IR 05000482/2022002
| ML22199A279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/2022 |
| From: | Greg Werner NRC/RGN-IV/DORS |
| To: | Reasoner C Wolf Creek |
| Werner G | |
| References | |
| IR 2022002 | |
| Download: ML22199A279 (30) | |
Text
July 25, 2022
SUBJECT:
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2022002
Dear Mr. Reasoner:
On June 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station. On July 7, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Jaime McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Gregory E. Werner, Chief Projects Branch B Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000482 License No. NPF-42
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000482
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-002-0002
Licensee:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Facility:
Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location:
Burlington, KS
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2022 to June 30, 2022
Inspectors:
J. Braisted, Senior Reactor Inspector
G. George, Senior Reactor Inspector
C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Melfi, Project Engineer
W. Tejada, Physical Security Inspector
F. Thomas, Reactor Inspector
J. Vera, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Gregory E. Werner, Chief
Projects Branch B
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section 71152
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Scope the Class 1E Air Conditioning Cross Train Cooling System Safety Function into the Maintenance Rule Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2022002-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for the licensees failure to monitor safety-related structures, systems, and components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposure comparable to the guidelines. Specifically, the licensee failed to scope the class 1E air conditioning cross train cooling system a safety-related system relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events in the scope of the maintenance rule program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).
Failure to Maintain Configuration Control of the Emergency Core Cooling System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2022002-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to maintain procedure SYS BG-201, Shifting Charging Pump, revision 74, to maintain configuration control of the emergency core cooling system. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain one of the two centrifugal charging pump discharge header inlet isolation valves (BG8483A and BG8483C) always closed to ensure proper operation of the centrifugal charging pump minimum flow valves during design basis accident conditions with the worst-case single failure.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period at full power. On April 29, 2022, the licensee reduced power to 58 percent at the request of the transmission system operator to facilitate unplanned outage of the 345 kV Rose Hill Line and was returned to full power on May 1, 2022. On June 16, 2022, the licensee reduced power to 85 percent for scheduled surveillance testing of the main turbine control valves and was returned to full power on the same day. On three occasions during the quarter the licensee reduced power to 70 percent for flexible power operations (based on daily market demand) and returned to full power after each occasion.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)train B safety injection system due to loop 4 hot leg primary isolation check valve leakage on April 12, 2022 (2)train B charging system following a technical specification equipment outage on April 13, 2022 (3)train B emergency core cooling system cold leg recirculation on May 14, 2022
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)turbine building, fire area T-2, on April 30, 2022 (2)volume control tank room, fire area A-8, on May 2, 2022 (3)lower cable spreading room, fire area C-21, on May 4, 2022 (4)hourly fire watch for fire areas C-9, C-12, C-18, C-21, and C-24 when starting centrifugal charging pump (CCP) B on May 11, 2022 (5)hourly fire watch for fire areas C-10, C-11, C-17, C-22, C-23, C-30, and C-33 when starting CCP A on May 11, 2022
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on April 22, 2022.
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
(1)train B essential service water manhole inspections on April 25, 2022 (2)auxiliary building level 2000 on May 3, 2022
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the following activities:
control rod operability verification and parking on April 14, 2022
flexible power operations on April 27, 2022
return to full power following unplanned 345 kV Rose Hill Line outage on May 1, 2022
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Inspectors observed and evaluated simulator training activities on April 4, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)trains A and B class 1E air conditioning system cross train system not scoped into maintenance rule on June 9, 2022 (2)trains A and B charging system maintenance effectiveness on June 14, 2022
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)emergent work activities for main turbine control valve 1 oscillation troubleshooting and repair on April 11, 2022 (2)train B charging system planned technical specification equipment outage on April 11, 2022 (3)turbine control valve oscillation operational decision-making issue on May 17, 2022 (4)train A essential service water and emergency diesel generator planned technical specification equipment outage on May 17, 2022 (5)emergency diesel generator A voltage regulatory troubleshooting and technical specification equipment outage extension on May 19, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)train B residual heat removal (RHR) pump dry and wet boron leakage from the mechanical seal operability determination on May 8, 2022 (2)trains A and B charging system cross-tied during charging pump discharge header alignment operability determination on May 25, 2022 (3)emergency diesel generator A excitation circuit operability determination on May 25, 2022
71111.17T - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Sample Selection (IP Section 02.01)
The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determinations for 10 CFR 50.59 from April 11-19, 2022.
- (2) CP 20165, Diesel Fire Pump Instrument Control Panel Equivalent Replacement (Applicability Determination)
- (3) CP 20227, Remove Internals from Check Valve KAV0002 (50.59 Screen)
- (4) CP 20255, PFSSD [post-fire safe shutdown] Modification to Address IN 92-18 for Multiple MOVs [motor operated valves] (50.59 Screen)
- (5) CP 20380, PFSSD [post-fire safe shutdown] Modification to Address IN 92-18 for Multiple MOVs [motor operated valves]-Refuel 25 (50.59 Screen)
- (6) CP 20431, ESW [essential service water] VLC [vertical loop chase] Sump Pump Automatic Function (50.59 Screen)
- (7) CP 20008, 7300 Controls Upgrade - Temporary Loop System (Applicability Determination)
- (9) CP 20365, 345-120 Breaker Replacement (50.59 Screen)
- (10) CP 20393, Emergency Diesel Generator Supply Fan Motor Starters (50.59 Screen)
- (12) CP 13908, Westinghouse RHR Pump Motor Refurbishment Upgrades (50.59 Screen)
- (13) CP 14853, SGK04A & B PMT [post maintenance testing]-Bitzer Compressor Replacement (Applicability Determination)
- (14) CP 15246, NG [Low Voltage System] Voltmeter Replacement (50.59 Screen)
- (15) CP 13324, 7300 Controls Upgrade (50.59 Evaluation)
Required (50.59 Screen)
- (17) CP 20072, GTRE0059 & 60 Containment Cable Replacement (50.59 Screen)
- (18) CP 20312, E-1F9915 Impact for E-Plan [Emergency Plan] License Amendment 220 (Applicability Determination)
Vibration Alarms in Ovation (50.59 Screen)
- (20) CP 20347, RCS [reactor coolant system] Narrow Range RTD [resistance temperature device] Lead Resistance Imbalance (50.59 Screen)
- (21) CP 20550, System Description M-10BN Update (50.59 Evaluation)
- (22) EMG ES-33, revision 19, Post-SGTR [steam generator tube rupture] Cooldown Using Steam Dumps (50.59 Screen)
- (23) EMG ES-33, revision 20, Post-SGTR [steam generator tube rupture] Cooldown Using Steam Dumps (50.59 Screen)
- (24) EMG C-31, revision 30, SGTR [steam generator tube rupture] With Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired (50.59 Screen)
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)refueling water storage tank volumes and level set points permanent modification on June 9, 2022
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
(1)train B charging pump auxiliary lube oil pump and motor replacement post-maintenance testing on April 6, 2022 (2)train B charging pump seal area cleaning and breaker post-maintenance testing on April 6, 2022 (3)emergency diesel generator A fuel oil transfer system restoration following maintenance activities on May 18, 2022 (4)emergency diesel generator A voltage regulator on May 18, 2022 (5)emergency diesel generator A jacket water, lube oil, and intercooler temperature control valve power pill replacement post-maintenance testing on May 18, 2022
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)train B emergency core cooling and common void monitoring and venting on April 12, 2022 (2)train B component cooling water radwaste building return header isolation valve, EGHV0070B, stroke time inservice testing evaluation on April 19, 2022 (3)train A charging pump inservice surveillance testing on June 14, 2022
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)train B essential service water isolation to air compressor check valve EFV0076 on May 23, 2022
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
(1)emergency preparedness drill involving an anticipated transient without a scram, faulted steam generator, and reactor coolant leak on April 20 and May 4, 2022.
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
(1)emergency preparedness drill involving an anticipated transient without a scram, faulted steam generator, and reactor coolant leak on May 4,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06)===
- (1) April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1 2021 through March 31, 2022 BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)emergency preparedness drill SA-2022-01 development, control input, and crew performance on May 24, 2022.
(2)auxiliary feedwater room missed hourly fire watches on June 14, 2022.
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in the corrective action program equipment performance evaluations and clearance order error and planning issues that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Scope the Class 1E Air Conditioning Cross Train Cooling System Safety Function into the Maintenance Rule Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2022002-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for the licensees failure to monitor safety-related structures, systems, and components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposure comparable to the guidelines. Specifically, the licensee failed to scope the class 1E air conditioning cross train cooling system a safety-related system relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events in the scope of the maintenance rule program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).
Description:
While performing reviews of the licensees maintenance rule program associated with the DC distribution system (NK), the inspectors identified a safety-related function for the swing battery chargers, NK25 and NK26, which was not scoped into the maintenance rule program. Specifically, in November 2018, the licensee failed to scope the safety-related function associated with class 1E air conditioning cross train cooling system that was implemented by design change package 14269 and amendment 219, Issue of Amendment:
Addition of New Technical Specification 3.7.20, Class 1E Electrical Equipment Air Conditioning (A/C) System, dated September 11, 2018. The licensee assigned work order 16-414781-054 to perform a maintenance rule evaluation for the control building HVAC system function GK-01 and provide a suitable environment for class 1E electrical equipment during normal and accident conditions, which was not completed prior to the inspectors review of the maintenance rule program review for the NK system. Additionally, the inspectors identified four functional failures associated with the NK25 and concluded the availability, reliability, and capability of NK25 was impacted.
The safety-related function of the class 1E air conditioning cross train cooling system was to provide cooling to both trains of class 1E electrical equipment (AC and DC) located on the 2016 and 2000 elevation during normal and accident conditions. With one class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning train inoperable, action must be initiated immediately to implement mitigating actions. The mitigating actions taken with one class 1E electrical equipment air condition train inoperable include enabling the halon interlock relay and starting the appropriate single train recirculating fans (including opening discharge dampers).
Additionally, the NK25 and NK26 are placed into service and battery chargers NK21 and NK24 are secured within three hours. This is done to move heat load from the 2016 elevation down to the 2000 elevation.
Therefore, the inspectors concluded the class 1E air conditioning cross train cooling system was a safety-related system that was relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and was required to be scoped into the maintenance rule program.
Additionally, it was concluded the licensee failed to demonstrate effective control of equipment performance or condition for equipment that should have been scoped into the maintenance rule program (e.g., the four functional failures of NK25). The inspectors informed the licensee, and they entered the concern into the corrective action program as condition reports 10012398 and 10012596.
Corrective Actions: The licensee scoped class 1E air conditioning cross train cooling system into the maintenance rule program under the GK and NK system functions, performed an extent of condition and identified three additional system modifications that where not scoped into the maintenance rule program, and changed the process for maintenance rule program scoping reviews for design changes. Additionally, the licensee determined NK system function for the class 1E air conditioning cross train cooling system was required to be transitioned to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).
Corrective Action References: Condition reports 10012398 and 10012596
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to scope the safety-related function associated with the DC distribution system swing battery chargers NK25 and NK26 for implementation of the class 1E air conditioning cross train cooling system was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the cornerstone objectives were adversely affected because effective control of equipment performance or condition for equipment that should have been scoped was not demonstrated (e.g., the safety-related swing battery charger NK25).
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it
- (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system,
- (2) does not represent a loss of the probability risk analysis (PRA) function of a single train technical specification system for greater than its allowed outage time,
- (3) does not represent a loss of PRA function of one train of a multi-train technical specification system for greater than its allowed outage time, (4)does not represent a loss of the PRA function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
- (5) does not represent a loss of PRA system and/or function as defined by the plant risk information e-book (PRIB) or the licensees PRA for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and
- (6) does not result in the loss of a high safety-significant, nontechnical specification train for greater than 3 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the licensee failed to have a consistent process for ensuring new system modifications were appropriately reviewed to ensure they were incorporated, if required, into the maintenance rule program.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1), states, in part, that holders of an operating license shall include within the scope of the monitoring program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)safety-related structures, systems, or components (SSCs) that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident that could result in potential offsite exposure comparable to the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to include within the scope of the monitoring program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), a safety-related system relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to shut down the reactor and maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. Specifically, from November 2018 to May 2022, the safety-related class 1E air conditioning cross train cooling systems that maintains AC and DC distribution components within required temperatures for safe shutdown were not being monitored to ensure maintenance effectiveness.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Maintain Configuration Control of the Emergency Core Cooling System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2022002-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to maintain procedure SYS BG-201, Shifting Charging Pump, revision 74, to maintain configuration control of the emergency core cooling system. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain one of the two CCP discharge header inlet isolation valves (BG8483A and BG8483C) always closed to ensure proper operation of the CCP minimum flow valves during design basis accident conditions with the worst-case single failure.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed: procedure SYS BG-201, Shifting Charging Pump, revision 74, Vendor Letter SNP-4943, Charging Pump Miniflow, dated October 25, 1982, the current licensing and design basis for the safety-related charging system and performed walkdowns of the system. From this review, the inspectors identified the following:
Procedure SYS BG-201: The inspectors identified section 6.7, Shifting Charging Pump Discharge Header Alignment, aligns both safety-related CCPs to the charging discharge by opening one of the two discharge header inlet isolation valves (BG8483A and BG8483C) prior to closing one of the valves to complete the shifting of a CCP to the discharge header. The configuration with both BG8483A and GB8483C being open during shifting of CCPs was approximately 30 minutes prior to either BG8483A or BG8483C being locked closed. The basis for allowing both valves to be open at the same time during the shifting of CCPs discharge header alignment was provided by Technical Specification Interpretation 009-85, revision 2, dated November 17, 1988. Specifically, Technical Specification Interpretation 009-85 stated:
In Modes 1, 2, and 3, opening BG8483A and C violates additional guidelines for safety injection through the boron injection tank.
Maintaining filtered seal injection to the reactor coolant pumps and a flow path simultaneously is the primary concern. In all Modes, operation of the CCPs in parallel for this brief evolution does not place the plant in a degraded condition and is in fact the most conservative way to comply with the present technical specification.
System Walkdown: During the system walkdown, the inspectors identified a sign above both BG8483A and BG8483C that one of the valves shall always be locked closed in accordance with vendor letter SNP-4943.
Vendor Letter SNP-4943: This letter states, in part, for a design basis accident with worst-case single failure:
If valve BG8483A and C are both open, then the existing instrumentation and logic are of themselves inadequate for opening and closing the CCPs minimum flow valves when required. Since the flow below which the minimum flow valve must be opened is greater than the flow above which the minimum flow valve must be closed, the existing flow switch was inadequate. Additional logic and instrumentation would have to be added. Two additional flow switches having 140 gpm setpoints would have to be added in parallel with the existing flow switches. One or two possible pressure switches would have to be installed on the discharge of the each CCP to determine if the pump was running. Logic would also have to be provided to close the A minimum flow valve above 140 gpm if limit switch signals indicated that boron injection tank inlet valve BGHV8803B was open while CCP B was not operating.
This closure logic would also have to block the opening logic (greater than 243.6 gpm). The closure setpoint of 280 gpm would also still have to be accommodated. Similar logic would have to be provided for the train B minimum flow valve.
Additionally, the vendor stated the following recommendations:
In summary, it is recommended that either BG8483A or BG8483C be locked closed at all times as shown on the current issue of the vendor engineering flow diagrams. It is also recommended that this requirement be reflected in the Technical Specifications. The setpoints in the precautions, limitations, and setpoint document will be consistent with the locked closed valve arrangement. Should check valves be installed at some future time and BG8483A and C are opened, then the setpoints are still valid.
From the inspectors walkdown of the charging system and review of drawing M-12BG03, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System, revision 51, no additional instrumentation or check valves were installed, as discussed in vendor letter SNP-4943.
Based on the above information, the inspectors concluded the licensee failed to maintain configuration control of the emergency core cooling system when performing procedure SYS BG-201, section 6.7. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain one of the two CCP discharge header inlet isolation valves (BG8483A and BG8483C) closed at all times to ensure proper operation of the CCP minimum flow valve during design basis accident conditions with the worst--case single failure. The licensee initiated condition report 10013797.
Corrective Actions: The licensee established a compensatory measure using a dedicated individual to close either BG8483A or BG8483C when performing section 6.7 of procedure SYS BG-201 during a design basis accident that requires safety injection, until procedure SYS BG-201 has been updated.
Corrective Action References: Condition report 10013797
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to maintain emergency core cooling system configuration to ensure proper operation of the CCP minimum flow valve during design basis accidents was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, with both CCP A and B discharge header inlet isolation valves (BG8483A and BG8483C) open does not maintain the required emergency core cooling system configuration to ensure proper operation of the CCP minimum flow valves to prevent pump damage during design basis accidents conditions with the worst-case single failure for the charging system.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it
- (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system,
- (2) does not represent a loss of the probability risk analysis (PRA) function of a single train technical specification system for greater than its allowed outage time,
- (3) does not represent a loss of PRA function of one train of a multi-train technical specification system for greater than its allowed outage time,
- (4) does not represent a loss of the PRA function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
- (5) does not represent a loss of PRA system and/or function as defined by the plant risk information e-book (PRIB) or the licensees PRA for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and
- (6) does not result in the loss of a high safety-significant, nontechnical specification train for greater than 3 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance. Specifically, the basis for allowing both BG8483A and C to be open during the performance of procedure SYS BG-201, section 6.7, was established in November 1988 inconsistent with Technical Specification Interpretation 009-85, revision 2.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering applicable procedures recommended in appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, revision 2, dated February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, appendix A, section 3.d, requires procedures for startup, operation, and shutdown of safety-related pressurized water reactor emergency core cooling system. The licensee established procedure SYS BG-201, Shifting Charging Pumps, revision 74, section 6.7, to provide instructions for shifting charging pump discharge header alignment without operation of the emergency core cooling system CCP.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to maintain procedures for operation of the safety-related pressurized water reactor emergency core cooling system. Specifically, from November 1988 to May 2022, procedure SYS BG-201 failed to maintain configuration control of the emergency core cooling system CCP discharge header inlet isolation valves to ensure proper operation of the CCP minimum flow valve during design basis accident conditions with worst-case single failure.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152A This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.d requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering fire protection program implementation.
The licensee established procedure AP 10-104, Breach Authorization, revision 39, for impairments of the fire protection system and instructions to maintain required barriers for fire protection. Procedure AP 10-104, step 6.2.5.1, states in part, with a functional fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable/nonfunctional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to implement the fire protection program procedure AP 10-104, step 6.2.5.1. Specifically, from January 1, 2021, to March 9, 2022, on multiple occasions the licensee failed to establish an hourly fire watch patrol for an inoperable/nonfunctional fire barrier for the auxiliary feedwater vestibule (room 1329) fire door 13291 as identified on breach authorization permit BAP-21-0465.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors assigned the finding a fire category 1.4.1 using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, appendix F, attachment 1, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Worksheet, dated May 2, 2018, because the finding involved fire prevention and administrative controls. The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because the finding:
- (1) did not increase the likelihood of a fire, delay detection of a fire, or resulted in a more significant fire than previously analyzed such that credited safe shutdown strategy could be adversely impacted; and
- (2) the degraded fire confinement element continued to provide adequate fire endurance to prevent fire propagation through the fire confinement element given the combustible loading and location of equipment important to safe shutdown in the fire area of concern. Specifically, there was no combustible material or safety equipment that constituted a fire target.
Corrective Action References: Condition report 10013103 Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review 71152S The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program, performance indicators, system health reports, and other documentation available to help identify performance trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors verified that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address the identified adverse trends. The inspectors did not review any cross-cutting themes because none existed at the site.
To verify the licensee was taking corrective actions to address identified adverse trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue, the inspectors and the licensee noted an apparent negative trend in the corrective action program associated with equipment performance evaluations (EPE). Specifically, the inspectors identified concerns with risk recognition when addressing equipment deficiencies associated with low-risk component issues screening out of the process when they are used in higher risk systems.
Additionally, the inspectors and the licensee identified EPEs requiring re-performance due to weakness in the evaluation. In response, the licensee initiated condition reports 10012377, 10012988, and 10013471, and implemented the following corrective actions:
1. Condition report 10012377 corrective actions included the following items:
a.
Revised the EPE guidance to provide more detail on how to complete an EPE.
Specifically, the licensee implemented a new standalone EPE form with supporting engineering desktop guidance to complete EPEs.
b.
Prior to closing an EPE within the corrective action program a maintenance rule system matter expert review was required prior to maintenance rule closure.
2. Condition report 10013471 corrective action item included vendor training to address
training request 2022-0027-1 for selected licensee personnel to improve the performance associated with EPEs. Additionally, the training included organizational and programmatic evaluations and their use in improving equipment reliability performance.
3. Condition report 10012988 corrective action was to review the proposed changes
being implemented by condition report 10012377 and create additional actions as required to address identified EPE performance gaps.
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review 71152S The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program, performance indicators, system health reports, and other documentation available to help identify performance trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors verified that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address the identified adverse trends. The inspectors did not review any cross-cutting themes because none existed at the site.
To verify the licensee was taking corrective actions to address identified adverse trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue, the inspectors and the licensee noted an apparent negative trend associated with clearance orders. Specifically, since November 2021, the licensee has written several condition reports regarding clearance order errors. Condition report 10011797 was written on January 24, 2022, to identify a possible trend in low level clearance order errors. The initial trend analysis concluded there was a low-level trend, and the condition report implemented some actions to address the trend. During the week of February 21, 2022, three additional clearance order errors were discovered during clearance order implementation or after placement in the field. The licensee initiated condition report 10013136 and performed a common cause evaluation. The clearance order errors included:
A new work order was added to a clearance order. This work order required a fuse to be tagged. However, the preparer did not recognize this requirement and neither did the tagging authority. The verification by two clearance order peers failed to identify the error made by the new preparer.
A preparer failed to validate that the components on a copied clearance order matched the components listed in the work order.
A clearance order was copied which correctly tagged supply fan and damper actuators but did not prevent the emergency diesel generator from starting. The copied clearance order had included the note to prevent the emergency diesel generator from starting, but it was removed. This error was found during the tagging authority review.
An operator instructed an electrician to sign electronically as the Tag First Verifier for placement. The electrical technician signed for lifted leads and operations department personnel signed the independent verification. When tagging lifted leads per procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders revision 43C, the operations department is responsible for both the placement and verification of the Do Not Operate tags. The error was not noticed until the clearance was verified as hung.
A planner failed to notify the clearance order group when a revision to the work order scope was completed as required by procedure, so the change in work scope bypassed the clearance order group. The workers performing the maintenance were covered by an existing clearance order that they had control of, but which did not specifically identify the additional work scope (isolation boundary was the same).
After planning a revision for a work order the electrical master did not send the revision to the clearance order group in accordance with procedure AP 21E-001.
A clearance order was created to work on the component cooling water side of a RHR pump seal cooler by copying a previous clearance order. The valve labeling and mechanical prints and available information were not reviewed thoroughly enough to identify that a valve was on the RHR pump side, and not the CCW side. Neither the preparer nor tagging authority recognized this error. This issue was not identified until the clearance order was in the process of being hung, but prior to be turned over to maintenance. The licensee recognized that a similar error occurred in 2020.
A work order scope was changed after initial preparation, and not caught by the tagging authority. The planner failed to notify the clearance order group of the change in work scope.
The licensee initiated the following corrective actions:
The clearance order group supervision has provided coaching, performed a stand down, and is providing additional oversight to the newer/less proficient preparers. The maintenance group involved in signing for a lifted lead inappropriately have also been coached. The above events were also evaluated with regards to nuclear safety culture. All the above events were identified at a low level and no nuclear safety culture theme was identified.
Peer checks of clearance orders prepared by new preparers have now been instituted. When a new preparer works on a clearance order that is different from what they have done before or is outside the scope of what they understand, they are expected to get a peer check from a more experienced preparer prior to signing off the clearance order.
The inspectors noted the trends in clearance order errors so far have been identified at a low level. The inspectors also observed that such errors could continue if the corrective actions implemented are not effective. Additionally, the inspectors noted the clearance order error low level trend has an impact on cross-cutting area H.5, Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk insights, job site conditions, and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities; work activities are coordinated to address conflicting or changing priorities across the whole spectrum of activities contributing to nuclear safety; and leaders consider the impact of changes to the work scope and the need to keep personnel apprised of work status. No findings or violations were identified in the review of this trend.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On April 19, 2022, the inspectors presented the 10 CFR 50.59 inspection results to Mr.
J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On July 7, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
BN-M-013
Time Available for Injection, ECCS, and Containment Spray
Pump Transfer and Evaluation of Air Entrainment at Empty
Alarm
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
10013562
M-12BB01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
M-12BG03
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume
Control System
M-12BN01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Borated Refueling
Water Storage System
M-12EJ01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal
System
M-12EM01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
M-12EM02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
Drawings
M-12EP01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Accumulator Safety
Injection
BD-EMG ES-12
Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation
17A
CKL BG-120
Chemical and Volume Control System Valve Lineup
CKL EM-120
Safety Injection System Lineup
EMG ES-12
Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation
STS CR-001
Shift Log for Modes 1, 2, and 3
113
Procedures
SYS BG-201
Shifting Charging Pumps
73, 74
Calculations
XX-E-013
Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
2008-5211, 2008-5341, 25002
Miscellaneous
Document
Revision Request
SYS BG-201 Shifting Charging Pumps
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
08-1850
E-1F9910
Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Area Analysis
OTSC 08-0134
SYS BG-201 Shifting Charging Pumps
OFN BG-045
Gas Binding of CCPs or SI Pumps
6A
OFN KC-016
Fire Response
Procedures
SYS BG-201
Shifting Charging Pumps
Calculations
FL-03
Flooding of Individual Auxiliary Building Rooms
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10013639, 10014670
M-12LF02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Building Floor
and Equipment Drain System
Drawings
M-1G022
Equipment Locations Reactor and Auxiliary Buildings Plan
Ground Floor El. 2000-0
Miscellaneous
WCRE-35
Boundary Matrix
ALR 00-008B
Serv WTR Press HI LO
ALR 00-055A
11A
ALR 00-055B
2A
Procedures
ALR 00-094F
Misc Sumps Lev Hi
STN SF-001
Control Rod Parking
21A
Procedures
STS SF-001
Control and Shutdown Rod Operability Verification
Calculations
GK-M-016
Wolf Creek Control Building Loss of Class 1E A/C GOTHIC
Room Heat Up Analysis with Installed Crosstie Fans and
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
131256, 136749, 140976, 140977, 10010697, 10014069,
10014081, 10014082
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10012398, 10012596, 10015063
M-12BG03
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume
Control System
Drawings
M-12BG05
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Control System
M-12GK03
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Control Building HVAC
M-12GK05
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Control Building
M-618.4-00010
Wolf Creek CGK06A Fan Supply Duct General Assembly
M-618.4-00007
Greenheck Bubble Tight, Fire and Isolation Dampers
Miscellaneous
WCRE-38
Surveillance Frequency Control Program Surveillance Test
Interval List
ALR 00-042B
VCT Lev HILO
ALR 00-058A
ALR 00-079D
Delta Flux Out of Band, Rev. 10 (P) OFN BG-009,
Emergency Boration
ALR 00-081D
Rob Bank Lo Limit
ALR 00-082C
Rob Bank LoLo Limit
OFN BG-009
Emergency Boration
Procedures
STN GK-001A
Class 1E Recirculation System Train A Functional Test
Work Orders
18-445355-000, 19-449796-000, 20-461689-000,
20-463001-000, 20-463003-000, 21-474330-000
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10013460, 10013949, 10013950, 10013953, 10014472,
10014489, 10014504
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10013396, 10014444, 10014451
M-12BG03
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume
Control System
M-12EM02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
Drawings
M-12KC02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Fire Protection System
Miscellaneous
ODMI 2022-02
Turbine Control Valve Oscillation at 70% Power
AI 22C-013
Protected Equipment Program
23B
AP 10-103
Fire Protection Impairment Control
AP 21-200
Operational Decision Making
10B
Procedures
On-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CKL EM-120
Safety Injection System Lineup Checklists
EMG FR-C1
Response to Inadequate Core Cooling
EMG FR-C2
Response to Degraded Core Cooling
OFN AC-002
Main Turbine High Vibration
Work Orders
2-478763-000, 22-479602-000, 22-479602-001,
2-479602-002, 22-479602-003, 22-479602-004,
2-479602-005
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
103970, 10014020, 10014022, 10014472, 10014489,
10014504, 1003435,
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10013610, 10013797
Drawings
M-12BG03
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume
Control System
M-018-00825-
W02
Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment
Miscellaneous
WCRE-034
Fourth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Basis Document
AI 16F-001
Evaluation of Boric Acid Leakage
11A
AI 16F-002
Boric Acid Leakage Management
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
10A
WCGS Leak Reduction of Primary Coolant Sources Outside
of Containment
10A
Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment
45A
AP 28-001
Operability Evaluations
27A
Procedures
SYS BG-201
Shifting Charging Pumps
73, 74
Work Orders
15-402735-000, 15-402735-002, 15-702735-005,
15-402735-006, 20-464381-000, 20-464381-001,
21-470773-014, 22-479602-000, 22-479602-001,
2-479602-002, 22-479602-003, 22-479602-004,
2-479602-005
17-073
Wolf Creek Thermally Induced Current Analysis
Calculations
HG-C-001
Structural Evaluation of the Cask Pedestal of Wolf Creek
Generating Station
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
KA-04-W
Provide Check Valve Engineering Assessment
XX-E-006
AC [Alternating Current] System Analysis
008
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 73206, 73333, 100357, 116786, 121810, 132144, 141943,
143212, 144548, 145351, 10002640, 10006110, 10006220,
10007567, 10008771, 10008772, 10009317, 10012958
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports 10013708, 10013745, 10013746
E-138N08
Schematic Diagram, SIS Pump Miniflow Isolation Valve
KD-7496
One Line Diagram
M-10BN
Borated Refueling Water Storage
M-12AE01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Feedwater System
M-12BM02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Steam Generator
Blowdown System
M-12EJ01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Residual Heat
Removal System
M-12KA01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Compressed Air
System
Drawings
WIP-E-017-
00563-007-A-1
NG01 Connection Diagram
CP 013324
7300 Controls Upgrade
001
CP 015246
NG Voltmeters Replacement
CP 020393
EDG Supply Fan Motor Starters Replacement
CP 12513
ESF XNB02 Transformer Replacement
CP 13908
Westinghouse RHR Pump Motor Refurbishment and
Upgrades
CP 14853
SGK04A & B PMT-Bitzer Compressor Replacement
CP 20008
7300 Controls Upgrade - Temporary Loop System
CP 20021
ESF XNB01 Transformer Replacement
CP 20161
Removal of Interlock to Motor Driven Feedwater Pump Motor
Start
Engineering
Changes
CP 20165
Diesel Fire Pump Instrument Control Panel Equivalent
Replacement
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CP 20227
Remove Internals from Check Valve KAV0002
CP 20255
PFSSD Modification to Address IN 92-18 for Multiple MOVs
CP 20365
345-120 Breaker Replacement
04/22/2021
CP 20380
PFSSD Modification to Address IN 92-18 for Multiple MOVs-
Refuel 25
CP 20431
ESW VLC Sump Pump Automatic Function
Engineering
Evaluations
M-761A-00108
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Company NSSS Control
Replacement - Operating Differences
09/23/2021
AI 23N-001
Air Operated Valve Categorization
E-017-00820
Report on Nuclear Qualification Testing of BGII-252, BVII-
5A, BWII-1316, BGP-241, VX-252, KX-241 and KA-241
Instruments
ET 20-0007
License Amendment Request for Replacement of
Engineered Safety Features Transformers with New
Transformers that have Active Automatic Load Tap
Changers
06/08/2020
M-622.1A
Design Specification M-622.1A (Q) for Replacement
Packaged Air Conditioning Units for the Wolf Creek
Generating Station ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
Section III Class 3
WCNOC-16-0022
Replace Limit Switch for BMTV0040
2/13/2018
WCOP-24
Operations EMG/OFN Setpoints
Miscellaneous
WIP-E-017-
00397-W25-A
Instruction Manual for Load Center Unit Substations GE
AI 26A-003
Regulatory Evaluations (Other Than 10 CFR 50.59)
ALR 00-022A
XNB02 XFMR Lockout
ALR 00-022D
XNB02 XFMR Trouble
ALR 832
ESF XFMR XNB02
Temporary Configuration Changes
16B
Receipt Inspections
CFR 50.59 Reviews
APF 06-002-03
EAL Classification Matrix
0B
EMG FR-C2
Response to Degraded Core Cooling
Procedures
IP-ENG-001
Standard Design Process (SDP)
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
STN AE-007
Startup Main Feedwater Pump Operational Test
STN XNB-002
XNB02 ESF Transformer #2 Alarm and Trip Circuitry
Verification
STS IC-660A
Channel Calibration Digital High Range Area Radiation
Monitor GT RE-0059
5A
SYS AE-122
Startup Main Feedwater Pump Startup
Self-Assessments QH-2022-2300
CFR 50.59, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and
Experiments
2/24/2022
Work Orders
Work Order (WO)
17-429672-000, 17-432438-006, 18-440780-006,
20-461706-000, 21-469378-000, 21-475741-000
BN-20
RWST Volumes and Level Set Points
1, 2, 3, 4
BN-M-013
Time Available for Injection, ECCS, and Containment Spray
Pump Transfer and Evaluation of Air Entrainment at Empty
Alarm
SA-87-007
Determination of High Head and Indeterminate Head Safety
Injection Flow Rate
Calculations
SA-92-009
Calculation of RWST Depletion Rate and ECCS
Recirculation Switchover Time Following a Postulated
Primary/Secondary Pipe Rupture
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10006389, 10010968, 10012517
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
10014808
M-12BN01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Borated Refueling
Water Storage System
M-12EJ01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal
System
Drawings
M-12EM01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
Engineering
Changes
CP 020550
System Description M-10BN Update
Miscellaneous
BLWE-1525
RWST and Level Setpoints
11/02/1981
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SNP-3346
SNUPPS Project RWST Sizing and Level Setpoints
05/29/1980
AI 21-016
Operator Time Critical Actions Validation
ALR 00-047E
RWST LEV HILO
EMG E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
OFN BB-005
RCP Malfunctions
Procedures
STS EM-003B
Work Orders
18-440567-009, 20-462092-000
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10013418, 10014330, 10014448, 10014467, 10014472
Post Maintenance Testing Development
21A
MGE EOOP-05
Insulation Resistance Testing
MPE E009Q-03
Inspection and Testing of Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breakers
MPE NE-004
Alternator Inspection
16B
RNM C-0578
Westinghouse CO Induction Disc Overcurrent Relay
STS KJ-005A
Manual/Auto Start, SYNC and Loading of EDG NE01
SYS KJ-123
Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator A
Procedures
SYS KJ-130
Removal and Restoration of EDG Support Systems
14A
Work Orders
18-436205-004, 20-446044-002, 20-466044-000,
21-474435-000, 21-475395-000, 21-475395-001,
21-475502-001, 21-475505-001, 21-475506-001,
21-475720-000, 21-476351-000, 22-479602-000
EER 91-EF-03
Review of the Ultimate Heat Sink Performance with Two
ESW Train Operation
EF-29
EF-HV-43 and 44 Maximum Flow After Pipe Break of Non-
Nuclear Piping Downstream
EG-M-046
Hydraulic Analysis of the Component Cooling Water System
for Break Flow Determination and Orifice Sizing
Calculations
J-K-EF01
Instrument Loop Uncertainty Estimate and Safety Related
Setpoints Determination for EF System Loops 43 and 44
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
73370, 10012698, 10012801
Drawings
M-12BG03
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical and Volume
Control System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
M-12EF01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water
System
M-12EF02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water
System
M-12EJ01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal
System
MI93-1310
Procedure Change Form
MI94-0067
Procedure Change Form
WCOP-02
Inservice Testing Program for Pumps, Valves, and Snubbers
WCOP-02
Inservice Testing Program for Pumps, Valves, and Snubbers
WCRE-34
Fourth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Basis Document
Miscellaneous
Work Request
WR 05795-93
AI 23P-001
Gas Intrusion Program
4A
Inservice Inspection Program
ASME Code Testing of Pumps and Valves
2A
Surveillance Testing
17A
OFN SG-003
Natural Events
STS BG-007B
ECCS Train B Void Monitoring and Venting
STS BG-100A
Centrifugal Charging System A Train Inservice Pump Test
STS EF-201A
ESW System Inservice Check Valve Test
2A
STS EF-210B
ESW System Inservice Check Valve Test
Procedures
STS EG-205B
Train B CCW to Radwaste Supply/Return Valves Inservice
Test
Work Orders
08-305903-000, 20-461452-000, 20-466523-000,
21-468408-000, 21-469314-000, 21-472076-000,
21-472328-000, 22-477904-000
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10014124, 10014211, 10014212
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
10014624
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline
Miscellaneous
WCNOC-163
Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI) Basis
Document
RCS Unidentified Leak Rate Monitoring Program
Procedures
STS BB-006
RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10013103, 10013647, 10013905, 10013906, 10013907,
10013926, 10014177, 10014319
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
10015826
BAP-21-0465
Breach Authorization Permit
Miscellaneous
E-1F9910
Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Area Analysis
AP 10-103
Fire Protection Impairment Control
Procedures
AP 10-104
Breach Authorization
39A
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10012017, 10013136, 10013176, 10014298
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10012377, 10012988, 10013471, 10015825
Procedures
EDI 23M-050
Equipment Evaluation for Maintenance Rule
13, 14