IR 05000482/2024002
ML24200A177 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Wolf Creek ![]() |
Issue date: | 07/18/2024 |
From: | Greg Werner NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBB |
To: | Reasoner C Wolf Creek |
Werner G | |
References | |
IR 2024002 | |
Download: ML24200A177 (1) | |
Text
July 18, 2024
SUBJECT:
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2024002
Dear Cleve Reasoner:
On June 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station. On July 9, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with R. Bayer, General Manager, Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Gregory E. Werner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000482 License No. NPF-42
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket No.
05000482
License No.
Report No.
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-002-0009
Licensee:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
Facility:
Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location:
Burlington, KS
Inspection Dates:
April 1 through June 30, 2024
Inspectors:
G. Birkemeier, Resident Inspector
N. Greene, Senior Health Physicist
C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Mejia, Reactor Inspector
J. Melfi, Project Engineer
D. Proulx, Senior Project Engineer
B. Tharakan, Technical Assistant
Approved By:
Gregory E. Werner, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch B
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Adequately Barricade and Post a High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000482/2024002-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71124.01 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.1.a, High Radiation Areas, when the licensee failed to adequately barricade and conspicuously post a high radiation area on the 2000-foot elevation of the containment. Specifically, on April 11, 2024, while performing a walk down in the containment, the NRC inspector identified an area outside of a posted and barricaded high radiation area that had accessible dose rates in excess of 100 millirem per hour.
Failure to Follow Licensee Procedures and Implement High Contamination Area Controls Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000482/2024002-02 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71124.01 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, appendix A, February 1978, when the licensee failed to adequately implement high contamination area controls for a job activity. Specifically, on April 8, 2024, at least two workers, a welder, and a pipefitter, were exposed to high contamination conditions of 300,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters (dpm/100cm2) while performing weld preparation associated with the replacement of train A residual heat removal drain valves EJV0169 and EJV0007 on the pump suction line. As a result, two workers were contaminated and had to be evaluated for unintended internal dose.
Failure to Perform a Radiation Survey to Identify the Magnitude and Extent of Changing Radiological Conditions Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000482/2024002-03 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71124.01 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) when the licensee failed to survey an area with changing radiological conditions. Specifically, on April 2, 2024, during activities associated with refueling outage 26, the licensee withdrew the incore detector thimbles and failed to survey the area above and around the entrance to the incore tunnel to identify the extent and magnitude of the changing radiation levels. As a result, workers in the high radiation area were not informed about elevated radiation levels as high as 240 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters from the incore tunnel entrance.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period shutdown for refueling outage 26, which began on March 28, 2024. On May 10, 2024, the unit commenced reactor startup, and the reactor was made critical. The unit returned to full power on May 14,
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of a tornado/missile for the following systems:
- refueling water storage tank on June 12, 2024
- boric acid transfer system on June 12, 2024
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)containment recirculation sump recovery path on April 10, 2024 (2)train A component cooling water system on April 25, 2024 (3)train B offsite circuit to train B safety-related 4160-volt bus (NB02) on April 30, 2024 (4)train B containment coolers on April 30, 2024 (5)train B residual heat removal (RHR) system fire in the control room actions on April 30, 2024 Type text here
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)reactor building 2000-foot elevation inside the secondary shield wall, fire area RB-1 and RB-2, on April 2, 2024 (2)reactor building 2026-foot elevation, fire area RB-3, RB-4, RB-7, and RB-8 on April 2, 2024 (3)reactor building 2068-foot elevation, fire area RB-6, on April 16, 2024 (4)reactor building area within primary shield wall, fire area RB-10, on April 16, 2024 (5)reactor building 2047-foot elevation, fire area RB-5 and RB-10, on April 17, 2024 (6)communication corridor fire doors being held open during alternate ventilation lineup, fire area CC-1, on April 23, 2024 (7)south electrical penetration room damaged fireproofing, fire area A-17, on May 7, 2024
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) train A component cooling water heat exchanger performance analysis on April 2, 2024
===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities during refuel outage 26, from April 1 to May 23, 2024.
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01)===
The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:
- (1) Ultrasonic Examination
- accumulator safety injection, EP-01-MW7152, pipe to valve
- chemical volume control system, BG-02-S056-A, tee to pipe
- chemical volume control system, BG-21-F027A, pipe to pipe
- control rod drive mechanism, CH-213-112-C, nozzle to housing
- control rod drive mechanism, CH-214-112-B, nozzle to housing
- control rod drive mechanism, CH-214-112-G, nozzle to housing
- control rod drive mechanism, CH-215-112-C, nozzle to housing
- main steam, AB-01-F006, elbow to pipe
- main steam, AB-01-F097, pipe to flued head
- reactor coolant pump, PBB01A-Studs, main studs (24)
- reactor coolant system, BB-04-S002-E, reducer to pipe
- reactor coolant system, BB-04-S011-D, reducer to pipe
- reactor coolant system, BB-04-F0001, nozzle to pipe
- reactor coolant system, BB-06-PW6000, pipe to endcap
- RHR, EJ-04-F043, pipe to valve
- RHR, EJ-04-F048A, pipe to valve
- reactor vessel closure head Bolting, CH-STUDS-1 thru 54, closure head studs (54)
- reactor vessel closure head, RBB01, CH-101-104-A, shell to shell
- reactor vessel closure head, RBB01, CH-101-104-B, shell to shell
- reactor vessel closure head, RBB01, CH-101-104-C, shell to shell
- reactor vessel closure head, RBB01, CH-101-104-D, shell to shell
- reactor vessel closure head, RBB01, CH-103-101, dome to shell, one recordable indication being tracked, no change, indication allowable per ASME Sec XI, IWB-3510.
Visual Examination
- essential service water, 1-EF07-C009, piping support
- essential service water, 1-EF01-C002, piping support
- fuel pool cooling, EEC01A-SUP-1, heat exchanger support
- fuel pool cooling, EEC01A-SUP-2, heat exchanger support
- fuel pool cooling, EEC01A-SUP-3, heat exchanger support
- component cooling water, PEG01A-SUP-1, pump support
- reactor vessel closure head, RBB01, bare metal head surface
- reactor vessel internals, upper internals, core barrel, lower internals Magnetic Particle Examination
- essential service water, BW-4, butt weld, pipe to pipe
- essential service water, WBU-6A, weld build up
- reactor vessel closure head, RBB01, CH-101-101, head to flange weld Welding Activities
safety injection system, EMV0066 & EMV0136 valves and piping, W-1A, W-2, W-3A, W-4A, W-5A, W-6A, W-7A o
RHR system, EJV0007 & EJV0169 valves and piping, BW-1, BW-2A, BW-3A, BW-4, SW-1A, SW-2, SW-3A PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection
Activities (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the following vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately:
- (1) Reviewed video of reactor vessel head penetrations 1, 3, 7, 8, 12, 16, 18, 22, 25, 31, 32, 34, 37, 39, 40, 43, 54, 56, 60, 62, 64, 67, 71, 73, 76, 78, and general head area.
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following evaluations:
(1)boric acid evaluations and screenings:
- boric acid evaluation, 2024 04-19 BBFT0446
- boric acid evaluation, 2024 04-20 BBFT0017
- boric acid evaluation, 2024 04-20 EMV0057
- boric acid evaluation, 2024 04-21 EPV0001
- boric acid evaluation, 2024 04-28 BGFT0138B
- boric acid evaluation, 2024 04-29 BGHV8146
- boric acid evaluation, 2024 04-30 EJV0179
- Condition report (CR) 10031941 EMV0053
- CR 10031946 BBV0261
- CR 10031947 BBV0241
- CR 10031948 BBPI001
- CR 10031949 BBLT0462
- CR 10031953 BBFI0033
- During walkdown, indications of refueling cavity liner leaks through concrete were observed.
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified that the licensee is monitoring the steam generator tube integrity appropriately through a review of the following examinations:
- (1) A 100 percent full length eddy current inspection of all tubes, with bobbin coil probe, in steam generators A, B, C and D. A total of 45 tubes were plugged, which included 4 tubes in steam generator A, 20 tubes in steam generator B, 12 tubes in steam generator C, and 9 tubes in steam generator D. One tube from steam generator A had an axial indication of outside diameter stress corrosion cracking, located at a dent located at the seventh support plate on the cold leg side, and was plugged.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during plant startup from refueling outage 26 and low power reactor physics testing on May 10, 2024.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated just-in-time training for plant startup from refueling outage 26 on April 30, 2024.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)steam generator atmospheric relief valve and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump flow control valve nitrogen accumulator system maintenance effectiveness on May 16, 2024 (2)spent fuel pool cooling maintenance effectiveness on June 10, 2024
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)emergent activities for the loss of train A safety-related 4160-volt bus during load shedder and emergency load sequencers card replacement on April 8, 2024 (2)turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump overspeed failure emergent work activities on May 8, 2024 (3)train B essential service water from component cooler water B heat exchanger isolation valve failed fire protection surveillance testing emergent work activities or May 30, 2024 (4)train A 4kV degraded voltage time delay relay failure emergent work activities on June 12, 2024 (5)ultimate heat sink dredging activities on June 26, 2024
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)train B essential service water piping leak from a weld above drain valve EFV0278 operability determination on April 30, 2024 (2)turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam generator A flow control valve with a nitrogen leak on the associated atmospheric relief valve operability determination on May 15, 2024 (3)train A safety-related 4160-volt station blackout supply breaker 114 failed to closed during surveillance testing past operability determination on June 11, 2024 (4)train A centrifugal pump coupling grease leakage operability determination on June 11, 2024 (5)emergency diesel generator B number 8-cylinder abnormal low firing pressure and high exhaust temperature operability determination on June 30, 2024
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)startup transformer replacement on April 23, 2024 (2)removal of flux thimble at reactor location L-8 from service on May 15, 2024
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 26 from April 1 to May 11, 2024.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
(1)emergency diesel generator A maintenance post-maintenance testing on April 18, 2024 (2)containment cooler D motor replacement post-maintenance testing on April 28, 2024 (3)startup transformer replacement post-maintenance testing on April 30, 2024 (4)train A RHR maintenance post-maintenance testing on May 1, 2024 (5)train B RHR maintenance post-maintenance testing on May 1, 2024 (6)train A essential service water pump motor replacement post-maintenance testing on May 1, 2024 (7)emergency diesel generator B maintenance post-maintenance testing on May 15, 2024 (8)train A load shedder and emergency load sequencer card replacement post-maintenance testing on May 15, 2024
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)main steam safety valve lift set point testing on May 6, 2024 (2)engineered safety feature actuation system 18-month surveillance test risk-informed documented evaluation on May 7, 2024 (3)low temperature overpressure protection relief valve testing on May 15, 2024
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)main feedwater bypass regulating valves B and D greater than alert value on June 11, 2024
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)reactor coolant pump B seal water supply valve, BBHV8351B, on May 14, 2024
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)reactor coolant system leakage post refueling outage on June 17, 2024
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)
(1)emergency preparedness drill involving an earthquake causing a loss of offsite power, loss of coolant accident, and a containment leak into auxiliary building on June 18,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructed workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection (RP) requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
(1)physical and programmatic controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel pool and other storage pools (2)workers exiting the containment building and performing contamination monitoring during a refueling outage
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
- (1) Radiation work permit (RWP) 243220, primary side steam generator eddy current testing (S/G A, B, C, D) and zero entry nozzle dam installation and removal
- (2) RWP 243200, RP primary & secondary steam generator rover coverage
- (3) RWP 246051, reactor vessel lower internals / core barrel removal and re-installation
- (4) RWP 242001, welding activities; work order 19-450006 RHR pump A High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas (HRAs) and very high radiation areas:
(1)very high radiation area - containment building, 2000' in-core tunnel access (2)locked high radiation area - 2047' containment building reactor head scaffolding
- (3) HRA - 2031' radwaste building high integrity container filter cask
- (4) HRA - 2000' containment building BCHV-8160l letdown piping
- (5) HRA - 2000' containment building inside bio-shield steam generator A and C platforms Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and RP technician performance as it pertains to RP requirements.
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:
(1)control building emergency ventilation system A and B trains (FGK02A and FGK02B)
(2)technical support services emergency ventilation system (VTF-1)
Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:
(1)high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration systems used on the steam generator A, B, C and D work in containment.
- (2) HEPA filtration system and decontamination tent used during steam generator stud cleaning.
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices. The NRC credits a baseline sample from the International Atomic Energy Agency Operational Safety Review Team review (under section 7.5.6) conducted March 6-23, 2023.
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &
Transportation
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors observed the preparation of radioactive shipment 24R09 of low specific activity radioactive material on April 10,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06)===
- (1) April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024 BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)emergency diesel generator B failure to start in manual due to a failed relay and emergency diesel part 21 on May 28, 2024
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in post-maintenance testing planning following corrective and planned maintenance activities that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow up (IP Section 03.01)
(1)emergent activities for the loss of train A safety-related 4160-volt bus during load shedding and emergency load sequencing card replacement on April 23,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Adequately Barricade and Post a High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000482/2024002-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71124.01 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.1.a, High Radiation Areas, when the licensee failed to adequately barricade and conspicuously post a high radiation area on the 2000-foot elevation of the containment. Specifically, on April 11, 2024, while performing a walk down in the containment, the NRC inspector identified an area outside of a posted and barricaded high radiation area that had accessible dose rates in excess of 100 millirem per hour.
Description:
On April 11, 2024, inspectors walked down the 2000-foot elevation of containment, near the letdown system containment isolation valve. While using a gamma dose rate survey meter, the inspectors identified general area dose rates of greater than 100 millirem per hour outside of the posted HRA boundary. The containment was generally posted as a radiation area. The inspectors noticed a licensee RP technician in the area and asked him to verify the general area dose rates just surveyed outside of the posted HRA boundary. The RP technician came over and surveyed the area with a Ludlum ion chamber survey meter and confirmed that the dose rates were greater than 100 millirem per hour, as observed by the inspectors. The inspectors then proceeded to exit containment for a scheduled meeting.
Upon exiting containment, the inspectors discussed this issue of concern with a RP supervisor waiting outside of containment. The RP supervisor and a RP tech then proceeded to perform additional surveys to evaluate the issue discussed. The licensee found the accessible higher dose rates appeared to stream from a 7-foot-high letdown piping elbow.
However, these post surveys were conducted after the HRA barricade was moved out from the initial boundary location as identified by the inspectors. After further discussion between NRC and the RP staff, it was determined that the HRA initially identified by the inspectors was not adequately posted and barricaded, as required by the licensee's Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1 and licensee procedure RPP 02-215, Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas," revision 36A, steps 4.15.1, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.3.4, and 9.1.2.
Procedure RPP 02-215, stated the following, in part:
- Step 4.15.1: A High Radiation Area is defined as any area, accessible to individuals, in which radiation levels from radiation sources external to the body could result in an individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess of 0.1 REM in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at 30 centimeters
- (cm) from the radiation source or 30 centimeters from any surface that the radiation penetrates.
- Step 5.2.1: Supervisors of RP ensure that plant areas are properly posted.
- Step 5.2.2: Supervisors of RP approve the down posting of high radiation areas and locked high radiation areas.
- Step 5.3.4: RP Technicians obtain approval from RP supervision to down post a high radiation area or a locked high radiation area.
- Step 9.1.2: Posted areas must be clearly and conspicuously marked at all accessible sides and entrances. access points, other than doorways, to either a high radiation area or a locked high radiation area will be conspicuously posted to prevent inadvertent entry into the area.
In this occurrence, the HRA, with dose rates greater than 100 millirem per hour at 30 cm from the source, was not conspicuously posted and adequately barricaded, as required.
Additionally, RP supervision discussed the issue with multiple workers and RP staff and determined that the HRA boundary had been moved or down posted without their approval, as required, prior to the inspectors identifying the HRA dose rates outside of the boundary.
Corrective Actions: Once the HRA dose rates and inadequate posting and boundary were confirmed by RP, RP supervision immediately extended the HRA boundary out approximately 2 feet from its current location, added a steel stanchion, and taped it to the floor to prevent easy removal or movement. These implemented corrective actions established appropriate controls for the HRA posting and barricade. The licensee also coached workers on the requirements to inform RP supervision of moving boundaries, down posting HRAs, and establishing appropriate HRA controls.
Corrective Action References: CRs 10032152 and 10032533
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to barricade and conspicuously post an HRA on the 2000-foot elevation of containment.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the program & process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, the failure to barricade and conspicuously post an HRA had the potential for workers to inadvertently enter an HRA without knowledge that the dose rates exceeded 100 mrem per hour and accumulating unintended dose.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because:
- (1) it did not involve as-low-as-reasonably achievable planning or work controls,
- (2) there was no overexposure,
- (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and
- (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, licensee Procedure RPP 02-215 required that HRA boundaries were conspicuously posted and barricaded, that RP supervision ensured that HRAs were posted, and RP supervision approved and was knowledgeable of HRA down postings. However, these requirements were not met when RP supervision determined that the HRA boundary in the 2000-foot elevation of containment had been moved (i.e., down posted) without their knowledge and approval, resulting in an inadequately controlled HRA.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 20.1901(b), Posting of High Radiation Areas, requires, in part, that the licensee shall post each high radiation area with a conspicuous sign or signs bearing the radiation symbol and the words, CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA, or, DANGER, HIGH RADIATION AREA.
Technical Specification 5.7.1.a, High Radiation Areas, requires, in part, that each entryway to areas with dose rates greater than 100 millirem per hour and not exceeding 1.0 rem per hour at 30 centimeters from the radiation source, or any surface penetrated by the radiation, shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as an HRA. Such barricades may be opened as necessary to permit entry or exit of personnel or equipment.
Contrary to the above, on April 11, 2024, the licensee failed to barricade and conspicuously post entryways to a high radiation area with a conspicuous sign or signs bearing the radiation symbol and the words CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA or DANGER, HIGH RADIATION AREA, as required by 10 CFR 20.1901(b) and TS 5.7.1(a). Specifically, an area in the 2000-foot elevation of containment with radiation levels exceeding 100 millirem per hour at 30 cm from the source but did not exceed 1.0 rem per hour at 30 centimeters from the radiation source, or any surface penetrated by the radiation, was not barricaded or posted as a high radiation area, as required.
Type text here
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Follow Licensee Procedures and Implement High Contamination Area Controls Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000482/2024002-02 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71124.01 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, appendix A, February 1978, when the licensee failed to adequately implement high contamination area controls for a job activity. Specifically, on April 8, 2024, at least two workers, a welder and a pipefitter, were exposed to high contamination conditions of 300,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters (dpm/100cm2)while performing weld preparation associated with the replacement of train A residual heat removal drain valves EJV0169 and EJV0007 on the pump suction line. As a result, two workers were contaminated and had to be evaluated for unintended internal dose.
Description:
After reviewing the assigned radiation work permit (RWP), reviewing survey maps of the work area, and briefly speaking to the welder, the inspectors questioned the licensee about whether the welding activities on RHR piping should have been performed with high contamination area controls in place. On day shift of April 8, 2024, a pipefitter and welder were assigned to grind out a socket weld on the train A RHR suction header drain line containing valves EJV0169 and EJV0007. A HEPA air mover and sampler were already staged in the work area by the night shift workers. The workers were signed onto RWP 24-2001, task 2, Welding Activities. The workers were wearing a full set of protective clothing as required for a contamination area. Intermittent RP coverage was provided.
Upon performing the socket weld, the workers identified that additional RHR piping would need to be accessed due to damaging the piping above the valve EJV0169. Working on this additional piping was a change in their work scope. The pipefitter used a 4-inch grinder to remove the socket weld and a hand-file to dress up the pipe prior to welding. Upon exiting from the radiologically controlled area for the lunch period, the pipefitter was found to have 300 net counts per minute (ncpm) on his beard. He was decontaminated and released. A whole-body count was not immediately performed to assess potential internal exposure at this time. Licensee procedures required a whole-body count if facial contamination is detected. The licensee wrote CR 10031822 for not performing a timely whole-body count.
After lunch, the workers went back to continue with the weld on the RHR piping. The RP technician repositioned the HEPA air mover suction closer to provide better air flow away from the workers. Highly contaminated water was dripping out of the RHR system piping at the rate of one drop per second and was captured on an absorbent pad. The water was interfering with the welding. After performing some welding and spending 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> in the work area, the workers exited the area. Radiation protection personnel surveyed the workers and found contamination on the welder. The welder was found to have 40,000 ncpm (i.e., 400,000 dpm/100cm2 with 10-percent efficiency) on his upper front shirt and 500 ncpm on his face. This time, after the welder was decontaminated, he was immediately sent for a whole-body count. Radiation protection personnel provided the inspectors with initial surveys of the area that indicated contamination levels were as high as 2.4 million dpm/100cm2 beta/gamma and 864 beta/alpha ratio. The pipe was decontaminated to 10,000 dpm/100cm2 beta/gamma before work commenced during the dayshift on April 8th.
A follow up survey, M-20240408-25, was performed in the work area. The welders hood was found to have 30,000 dpm/100cm2 beta/gamma, the water and pipe were 300,000 dpm/100cm2 beta/gamma. The welder stated that water continued to drip out of the pipe during their work. Neither the welder nor the RP technician identified this condition as adverse to the protection provided by a single set of protective clothing nor did they stop work until it was confirmed the accessible contamination levels had increased significantly such that the area, they were working in was a high contamination area, which required additional controls. The inspectors determined this was contrary to the RWP procedure, which required they stop work if radiological conditions change or compliance with the RWP requirements can no longer be achieved. Given that highly contaminated water continued to drip from the pipe while the work was ongoing, the inspectors concluded that the radiological conditions had changed and compliance with the RWP requirements was not achieved.
Corrective Actions: The licensee assessed the internal dose of the contaminated welder and pipefitter and determined neither worker received an internal dose. The licensee conducted a review of their procedures for missed opportunities to prevent future personnel contamination events for similar activities. Radiation protection personnel were provided additional training on compliance with RWP requirements and procedures. Workers were coached on refraining from touching their face or clothing while working in contaminated areas and stopping when faced with uncertain or changing conditions.
Corrective Action References: CRs 10031822, 10031829, and 10032535
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to establish high contamination area controls when two workers were commencing job activities in radiological conditions exceeding 100,000 dpm/100cm2 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the program & process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, the licensee's failure to implement high contamination area controls for welding activities on the train A RHR system had the potential to lead to unintended dose for the welder and/or pipefitter and resulted in measured contamination levels as high as 400,000 dpm/100cm2 beta/gamma found on the welder's shirt.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because:
- (1) it did not involve as-low-as-reasonably achievable planning or work controls,
- (2) there was no overexposure,
- (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and
- (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, the licensee noted that the workers had to change their work scope while accessing additional contaminated piping that contained a constant leakage of highly contaminated water (i.e., surveyed at 300,000 dpm/100cm2), and never stopped the job to determine if the radiological conditions they were exposed to were unknown or of high risk for contamination and possible unintended internal exposure.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, states in part, written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, section 7.e., Procedures for Control of Radioactivity, recommends in part, adequate procedures for "Radiation Protection." Procedure RPP 02-105, RWP, revision 53, step 5.3.5, requires Stopping work whenever changes in the radiological conditions warrant such action or whenever compliance with the RWP requirements can NO longer be achieved.
Contrary to the above, on April 8, 2024, the licensee failed to follow licensee RP procedures.
Specifically, the licensee failed to follow Procedure RPP 02-105 when they did not stop when changes in the radiological conditions, (i.e., the constant dripping of highly contaminated water from the RHR piping) warranted such action and compliance with RWP requirements could no longer be achieved, by using a single set of protective clothing for a contamination area versus additional protective clothing and equipment for a high contamination condition.
This failure resulted in a personnel contamination event where a welder was found to have high levels of radioactive contamination on his shirt and his face.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Perform a Radiation Survey to Identify the Magnitude and Extent of Changing Radiological Conditions Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000482/2024002-03 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71124.01 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) when the licensee failed to survey an area with changing radiological conditions. Specifically, on April 2, 2024, during activities associated with refueling outage 26, the licensee withdrew the incore detector thimbles and failed to survey the area above and around the entrance to the incore tunnel to identify the extent and magnitude of the changing radiation levels. As a result, workers in the high radiation area were not informed about elevated radiation levels as high as 240 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters from the incore tunnel entrance.
Type text here
Description:
On April 9, 2024, during refueling outage (RF) 26, NRC inspectors performed radiation surveys of the Wolf Creek reactor inside the bio-shield on the 2000-foot elevation of containment while the reactor was defueled. The entryway to the bio-shield was posted and barricaded as a high radiation area and contamination area. While performing a survey near the entrance to the incore tunnel, which was locked, enclosed, and posted with signage stating, "Grave Danger - Very High Radiation Area," the inspectors identified dose rates higher than expected based on the high radiation area briefing of radiological conditions within the bioshield and existing radiation protection (RP) survey maps. The inspectors identified that dose rates were over 200 millirem per hour at the ladder access entrance to the incore tunnel. The inspectors informed the licensee's RP staff about the elevated dose rates and the licensee performed confirmatory surveys to validate the inspectors' findings.
The licensee confirmed the dose rates were up to 240 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters from the incore tunnel ladder access and cover plate. These elevated dose rates were not previously recorded by the licensee on survey maps that were being used to brief workers entering the high radiation area. The previous surveys indicated that the highest dose rates in the same area were 12 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters, which were 20 times less than actually encountered. After additional discussions with the licensee, the inspectors determined that after the incore detector thimble tubes were withdrawn on April 2, 2024, no surveys were performed to assess the magnitude and extent of radiation levels in the area.
Subsequent to the withdrawal of the thimble tubes, scheduled refueling outage work activities continued in the area without workers being made knowledgeable of the increased dose rates until April 10th when the licensee performed the confirmatory surveys and updated the applicable survey maps of the area.
The inspectors requested a list of any work activity that had been performed in the area from the time of retracting the thimble tubes on April 2, 2024, until the time of the elevated dose rates discovery on April 9, 2024. The licensee provided information that confirmed work was performed in the area on April 5, 2024, and that workers would not have known the radiation levels had changed such that dose rates were 20 times higher than those briefed to them per the survey at the time.
Corrective Actions: On April 10, 2024, the licensee performed a survey at the incore tunnel entrance. The survey was documented, M-20240411-8, and the status boards were updated to reflect the current radiological conditions with dose rates as high as 240 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters from the incore tunnel entrance. The licensee then evaluated their RP program and process for deficiencies.
Corrective Action References: CRs 10032074 and 10032536
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to perform an adequate survey to identify changing radiological conditions after withdrawing the incore thimbles, which resulted in workers not being made knowledgeable of the actual dose rates in the high radiation area that were up to 20 times higher than indicated on survey maps and briefed to the workers.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the program & process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, from April 2-10, 2024, work commenced in the high radiation area above and around the entrance to the incore tunnel without workers being made knowledgeable of the actual dose rates that were up to 20 times higher than indicated on survey maps and briefed to the workers, which challenged the licensee's ability to prevent unplanned dose.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because:
- (1) it did not involve as-low-as-reasonably achievable planning or work controls,
- (2) there was no overexposure,
- (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and
- (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Specifically, the licensee evaluated their program and process and determined that multiple procedures were deficient in information and requirements to evaluate changing radiological conditions. For example, procedures used for the incore thimble work failed to contain specific instructions to survey the area after withdrawal and insertion of the thimbles to ensure that actual radiological conditions were identified and documented to maintain knowledgeable workers in the field.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 20.1501(a) requires, in part, that each licensee make or cause to be made surveys that
- (1) may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in Part 20 and that surveys
- (2) are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels.
Contrary to the above, from April 2-10, 2024, the licensee failed to make or cause to be made surveys that complied with the regulations in Part 20 and were reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels in the area above and around the entrance to the incore tunnel. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform surveys after withdrawing the incore detector thimble tubes and evaluate the potential radiological hazards of the changing conditions when dose rates changed from 12 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters to 240 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters, which resulted in inaccurate survey maps being used to brief workers entering the high radiation area and those workers not being made knowledgeable of the actual radiological conditions.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Semiannual Trend 71152S The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program, performance indicators, system health reports, and other documentation available to help identify performance trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue.
To verify that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address identified adverse trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue, the inspectors reviewed the corrective action program documentation associated with a potential adverse in performing and planning required post-maintenance testing following maintenance activities with a contributing cause associated with the cross-cutting aspect H.5, Work Management.
Selected examples of these events included:
- NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2024001 documented non-cited violation (NCV) 2024001-02, Failure to Perform Post-Maintenance Testing Following Maintenance and Installation of the Bypass Reactor Trip Breaker, for the licensees failure to perform appropriate post-maintenance testing following reactor trip breaker maintenance and installation to verify full technical specification operability. Specifically, Work Order (WO) 18-445075-000 failed to provide appropriate instructions for safety-related bypass reactor trip breaker post-maintenance testing following maintenance and installation to verify the breaker was fully operable, by testing the technical specification required P-4 interlock that was later found to be inoperable due to incorrect wiring. The inspectors assigned a cross-cutting aspect of H-5, Work Management, because the licensee inappropriately planned the installation of the vendor overhauled reactor trip breakers in Mode 1 preventing the licensee from performing adequate post-maintenance testing to verify proper operation of the reactor trip breaker in the bypass location to ensure it was fully operable. The licensee-initiated Condition Reports 10031001 and 10031493.
- The inspectors identified a minor finding and associated violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensees failure to implement Procedure AP 16E-002, Post Maintenance Testing, revision 21B, for containment cooler D motor and fan assembly replacement. Specifically, the licensee failed to plan post-maintenance testing to measure containment cooler D air flow capacity following the replacement of the motor and fan assembly. The inspectors determined the cross-cutting aspect H.5, Work Management, was applicable because the licensee failed to implement AP 16E-002 when planning, controlling, and executing work activities associated with the post-maintenance testing development of containment cooler Ds motor and fan assembly replacement during refueling outage 26. The licensee-initiated Condition Report 10032793 and a performed a satisfactory air flow capacity post-maintenance testing.
- The licensee identified a minor finding and associated violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensees failure to perform required post-maintenance testing for auxiliary feedwater flow control valves ALHV0006, ALHV0008, and ALHV0012. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform Procedure STS AL-201C, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Inservice Valve Test, revision 13, in accordance with work orders: WO 53554, WO 53513, and WO 53369. The inspectors determined the cross-cutting aspect H.5, Work Management, was applicable due to the failure to coordinate work activities to address changing priorities across a whole spectrum of activities contributing to nuclear safety. Specifically, when the licensee changed to perform corrective maintenance for ALHV0006, ALHV0008, and ALHV0012 from online to the outage they failed to ensure the post-maintenance testing activities were also changed to the outage. The licensee-initiated Condition Report 10033418 and a performed Procedure STS AL-201C satisfactorily.
- The inspectors reviewed Condition Report 10033122 and the associated performance assessment worksheet for the licensee failing to perform timed stroke testing of the air operated containment purge isolation valve GTHZ0008 following diagnostic testing.
The diagnostic testing procedure provides procedural guidance to remove and re-install the air-lines for GTHZ0008 in accordance with AP 29B-002, ASME Code Testing of Pumps and Valves, revision 12A, and WO 23-486310-002. The diagnostic testing was performed on April 14, 2024, during refueling outage 26 during the defueled window and the station entered Mode 6 on April 24, 2024. The licensees performance assessment worksheet concluded the operator mindset was to consider the need for post-maintenance testing when putting equipment back in service, not when taking it out of service. As a result, the need for the post-maintenance testing was missed. The inspectors reviewed the associated work orders: WO 23-486310-000, WO 23-486310-001, and WO 23-486310-002, and Technical Specification 3.9.4, Containment Penetrations. Technical Specification 3.9.4 states for the containment purge system, each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either: 1. Closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or 2. Capable of the being closed by an operable containment purge isolation valve. Work Order 23-486310-002 directed the licensee stroke GTHZ0008 in accordance with Procedure STS GP-001, Containment Purge Valves Actuation Test, revision 32. However, the work order was assigned a mode restraint of Mode 4, instead of a mode restraint of Mode 6. From this information the inspectors identified a minor finding and associated violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensees failure to performed required post-maintenance testing for GTHZ0008 prior to entering Mode 6. The inspectors determined the cross-cutting aspect H.5, Work Management, was applicable due to the failure to coordinate work activities to address changing priorities across whole spectrum of activities contributing to nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to assign the correct mode restraint for WO 23-486310-002 to ensure the post-maintenance testing for GTHZ0008 was completed prior to entering Mode 6 on April 24, 2024.
The inspectors concluded there was an adverse trend in a failure to perform and plan required post-maintenance testing following planned and corrective maintenance with a contributing cause associated with the cross-cutting aspect of H.5 Work Management.
Additionally, the inspectors noted the licensee also identified the adverse trend in a failure to perform and plan required post-maintenance testing. The licensee initiated CRs 10033639 and 10032794 for the adverse trend in post-maintenance testing activities. At the end of the inspection quarter, the licensee was still developing corrective actions to correct the post-maintenance testing adverse trend. The inspectors did not review any cross-cutting themes because none existed at the site.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 23, 2024, the inspectors presented the RP inspection results to M. Boyce, Vice President, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 23, 2024, the inspectors presented the in-service inspection results to M. Boyce, Vice President, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 9, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to R. Bayer, General Manager, Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
AN 93-065
and Tornado Evaluation
Calculations
CWS-SNP-
453C
Revised SNP Setpoints
03/01/1984
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
2000-1528, 10015262
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Reports
10033969, 10034320
Drawings
M-12BG03
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Chemical and
Volume Control System
Drawings
M-12BG05
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Chemical and
Volume Control System
Miscellaneous
M-10BG
System Description Chemical
and Volume Control System
Miscellaneous
WCRE-03
Wolf Creek Tank Document
Miscellaneous
WCRE-34
Fourth 10-Year Interval
Inservice Testing Basis
Document
Procedures
AI 14-006
Severe Weather
Procedures
ALR 00-047D
RWST Lev LOLO 1 Auto XFR
10B
Procedures
ALR 00-047E
RWST Lev HILO
Procedures
EMG E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety
Injection
Procedures
EMG ES-02
Reactor Trip Response
Procedures
EMG ES-04
EMG ES-04, Natural
Circulation Cooldown
Procedures
OFN BG-009
Emergency Boration
Procedures
OFN SG-003
Natural Events
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10031465, 10031524,
10031582, 10031680,
10031710, 10031715,
10031745, 10031800,
10031854, 10031864,
10031870, 10031882,
10032073, 10032095,
10032099, 10032106,
10032118, 10032183,
10032221, 10032258,
10032275, 10032576,
10032649, 10032772
Type txt here
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Reports
10031367, 10031952,
10032260
Drawings
M-12BB01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
Drawings
M-12BG03
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Chemical and
Volume Control System
Drawings
M-12BN01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Borated Refueling
Water Storage Tank
Drawings
M-12EJ01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Residual Heat
Removal System
Drawings
M-12EM01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram High Pressure
Coolant Injection System
Drawings
M-12EP01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Accumulator Safety
Injection
Miscellaneous
E-1F9905
Fire Hazard Analysis
Miscellaneous
E-1F9910
Post Fire Safe Shutdown Area
Analysis
Miscellaneous
E-1F9915
Design Basis Document for
Procedure OFN RP-017
Miscellaneous
WCRE-34
Fourth 10-Year Interval
Inservice Testing Basis
Document
Procedures
Scaffold Construction
26A
Procedures
Heat Exchanger Program
Procedures
GEN 00-008
RCS Level Less Than Reactor
Vessel Flange Operations
Procedures
OFN BB-031
Shutdown LOCA
Procedures
OFN EJ-015
Loss of RHR Cooling
Procedures
OFN EJ-040
CL Recirc during Mode 3, with
Accumulators Isolated, Mode
4, 5, or 6
Procedures
OFN RP-017
Control Room Evacuation
Procedures
OFN RP-017A
Hot Standby to Cold
Shutdown form Outside the
Control Room Due to Fire
Procedures
STN PE-038
Containment Cooler
Performance Test
Work Orders
242, 55856, 55907, 56780,
56910, 56991, 57658,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
20-462334-000, 21-475554-
000, 23-483955-000
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10031116, 10031234,
10031523, 10031878,
10032097
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Reports
10032199, 10032254,
10032255
Miscellaneous
WCRE-35
Boundary Matrix
Procedures
AP 10-103
Fire Protection Impairment
Control
Procedures
AP 10-104
Breach Authorization
Work Orders
Calculations
EG-08-W
Minimum Wall Thickness in
Cooling Water Heat
Exchangers EEG01A and
EEG01B
Calculations
EG-09-W
Tube Plugging for CCW Heat
Exchangers
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10031516, 10031578,
10031579, 10031581,
10031582, 10031726,
10031854, 10032260,
10032870
Drawings
M-1HX001
Heat Exchanger Tube Sheet
Map Component Cooling
Water Heat Exchanger "A"
(North End) EEG01A
Drawings
M-1HX001
Heat Exchanger Tube Sheet
Map Component Cooling
Water Heat Exchanger "B"
(South End) EEG01AB
Procedures
STN PE-033
CCW Heat Exchanger
Performance Test
Work Orders
23-484909-000
04/11/2024
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10018380, 10018382,
10018387, 10019129,
10019132, 10019603,
10020507, 10020515,
10020517, 10020493,
10020491, 10020492,
10020507, 10020512,
10020515, 10020517,
10029772, 10030434,
10030796, 10031467,
10031482, 10031486,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
10031679, 10031706,
10031862, 10031864,
10031896, 10031957,
10031999, 10032067,
10032127, 10032172,
10032298, 10032330,
10032370, 10032379
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Reports
10031259, 10031553,
10031924, 10031947,
10033822, 10033823
Drawings
M-12EM01
Piping & Instrumentation
Diagram High Pressure
Coolant Injection System
Drawings
M-13EJ01
Piping Isometric Residual
Heat Removal System
Auxiliary Bldg. "A" Train
Drawings
M-13EM07
Small Piping Isometric High
Pressure Coolant Injection
System - Aux. Bldg.
Drawings
M-703-00023
SHUPPS Lower Internals
Assembly
Drawings
M-703-00024
SHUPPS Upper Internals
Assembly
Drawings
M-703-00059
Loop Lower Radial Support
Clevis Insert Gaging and
Assembly
Miscellaneous
AI 16F-001
Evaluation of Boric Acid
Leakage
Miscellaneous
AI 16F-002
Boric Acid Leakage
Management
Miscellaneous
Repair/Replacement Program
20B
Miscellaneous
Boric Acid Corrosion Control
Program
Miscellaneous
I-ENG-023
Steam Generator Data
Analysis Guidelines
Miscellaneous
INR-WC-
Remote Visual Examination
Indication Notification Report
04/12/2024
Miscellaneous
M-703-00207
W02
Design Specifications for
Nuclear Reactor Internals
11/25/2003
Miscellaneous
WCRE-30
Inservice Inspection Program
Plan Wolf Creek Generation
Station Interval 4
Miscellaneous
WR 02070-90
Engineering Disposition
04/17/1990
NDE Reports
5167
Magnetic Particle
Examination, WBU-6A
05/07/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NDE Reports
5168
Magnetic Particle
Examination, BW-4
05/07/2024
NDE Reports
STS PE-040A
2/8/2022
NDE Reports
STS PE-040E
RPV Head Bare Metal
Inspection
05/02/2024
NDE Reports
STS PE-040E
RPV Head Bare Metal
Inspection
11/16/2022
NDE Reports
STS PE-040H
11/16/2022
Procedures
54-ISI-364-
009
Remote Underwater Visual
Examination of Reactor
Pressure Vessels, Vessel
Internals, and Components in
Pressurized Water Reactors in
Accordance with Section XI
2/22/2018
Procedures
54-ISI-364-
009
Remote Underwater Visual
Examination of Reactor
Pressure Vessels, Vessel
Internals, and Components in
Pressurized Water Reactors in
Accordance with Section XI.
Procedures
CWD-1
Control of Welding
Documentation
Procedures
GWS-ASME
ASME General Welding
Standard
Procedures
LMT-08-PDI-
UT-1
Ultrasonic Examination of
Ferritic Piping Welds
Procedures
LMT-08-PDI-
UT-2
Ultrasonic Examination of
Austenitic Piping Welds
Procedures
LMT-08-PDI-
UT-5
Straight Beam Ultrasonic
Examination of Bolts and
Studs
Procedures
LMT-08-PDI-
UT-6
Ultrasonic Examination of
Closure Head Welds and
Adjacent Base Metal
Procedures
LMT-21-
PAUT-028
Manual Phased Array
Ultrasonic Examination of
Pressure Retaining Welds in
Control Rod (CRD) Housings
Procedures
QCP-20-541
VT-3 Visual Examination
Procedures
STS PE-040E
RPV Head Visual Examination
Work Orders
16-418193-000, 17-431456-
001, 19-450006-000,
21-474032-056, 21-474032-
066, 21-474032-067,
2-482436-002, 22-482488-
000, 12003, 12008, 12011,
2013, 12015, 12017, 12346,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2348, 55017, 55020
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Report
10033371
Procedures
GEN 00-003
Hot Standby to Minimum Load
111
Procedures
RXE 01-002
Reload Low Power Physics
Testing
Calculations
KA-03-W
Accumulators Capacity
Calculation
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
33653, 33654, 33758, 121822,
23103, 137915, 142204,
10007665, 10012448,
10012555, 10030624,
10030630, 10030361,
10030650, 10030667,
10030732, 10030733,
10030734, 10030736,
10030739, 10030769,
10032166, 10032356,
10032400, 10033032
Drawings
M-11EF01
System Flow Diagram
Essential Service Water
Drawings
M-12EF02
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Essential Service
Water System
Drawings
M-12GN01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Containment Cooling
System
Drawings
M-12KA05
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Compressed Air
System
Engineering
Changes
CCP 07378
Containment Cooler Fusible
Link Equivalency Evaluation
Engineering
Changes
DCP 15241
Spent Fuel Pool Alternate
Cooling Modification
Engineering
Changes
DRE 20456
AV1 Positioner Gauge Block
Removal
Miscellaneous
M-10GN
System Description for
Containment Cooling System
Miscellaneous
M-620
Design Specification for
Containment Coolers for Wolf
Creek Nuclear Operating
Corporation (WCNOC)
Procedures
AP 16-003
Master Lubrication List and
Control of Lubricants
Procedures
Heat Exchanger Program
Procedures
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
BD OFN NB-
234
Loss of All AC Power -
Shutdown Conditions
Procedures
INC C-0010
7300 Loop P/S Card (NLP1)
3B
Procedures
INC S-0020
Air Operated Valve (AOV)
Diagnostic Testing
Procedures
OFN EC-046
Fuel Pool Cooling and
Cleanup Malfunctions
Procedures
OFN NB-034
Loss of All AC Power -
Shutdown Conditions
Procedures
STN EF-022B
ESW Train B Post-LOCA Flow
Balance
Procedures
STN PE-037A
ESW Train A Heat Exchanger
Flow and DP Trending
2A
Procedures
STN PE-037B
ESW Train B Heat Exchanger
Flow and DP Trending
Procedures
STS EF-925A
Containment Coolers Flow
Rate (Upon Safety Injection)
Verification - Train A
Procedures
STS EF-925A
Containment Coolers Flow
Rate (Upon Safety Injection)
Verification - Train A
Procedures
STS EF-925B
Containment Coolers Flow
Rate (Upon Safety Injection)
Verification - Train B
Procedures
STS KA-010
Accumulator Inservice Check
Valve Test
Procedures
SYS EC-202
Staging Alternate Spent Fuel
Pool Cooling
Work Orders
13326, 16866, 20453, 22872,
50424, 20-459056-000,
17-432437-006, 18-441848-
004, 20-464226-000,
20-467458-000, 21-471451-
000, 21-472154-000,
21-473086-004, 21-473493-
000, 21-474438-000,
2-477036-000, 22-480069-
000, 22-481429-000,
23-483713-000, 23-483892-
000, 23-483899-000,
23-484530-000, 23-488240-
000
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10031603, 10031604,
10033200, 10033869,
10033938, 10034274
Drawings
25-C-
KG1202
Site Plan
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
E-13EF04A
Schematic Diagram ESW
From Component Cooling
Water Heat Exch. ISO Valve
EFHV0060
Drawings
S-81
Ultimate Heat Sink Plan
G
Miscellaneous
Specification Number C-302
Procedures
OFN NB-030
Loss of AC Emergency Bus
NB01 (NB02)
Procedures
STN FC-002
Aux Feedwater Turbine
Overspeed Test
34A
Procedures
STN RP-002H
Procedures
STS IC-805A
Channel Calibration of NB01
Grid Degraded Voltage, Time
Delay Trip
15A
Procedures
TMP 10-035
Dredging the UHS Channel
Work Orders
17123, 61319, 64522, 66805
Calculations
KA-03-W
Accumulators Capacity
Calculation
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
33653, 33654, 33758,
10005547, 10029678,
10030624, 10030630,
10030361, 10030650,
10030667, 10030732,
10030733, 10030734,
10030736, 10030739,
10031933, 10032433,
10032656, 10033139,
10033418, 2008-05818
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Report
10034767
Drawings
M-12EF02
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Essential Service
Water System
Drawings
M-12KA05
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Compressed Air
System
Miscellaneous
M-018-00309
Instruction Manual for
System
W141
Miscellaneous
M-721-00093
Instruction Manual for
Charging/Safety Injection
Pump
W50
Operability
KA-11-001
Operability Evaluation
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Evaluations
Procedures
Procedures
CKL KU-120
Checklist
Procedures
EMG C-0
Loss of All AC Power
Procedures
QCP-20-502
Magnetic Particle Examination
Techniques
Procedures
STN KU-001A
Test
Procedures
STS KA-010
N2 Accumulator Inservice
Check Valve Test
Procedures
STS KU-121
Energizing NB01 from Station
Blackout Diesel Generators
Work Orders
13326, 22872, 40594, 50424,
216, 58244, 08-312917-
005, 20-459655-000, 21-
471249-000, 22-481429-000,
23-484530-000, 23-487665-
000, 23-488240-000
Calculations
XX-E-006
AC System Analysis
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10028675, 10028767,
10029120, 10030207,
10030607, 10030882,
10031049, 10031320,
10031321, 10031341,
10031502, 10031518,
10031586, 10031664,
10031897, 10031898,
10032140, 10032251,
10032267, 10032341,
10032395, 10032407,
10032444
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Reports
10031379, 10034770
Drawings
M-12BB04
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
Drawings
M-705-00020
Bottom Mounted Instrument
Thimble Guide
W02
Drawings
M-705-00024
Bottom Mounted Instrument
Thimble Guide
W08
Drawings
M-705-00026
Bottom Mounted Instrument
Thimble Guide
W07
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
M-705-00029
Bottom Mounted Instrument
Thimble Guide
W01
Drawings
M-764-00316
Bottom Mounted Instrument
Thimble Guide
B2
Engineering
Changes
CP 012331
Seal Table Maintenance
Fitting Assembly Replacement
0, 1, 2
Engineering
Changes
DCP 01500
Start-Up Transformer
(XMR01) Replacement
Engineering
Changes
DECP 020771
Remove Flux Thimble at
Rector Location L-8 from
Service
Miscellaneous
E-10NF(Q)
Load Shedding and
Emergency Load Sequencing
Miscellaneous
M-705-00032
Deep Bore Seal Table
Maintenance Fitting Assembly
Installation at Wolf Creek
W03
Miscellaneous
TR-94-0015
WCNOC Cycle 27 Core
Operating Limits Report
(COLR)
Miscellaneous
NP
Analysis Update for the
Inadvertent Loading Event
03/00/2009
Miscellaneous
WCRE-23
Inservice Inspection
Classification Basis Document
Procedures
AI 22D-003
Outage Scope Identification,
Control and Risk
Determination
Procedures
Wolf Creek Cyber Security
Program
Procedures
Repair/Replacement Program
Procedures
Post Maintenance Testing
Development
21B
Procedures
ASME Section XI System
Pressure Testing
2A
Procedures
INC S-0607
Incore Detector Thimble
Insertion
Procedures
STS KJ-001B
Integrated D/G and
Safeguards Actuation Test -
Train B
Procedures
STS PE-040A
Pressure Test
16A
Work Orders
2663, 55830, 57623, 57655,
57757, 58130, 58270,
23-484977-002
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
101466, 10006003, 10015377,
10019243, 10028254,
10030261, 10030278,
10030526, 10030881,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
10031056, 10031112,
10031126, 10031256,
10031263, 10031266,
10031428, 10031430,
10031467, 10031518,
10031519, 10031537,
10031702, 10031704,
10031760, 10031761,
10031784, 10031813,
10031824, 10031846,
10032104, 10032161,
10033063, 10033065,
10033088, 10033655
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Reports
10031377, 10031960,
10033154, 10033155,
10033156, 10033157,
10034768, 10034769
Procedures
AI 15C-006
Management Oversight
Requirements for Infrequently
Performed and Potentially
Degrading Evolutions
Procedures
AP 14-001
Lifting, and Rigging
6A
Procedures
Boric Acid Corrosion Control
Program
Procedures
FHP 02-007A
Reactor Vessel Closure Head
Removal
Procedures
FHP 02-016
Reactor Vessel Lower
Internals Removal and
Installation
Procedures
GEN 00-008
RCS Level Less Than Reactor
Vessel Flange Operations
Procedures
MGM MOOP-
Relief Valve Bench Testing
26A
Procedures
STN EJ-002
Containment Inspection
Procedures
STN PE-040D
RCS Pressure Boundary
Integrity Walkdown
Procedures
STS MT-070
ASME Code Testing of
Safety/Relief Valves
Work Orders
33719, 55472, 55705, 60885,
20-461819-000, 20-461819-
001, 20-461819-003, 20-
2020-003, 21-474028-000,
21-474028-001, 21-474028-
003, 21-474101-000,
21-474101-001, 21-474101-
003, 23-487552-000,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
23-487553-000
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
73421, 101466, 10008190,
10008191, 10015380,
10020251, 10021293,
10028066, 10029827,
10029828, 10030112,
10030189, 10030193,
10030525, 10031127,
10031187, 10031343,
10031400, 10031401,
10031722, 10031805,
10031806, 10031895,
10032019, 10032099,
10032101, 10032207,
10032223, 10032225,
10032226, 10032257,
10032276, 10032408,
10032433, 10032475,
10032477, 10032534,
10032553, 10032570,
10032656, 10032677,
10032730, 10032772,
10032848, 10032963,
10033001, 10033066,
10033139, 10033145,
10033147, 10033149,
10033180, 10033366,
10033857, 10034200
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Reports
10031379, 10032272,
10032492, 10032793,
10033210, 10033213
Drawings
E-025-00007
sheet 236
Loops 2 and 3 ISO
W14
Drawings
M-12BB03
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Reactor Coolant
Pump
Drawings
M-12EF01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Essential Service
Water System
Drawings
M-12EF02
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Essential Service
Water System
Drawings
M-12EJ01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Residual Heat
Removal System
Drawings
M-724-00595
Nozzle Type Relief Valve
W03
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
M-K2EF01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Essential Service
Water System
Engineering
Changes
WCNO#PES-
00069-REPT-
2
Wolf Creek Unit 1 STRIDE 23-
Risk Evaluation
Miscellaneous
STRIDE 21-01
Wolf Creek Integrated D/G
and Safeguards Actuation
Testing
Miscellaneous
WCOP-02
Inservice Testing Program for
Pumps, Valves, and Snubbers
Miscellaneous
WCOP-02
Inservice Testing Program for
Pumps, Valves, and Snubbers
Miscellaneous
WCRE-34
Fourth 10-Year Interval
Inservice Testing Basis
Document
Procedures
Post Maintenance Testing
Development
21B
Procedures
Control of Containment
Penetrations during Shutdown
Operations
11B
Procedures
ASME Code Testing of Pumps
and Valves
2A
Procedures
Program Plan for Containment
Leakage Measurement
17A
Procedures
RCS Unidentified Leak Rate
Monitoring Program
Procedures
E-13GN02A
Schematic Diagrams
Containment Cooler Fans B
and D
1B
Procedures
GEN 00-006
Hot Standby to Gold
Shutdown
106
Procedures
MGE LT-100
Llmitorque Valve Operator
General Notes and Details
Procedures
STN EJ-202
RHR System Valve Test
Procedures
STS AE-209A
Main Feed Reg Valve Bypass
Valve Inservice Valve Test
Train A
Procedures
STS AE-209B
Main Feed Reg Valve Bypass
Inservice Valve Test Train B
Procedures
STS BB-006
RCS Water Inventory Balance
Using the NPIS Computer
Procedures
STS CV-106
Inservice Testing Check Valve
Condition Monitoring for
EFV0476, 0478, 0482, 0484
Procedures
STS GN-001
CTMT Cooling Fans
Operability Test
Procedures
STS KJ-001A
Integrated D/G and
73A
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Safeguards Actuation Test -
Train A
Procedures
STS KJ-001B
Integrated D/G and
Safeguards Actuation Test -
Train B
Procedures
STS KJ-011B
DG NE02 24 Hour Run
Procedures
STS MT-008
S/G Spring Loaded Safety
Valve Settings
27D
Procedures
STS MT-070
ASME Code Testing of
Safety/Relief Valves
Procedures
STS PE-122
LLRT Valve Lineup for
Penetration 22
Procedures
SYS KJ-124
Post Maintenance Run of
B
Work Orders
2362, 12703, 15900, 20864,
23060, 24808, 44349, 46438,
251, 56102, 56910, 57458,
57647, 57695, 59503, 60540,
60580, 60601, 61166, 61169,
14-395986-006, 15-399425-
003, 17-425266-005, 17-
25266-006, 17-425266-007,
17-425266-008, 20-461819-
000, 20-461819-001,
20-461819-003, 20-462020-
003, 21-474028-000,
21-474028-001, 21-474028-
003, 21-474101-000,
21-474101-001, 21-474101-
003, 23-483960-000,
23-485386-000, 23-485745-
000, 23-485746-000,
23-485829-002, 23-485897-
000, 23-487424-000,
23-487552-000, 23-487553-
000, 23-487813-000
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10034406, 10034408,
10034410, 10034413,
10034417, 10034421,
10034422, 10034426,
10034430, 10034432,
10034433, 10034434,
10034435, 10034437,
10034438, 10034444,
10034447, 10034450,
10034452, 10034454,
10034455, 10034456,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
10034471, 10034490
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Report
10034519
Procedures
ALR 00-123A
MFP B Trip
Procedures
EMG E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety
Injection
Procedures
OFN NB-030
Loss of AC Emergency Bus
NB01 (NB02)
ALARA Plans
RWP 240061
Fuel Building Transfer Canal
Entry
10/30/2023
ALARA Plans
RWP 244420
Scaffolding Activities
11/01/12023
ALARA Plans
RWP 246020
Reactor Vessel Head
Preparation
10/02/2023
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10027419, 10027420,
10027133, 10028178,
10028180, 10028295,
10030172, 10030174,
10030175
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Reports
10031817, 10031822,
10031829, 10031843,
10031852, 10032026,
10032028, 10032034,
10032074, 10032152,
10032215, 10032250,
10032533, 10032535,
10032536, 10032537,
10032540
Procedures
Radiation Protection Manual
20A
Procedures
Containment Entry
19A
Procedures
Access to Locked High or
Very High Radiation Areas
29A
Procedures
ALARA Program
Procedures
Use of Temporary Shielding
19C
Procedures
Radiation Worker Guidelines
56A
Procedures
Self-Assessment Process
Procedures
NRC Interface and Inspection
Guidance
Procedures
INC S-0606
Incore Detector Thimble
Withdrawal
Procedures
RPP 02-105
Procedures
RPP 02-210
Radiation Survey Methods
Procedures
RPP 02-215
Posting of Radiological
Controlled Areas
36A
Procedures
RPP 02-405
RCA Access Control
Procedures
RPP 02-510
Discrete Radioactive Particle
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Contamination Control
Procedures
RPP 02-515
Release of Radioactive
Material from the RCA
Radiation
Surveys
M-20190919-
RadWaste General Floor Area
Routine
09/19/2029
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240330-
I/S Bioshield Post-Peroxide
Survey B/C Loop down post
03/30/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240402-
Pulling Incore Thimble Tubes
04/01/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240403-
Reactor Head Scaffold Survey
04/03/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240404-
RadWaste East Title:
Thursday Weekly
04/04/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240404-
RB2047C RV Head Stand -
Bare Metal Inspection of RV
Head
04/04/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240407-
Socket weld prep work on
EJV0169 and EJV0007
04/07/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240407-5
47' CTMT After Draindown
04/07/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240407-7
1974 RHR A Drain line
removal EJV-Title: 0007, EJV-
0169
04/07/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240407-8
2000' CTMT Seal Table -
Thimble Retraction
04/07/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240408-
Weekly Survey 2000'
Containment
04/08/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240408-
Daily 2000' RadWaste
04/08/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240408-
PCE#818
04/08/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240408-
Contamination survey of "A"
RHR Pump Room
04/08/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240409-2
0007 and EJV-0169
04/08/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240409-
RHR "A " Pre-Job Welding
Walkdown
04/09/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240409-9
26' Containment Weekly
Survey
04/09/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240410-
Skimmers labeled with
Radioactive Material sticker
04/10/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240411-8
2000' I/S Bio - Dose Rate
Verification at VHRA Incore
Tunnel Boundary
04/10/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240416-
2000' BCHV-8160 Letdown
04/16/2024
Radiation
Work Permits
RWP 230036
Containment access during
plant modes 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5 for
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
(RWPs)
maintenance functions
Radiation
Work Permits
(RWPs)
RWP 230120
LHRA Waste processing
activities requiring High Risk
Radiation Protection (RP)
Supervisory Oversight
Radiation
Work Permits
(RWPs)
RWP 230610
Prepare Dry Storage
Container (DSC) and Transfer
Cask (TC) for fuel loading,
load DSC with Fuel, relocate
DSC to Cask Washdown Pit
(CWP), decontaminate
DSC/TC, close DSC, move
DSC/TC to Fuel Building truck
bay
Radiation
Work Permits
(RWPs)
RWP 242001
Welding Activities
Self-
Assessments
Audit Report
No: 24-01-
RP/PC
QUALITY ASSURANCE
AUDIT REPORT
Radiological Protection and
Process Control
2/28/2024
Work Orders
23-483995-
000
Perform INC S-0606 In-core
Detector Thimble Withdrawal
04/02/2024
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10024319, 10024625,
10025705, 10025717,
10026482, 10026816,
10027295, 10028605,
10029010, 10030210,
10020326, 10030237
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition
Reports
10030237, 10031852,
10032026, 10032028,
10032034
Drawings
A-KAT-12
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram: Mechanical HVAC
Plans Sections and Details
Drawings
M-12GK01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram: Control Building
Drawings
M-12GK03
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram: Control Building
Miscellaneous
Air Sample Logs: January 1,
23, to March 14, 2024
Miscellaneous
Updated Safety Analysis
Report (USAR), Chapter 9.4 -
Air Conditioning, Heating,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Cooling, and Ventilation
Miscellaneous
USAR, Chapter12.0 -
Radiation Protection
Miscellaneous
System Health Report
(7/1/2023 - 12/31/2023): Fuel
Building HVAC system
04/11/2024
Miscellaneous
2-480447-
000
Charcoal Adsorbent In-Place
Leak Test Safety Related
Units - FGK02B
07/06/2023
Miscellaneous
2-481189-
000
Charcoal Adsorbent Sampling
for Nuclear Safety Related
Units - FGK02A
2/23/2023
Miscellaneous
2-482265-
000
HEPA Filter In-Place Leak
Test Safety Related Units -
FGK01A
06/19/2023
Miscellaneous
2-482268-
000
Charcoal Adsorbent Sampling
for Nuclear Safety Related
Units - FGK01A
06/19/2023
Miscellaneous
23-487062-
000
HEPA Filter In-Place Leak
Test Safety Related Units -
FGK02A
07/19/2023
Miscellaneous
AIF 10-001-02
SCBA Inspections from
November 4, 2022, to
February 5, 2024
2/05/2024
Miscellaneous
GT 1245302
Self-Contained Breathing
Apparatus Training
Procedures
AI 10-004
Air Fill Station Operation
4A
Procedures
AI 14-009
Industrial Respiratory
Protection Program
Procedures
Respiratory Protection
Program at Wolf Creek
Procedures
RPP 03-210
Internal Exposure Calculations
and Evaluations
17D
Procedures
RPP 03-310
Respiratory Protection
Equipment
Procedures
RPP 05-201
Eberline RAS-1 Operation for
Tritium Air Sampling
Procedures
RPP 05-205
AMS-4 Operation
Procedures
RPP 05-920
Use of Vacuum Cleaners and
Portable HEPA Ventilation
Units in the RCA
7A
Procedures
STN PE-004
Charcoal Adsorber In-Place
Leak Test Non-Safety Related
Units
Procedures
STS PE-006A
Train A Charcoal Adsorber In-
Place Leak Test Safety
Related Units
Procedures
SYS GK-121
Control Building HVAC
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Operations
Procedures
SYS GK-123
Control Building A/C Units
Startup and Shutdown
Procedures
SYS VT-100
HVAC Startup and Shutdown
Radiation
Surveys
AS 24-0060
Airborne Radioactivity Record:
26' Fuel Building
2/27/2024
Radiation
Surveys
AS 24-0064
Airborne Radioactivity Record:
26' Fuel Building
2/27/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240409-
S/G B & C Primary Dose Rate
& Smear Survey
04/09/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240409-6
2000' CTMT, S/G "A" & "D"
Routine Survey
04/09/2024
Radiation
Work Permits
(RWPs)
RWP 243200
Radiation Protection Primary
and Secondary Steam
Generator Rover Coverage
Procedures
RPP 07-111
Handling Cartridge Filters
Procedures
RPP 07-123
Preparation and Shipment of
Radioactive Waste and
Material
9D
Shipping
Records
24R09
UN2912, Radioactive
materials, low specific activity
(LSA-I), 7, Fissile Excepted,
dry active waste
04/10/2024
71151
Procedures
DB-EMG ES-
Transfer to Cold Leg
Recirculation
71151
Procedures
EMG ES-12
Transfer to Cold Leg
Recirculation
71151
Procedures
WCNOC-163
Mitigating System
Performance Index (MSPI)
Basis Document
71152A
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
108366, 145735, 10019562,
10029246, 10029822,
10030242, 10031127,
10031663, 10027491
71152A
Drawings
E-13KJ03A
Schematic Diagram Diesel
Gen KKJ01B Engine Control
(Start/Stop Circuit)
71152A
Drawings
E-13KJ03A
Schematic Diagram Diesel
Gen KKJ01A Engine Control
(Start/Stop Circuit)
71152A
Drawings
M-12KJ05
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Standby Diesel
Generator B Intake Exhaust,
F.O., and Start Air Sys.
71152A
Engineering
Changes
CP 20454
Kinectrics Relay/Contact Block
Replacement for EDG Room
Panels
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71152A
Miscellaneous
M-018-00309
Instruction Manual for
System
W141
71152A
Procedures
CKL ZL-004
Turbine Building Reading
Sheet
2
71152A
Procedures
STS KJ-015B
Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync
and Loading of EDG NE02
71152A
Procedures
SYS KJ-124
Post Maintenance Run of
B
71152A
Work Orders
WO 26620. 21-469171-006, 21-
469172-000, 56090,
21-469171-013
71152S
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10027129, 10027148,
10031001, 10031493,
10032794, 10033122,
10033418, 10033639
71152S
Drawings
M-12GT01
Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram Containment Purge
Systems
71152S
Miscellaneous
M-018-00309
Instruction Manual for
System
W141
71152S
Procedures
Post Maintenance Testing
Development
21B
71152S
Procedures
Heat Exchanger Program
71152S
Procedures
Reliability Program
71152S
Procedures
CKL ZL-005A
A EDG Operating Log
6A
71152S
Work Orders
20-461655-004, 23-486310-
000, 23-486310-001,
23-486310-002
Corrective
Action
Documents
Condition
Reports
10031603, 10031604
Procedures
APF 06-002-
Emergency Action Levels
Technical Bases
43