IR 05000482/2017002

Wolf Creek Generating Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2017002 and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion

ML17223A285
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	08/10/2017
From:	Taylor N H NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
To:	Heflin A C Wolf Creek
Nick Taylor
References
EA-17-064 IR 2017002
Download: ML17223A285 (63)

Text

August 10, 2017

EA-17-064 Adam C. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 6 6839

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2017 002 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Dear Mr. Heflin:

On June 30, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On July 20, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Cleveland Reasoner, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements.

The NRC is treating these violation s as non-cited violations consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance of these non-cited violations

, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.

A violation of the licensee's current site

-specific licensing basis for tornado

-generated missile protection was identified.

Because this violation was identified during the discretion period covered by Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 15

-002, "Enforcement Discretion for Tornado Missile Protection Noncompliance," and because the licensee was implementing compensatory measures, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion by not issuing an enforcement action for the violation and allowing continued reactor operation.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E. LAMAR BLVD ARLINGTON, TX 76011

-4511 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,/RA T. Pruett for/

Nicholas H. Taylor, Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50

-482 License No

. NPF-42

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000482/2017002 w/ Attachment s: 1.Supplemental Information2.Request for Information for the OccupationalRadiation Safety Inspection conducted May 8thru 12, 20173.Request for Information for the OccupationalRadiation Safety Inspection conducted June 12thru 16, 2017

SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword: By:NHT/dll Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002 OFFICE SRI:DRP/B RI:DRP/B C:DRS/OB C:DRS/PSB2 C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 NAME DDodson FThomas VGaddy HGepford TFarnholtz GWerner SIGNATURE

/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 8/2/2017 08/02/17 7/31/17 07/28/2017 07/27/2017 08/02/17 OFFICE TL:DRS/IPAT ORA/ACES BC:DRP/B DRP/D NAME THipschman MHay NTaylor TPruett SIGNATURE

/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 8/1/2017 8/2/17 8/3/17 8/10/11 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000482 License: NPF-42 Report: 05000482/2017002 Licensee:

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility:

Wolf Creek Generating Station Location:

1550 Oxen Lane NE Burlington, KS 66839 Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2017 Inspectors:

D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector F. Thomas, Resident Inspector N. Greene, Ph.D., Health Physicist S. Money, Health Physicist M. Phalen, Senior Health Physicist Approved By: Nicholas H. Taylor Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects

2

SUMMARY

IR 05000482/2017002; 04/01/2017 - 06/30/2017; Wolf Creek Generating Station; Flood Protection Measures, and Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

The inspection activities described in this report were performed between April 1 and June 30, 2017, by the resident inspectors at Wolf Creek Generating Station and inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office

. Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements

. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., Green, greater than Green, White, Yellow, or Red), determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014

. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG

-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," dated July 2016

.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.7 for the licensee's failure to place the unit in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> with the train A component cooling water system inoperable. Specifically, the essential service water emergency make-up to component cooling water train A valve was not declared inoperable when it was out of service, and as a result, train A component cooling water was out of service for longer than its Technical Specification allowed outage time. The licensee's planned actions include revising Technical Specification Bases 3.7.7 and training operators on the proposed Technical Specification Bases revisions, and the licensee issued an "Essential Reading" document for operators to review. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 111808. The failure to declare train A component cooling water inoperable is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the finding using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of challenge the unknown because individuals did not stop when faced with uncertain conditions, and risks were not evaluated and managed before proceeding. This issue is indicative of current performance because the creation and implementation of the subject clearance order occurred in the last three years [H.11]. (Section 1R15)

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

Green.

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensee's failure to establish adequate measures to ensure that safety-related components remained capable of performing their functions. Specifically, the licensee did not have adequate preventive maintenance or testing tasks established to provide reasonable assurance that floor drains would not become clogged and impact the ability of train A safety-related components to perform their expected functions. As a result, a containment isolation valve was not adequately protected.

The station's immediate corrective actions included entering the condition into the corrective action program, declaring the subject valves inoperable, and cleaning the debris from the clogged floor drains.

The licensee created Work Order 17

-429068-000 to evaluate and establish new preventive maintenance tasks for floor drains

, and the licensee is continuing with, but had not yet completed, the remainder of the floor drain inspections for other safety-related areas.

The failure to establish adequate measures to ensure that floor drains in safety-related areas remained free of debris and safety-related components remained capable of performing their function is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the structure, system, and component and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that the finding has a problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspect in the area of identification because individuals did not identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. Condition Report 90879, documented in January 2015, was an opportunity for the licensee to identify the inadequacy of the floor drain preventive maintenance and testing strategy and reflects current performance [P.1]. (Section 1R06)4

PLANT STATUS

On April 24, 2017, operators reduced power to approximately 63 percent following removal of the Wolf Creek-Benton offsite 345 kV line from service after Wolf Creek received reports of a fire impacting the Wolf Creek-Benton offsite 345 kV line. The plant was restored to approximately full power on April 25, 2017, and the plant operated at or near full power for the rest of the period.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

On May 18, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's readiness for impending adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed plant design features, the licensee's procedures to respond to tornadoes and high winds, and the licensee's planned implementation of these procedures. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant. These activities constituted one sample of readiness for impending adverse weather conditions, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial Walk

-Down

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk

-downs of the following risk

-significant systems: April 11, 2017, centrifugal charging pump A June 13, 2017, safety injection pump A June 14, 2017, containment spray pump A June 27, 2017, auxiliary feedwater pump B The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the trains were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constituted four partial system walk

-down sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Complete Walk

-Down

a. Inspection Scope

On June 24, 2017, the inspectors completed a system walk

-down inspection of the essential service water system. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct system lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders, condition reports, temporary modifications, and other open items tracked by the licensee's operations and engineering departments. The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constituted one complete system walk

-down sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on five plant areas important to safety:

May 9, 2017, fire area A

-29, auxiliary feedwater pump B valve compartment, elevation 2,000 and 2,016 feet May 9, 2017, fire area A

-30, auxiliary feedwater pump valve compartment, elevation 2,000 and 2,016 feet May 11, 2017, fire area RWST, refueling water storage tank valve house, elevation 1,988 and 2,000 feet June 16, 2017, fire area A

-2, safety related pump rooms, train A, elevation 1,967 and 1,974 feet June 28, 2017, fire area s C-22 and C-33, upper cable spreading room and south vertical cable chase, elevation 2,073 feet 6 inches For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.

These activities constituted five quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

On May 12, 2017

, the inspectors completed their annual evaluation of the licensee's fire brigade performance. This evaluation included observation of an unannounced fire drill for a fire in the north end of the turbine building, elevation 2,033 feet (T

-7), on May 12, 2017.

During this drill, the inspectors evaluated the capability of the fire brigade members, the leadership ability of the brigade leader, the brigade's use of turnout gear and fire

-fighting equipment, and the effectiveness of the fire brigade's team operation. The inspectors also reviewed whether the licensee's fire brigade met NRC requirements for training, dedicated size and membership, and equipment.

These activities constituted one annual inspection sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

On April 17 and 25, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's ability to mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensee's flooding analysis, the inspectors chose one plant area, pipe penetration room A, containing risk

-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that were susceptible to flooding. The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be successfully accomplished.

In addition

, on May 15 and June 19, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected two underground vaults that contained risk

-significant or multiple-train cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment:

Train A essential service water system manhole MHE 4A Train A essential service water system manhole M HE5A The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the vaults and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion. The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.

These activities constituted completion of one flood protection measure sample and one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Green non

-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensee's failure to establish adequate measures to ensure that safety-related components remained capable of performing their function s. Specifically, the licensee did not have adequate preventive maintenance or testing tasks established to provide reasonable assurance that floor drains would not become clogged and impact the ability of train A safety-related components to perform their expected functions. As a result, a containment isolation valve was not adequately protected

.

Description.

On January 12, 2015, the licensee documented Condition Report 90879, which documented minor flood door seal and floor drain screen plugging issues identified by the inspectors. Corrective action 90879 04, "Add acceptance criteria to Locked [Preventive Maintenance Activities

]," included remedial actions to revise floor drain preventive maintenance activities. Specifically, floor drain preventive maintenance activities for all plant floor drains were to be modified to include acceptance criteria for floor drain screen clogging. Work Order 14

-395771-000 was modified and Work Order 15-397860-000 was initiated to perform baseline borescopic inspections of the floor drain system. The licensee began conducting bor escopic inspections in November 2015. The work order did not evaluate the acceptability of existing preventive maintenance activities.

On August 2, 2016, in response to inspector questions concerning preventive maintenance and testing activities associated with the floor drain system, the licensee documented Condition Report 106165, which noted that Work Order 15

-397860-000 was closed prior to completion, and the bor escopic inspections were never completed. Condition Report 106165 also included enhancement actions to provide inspection criteria for Work Orders 15

-397860-000 and 15

-397860-001 and monitor progress of inspections that were planned for April, May, and July of 2017.

On February 23, 2017, the licensee documented in Condition Report 111210 additional inspector concerns and information needs to resolve preventive maintenance activit y bases and the need for the bor escopic inspection schedule. The inspectors questioned how the licensee had reasonable assurance and an adequate basis for concluding that the drains were free of debris and capable of performing their design function.

Considering that the current preventive maintenance activity did not include any flow verification, had never included any verification of internal condition since original plant construction, and considering that the drains had never been cleaned, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had not taken adequate measures to ensure that floor drains in safety

-related areas remained free of debris and capable of performing their function.

On April 19, 2017, the licensee began conducting inspections to determine drain conditions. Condition Reports 112436, 112503, and 112588

, documented wood debris in the train A emergency diesel generator room sump, a 3 inch diameter pipe cap inside a 4 inch diameter train A component cooling water heat exchanger room drain lin e, and "a collection of loose debris that impede[s] a large cross

-section of the drain piping" associated with the train A safety-related piping penetration room.

Neither the emergency diesel generator

, nor the component cooling water heat exchanger room issues impacted operability of equipment in the affected areas.

On April 25, 2017, the licensee declared the boron injection tank outlet isolation valve (EMHV8801A

), the train A safety injection hot leg isolation valve (EMHV8802A

), the charging pump to regenerative heat exchanger containment isolation valve (BGHV8105), and the pressurizer vapor sample outer containment isolation valve (SJHV0013) inoperable because the loose debris that impeded the penetration room floor drains had clogged two of three drai ns. The calculated flood height in the train A safety-related piping penetration room with two drains clogged was determined to be 39.4 inches, which exceeded the maximum expected flood height of 23.2 inches, as described in Calculation FL

-11, "Flooding of Auxiliary Building Containment Penetration Areas," and the height of the subject valves' electrical conduits were below 39.4 inches. The pressurizer vapor sample outer containment isolation valve had the lowest control or power cable conduit (the termination for this valve is at approximately 30.5 inches).

The licensee cleaned the floor drains and removed the blockage that was obstructing the two floor drains in the train A safety-related piping penetration room, which ensured equipment operability. The licensee also performed additional evaluation of the potentially inoperable valves and determined that the termination points for the EMHV8801A, EMHV8802A, and BGHV8105 valves remained above worst case flood levels, and therefore always maintained their function. In the case of SJHV0013, whose cable termination points were below the possible flood level, the valve is normally in its closed, safe position, and it is a fail closed solenoid operated valve that would close should submergence impact the power supply to the valve when it is open

. In the event that the valve was closed and flood waters caused the valve to open, containment isolation valve SJHV0012, which is inside containment and in series with SJHV0013 (both make up penetration 69), is normally closed, located in a different area, and no instances when the SJHV0012 valve was not able to provide the containment isolation function for penetration 69 were identified. Therefore, the train A containment isolation function for penetration 69 was maintained.

On June 14, 2017, the licensee created Work Order 17

-429068-000 to evaluate and establish new preventive maintenance tasks for floor drains. Additionally, at the time of this report the licensee was continuing with, but had not yet completed, the remainder of the floor drain inspections for other safety

-related areas

- these additional extent of condition inspections are required to verify floor drain conditions.

Analysis.

The failure to establish adequate measures to ensure that floor drains i n safety-related areas remained free of debris and safety-related components remained capable of performing their function, in accordance with Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control,

" is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the SSC and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, one containment isolation valve was not adequately protected from internal flood sources and may not have operated reliably to isolate containment during the design basis internal flood event coincident with the need to isolate containment. Additionally, calculated internal flood height margin to this and other safety

-related valves was eliminated or severely reduced.

The inspectors evaluated the finding using Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At

-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding is not a deficiency representing an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment (valves, airlocks, etc.), containment isolation system (logic and instrumentation), or heat removal components; and the finding does not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment.

Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

The inspectors determined that the finding has a problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspect in the area of identification because individuals did not identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program.

Specifically, individuals did not recognize deviations from standards following the documentation of Condition Report 90879 in January 2015, which documented inspector identified floor drain concerns and reviewed preventive maintenance tasks associated with floor drains. This corrective action was an opportunity for the licensee to identify the inadequacy of the floor drain preventive maintenance and testing strategy and reflects current performance

[P.1]. Enforcement

. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," states, in part, that for those SSCs to which this appendix applies, measures shall be established to assure the regulatory requirements and design basis of SSCs are correctly translated into procedures and instructions. Contrary to the above, prior to June 14, 2017, for quality related components in the train A safety-related piping penetration room, to which 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B applies, the licensee failed to establish measures to assure the regulatory requirements and design basis of SSCs are correctly translated into procedures and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the safety

-related pressurizer vapor sample outer containment isolation valve in the train A safety-related piping penetration room w as adequately protected from internal flooding hazards in the event of a design basis internal flood. The licensee evaluated the condition to ensure that a design basis internal flood with two of three floor drains clogged would not have prevented the performance of safety-related functions. The station's immediate corrective actions included entering the condition into the corrective action program, declaring the subject valves inoperable, and cleaning the debris from the clogged floor drains. The floor drains that still need to be inspected do not represent an immediate safety concern because no additional impacts to safety

-related equipment have yet been identified and the additional drain inspections are expected to be completed in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance.

The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports 106165, 111210, 112436, 112503, and 112588

. This violation is being treated as a non

-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000482/2017002

-01, "Failure to Ensure Safety

-Related Valves were Adequately Protected from Internal Flooding Hazards."

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

.1 Review of Licensed Operator

Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On May 16, 2017, the inspectors observed a portion of an annual requalification test for licensed operators. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators' critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities

. These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

On April 24 and 25, 2017, the inspectors observed the performance of on

-shift licensed operators in the plant's main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity and risk due to power ascension activities and a subsequent partial reactor trip alarm

.

In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including the conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.

These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed one instance of degraded performance or condition of safety-significant SSCs:

April 26, 2015, containment spray pump A, failed to start The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.

These activities constituted completion of one maintenance effectiveness sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk

April 13, 2017

, planned maintenance for train B essential service water pump May 31, 2017, planned maintenance for turbine driven auxiliary feed water pump June 14, 2017, planned maintenance for train B containment spray pump The inspectors verified that these risk assessment s were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessment s and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessment s. These activities constituted completion of three maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determinations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs: March 22, 2017, operability determination of train A component cooling water with the train A essential service water to component cooling water pump suction isolation valve out

-of-service March 14 and April 5, 2017, operability and past operability determination s of emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer lines

The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC.

These activities constituted completion of two operability and functionality review samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.

.1 Failure to Declare Train A Component Cooling Water Inoperable

Introduction

. The inspectors identified a Green non

-cited violation of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.7 for the licensee's failure to place the unit in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> with the train A component cooling water system inoperable. Specifically, the essential service water emergency make

-up to component cooling water train A valve was not declared inoperable when it was out of service, and as a result, train A component cooling water was out of service for longer than its Technical Specification allowed outage time.

Description.

Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System," requires in part, that the train A and train B component cooling water system shall be operable; this Limiting Condition for Operation is applicable for MODEs 1 through 4. When the unit is in MODEs 1, 2, 3, or 4, and one of two required trains of component cooling water is inoperable, the out of service train of component cooling water is required to be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. When the out of service train of component cooling water is out of service for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the station has an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to be in MODE 3, and an additional 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> to be in MODE 5. On March 19, 2017, at 8:38 p.m., the train A essential service water emergency make-up to component cooling water valve was removed from service to support maintenance under clearance order D

-EG-A-005, prepared on February 1, 2017, and no technical specification limiting conditions for operation were entered for the condition. The inspectors noted the configuration, noted that the essential service water emergency make

-up to component cooling water valves are labeled with colored placards designating the safety

-related power source supplying each valve, reviewed the Technical Specifications, and reviewed Section 9.2.1.2.1.1, "Safety Design Basis," and 9.2.1.2.3, "Safety Evaluation

," of the Wolf Creek Updated Safety Analysis Report.

Section B 3.7.7 of the Technical Specification Bases states, "A [component cooling water] train is considered operable when-the associated piping, valves, heat exchanger, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are operable."

Essential service water system Section 9.2.1.2.1.1, "Safety Design Basis," of the Updated Safety Analysis Report states, "The [essential service water system] provides emergency make

-up to the fuel storage pool and component cooling water systems, and is the backup water supply to the auxiliary feedwater system." Essential service water system Section 9.2.1.2.3, "Safety Evaluation,"

of the Updated Safety Analysis Report states, "Safety Evaluation Ten

- The [essential service water system] is capable of supplying emergency makeup to the fuel storage pool and component cooling water systems and the backup water to the auxiliary feedwater system-The [essential service water system

] design assures that the flow requirements are met by operation of an [essential service water syste m] pump in each train and proper realignment of the associated valves." Section 9.2.5.2.3, "Emergency Makeup Water Requirement," provides additional insight regarding the safety design basis when it states, "Makeup water may also be required to replace evaporative losses or minor leakage from the component cooling water system."

Table 9.2

-3, "Essential Service Water System Flow Requirements Post

-[Loss of Coolant Accident] Operation," lists train A and B required flow as 100 gallons per minute per train for "maximum makeup to component cooling water system."

With the train A essential service water emergency make

-up to component cooling water valve out of service to support maintenance, the essential service water system was not capable of supplying emergency makeup to the A train component cooling water system to replace evaporative losses or minor leakage post-accident.

The inspectors informed the licensee of their operability questions and concerns with the train A component cooling water configuration.

The licensee documented Condition Report 111808 and evaluated the inspectors' questions. On March 23, 2017, at 6:11 p.m., approximately 93.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> since it had been removed from service, the train A essential service water emergency make

-up to component cooling water valve was restored to service, and as a result of the inspectors' questions, the licensee documented Licensee Event Report 2017 000, "Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to One Train of Component Cooling Water Inoperabl e." The licensee completed a basic cause evaluation for the cause of the failure to declare train A component cooling water inoperable. The licensee's evaluation determined that the issue was historical and was caused by the lack of guidance in the Technical Specification Bases

-the licensee's cause evaluation did not discuss the Updated Safety Analysis Report or discuss whether the Updated Safety Analysis Report should have been considered during clearance order preparation or work implementation.

The licensee also determined that the train A and train B emergency make

-up valves had been isolated a total of seven times since January 2014 without entering Technical Specification 3.7.7.

The inspectors reviewed the cause evaluation and also reviewed Sectio ns 9.2.1.2.1.1 and 9.2.1.2.3 of the Wolf Creek Updated Safety Analysis Report, as previously described. Finally, the inspectors also noted that Section 6.1.1 of procedure AP 26C-004, "Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment," Revision 34A, states, "Certain conditions render SSCs clearly inoperable-when a[n] SSC is unable to fulfill its specified safety function(s)-due to being removed from service (tagged out).

" Considering all of this information the inspectors concluded that it was reasonable for the operators to recognize that train A component cooling water would be made inoperable when the valve was disabled from March 19, 2017, until March 23, 2017. Additionally, the inspectors noted that although the Technical Specification Bases did not specifically discuss the essential service water emergency make

-up to component cooling water valve, the Technical Specification Bases did state that valves required to perform the safety related function must be operable to consider train A component cooling water operable. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the clearance order writing process or those involved in implementing the clearance order should have questioned the basis for the operability treatment of the essential service water emergency make

-up to component cooling water valve, which could have prevented the operability issue.

Although the essential service water emergency make

-up to A component cooling water valve was out of service, the normal demineralized make

-up water supply was available during the March 19 to March 23, 2017, timeframe. Additionally, train A component cooling water was in service and providing cooling throughout the duration of the inoperability period, with no identified leaks requiring makeup.

Therefore, the inspectors concluded there was not an actual loss of function of train A component cooling water.

The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 111808. The licensee's corrective action plans include revising Technical Specification Bases 3.7.7

, training operators on the proposed Technical Specification Bases, and the licensee issued an "Essential Reading" document for operators to review

.

Analysis.

The failure to declare train A component cooling water inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.7 is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, essential service water emergency make

-up to train A component cooling water was out of service and train A component cooling water was inoperable for longer than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, and the station did not enter MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

The inspectors evaluated the finding using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At

-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC that maintained its operability or functionality; the finding does not represent a loss of system and/or function; the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification

-allowed outage time; and the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety

-significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross

-cutting aspect in the area of challenge the unknown because individuals did not stop when faced with uncertain conditions, and risks were not evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, during clearance order preparation, implementation, and restoration, individuals did not maintain a questioning attitude during pre

-job briefs and job-site reviews to identify and resolve unexpected conditions. This issue is indicative of current performance because the creation and implementation of the clearance order occurred in the last three years [H.11].

Enforcement.

Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System," requires, in part, that train A and train B component cooling water shall be operable in MODES 1 through 4

, and when one of two required trains of component cooling water is inoperable, the out of service train of component cooling water is required to be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or the reactor must be in MODE 3 in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Contrary to the above, between March 19, 2017, and March 23, 2017, the train A component cooling water system was not operable in MODE 1, and neither the out of service train of component cooling water was restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, nor the reactor placed in MODE 3 in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Specifically, the essential service water make

-up to component cooling water train A valve was out of service for approximately 93 hours0.00108 days <br />0.0258 hours <br />1.537698e-4 weeks <br />3.53865e-5 months <br />, which exceeded the Technical Specification allowed outage time. Because no leaks requiring makeup to the CCW system existed, the inspectors concluded there was not an actual loss of function of train A component cooling water.

The station's immediate corrective actions included entering the condition into the corrective action program

, evaluating the condition, and issuing an essential reading. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 111808

. This violation is being treated as a non

-cited violat ion consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000482/

2017002-02, "Failure to Declare Train A Component Cooling Water Inoperable

."

.2 Enforcement Action

EA-17-064, Enforcement Discretion for Tornado

-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliances Description

. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," Criterion 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," states, in part, that SSCs important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as tornadoes. Criterion 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Basis," states, in part, that SSCs important to safety shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects including missiles that may result from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit. Section 9.5.4.1.1, "Safety Design Bases," of the Updated Safety Analysis Report describes "Safety Design Basis One" for the emergency diesel engine fuel storage tank system, "[It] is protected from the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and external missiles ([General Design Criteria]

-2)."

On April 5, 2017, the licensee reevaluated operating experience that was initially entered into the corrective action program and evaluated on March 14, 2017, concerning a low-probability scenario where one or more tornado

-generated missiles could impact the emergency fuel oil truck connection lines on the south wall of the diesel generator building. The two non

-safety-related connection lines are each connected to the safety-related normal fuel oil transfer lines via a tee connection and a normally closed isolation valve. Direct impact by a tornado

-generated missile to either train's truck connection line could impart a load that has not been evaluated on the tee connection to the fuel oil transfer line. Failure of the tee connection could result in the associated emergency diesel generator being incapable of performing its safety function.

The licensee concluded that a potential unanalyzed condition prohibited by Technical Specifications existed for emergency diesel generator fuel transfer line connections, as described in Condition Report 112131 and in LER 2017-002-00, "Tornado Missile Vulnerabilities Result in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

." On February 7, 2017, the NRC issued Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, "Enforcement Discretion for Tornado

-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance

," Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession Number ML16355A286). The EGM referenced a bounding generic risk analysis performed by the NRC staff that concluded that tornado missile vulnerabilities pose a low risk significance to operating nuclear plants. Because of this, the EGM described the conditions under which the NRC staff may exercise enforcement discretion for noncompliance with the current licensing basis for tornado

-generated missile protection. Specifically, if the licensee could not meet the technical specification required actions within the required completion time, the EGM allows the staff to exercise enforcement discretion provided the licensee implements initial compensatory measures prior to the expiration of the time allowed by the limiting condition for operation.

The compensatory actions should provide additional protection such that the likelihood of tornado missile effects are lessened. The EGM then requires the licensee to implement more comprehensive compensatory measures within approximately 60 days of issue discovery. The compensatory measures must remain in place until permanent repairs are completed, or until the NRC dispositions the

non-compliance in accordance with a method acceptable to the NRC such that discretion is no longer needed. Because EGM 15-002 listed Wolf Creek as a Group A plant, enforcement discretion will expire on June 10, 2018.

The licensee declared both diesel generators inoperable, complied with the applicable technical specification action statements, initiated condition report 112131, invoked the enforcement discretion guidance, implemented prompt compensatory measures, and returned the SSCs to an operable

-degraded/non

-conforming status. The licensee instituted compensatory measures intended to reduce the likelihood of tornado missile effects.

These included verifying that guidance was in place for severe weather procedures, abnormal and emergency operating procedures, and FLEX support guidelines, that training on these procedures was current, and that a heightened level of awareness of the vulnerability was established.

Enforcement.

Technical Specification 3.8.1 requires, in part, that two diesel generators capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) shall be operable and one of the two out of service diesel generators be restored to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, or the reactor must be in MODE 3 in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

. Contrary to the above, prior to April 5, 2017, two diesel generators capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s)were not operable and neither one of the two out of service diesel generators was restored to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> nor the reactor placed in MODE 3 in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

. Specifically, the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer lines were not designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as tornadoes

. Licensee Event Report 2017-002-00 described the licensee's corrective actions, including eliminating the tornado missile vulnerability by completing Design Change Package 15264, which cut, plugged, and covered the emergency fuel oil truck connection lines with 7/8 inch thick carbon steel plates.

The inspectors verified through inspection sampling that the EGM 15-002 criteria were met and that the issue was documented in Condition Reports 111624, 111625, and 112131. Therefore, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion (Enforcement Action (EA)064) in accordance with Section 3.2 of the Enforcement Policy because the violation involves an old design issue that was identified by the lice nsee as a result of a voluntary initiative, was corrected, and was unlikely to be identified by efforts such as normal surveillances or routinely scheduled quality assurance activities.

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

On June 2, 2017, the inspectors reviewed a permanent modification to the essential service water system vertical loop vacuum breaker valves

. The inspectors reviewed the design and implementation of the modification. The inspectors verified that work activities involved in implementing the modification did not adversely impact operator actions that may be required in response to an emergency or other unplanned event.

The inspectors verified that post

-modification testing was adequate to establish the operability of the SSC as modified.

These activities constituted completion of one sample of permanent modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk

-significant SSCs:

May 15, 2017, station blackout diesel generator A planned maintenance May 30, 2017

, non-safety auxiliary feedwater pump planned maintenance May 31, 2017, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump planned maintenance June 13 and 14, 2017, safety injection pump B planned maintenance June 14, 2017, containment spray pump B planned maintenance The inspectors reviewed licensing

- and design

-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post

-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post

-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.

These activities constituted completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed six risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:

In-service tests:

May 2, 2017, STS EF

-100B, "[Essential Service Water]

System Inservice Pump B and [Essential Service Water]

Check Valve Test" Containment isolation valve surveillance tests:

May 8, 2017, STS PE

-015, "Containment Purge Valve Leakage Test" Other surveillance tests:

April 3, 2017, STS IC

-260, "[Channel Operational Testing]

[Auxiliary Feedwater]

Pump Suction Pressure Low Transfer to [Essential Service Water]

" April 11, 2017, STN RP

-002E, "[Emergency Diesel Generator] B Control Circuit and Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Iso[lation] Switch" May 4, 201 7, STS IC-211A, "Actuation Logic Test Train B Solid State Protection System" May 10, 2017, STS IC

-447, "Channel Calibration Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range Incore

-Excore" The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.

These activities constituted completion of six surveillance testing inspection sample s, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstones:

Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance in assessing the radiological hazards in the workplace associated with licensed activities. The inspectors assessed the licensee's implementation of appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure control measures for both individual and collective exposures. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, walked down various areas in the plant, performed independent radiation dose rate measurements, and observed postings and physical controls. The inspectors reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:

Radiological hazard assessment, including a review of the plant's radiological source terms and associated radiological hazards. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's radiological survey program to determine whether radiological hazards were properly identified for routine and non

-routine activities an d assessed for changes in plant operations

.

Instructions to workers including radiation work permit requirements and restrictions, actions for electronic dosimeter alarms

, changing radiological condition, and radioactive material container labeling.

Contamination and radioactive material control

, including release of potentially contaminated material from the radiologically controlled area, radiological survey performance, radiation instrument sensitivities, material control and release criteria, and control and accountability of sealed radioactive sources.

Radiological hazards control and work coverage. During walk downs of the facility and job performance observations, the inspectors evaluated ambient radiological conditions, radiological postings, adequacy of radiological controls, radiation protection job coverage, and contamination controls. The inspectors also evaluated dosimetry selection and placement as well as the use of dosimetry in areas with significant dose rate gradients. The inspectors examined the licensee's controls for items stored in the spent fuel pool and evaluated airborne radioactivity controls and monitoring.

High radiation area and very high radiation area controls. During plant walk downs, the inspectors verified the adequacy of posting and physical controls, including areas of the plant with the potential to become risk

-significant high radiation areas.

Radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency with respect to radiation protection work requirements. The inspectors determined if workers were aware of significant radiological conditions in their workplace, radiation work permit controls/limits in place, and electronic dosimeter dose and dose rate set points. The inspectors observed radiation protection technician job performance, including the performance of radiation surveys.

Problem identification and resolution for radiological hazard assessment and exposure controls. The inspectors reviewed audits, self

-assessments, and corrective action program documents to verify problems were being identified and properly addressed for resolution.

These activities constitute completion of the seven required samples of radiological hazard assessment and exposure control program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.01.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed licensee performance with respect to maintaining individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA

). The inspectors performed this portion of the attachment as a post

-outage review. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, reviewed licensee documents, and evaluated licensee performance in the following areas:

Radiological work planning, including work activities of exposure significance

, and radiological work planning ALARA evaluations

, initial and revised exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation requirements

. The inspectors also verified that the licensee's planning identified appropriate dose reduction techniques

, reviewed any inconsistencies between intended and actual work activity doses

, and determined if post-job (work activity) reviews were conducted to identify lessons learned

.

Verification of dose estimates and exposure tracking systems, including the basis for exposure estimates, and measures to track, trend, and if necessary reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities. The inspectors evaluated t he licensee's method for adjusting exposure estimates and reviewed the licensee's evaluations of inconsistent or incongruent results from the licensee's intended radiological outcomes.

Problem identification and resolution for ALARA planning. The inspectors reviewed audits, self

-assessments, and corrective action program documents to verify problems were being identified and properly addressed for resolution.

These activities constitute completion of three samples of the five required samples of occupational ALARA planning and controls program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.02, and completes the inspection.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS3 In-plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee controlled in

-plant airborne radioactivity concentrations consistent with ALARA principles and that the use of respiratory protection devices did not pose an undue risk to the wearer. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, walked down various areas in the plant, and reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:

Engineering controls, including the use of permanent and temporary ventilation systems to control airborne radioactivity. The inspectors evaluated installed ventilation systems, including review of procedural guidance, verification the systems were used during high

-risk activities, and verification of airflow capacity

, flow path, and filter/charcoal unit efficiencie s. The inspectors also reviewed the use of temporary ventilation systems used to support work in contaminated areas such as high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)/charcoal negative pressure units. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's airborne monitoring protocols, including verification that alarms and set points were appropriate.

Use of respiratory protection devices, including an evaluation of the licensee's respiratory protection program for use, storage, maintenance, and quality assurance of National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) certified equipment

, air quality and quantity for supplied-air devices and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) bottles, qualification and training of personnel, and user performance.

Self-contained breathing apparatus for emergency use

, including the licensee's capability for refilling and transporting SCBA air bottles to and from the control room and operations support center during emergency conditions, hydrostatic testing of SCBA bottles, status of SCBA staged and ready for use in the plant including vision correction, mask sizes, etc., SCBA surveillance and maintenance records, and personnel qualification, training, and readiness.

Problem identification and resolution for airborne radioactivity control and mitigation. The inspectors reviewed audits, self

-assessments, and corrective action documents to verify problems were being identified and properly addressed for resolution.

These activities constitute completion of the four required samples of in-plant airborne radioactivity control and mitigation program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.03.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and operability of the licensee's personnel monitoring equipment, verified the accuracy and effectiveness of the licensee's methods for determining total effective dose equivalent, and verified that the licensee was appropriately monitoring occupational dose.

The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, walked down various portions of the plant, and reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:

Source term characterization, including characterization of radiation types a nd energies, hard-to-detect isotopes, and scaling factors

.

External dosimetry including National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accreditation

, storage, issue, use, and processing of active and passive dosimeters

.

Internal dosimetry, including the licensee's use of whole body counting, use of in vitro bioassay methods, dose assessments based on airborne monitoring, and the adequacy of internal dose assessments

.

Special dosimetric situations, including declared pregnant workers, dosimeter placement and assessment of effective dose equivalent for external exposures (EDEX), shallow dose equivalent

, and neutron dose assessment.

Problem identification and resolution for occupational dose assessment. The inspectors reviewed audits, self

-assessments, and corrective action program documents to verify problems were being identified and properly addressed for resolution.

These activities constitute completion of the five required samples of occupational dose assessment program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity (BI01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's reactor coolant system chemistry sample analyses for the period of April 1, 201 6, through March 31, 201 7, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors observed a chemistry technician obtain and analyze a reactor coolant system sample on June 15, 2017. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constituted verification of the reactor coolant system specific activity performance indicator for Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Reactor Coolant System Identified Leakage (BI02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records of reactor coolant system identified leakage for the period of April 1, 2016, through March 31, 2017

, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors observed the performance of STS BB-006, "RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPSI Computer," Revision 16, for June 2, 2017. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99

-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constituted verification of the reactor coolant system leakage performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (OR0

1)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that there were no unplanned exposures or losses of radiological control over locked high radiation areas and very high radiation areas during the period of October 1, 2016, to March 31, 2017. The inspectors reviewed a sample of radiologically controlled area exit transactions, focusing on those showing exposures greater than 100 millirem. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constitute verification of the occupational exposure control effectiveness performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified

.4 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences (PR01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed corrective action program records for liquid and gaseous effluent releases, leaks, and spills that occurred between October 1, 2016, and March 31, 2017, in order to verify the performance indicator data submitted to the NRC. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7

, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constitute verification of the radiological effluent technical specifications (RETS)/offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM) radiological effluent occurrences performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program and periodically attended the licensee's condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Semiannual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program, performance indicators, quality assessments, system health reports, and other documentation to identify trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors verified that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address the following identified adverse trends:

Increased number of inadequate preventive maintenance issues Increased number of low

-level status control events These activities constituted completion of one semiannual trend review sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

b. Observations and Assessments The inspectors evaluated a sample of recent issues and events that occurred to determine whether issues were appropriately considered as emerging or adverse trends. The inspectors verified that these issues were addressed within the scope of the corrective action program

. The inspectors' review of the trends identified above produced the following observations and assessments:

Inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to recent preventive maintenance related issues that have been identified by the inspectors or been self

-revealed. Specifically, inspection report 05000482/2017001 (ML17132A257) documented a self-revealing Green non

-cited violation associated with the licensee's failure to provide adequate work instructions for preventive maintenance on safety

-related equipment, which resulted in non

-functionality the Class 1E air conditioner air handling units. Inspection report 05000482/2016004 (ML17045A201) documented an inspector identified Green non

-cited violation associated with the licensee's failure to create a preventive maintenance task for emergency diesel generator excitation system diodes, which resulted in degradation of the excitation system diodes associated with the train B emergency diesel generator.

Inspection report 05000482/2016003 (ML16314B839) documented an inspector identified Green non

-cited violation associated with the licensee's failure to adjust a preventive maintenance task for a lockout relay and test the relay in accordance with vendor recommendations and industry operating experience, which resulted in the lockout relay associated with the train B essential service water pump motor breaker failing as

-found testing.

The licensee had not identified an adverse trend or evaluated possible common causes between the apparently related issues.

The inspectors determined that a possible emerging trend existed, which warrants additional evaluation. The licensee documented the inspectors' concerns in condition report 114437.

Inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to three status control events during the first quarter of 2017, which related to the trend evaluation for operator fundamentals involving monitoring, as discussed in inspection report 05000482/2016004 (ML17045A201). Specifically, 2017 Condition Report 110865 documented a turbine sump being overwhelmed due to an incorrect valve being manipulated; 2017 Condition Report 111073 documented a hand switch that was taken to stop instead of normal after stop during relay testing;

and 2017 Condition Report 111174 documented an issue associated with train A emergency diesel generator instrument air outlet valves for both pressure regulators being incorrectly isolated during post maintenance testing activities prior to returning the emergency diesel generator to service

-this resulted in a lack of lube oil pressure indication and a trip of the emergency diesel during post maintenance testing.

In each case, the status control events were of minor significance, but operations self-identified an area for improvement associated with these status control events and performed a common cause evaluation associated with condition report 111214. The licensee concluded that the events were related to teamwork, including inadequate peer checking and use of resources. Actions taken included a stand down with all operations personnel, each crew will have three reactor operators, and a teamwork dynamic learning activity was completed in May 2017.

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's response to this trend and determined the actions were adequate to address the identified causes

.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Annual Follow

-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected three issues for an in

-depth follow

-up: On January 31, 2017

, at 5:50 p.m., the licensee made an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.6.6, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems,"

Condition C, and Technical Requirements Manual 3.8.11, "Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices," Condition A, after containment cooler D lost indication and tripped during a transfer from slow to fast spee d. This resulted in containment cooler fan D being declared inoperable.

The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors assessed the licensee

's prioritization and planned corrective actions and whether these actions were adequate to correct the condition

. The inspectors noted that the cause evaluation was being revised to ensure the appropriate causes, corrective actions, and extent of condition reviews would be identified and completed.

On March 15, 2017, during the performance of STS BN

-201B, "RWST to Refuel Pool Isolation In

-Service Valve Test," Revision 7, BN HCV

-8800B failed to stroke closed within the required time of 10.0 seconds. The actual stroke time was 10.5 seconds. STS BN-201B is a quarterly test, and the valve also failed to stroke closed within the required time on December 13, 2016. Condition report 109980 documents the December 13, 2016

, stroke time of 10.9 seconds.

The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, and extent of condition reviews. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition

.

On March 4, 2013, condition report 65017 documented event notification 48797 and industry wedge pin failures in Anchor Darling motor operated double disc gate valves with threaded stem to upper wedge connections.

The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, evaluation

, and extent of condition reviews. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the completed corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition

. These activities constituted completion of three annual follow

-up sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000482/2017

00: Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to One Train of Component Cooling Water Inoperable On March 19, 2017, with the plant in MODE 1, planned work activities isolated emergency make-up from the essential service water system to train A component cooling water. The inspectors questioned the configuration, and the licensee determined that train A component cooling water was inoperable when emergency make-up from essential service water was isolated and the allowed outage time of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.7 was exceeded. The emergency make-up valve was returned to service on March 23, 2017.

The licensee determined that adequate information was not incorporated into Technical Specification Bases 3.7.7

. The licensee documented condition report 111808, training request 2017

-0098, and essential reading 2017

-013. The inspectors reviewed this issue and determined that this issue constituted an NRC

-identified violation, and the enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section

1R15 of this inspection report.

This LER is closed.

.2 (Closed) LER 05000482/2017

00: Tornado Missile Vulnerabilities Result in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications On April 5, 2017, with the plant in MODE 1, the licensee submitted an 8

-hour, non-emergency report (Event Notification 52666) to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 after determining that safety

-related fuel oil transfer lines inside the diesel generator building could be damaged if tornado generated missiles struck the non

-safety-related truck connections to these lines. Since both fuel oil transfer lines are required to supply fuel to the emergency diesel generators, both emergency diesel generators were declared inoperable.

The licensee documented condition report 112131, completed a basic cause evaluation

, and implemented design change package 15264 to perman ently eliminate the vulnerability, which was implemented May 31, 2017. The licensee's immediate corrective actions included implementing compensatory measures consistent with EGM 15-002, "Enforcement Discretion for Tornado

-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance." The inspectors reviewed this issue and determined that it was appropriate to exercise enforcement discretion for the licensee's actions on and after April 5, 2017, and not take enforcement action for the required actions of Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources

- Operating," since the non

-compliances were resolved before June 10, 2018 (EA-17-064). The enforcement aspects are discussed in Section 1R15 of this inspection report.

This LER is closed.

These activities constituted completion of two event follow

-up sample s, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On May 12, 2017, regional inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

On June 16, 2017, regional inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. S. Smith, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

On July 20, 2017, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

R. Adams, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

J. Ashley, Supervisor, System Engineering

R. Audano, Superintendent, Maintenance

R. Ayers, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

T. Baban, Manager, Engineering

Programs

W. Brandt, Shift Manager

K. Clark, Technician, Fire Protection

M. Corbin, Superintendent, Security Operations

J. Cuffe, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

T. East, Superintendent, Emergency Planning

J. Edwards, Manager, Operations

R. Fincher, Manager, Quality

R. French, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

J. Fritton, Oversight

G. Fugate, Director, Plant Support

L. Fure, Master Technician, Radiation Protection

A. Gilliam, Technician, Radiation Protection

N. Good, Licensing Engine

er

C. Gross, Manager, Chemistry

C. Hafenstine, Manager, Regulatory Affairs

D. Hall, Manager, Strategic Projects

A. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer

P. Herrman, Manager, Design Engineering

R. Hobby, Licensing Engineer

J. Isch, Superintendent, Operations Work Controls

K. Jay, Manager, Radiation Protection

R. Jung, Instructor, Fire Protection

J. Knust, Licensing

Engineer

R. Lane, Manager, Integrated Plant Scheduling

B. Lee, Licensed Supervising Instructor

D. Mand, Director, Engineering

J. McCoy, Vice President, Engineering

W. Muilenburg, Supervisor

, Licensing

L. Ratzlaff, Manager, Maintenance

C. Reasoner, Site Vice President

J. Schepers, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

M. Skiles, Manager, Security

T. Slenker, Supervisor, Operations Support

S. Smith, Plant Manager

L. Stone, Licensing Engineer

A. Stull, Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer

J. Suter, Supervisor, Fire Protection

M. Tate, Superintendent, Security Operations

J. Yunk, Manager, Training

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000482/2017002

-01 NCV Failure to Ensure Safety

-Related Valves were Adequately Protected from Internal Flooding Hazards (Section 1R06)

05000482/2017002

-02 NCV Failure to Declare Train A Component Cooling Water Inoperable (Section 1R15)

Closed

05000482/2017

-001-00 LER Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to One Train of Component Cooling Water Inoperable

05000482/2017

-002-00 LER Tornado Missile Vulnerabilities Result in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AI 14-006 Severe Weather

Drawings

Number Title Revision

M-12AL01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System 28 M-12EF01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water System 29

Condition Report

s

113136

Section 1R04

Equipment Alignment

Procedures

Number Title Revision

CKL

AL-120 Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Lineup

CKL

BG-120 Chemical and Volume Control System Normal Valve Lineup

CKL

EF-120 Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup

Procedures

Number Title Revision

CKL

EM-120 Safety Injection System Lineup Checklists

CKL

EN-120 Containment Spray System Lineup

15A

Drawings

Number Title Revision

EID-0018 P&ID System Composite System BG, BN, EM, EJ, EP

M-12AL01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System 28 M-12BG01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System

M-12BG03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical & Volume Control System

M-12EA01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Service Water System

M-12EF01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water System 29 M-12EF02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 42 M-12EF03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 19 M-12EG01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling Water System

M-12EG02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling Water System

M-12EM01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System

M-12EN01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Containment Spray System 13

Condition Report

s

112179

112180

112181

112668

112669

112670

112671

112759

112761

112765

112829

113304

113333

113334

113458

113484

113971

Work Orders

98-200354-000

Section 1R05

Fire Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AI 10-001 Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory, Maintenance and Cleaning 12

AI 10-001 Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory, Maintenance and Cleaning 13

AP 10-105 Fire Protection Training and Drills

AP 10-106 Fire Preplans

AP 10-106 Fire Preplans

Drawings

Number Title Revision

E-1F3601 Fire Detection/Protection System Control [Building] & Communication [Corridor]

- EL. 2061'

-6" & EL. 2073'-6" 2 E-1F9905 Fire Hazard Analysis

E-1R8900 Raceway Notes, Symbols and Details

M-663-00017 Penetration Seal Typical Details

W22 M-650A-00048 Upper Cable Spreading Room Pre

-Action Sprinkler System

W06

Condition Report

s

112843

113012

113849

114118

114183

114184

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Revision/Date

APF 10-105-02 Fire Drill Scenario and Critique Report

APF 10-105-02 Fire Drill Scenario and Critique Report

, Unannounce

d, Backshift May 12, 2017

Section 1R06

Flood Protection Measures

Drawings

Number Title Revision

M-12BG01 Piping & Instrumentation Chemical and Volume Control System 19 M-12BG03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Chemical & Volume Control System

M-12SJ01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Nuclear Sampling System 15

Condition Reports

51622 90879 94473

106165

111210

111358

111359

112036

112097

112436

112503

112588

112590

112594

113211

Work Orders

07-299627-004 14-395771-000 15-397860-000 15-397860-001 16-416247-000 16-416247-001 16-416247-003 16-416247-005 17-429068-000

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Revision

FL-11 Flooding of Auxiliary Building Containment Penetration Areas 1

FL-11-001-CN001 Flooding of Auxiliary Building Containment Penetration Areas 1

Section 1R11

Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Procedures

Number Title Revision

ALR 00-083C Rx Partial Trip

5A

AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations

AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations

GEN 00-004 Power Operation

STS

SE-001 Power Range Adjustment to Calorimetric

Condition Report

s

112548

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Revision/Date

Operations Requalification Cycle 17

-5 Annual Exams April 25, 2017

16-07 Requalification Exam

16-08 2017 Annual Requalification Exam Section 1R12

Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

Number Title Revision

MPE E009Q-03 Inspection and Testing of Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breakers

STN

IC-459 Channel Calibration Spray Additive Tank Level Loop ENLPL0015 6C STN

IC-460 Channel Calibration Spray Additive Tank Level Loop ENLPL0016

7C STS

EN-003B Train B Spray Additive System Flow Test

STS

EN-207 CTMT Spray Sump Valve Operability Test

Condition Report

s 89095 90486 95773 96614

109140

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Date 85309 Functional Failure Determination Checklist December 1

1, 2014 95773 Functional Failure Determination Checklist May 28, 2015 95778 Functional Failure Determination Checklist May 28, 2015 EN System Health Report April 1 to June 30, 2016

EN-01 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed

June 13, 2017

EN-02 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed

June 13, 2017

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Date

EN-03 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed

June 13, 2017

EN-04 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed

June 13, 2017 STS

IC-643A Slave Relay Test K643 Train A Containment Spray Completed February

23, 2017 STS

IC-644A Slave Relay Test K

644 Train A Containment Spray Completed March 1, 2017

Section 1R13

Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AI 15D-026 Control of Cyber Security Tamper Indicating Devices (TID)

AI 22C-013 Protected Equipment Program

AP 22C-003 On-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment

AP 22C-007 Risk Management and Contingency Planning

Drawings

Number Title Revision

M-12AL01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System 28 M-12EF01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water System 29 M-12EF02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 42 M-12EF03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 19

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Date 2017-0203 On-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment; Risk Assessment Dates

- April 10, 2017, through April 16, 2017 April 6, 2017

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Date 2017-0210 On-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment; Risk Assessment Dates

- May 29, 2017, through June 4, 2017 May 25, 2017

Section 1R15

Operability Evaluations

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment

AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment

AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment

34A

AP 28-001 Operability Evaluations

Drawings

Number Title Revision

M-12JE01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Emergency Fuel Oil System 19

Condition Report

s

111624

111625

111808

112131

113699

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Revision/Date

APF 21-001-02 Night Shift Control Room Turnover Form March 21, 2017

APF 28-001-01 Operability Evaluation

D-EG-A-005 EGHV0013 Printed

March 23, 2017

D-EG-A-005A EGHV0013 Printed

March 20, 2017 D-EG-A-005B EGHV0013 Printed

March 23, 2017

LER 2017-001-00 Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to One Train of Component Cooling Water Inoperable May 17, 2017

LER 2017-002-00 Tornado Missile Vulnerabilities Result in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications May 31, 2017

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Revision/Date

PSA-05-0013 WCGS PRA Component Cooling Water System Notebook

- 2002 Update Section 1R18

Plant Modifications

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AI 05-005 Design, Implementation, and Configuration Control of Modifications

AI 05-025 Post Modification Testing Plan

Drawings

Number Title Revision

WIP-M-16EF03-066-A-1 Hanger Drawing Control Index

WIP-M-16EF05-066-A-1 Hanger Drawing Control Index

WIP-M-16EF19-001-A-1 Hanger Drawing Control Index

WIP-M-16EF19-001-B-1 Hanger Drawing Control Index

WIP-M-18EF13-010-A-1 Hanger Details Small Pipes Miscellaneous Details Essential Service Water System

WIP-M-223F-00003-W03-A-1 Crispin Model VR

-41 Relief Check Valve Flanged Ends Size Fig. 150-VR 0

WIP-M-223F-00004-W01-A-1 Crispin Model VR

-41 Relief Check Valve Flanged Size

150LB Carbon Steel with Resilient Seat

Condition Report

s

101760

Work Orders

16-410599-000 16-410599-001 16-410599-004 17-422064-000 17-422064-001 17-422064-002 17-422239-000 17-422239-001 17-422239-004 17-422239-012 17-423329-000 17-423329-001 17-423329-004 17-423329-012

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Revision/Date

APF 05-024-01 Minor Change Package (MCP):

ESW Water Hammer Vacuum Breaker Valves Spring Replacement

-

015214 February 1

6, 2017

APF 05-024-01 Minor Change Package (MCP):

ESW Water Hammer Vacuum Breaker Valves Spring Replacement

-

015230 April 13, 2017

APF 26A-003-01

Applicability Determination:

ESW Water Hammer Vacuum Breaker Valves Spring Replacement

-

015214 February

14, 2017

APF 26A-003-01

Applicability Determination:

ESW Water Hammer Vacuum Breaker Valves Spring Replacement

-

015230 April 12, 2017

APF 26A-003-02

50.59 Screen:

ESW Water Hammer Vacuum Breaker Valves Spring Replacement

-

015214 April 4, 2017

APF 26A-003-02

50.59 Screen:

ESW Water Hammer Vacuum Breaker Valves Spring Replacement

-

015230 April 12, 2017 EF01-22-003-CN002 Calculation Change Notice:

CP 15

214 R01 3 EF01-25-003-CN002 Calculation Change Notice:

CP

214 R01 3 EF02-06-007-CN005 Calculation Change Notice:

CP

230 R01 7 EF03-58-001-CN003 Calculation Change Notice:

CP

230 Rev.1 1 P-009A-010-CN001 Design Verification Report:

Piping Stress Analysis for Essential Service Water System, Train "B" Return Line

P-011AB-007-CN001 Calculation Change Notice:

Piping Stress Analysis For Essential Service Water, Train "A" Return Line Section 1R19

Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision

STN

AP-101 NSAFP Recirc Test

STN

EG-003B CCW Train B Void Monitoring and Venting

STN

KU-010 Operation of SBO DG Test

STS

AL-103 TDAFW Pump Inservice Pump Test

STS

AL-103 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Inservice Pump Test

STS

EM-100B Safety Injection Pump "B" Inservice Pump Test

STS

EN-100B Containment Spray Pump B Inservice Pump Test

Procedures

Number Title Revision

STS

EN-007B Containment Spray Train B Void Monitoring and Venting

SYS

EC-121 Recirc of the RWST Through the Fuel Pool Cleanup System

Drawings

Number Title Revision

M-12EM01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System

Condition Report

s

113453

113694

Work Orders

16-414754-000 16-417183-000 16-417672-001 16-417672-005 16-419426-000 16-419455-000 16-419472-001 17-421226-000

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Date

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet

- CCW Train B Void Monitoring and Venting Completed June 13, 2017

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet

- Containment Spray Train B Void Monitoring and Venting Completed June 12, 2017

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet

- NSAFP Recirc Test Completed May 30, 2017

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet

- Safety Injection Pump "B" Inservice Pump Test Completed June 13, 2017

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet

- Safety Injection Pump "B" Inservice Pump Test Completed June 14, 2017

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet

- Turbine Driven AFW Pump Inservice Pump Test Completed May 31, 2017 D-AL-T-003 KFC02 Completed May 31, 2017

Section 1R22

Surveillance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations

STN

RP-002E EDG B Control CKT and FO XFER Pump Iso Switch

STS

EF-100B ESW System Inservice Pump B & ESW B Check Valve Test

48A STS

IC-211B Actuation Logic Test Train B Solid State Protection System

37A STS

IC-260 Channel Operational Test Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Pressure Low Transfer to ESW

15A STS

IC-447 Channel Calibration Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range Incore

-Excore 44 STS

IC-453B Channel Calibration Fuel Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor GG RE

-0028 19 STS

PE-015 Containment Purge Valve Leakage Test

Drawings

Number Title Revision

M-12EF01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water System 29 M-12EF02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 42

Condition Report

s

111888

112830

Work Orders

16-417303-000 16-420125-000 16-420250-000 17-427320-000

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Date

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet

- Actuation Logic Test Train B Solid State Protection System Completed May 4, 2017

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet

- Channel Calibration Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range Incore

- Excore Completed May 10, 2017

Section 2RS01:

Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 19D-100 Radioactive Source Program

AP 25A-001 Radiation Protection Manual

AP 25A-200 Access to Locked High or Very High Radiation Areas

AP 25A-700 Use of Temporary Lead Shielding for

LHRA or VHRA Barricades

AP 25B-100 Radiation Work er Guidelines

AP 25B-200 Radiography Guidelines

15A

FHP 02-019 Spent Fuel Pool Exclusion Area

RPP 01-105 Health Physics Organization, Responsibilities, and Code of Conduct 20

RPP 02-105 RWP [Radiation Work Permit]

44A

RPP-02-205 Radiological Survey Frequency Requirements

13A

RPP-02-210 Radiological Survey Methods

48A

RPP 02-215 Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas

RPP-02-405 RCA Access Control

RPP 02-515 Release of Material From the

RCA 33

RPP 02-605 Control and Inventory of Radiation Sources

RPP-03-406

RP-RP Dosimetry / Records

RPP 03-407 Testing of Portal Monitors as Passive Whole Body Counters 1A

RPP 05-319

SAM 11 Operation 4

RPP 05-707 Operation of Whole Body Counters 9

RPP 05-800 Operation and Spectrum Analysis with the Intrinsic Germanium Count System

RPP 05-906 Tri-Nuclear Underwater Filter/Vacuum Operation

11A

RPP 06-318 Thermo-Fisher Scientific SAM 12

Calibration

1A

RPP 06-319

SAM 11 Calibration

RPP 07-212 Requirements of Radioactive Materials Stored Outdoors

RPP 08-105 Underwater Dive Operations

Condition Reports

107705

110356

110847

111305

112513

Radiological Work Permits Number Title Revision

20163055 Water Jet Peening on Reactor Vessel Nozzles

20166031 Containment

2047 Reactor Vessel Head and Head Stand Area

1

20170010 Station Personnel Access to High Radiation Areas

20170020 Waste Processing Activities and Locked High Radiation Area Access

1

Air Sample Surveys Title Date Air Sample Log and Selected Air Sample Calculation Work Sheets (01/01/16-05/09/17) May 9, 2017

Audits, Self

-Assessments, and Surveillances Number Title Date

QA-2016-Fourth Quarter-RP-FAO QA Functional Area Owner Quarterly Oversight Perspective

- Radiological Protection January 2017

QA-2017-0321 QA Assessment of Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness May 3, 2017

QH-2016-1346 USAR Changes and Logic for Discontinuing Daily Monitoring with Portable Continuous Air Monitors (AMS

-4s) October 5, 2016

QH-2017-0313 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Contamination and Radioactive Material Control Measures at the RCA

March 7, 2017

QH-2017-1396 Wolf Creek Control for Tritium Gun Sights January 9, 2017

QH-2017-1435 Evaluating Collective Dose Reduction Process for Scaffold Frames Left In Containment at Power March 8, 2017

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

Fuel Pool (Non

-Fuel) Inventory April 28, 2017

Category 1 and 2 Radioactive Source Inventory April 28, 2017

Listing of Plant Modifications

- 01/01/16 - 05/09/17 May 9, 2017

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date STS

HP-001 Sealed Source Surveillance Tests January 25, 2017 STS

HP-001 Sealed Source Surveillance Test April 5, 2017 STS

HP-001 Sealed Source Surveillance Tests July 7, 2016 WC011005 Small Article Monitor (SAM)

Calibration February

27, 2017 WC093361 Small Article Monitor (SAM)

Calibration October 20, 2016

Section 2RS2: Occupational

ALARA Planning and Controls

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 25A-401 ALARA Program

AP 25A-410 ALARA Committee

2A

AP 25B-300 RWP Program

24A

RPP 02-105 Radiation Work Permits (RWP)

Condition Reports

96809

108513

109240

110252

112389

113762

Audits and Self

-Assessments Number Title Date 16-01-RP/PC Quality Assurance Audit Report:

Radiological Protection/Process Control February

24, 2016

QH-2017-1505 Quick Hit Assessment: NRC IP 71124.02

Assessment June 13, 2017

Radiation Work Permits Number Title Revision

155001 Reactor Cavity Decon Activities 3

161000 RP Rover for RF

1

161102 Incore Tunnel Inspections and Maintenance

Radiation Work Permits Number Title Revision

163049 Under RV Head Full Body Entry to Support RV head Inspections

163220 Primary Side Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing

164482 Remove/install Canopy Seal Weld Clamps from the top of the Seismic Platform at CRDM nozzles 11, 12, 23, 26, 77

165048 Containment High Contamination Decon of Reactor Head

165049 RP Decon Group Special Decon Activities

ALARA Review Packages, Post

-job ALARA Reviews, and In

-Progress Reviews

RWP Number Title Date

155001 ALARA Review Package August 5, 2015

161000 ALARA Review Package May 9, 2016

161000 In-Progress Review (50%)

September 30,

2016

161000 In-Progress Review (80%)

October 22, 2016

161000 Post-job ALARA Review February 22, 2017

163049 ALARA Review Package October 15, 2016

163220 ALARA Review Package September 8,

2016

164482 ALARA Review Package October 7, 2016

164482 In-Progress Review (50%)

October 16, 2016

164482 In-Progress Review (80%)

October 18, 2016

164482 Post-job ALARA Review November 23,

2016

165048 ALARA Review Package August 27, 2016

165048 In-Progress Review (50%)

October 26, 2016

165048 Post-job ALARA Review November

2, 2016

165049 ALARA Review Package August 16, 2016

165049 In-Progress Review (Exposure Estimate Revision)

September

13, 2016

165049 In-Progress Review (50%)

September

19, 2016

ALARA Review Packages, Post

-job ALARA Reviews, and In

-Progress Reviews

RWP Number Title Date

165049 Post-job ALARA Review November

28, 2016

Miscellaneous Documents

Title Date ALARA Sub

-Committee Meeting Minutes September 22,

2016 ALARA Sub-Committee Meeting Minutes September 29,

2016 ALARA Sub

-Committee Meeting Minutes October 23, 2016

ALARA Sub

-Committee Meeting Minutes November 11,

2016

RF 21 and Pre RF21 Forced Outage: Radiation Protection Summary January 9, 2017

Section 2RS3:

In

-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AI 10-001 Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory, Maintenance and Cleaning 12

AI 10-004 Air Fill Station Operation

AI 14-009 Industrial Respiratory Protection Program

AP-06-002 Radiological Emergency Response Plan

18A

AP 25B-600 Respiratory Protection Program at Wolf Creek

RPP 03-205

DAC-Hour Tracking

RPP 03-310 Respiratory Protection Equipment

19A

RPP 05-925 HEPA Portable Ventilation Unit Maintenance and Use

STN

PE-003

HEPA Filter In

-Place Leak Test Non

-Safety Related Units

10A STN

PE-004 Charcoal Adsorber In

-Place Leak Test Non

-Safety Related Units 10 STN

PE-055 DOP Testing of Portable Ventilation and Vacuum Units

5A STS

PE-005

HEPA Filter In

-Place Leak Test Safety Related Units

STS

PE-006

Charcoal Adsorber In

-Place Leak Test Safety Related Units 14

Condition Reports

255 93399 96446 97019 99533

102046

102823

103915

105928

Audits and Self

-Assessments Number Title Date

RF20 Alpha Characterization Study October 22,

2015

QA-2017-0317 QA Audit Report: Use of Respiratory Protection Devices April 12, 2017

In-Place Filter Testing Number Title Date STN

PE-003 (TSC

FF-1) HEPA Filter In

-Place Leak Test Non

-Safety Related Units December 28,

2016 STN

PE-004 (TSC

FF-1) Charcoal Adsorber In

-Place Leak Test Non

-Safety Related Units December

28, 2016 STS

PE-005 (FGK01A) HEPA Filter In

-Place Leak Test Safety Related Units February

3, 2017 STS

PE-006 (FGK01A) Charcoal Adsorber In

-Place Leak Test Safety Related Units February

3, 2017 STS

PE-006 (FGK01B) Charcoal Adsorber In

-Place Leak Test Safety Related Units April 2, 2017

TEDE / ALARA Reviews

RWP Number Title Date

162210 Respiratory Protection / TEDE Evaluation Worksheet June 6, 2016

162220 Respiratory Protection / TEDE Evaluation Worksheet May 12, 2016

170006 Respiratory Protection / TEDE Evaluation Worksheet October 12, 2016

170011 Respiratory Protection / TEDE Evaluation Worksheet October 11, 2016

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

Posi 3 USB Test Results Functional Test: Scott Airpack

2016

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date 17-13194 Air/Gas Quality Report & Certificate

NFPA 1989-2013 (N) - Trace Analytics LLC

April 26, 2017

AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Forms for Donning SCBA

2017

AIF 10-001-02 SCBA Inspection [3.2.1] May 4, 2017 GT1245302 Fire Protection Training Lesson Plan for Self

-Contained Breathing Apparatus User

- Rev. 16 May 9, 2016 GT1245302 Training Records for Self

-Contained Breathing Apparatus May 10, 2017

RPF 02-210-3 Air Sample Log

- DAC value >.

2016-2017

Section 2RS4: Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures

Number Title Revision

RPP-01-105 Health Physics Organization, Responsibilities, and Code of Conduct 20

RPP 02-210 Radiation Survey Methods

48A

RPP 03-121 Determination of Neutron Dose

RPP 03-122 Skin Dose Calculations

13A

RPP 03-205

DAC-Hour Tracking

RPP 03-210 Internal Exposure Calculations and Evaluations

RPP 03-406 RP Dosimetry / Records

RPP 05-707 Operation of Whole Body Counters

Condition Reports

95099 95107 97498

102798

102801

107242

107276

107994

108361

109961

111305

112114

112395

113762

Audits and Self

-Assessments Number Title Date 16-01-RP/PC Quality Assurance Audit Report: Radiological Protection/Process Control February

11, 2016

QH-2016-1356 Benchmarking for passive entry and exit whole body counts October 5, 2016

Audits and Self

-Assessments Number Title Date

QH-2017-1505 Quick Hit Assessment: NRC

IP 71124.04 Assessment June 13, 2017

Waste Stream Analysis Reports Number Title Date 396456001

CVCS Resins January 26, 2016

404868001 Drum Dryer Waste Tank August 10, 2016 418290001

RCS Filters February

2, 2017 418290002

SFP Filters February 22,

2017 418290003

Dry Active Waste February

20, 2017 418290004

Radwaste Resin March 1, 2017

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

2015 Whole Body Counting Reports

2015

2016 Whole Body Counting Reports

2016

DAC Hour Information for All Individuals

2015 and 2016

NRC Form 5 for Radworkers (

in total)

2015 and 2016 17025:2005

NVLAP Certificate of Accreditation

- Ionizing Radiati on Dosimetry

2017

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AI 26A-007 NRC Performance Indicators

AI 26A-008 NRC / INPO / WANO Performance Indicator and MOR Reporting Chemistry Desktop Guide

NRC / INPO /

WANO Performance Indicator Guidelines

Procedures

Number Title Revision Health Physics Desktop Instruction Updating the INPO HP CDE Database

STS

BB-006 RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer

Condition Reports

2244

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet

- RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer Completed June 2, 2017

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet

-

RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer Completed June 3, 2017 Database Searches RWP Entries Greater than Dose and Dose

-Rate Alarm Setting (01/01/2016 through 05/09/2017)

May 9, 2017

GRP-U1GC2017-006 Gaseous Radioactive Release Permit January 12, 2017

LRP-U1LB2016-072 Liquid Radioactive Release Permit November 15, 2016

NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AI 15C-012 Procedure Change Request (PCR) Module

AI 16C-006

Troubleshooting

AI 23D-003 MOV Trending and Periodic Verification Program

AI 28A-023 Evaluation of Maintenance Rule Functional Failure CRs

AP 15C-001 Procedure Writer's Guide

30A

AP 15C-004 Preparation, Review and Approval of Procedures, Instructions and Forms

AP 16B-003 Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance

AP 29B-003 Surveillance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision

STS

BN-201B BN

HCV-8800B, RWST To Refuel Pool Iso Inservice Valve Test 6 STS

GN-001 Containment Cooling Fans Operability Test

STS

IC-616B Slave Relay Test K616 Train B Safety Injection

STS

IC-616B Slave Relay Test K

616 Train B Safety Injection

SYS

EC-121 Recirc of the RWST Through the Fuel Pool Cleanup System

SYS

GN-120 Containment Cooling System Operation

SYS

GN-120 Containment Cooling System Operation

Drawings

Number Title Revision E-018 -00852 SZ. 5 2SP-IWD Schematic

W12 E-018 -00853 Wiring Diagram 2SP IWD (Size 5)

W12 E-13GN02 Schematic Diagrams Containment Cooler Fans A & C

E-13GN02A Schematic Diagrams Containment Cooler Fans B & D

M-12BN01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Borated Refueling Water Storage System

M-12GN01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Containment Cooling System 24 M-12GN02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Containment Cooling System 3 M-223A-00079 12" -150 Weld Ends Carbon Steel Double Disc Gate Valve with

SMB-00 Limitorque Actuator

W03

Condition Report

s 61565 65017 67902 67903 67904 67905 67906

102988

105347

108096

108783

109980

110048

110725

110865

111073

111174

111214

111640

111823

113911

113913

114437

Work Orders

13-369794-000 13-370024-000 13-370025-000 13-370026-000 13-370027-000

Work Orders

13-370028-000 13-374331-000 13-374332-000 13-374333-000 13-374334-000 13-374334-001 14-383026-005 14-383116-000 14-386746-000 14-386746-001 14-387945-000 16-420451-000 17-422333-000 17-422333-001 17-422333-002 17-422333-003 17-422333-004 17-422333-007 17-424714-000 17-424714-001 17-424714-002

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Revision/Date 29672 NG004T 480 VAC Motor Control Center Inspection, Cleaning and Testing May 17, 2017

APF 05-024-01 Minor Change Package (MCP):

Installation of Ring Lug Connection

-

015234 March 8, 2017

APF 05-024-01 Minor Change Package (MCP):

Size 5 Motor Starter Spring Contact Base Spacers

-

015267 May 1, 2017

BN-01 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation, Borated Refueling Water Storage System

- BN01

BN-02 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation, Borated Refueling Water Storage System

- BN02

BN-03 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation, Borated Refueling Water Storage System

- BN03

GN-01 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation, Containment Cooling System

-

GN-01

GN-02 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation, Containment Cooling System

-

GN-02

M-223A-00061 Instruction Manual for Gate & Check Valves

W19 M-223A-00061 Instruction Manual for Gate & Check Valves

W21 PIR 110725

Functional Failure Determination Checklist March 9, 2017

QA-2017-0297 4th Quarter Engineering Performance Report Started October

1, 2016

QA-2017-0315 Review of Long Standing CRs in Operations to Determine if Escalation is Warranted Started March

14, 2017

QA-2017-0319 Review of

CR 111823 for Potential Elevation

-Escalation Started March

20, 2017

QA-2017-0322 Operations 1

st Quarter 2017 Quality Oversight Report Started March

30, 2017

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Revision/Date

QA-2017-0330 Assessment of Clearance Order Boundary and Placement Started April

10, 2017

QA-2017-0334 QA Assessment of Work Orders (WOs)

16-420570-000 and 12-352280-000 in Support of Audit

17-03-ENG Started April

27, 2017 STS

PE-007 Periodic Verification of MOV's (EGHV0058) March 23, 2014 STS

PE-007 Periodic Verification of MOV's (EGHV

0059) October 16, 2016 STS

PE-007 Periodic Verification of MOV's (EGHV

0060) October 11, 2016 STS

PE-007 Periodic Verification of MOV's (EGHV

27) April 7, 2011 STS

PE-007 Periodic Verification of MOV's (EGHV

0130) March 21, 2014 STS

PE-007

Periodic Verification of MOV's (EGHV

0131)

October 14, 2016

VTM E-018-00190 B-410916 Instructions for Replacement of Type E

21MV3-M Vertical Interlock for Two Size Contractors

VTM E-018-00190 PA1548 Cleaning Vertical Mechanical Interlock on Size Section 4OA

3:

Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment

AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment

AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment

34A

AP 28-001 Operability Evaluations

Drawings

Number Title Revision

M-12JE01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Emergency Fuel Oil System 19

Condition Report

s

111624

111625

111808

112131

113699

Miscellaneou

s Number Title Revision/Date

APF 21-001-02 Night Shift Control Room Turnover Form March 21, 2017

APF 28-001-01 Operability Evaluation

D-EG-A-005 EGHV0013 Printed

March 23, 2017

D-EG-A-005A EGHV0013 Printed

March 20, 2017 D-EG-A-005B EGHV0013 Printed

March 23, 2017

LER 2017-001-00 Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to One Train of Component Cooling Water Inoperable May 17, 2017

LER 2017-002-00 Tornado Missile Vulnerabilities Result in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications May 31, 2017

PSA-05-0013 WCGS PRA Component Cooling Water System Notebook

- 2002 Update

The following items are requested for the Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection Wolf Creek Generating Station Inspection Dates:

May 8-12, 2017

Integrated Inspection Report 2017002

Inspection areas are listed in the attachments below.

Please provide the requested information on or before April 17, 2017

.

Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below.

For example, all contacts and phone numbers for Inspection Procedure 71124.0

should be in a file/folder titled

"1- A," applicable organization charts in file/folder "

1- B," etc.

If information is placed on ims.certrec.com, please ensure the inspection exit date entered is at least 30 days later than the onsite inspection dates, so the inspectors will have access to the information while writing the report.

In addition to the corrective action document lists provided for each inspection procedure listed below, please provide updated lists of corrective action documents at the entrance meeting.

The dates for these lists should range from the end dates of the original lists to the day of the entrance meeting.

If more than one inspection procedure is to be conducted and the information requests appear to be redundant, there is no need to provide duplicate copies.

Enter a note explaining in which file the information can be found.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact Martin Phalen at (817) 200

-1158 or martin.phalen@nrc.gov.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number

3150-0011.

1. Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) and Performance Indicator Verification (71151) Date of Last Inspection:

October 17 through 21, 2016

A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the Radiation Protection Organization staff and technicians

B. Applicable organization charts

C. ALL radiation protection related licensee (Wolf Creek) assessments and audits, all independent or third party radiation protection

-related assessments and audits, all radiation protection

-related self

-assessments, and all radiation safety

-related LERs, including, but not limited to, radiation monitoring instrumentation and radioactive effluents, releases and / or spills, written since September 1,

2016

D. Procedure indexes for the radiation protection procedures

E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.

Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.

1. Radiation Protection Program Description

2. Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations

3.

Personnel Dosimetry Program

4. Posting of Radiological Areas High Radiation Area Controls

RCA Access Controls and Radiation Worker Instructions Conduct of Radiological Surveys Radioactive Source Inventory and Control Declared Pregnant Worker Program

F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub

-tiered systems) since September 1, 20

a. Initiated by the radiation protection organization

b. Assigned to the radiation protection organization

NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.

Please provide in document formats which are "searchable" so that the inspector can perform word searches.

If not covered above, a summary of corrective action documents since September 1, 2016 involving unmonitored releases, unplanned releases, or releases in which any dose limit or administrative dose limit was exceeded (for Public Radiation Safety Performance Indicator verification in accordance with

IP 71151)

Additionally, a copy of ALL radiation protection AND chemistry department root cause evaluations, apparent cause evaluation, and condition evaluations performed since September 1, 2016

G. List of radiologically significant work activities scheduled to be conducted during the inspection period (If the inspection is scheduled during an outage, please also include a list of work activities greater than 1 rem, scheduled during the outage with the dose estimate for the work activity.)

H. List of active radiation work permits

I. Radioactive source inventory list

a. All radioactive sources that are required to be leak tested

b.

All radioactive sources that meet the 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix E, Category and above threshold.

Please indicate the radioisotope, initial and current activity (w/assay date), and storage location for each applicable source.

J.

The last two leak test results for the radioactive sources inventoried and required to be leak tested.

If applicable, specifically provide a list of all radioactive source(s) that have failed its leak test within the last two years

K. A current listing of any non

-fuel items stored within your pools, and if available, their appropriate dose rates (Contact / @ 30cm)

L. Computer printout of radiological controlled area entries greater than 100 millirem since the previous inspection to the current inspection entrance date.

The printout should include the date of entry, some form of worker identification, the radiation work permit used by the worker, dose accrued by the worker, and the electronic dosimeter dose alarm set

-point used during the entry (for Occupational Radiation Safety Performance Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151).

3.

In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03)

Date of Last Inspection:

March 9 through 13, 2015

A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:

1. Respiratory Protection Program

2.

Self-contained breathing apparatus

B. Applicable organization charts

C. Copies of audits, self

-assessments, vendor or NUPIC audits for contractor support (SCBA), and LERs, written since date of last inspection related to:

1.

Installed air filtration systems

2.

Self-contained breathing apparatuses

D. Procedure index for:

1.

Use and operation of continuous air monitors

2.

Use and operation of temporary air filtration units

3.

Respiratory protection

E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.

Additional specific procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.

1.

Respiratory protection program

2.

Use of self

-contained breathing apparatuses

3.

Air quality testing for SCBAs

4.

Use of installed plant systems, such as containment purge, spent fuel pool ventilation, and auxiliary building ventilation

F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub

-tiered systems) written since date of last inspection, related to the airborne monitoring program, including:

1.

Continuous air monitors

2.

Self-contained breathing apparatuses

3.

Respiratory protection program

NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.

Please provide in document formats which are "searchable" so that the inspector can perform word searches.

G. List of SCBA qualified personnel

- reactor operators and emergency response personnel

H. Inspection records for SCBAs staged in the plant for use since date of last inspection.

I. SCBA training and qualification records for control room operators, shift supervisors, STAs, and OSC personnel for the last year.

A selection of personnel may be asked to demonstrate proficiency in donning, doffing, and performance of functionality check for respiratory devices

J. List of respirators (available for use) by type (APR, SCBA, PAPR, etc.), manufacturer, and model

The following items are requested for the Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection at Wolf Creek

(June 12 thru 16, 2017)

Integrated Report 2017002

Inspection areas are listed in the attachments below.

Please provide the requested information on or before May 29, 2017.

Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below.

For example, all contacts and phone numbers for Inspection Procedure 71124.0

should be in a file/folder titled

"1- A," applicable organization charts in file/folder "

1- B," etc.

If information is placed on ims.certrec.com, please ensure the inspection exit date entered is at least 30 days later than the onsite inspection dates, so the inspectors will have access to the information while writing the report.

In addition to the corrective action document lists provided for each inspection procedure listed below, please provide updated lists of corrective action documents at the entrance meeting.

The dates for these lists should range from the end dates of the original lists to the day of the entrance meeting.

If more than one inspection procedure is to be conducted and the information requests appear to be redundant, there is no need to provide duplicate copies.

Enter a note explaining in which file the information can be found.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact Natasha Greene at (817) 200

-1154 or natasha.greene@nrc.gov.

The other inspector will be Shawn Money.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150

-0011.

2.

Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls (71124.02)

Date of Last Inspection:

October 17, 2016

A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for ALARA program personnel

B. Applicable organization charts

C. Copies of audits, self

-assessments, and LERs, written since date of last inspection

, focusing on ALARA

D. Procedure index for ALARA Program E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.

Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.

1. ALARA Program

2. ALARA Committee

3. Radiation Work Permit Preparation F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub

-tiered systems) written since date of last inspection, related to the ALARA program.

In addition to ALARA, the summary should also address Radiation Work Permit violations, Electronic Dosimeter Alarms, and RWP Dose Estimates

NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.

Please provide in document formats which are "searchable" so that the inspector can perform word searches. G.

List of work activities greater than 1 rem, since date of last inspection, Include original dose estimate and actual dose.

H. Site dose totals and 3

-year rolling averages for the past 3 years (based on dose of record) I. Outline of source term reduction strategy

J. If available, provide a copy of the ALARA outage report for the most recently completed outages for each unit

K. Please provide your most recent Annual ALARA Report.

4.

Occupational Dose Assessment (Inspection Procedure 71124.04)

Date of Last Inspection:

June 22, 2015

A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:

1. Dose Assessment personnel

B. Applicable organization charts

C. Audits, self

-assessments, vendor or NUPIC audits of contractor support, and LERs written since date of last inspection, related to:

1. Occupational Dose Assessment

D. Procedure indexes for the following areas:

1. Occupational Dose Assessment

E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.

Additional Specific Procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.

1. Radiation Protection Program

2. Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations

3. Personnel Dosimetry Program

4. Radiological Posting and Warning Devices

5. Air Sample Analysis

6. Performance of High Exposure Work

7. Declared Pregnant Worker

8. Bioassay Program

F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub

-tiered systems) written since date of last inspection, associated with:

1. National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP)

2. Dosimetry (TLD/OSL, etc.) problems

3. Electronic alarming dosimeters

4. Bioassays or internally deposited radionuclides or internal dose

5. Neutron dose

NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.

Please provide in document formats which are "searchable" so that the inspector can perform word searches.

G. List of positive whole body counts since date of last inspection, names redacted if desired H. Part 61 analyses/scaling factors I. The most recent National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accreditation report or, if dosimetry is provided by a vendor, the vendor's most recent results