identification and analysis of cause and specifying corrective action.
. MCF has been using the 7100.01 guideline as well' as direct and indirect
methods to identify and address these concerns. Craft and supervisory
personnel who identify' rework account for direct identification of rework. In
addition, indirect monitoring methods are used by analyzing MNCRs, COTS
(Corrected-On-The-Spot), critiques, QDRs, and new job order inventory to
,dentify where rework may have occurred. To capture the rework items, MCF now
(since May 1, 1989) has designated rework' coordinators in the construction and
maintenance areas. This is a collateral responsibility. Coordinators review
each identified rework item with the appropriate MCF Construction and
Maintenance personnel to determine whether rework actually occurred and how
many manhours were involved. This information will be consolidated monthly and
used to produce graphs showing the number of monthly events as well as monthly
and year-to-date percentage of rework based on craft manhours worked. These
Rework Reports will be sent to Plans and Programs for ir.clusion in the monthly
Plant Performance Monitoring Report.
This process is expected to improve as the database becomes more reliable
and personnel are trained to identify and report rework items. To enhance
collection of data, rework and recurring maintenance job orders are now
identified in specific data fields of the Work Management System. Upper
management will monitor and assess this data to determine if corrective action
is needed in areas such as training, increased supervision, etc.
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Determination of excessive recurring maintenance is normally based on
review of maintenance history for specific equipment or systems and placed on
the Plant Materiel Condition Issue (MCI) list for evaluation and establishment
of action items. Plant Engineering will address recurring maintenance items
via Plant Engineering Work Requests (PEWRs) issued from MCF. Plant Materiel
will address recurring maintenance items via implementation of procedure
118.1. These recurring maintenance items will be tracked by Plant Materiel and
reviewed by all divisions on the Quarterly Failure Tending Report.
GMS2 IMPLEMENTATION
The work control system has undergenc many changes to meet our business
needs. Many t,f these enhancements are listed in Reference 1.
In general, these enhancements have made Work Management Procedures reflect
the us,e of our automated Work Control System (GMS2). GMS2 users have been
trainsd by individual and group sessions conducted by the GMS2 Coordinator.
Work Management Procedures now reflect the system capabilities and skills of
our personnel. User support has also been enhanced by the recent issuance of a
GMS2 Users Manual. (Specifically, WMS procedures A000-ADM-1220.08, "MCF Job
Order" and A000-ADM-1220.01, " Work Request" have been revised to reflect the
use of the electronic work request and to identify additional GMS2 requirements
and user interfaces.) Procedure A000-ADM-1220.08 will be further revised to
incorporate the requirements of Procedure A000-ADM-1220.13, "Short Form" when
it is deleted. The resulting WMS will then use the Work Request to initiate
work and the Job Order as the work controlling document for MCF work. This l
situation was self-identified by GPU Nuclear (QDR 88-039 was written to address i
this concern, and MCF has completed the QDR requirements as of May 19, 1989).
GENERAL COMMENTS
To properly assess the results GPU nuclear has achieved in the area of
maintenance, a more encompassing time frame than the SALP period addresses must
be considered. GPU Nuclear's letter to Mr. Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provided information on the maintenance program
improvements undertaken and planned at Oyster Creek. The detailed information '
contained in that letter and recent performance indicators show continuing
improvements are being made in the following areas:
o Organization
Changes in organization have emphasized capability and accountability.
l o Staffing
Experience, training and qualifications have been upgraded for craft
personnel. Technical capability has been strengthened through the
addition of multi-disciplinary personnel.
o Accuracy of Technical Information
A concentrated effort to upgrade drawings and procedures has taken
l place.
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o Work Control
Communications, responsiveness, efficiency and quality have improved.
o -Materiel Condition
The work backlog reductions coupled with increased effort on
preventative maintenance have improved the overall plant materiel
, condition of Oyster Creek.
Maintenance programs have and will continue to be developed with full
consideration of safe, reliable _ operation. Our progress and future plans
reflect GPU Nuclear's commitment to effective maintenance.
ACTION ON NRC SALP RECOMMENDATION
The SALP recommendation in the MCFfSurveillance section was to provide the-
NRC wiJh a schedule for implementation of re'.! ability centered maintenance
control.
Application of the Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) methodology to
the development of Life of System Maintenance Plans (LOSMP) for plant systems-
and components.is in the initial stages. Based on system functions and
determination of potential failure mechanisms which impact those functions, RCM
produces a list of actions to assure system reliability. These actions will be
formalized into the Life of System Mahtenance Plan (LOSMP) for the system.
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' LOSMP will assure that proper implementing documents are in place to execute-
the actions prescribed by RCM. Completion of at least one system RCM and
hnplementation of its LOSMP is intended for 1989. Future work in this area and
level of effort for future years will be formulated after evaluation of the
1989 efforts however, we currently anticipate that 4 systems per year will be
compieted.-
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Fynctional Area: Emergency Preparedness
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. The.three areas to.be addressed in the Emergency Preparedness portion of
this response are: 1) Consistent number of. weaknesses are apparent 1y'due to a
Llack of effectiveness of Emergency Preparedness training;-2). Concern regarding
the default iodine component has not been adequately addressed; and 3) Training-
of TSC engineers in accident analysis other than core damage assessment should-
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be addressed.-
EXERCISE WEAKNESSES-
The report notes that the 1988 exercise performance.was adequate with
approximately the same number of weaknesses. identified from exercise to
exerci'se.. While'GPU Nuclear acknowledges the weaknesses,:it is our conclusion
_ that the' 1988 Annual Exercise represented a significant improvement over the
1987 exercise, and considered the NRC identified weaknesses in 1988 to be of
generally lesser cor' . ce than in 1987. Action was taken to address the
weaknesses and, we L M eva, the 1989 Exercise which identified no weaknesses
shows they were effective.
DOSE ASSESSMENT
Since the SALP, refinements have been made to the dose assessment process
including revisions to the default iodine component. It is our understanding
from NRC Inspection Report 88-30 that this item has been adequately resolved
and closed out.
TRAINING OF TSC ENGINEERS
!
.The Emergency Preparedness portion of the SALP report states that training
of TSC engineers does not include severe accident analysis. TSC management
'i ncludes one or more licensed operators who perform the role of accident
analysis.. Inspection findings'do.not cite a lack of accident analysis
capability. NRC Inspection Report 89-03 conducted from January 17-20, 1989,
,
determined EP training, including training for TSC engineers, to be
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acceptable. The inspection report further credits GPU Nuclear for providing j
training to TSC engineers in the areas of core darrage assessment and core
damage mitt f@lon. GPU Nuclear believes this level of training in addition to
other EP tM ining and periodic participation in drills is sufficient.
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Functional Area: Security
As noted at the SALP meeting on May 8, 1989, responses were made to the i
Oyster Creek RER Report in October 1988 and February 1989 and we had requested
reconsideration of two security violations reported in Inspection Report No.
50-219/B8-33. We are in receipt of your letter dated May 15, 1989, and note
that the violation concerning failure to properly report a security event has
been rescinded.
In response to weaknesses noted in the Dyster Creek Security Program, the
following actions have been or will be taken, in addition to any specific
corrective actions noted in any previously submitted reports:
o, The number of tours by the shift commanders was doubled from one to
two per shift. The shift commanders were instructed to be
particularly alert for unusual situations relating to outage work.
They were also instructed to interact with the Security patrols and
fixed posts to assure alertness and attentiveness.
o Security coverage in critical areas was increased.
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Special Intake Dilution Patrol was added.
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Two to four Security officers were added to Drywell manning
levels, depending on Drywell work activity.
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A closed-circuit television camera was used on the refueling
floor to monitor the reactor cavity area. This helped assure no
unauthorized drywell access from the Refueling floor, while
minimizing radiation exposure.
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The Security Manager met with the Operations Department to
reiterate the importance of the Operations / Security interface.
This information was conveyed to all Operations shift personnel.
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Security has taken the initiative to be in regular attendance at
the " Plan of the Day" meetings.
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Based on the shortage of available cont,*act guards to support the
added outage workload, the plans for the next outage call for
using temporary GPU Nuclear personnel, rather than contractor
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personnel. In this way, more control can be exercised in
! obtaining quality personnei to supplement the Security force.
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Work. Request Forms require notification of. Security when work is .
- being performed which could create Security-related problems.
The guidance associated with this form'has been made'more
- explicit to help avoid future problems.
The following activities,= while not done directly in response to the issues '
noted above, have been taken to improve the overall. effectiveness of the
Security program.
o
Extra initiatives.were taken in the Fitness for Duty area:
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All new outage contractors were drug screened prior to obtaining
unescorted access.
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. An extra outside patrol-- was added to'look for contraband material. or'-
consumption of. alcoholic beverages in the parking areas.
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A'11. security personnel were alerted to be observant for persons
entering the Protected Area'. unfit for. duty.
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o
.The last annual Site Emergency Drill utilized a. Security Event as the drill
scenario. This not only. tested normal emergency response capabilities, but
also challenged the Security force response and the Operations / Security
interfaces.
.o GPU Nuclear, at its own' initiative,' implemented the NUMARC Access
Authorization program for personnel screening prior to granting unescorted
access. A new person seeking unescorted access must:
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have a successful psychological test
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have a successful 5-year comprehensive background check
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be fingerprinted
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be covered.by a behavioral observation program
Prior to this change to the program, only a letter stating three years of
good work bistory was required for contractor personnel.
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GPO Nuclear, through its efforts, identified an industry-wide problem with
the administration of INPI Examinations. GPU Nuclear took prompt
corrective actions and notified the NRC and others in the ruclear industry,
o
A significant new effort was undertaken to do joint tactical training on a
continuing basis with the Ocean County Sheriff's Tactical Armed Response
(STAR) team.
While we acknowledge the deficiencies and areas needing improvement, and
have undertaken actions to respond, we believe performance did not deptade as
stated in the SALP Overal? Summary, but in fact improved.
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Functional Area: Engineering / Technical Support
The action plan as a follow on to the Technical Support Self-Assessment -
'(TSSA) commenced in 1988 with several of the items completed prior to the end-
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of the SALP period. The activities completed, underway, or i.' the
developmental stage'should constructively contribute to enhancement of
engineering' support.
The.four areas'we would like to address in the Engineering /Techcical
Support portion of the SALP are: 1) development of the Design Basis Documents;'
2) conduct of Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFIs);_3) further upgrade
the drawings frequently.used; and 4) development of an improved working
interface between site and~ corporate personnel.
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DESIGN BASES DOCUMENTS-
The initial pilot program to develop'two design basis documents (DBD) for
Oyster Creek is underway. The products of the first two systems are expected
in the third quarter of 1989. The success of this effort will mold the future
plans which-presently envision four additional system DBDs per year for several
years. This effort is being lead by the systems engineer responsible for each
chosen system. Working with counterparts at the site and other members of the
staff, improved documentation and understanding of the system will result, as
well as an improved working relationship between the assigned corporate and
site-based systems engineers.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INSPECTION
A program to conduct two SSFIs is underway with the results expected in the
third and fourth quarters. One of these SSFIs will be on the same system as a
DBD which should assist us in evaluating that product. Current plans are to
conduct four additional SSFIs in the next two years.
DRAWING UPGRADES
The_ Oyster Creek Drawing Consolidation Project is converting approximately
750 drawings into computer-aided design products. This will have the dual
benefit of significantly improving the legibility of the drawings and the
usability of the drawings. The drawings selected include all of the plant
P& ids, electrical one-lines, and a very large number of the most frequently
used electrical elementary drawings. This project was awarded in April 1989
and is scheduled for completion by the end of 1990. A second project to
improve the legibility of approximately 800 additional drawings by conventional ;
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means is also underway. This program .is scheduled for completion by the end-of
1989. These two projects are the latest phases of a program which began'in
1981.to walk down systems and assemble, update, upgrade and control-drawings at l
' Oyster Creek. Since its inception,.approximately ten thousand. revisions to
-drawings have been issued under this program.
WORKING INTERFACE- d
There have been a number of management and staff initiatives to improve the-
interface'between site and corporate personnel. Engineering interface' meetings
are being held approximately twice each month to review and improve the .I
coordination of ongoing ~ engineering, activities. Additionally, on each new
significant modification project,. kickoff meetings'are now being held to assure
that the_ appropriate' interaction.and awareness exists between site and
corporate personnel responsible for the modification. Finally, senior
management interface meetings.have been initiated'to review longer-term
profects of importance to the engineering support staffs. TheLinitial meeting
was held in July 1988, with the next meeting deferred until after the 12R
outage. The next meeting will be conducted by September, 1989 and thereafter
held on a semi-annual basis. We believe these diverse efforts will play a
significant role in improving the interface between site and corporate
personnel.
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Functional Area: Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification
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The two major areas we would like to address.in the Quality. Verification
portion'of this functional area are effectiveness of the Quality Assurance (QA)
- Program and corrective action follow-up.
These issues are closely related and both generally point out weaknesses in
identifying the extent of. the problem sufficiently and implementing ef fective
corrective actions.
As a result of the SALP comments and GPU Nuclear identified needs, the
following actions are being planned:
). GPU Nuclear will identify and implement "QA Verification Technique"
training for appropriate personnel by December 31, 1989.
2. The corrective action program for handling QA identified deficiencies
will be evaluated and any appropriate changes will be completed by -
September 1, 1989.
In addition, GPU Nuclear had previously identified that responsiveness to
QA deficiencies was a problem. Accordingly, the Oyster Creek Plan for
Excellence contains action plans to improve responsiveness. These plans
contain, as a central theme, greater use of the Director's weekly 0A meeting as
-a vehicle to identify responsiveness problems and achieve resolution. For
example, deficiencies open longer than 60 days are now being. reviewed monthly
at the meeting. In addition, quality deficiencies are tracked in the Station
3 Action Item Tracking System to improve management visibility of overdue items.
ACTION ON NRC SALP REC 0tHENDATION
The SALP recommendation in the Safety Assessment, Quality Verification
section.was to review the current and previously closed Preliminary Safety
i Concerns to verify that no outstanding safety issues remain unresolved.
This review was completed and the results documented to the NRC by letter
dated March 21, 1989. In addition the Potential Safety Concern procedure has
recently been significantly revised. Major enhancements include:
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Provides definitive criteria for what constitutes a safety concern.
-
Emphasizes the resolution of a safety concern rather than just the
deportability aspect.
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- Assigns, responsibility for disposition of a safety concern to the
cognizant technical department.
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Establishes reouired time frames for the determination'of
deportability 3nd or the existance of.a' safety. concern.
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.T.equires that upper management ' approve- the' final' determinations.
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