IR 05000482/2020001
| ML20125A233 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/2020 |
| From: | O'Keefe N NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B |
| To: | Reasoner C Wolf Creek |
| References | |
| IR 2020001 | |
| Download: ML20125A233 (26) | |
Text
May 7, 2020
SUBJECT:
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2020001
Dear Mr. Reasoner:
On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station. On April 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station. III
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Neil F. O'Keefe, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000482 License No. NPF-42
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000482
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0008
Licensee:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Facility:
Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location:
Burlington, KS 66839
Inspection Dates:
January 1 to March 31, 2020
Inspectors:
D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector
B. Baca, Health Physicist
J. O'Donnell, Senior Health Physicist
J. Vera, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Neil F. O'Keefe, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch B
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Identify Low Electrolyte Level in Battery Cells Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2020001-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.13 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, when the licensee failed to identify a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, maintenance technicians discussed low electrolyte level in safety-related cells from battery bank NK014 with the battery system engineer, but this condition was not entered into the corrective action program or corrected.
The inspector subsequently identified two cells with electrolyte level below the Technical Specification Category B limits, which necessitated entry into a Technical Specification action statement to promptly correct this degraded condition.
Inappropriate Use of Informal Processes to Complete Maintenance that Rendered Safety-Related Equipment Inoperable Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2020001-02 Open/Closed
[P.5] -
Operating Experience 71111.13 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified when the licensee failed to properly preplan and perform maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, a non-licensed operator identified a burned-out light bulb on a local status panel associated with the safety-related train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump and replaced the bulb. The bulb broke, creating a short circuit that blew fuses that rendered the pump and the associated emergency diesel generator inoperable. The inspectors determined that this maintenance activity was performed informally using skill-of-the-craft despite the existence of operating experience at Wolf Creek indicating that this type of activity was known to render associated safety-related equipment inoperable.
Failure to Control the Work Hours of Maintenance Supervisors Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2020001-03 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71111.20 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 26.205(d) when the licensee failed to control work hours as required by the licensees Procedure AP 13-001, Fatigue Management, Revision 20D. Specifically, four maintenance department supervisors had instances of excessive turnover and 35 instances when work hour requirements were exceeded were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On February 1, 2020, the licensee conducted a Technical Specification-required shutdown to repair containment purge valve leakage. The reactor was restarted on February 3, 2020. The unit returned to approximately rated thermal power on February 4, 2020. On March 6, 2020, an instrument air tubing leak caused a main turbine seal steam supply valve to fail open, causing reactor power to increase 2 MWth above 100 percent before operators reduced power to 96 percent. The reactor was returned to approximately rated thermal power on March 7, 2020, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. From January 1 - March 19, 2020, the inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; and observed risk-significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management elected to postpone and reschedule the inspection to a later date.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Safety injection train B on January 14, 2020
- (2) Safety injection train A on January 28, 2020
- (3) Essential service water train B on February 11, 2020
- (4) Containment spray train A on March 11, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Auxiliary building, elevation 1,974 feet, fire area A-7, on January 23, 2020
- (2) Auxiliary building, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas A-13 and A-15, on January 30, 2020
- (3) Auxiliary building, elevation 1,988 feet, fire area A-1, on February 19, 2020
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on February 5, 2020, and an announced fire drill on February 21, 2020.
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Cable Degradation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:
- (1) Essential service water train A electrical cabling manhole MHE2A on January 20, 2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during control rod operability testing and parking operations and during a power reduction associated with planned main turbine valve cycle testing on January 16 and 23, 2020, respectively.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator training activities that included reinforcement of communication standards, team dynamic standards, response to control room habitability issues, and self-contained breathing apparatus training on February 24, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Essential service water train B heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system recirculation damper failure on January 28, 2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;
- (1) Planned diving activities associated with circulating water bay C and temporary fire pump testing on January 6, 2020
- (2) Unplanned and emergent work activities associated with loss of control power to the emergency diesel generator train B fuel oil transfer pump on February 3, 2020
- (3) Planned turbine driven auxiliary feedwater system maintenance on February 25, 2020
- (4) Unplanned inoperability associated with NK14 and NK11 battery cells beginning on February 25, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Main steam isolation bypass valve status panel indication in alarm and possible loss of control power to the valve on January 6, 2020
- (2) Emergency exhaust auxiliary building differential pressure testing failure on January 17, 2020
- (3) Containment cooler train B drip pan misalignment on February 2, 2020
- (4) Containment cooler train C failed surge test on February 10, 2020
- (5) Steam generator blowdown isolation valve spurious closure on February 19, 2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Safety injection pump A discharge accumulator injection isolation valve following planned maintenance on January 14, 2020
- (2) Emergency diesel generator train B following planned maintenance on January 29, 2020
- (3) Component cooling water train A valves following planned maintenance on February 10, 2010
- (4) Containment cooler train C following planned maintenance on February 10, 2020
- (5) Component cooling water pump B following planned maintenance on March 3, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated applicable portions of activities associated with an unplanned outage on February 1 and 2, 2020.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) STN IC-460, "Channel Calibration Spray Additive Tank Level Loop ENLPL0016,"
Revision 7C, and STN IC-461, "Channel Calibration Spray Additive Tank Level Loop ENLPL0017," Revision 9, on January 2, 2020
- (2) STS EN-100A, "Containment Spray Pump A Inservice Pump Test," Revision 30, on February 13, 2020
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) STS BG-100B, "Centrifugal Charging System B Train Inservice Test," Revision 54, on January 8, 2020
- (2) STS AL-210A, "[Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater] Pump A Inservice Check Valve Test," Revision 14, and STS EF-210A, "[Essential Service Water] System Inservice Check Valve Test," Revision 12A, on February 18, 2020
- (3) STS EF-100A, "[Essential Service Water] System Inservice Pump A & [Essential Service Water] A Check Valve Test," Revision 48, on February 19, 2020
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) STS PE-015, Containment Purge Valve Leakage Test, Revision 23, on February 13,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material.
- (1) Observed licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area
- (2) Observed workers exiting the radiologically controlled area and worker responses to contamination alarms
- (3) Observed radiation protection technician surveying items for return to the tool room
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.
- (1) Observed operators moving irradiated items in the spent fuel pool under Radiation Work Permit 200016
- (2) Observed radiological controls for High Radiation Areas/Locked High Radiation Areas during walk downs of the auxiliary and radwaste buildings under Radiation Work Permit 200001
- (3) Observed the survey and release of seventeen barrels of potentially contaminated charcoal from the radiologically controlled area under Radiation Work Permit 200007
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:
- (1) Auxiliary building, volume control tank room 1313, elevation 2,000 feet
- (2) Radwaste building, high level storage room 7235, elevation 2,000 feet
- (3) Containment personnel hatch room 1507A
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:
- (1) Control room emergency ventilation system
- (2) Fuel building ventilation
Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:
- (1) Hot machine shop spray booth
- (2) Hot machine shop test stand
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices. The inspectors observed one full face mask fit test and six donning and doffing practicals. The inspectors also reviewed seven workers' medical, training, and fit testing information.
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses. The inspectors also reviewed the independent testing for grade D breathing air quality of the air filling station and the maintenance and testing records for the air filling station.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2019, through December 30, 2019
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2019, through December 30, 2019
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Steam generator 3 steam outlet flow unexpected decrease as documented in the corrective action program on January 13, 2020
- (2) Emergency diesel generator train B fuel oil transfer pump loss of control power on February 3, 2020
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's entry into a Technical Specification-required shutdown and outage on February 1, 2020, to correct excessive leakage from the containment purge system during testing.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated the licensees response to an instrument air tubing leak, which caused a main turbine seal steam supply valve to fail open, causing reactor power to increase 2 MWth above 100 percent before operators reduced power to 96 percent on March 6,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Identify Low Electrolyte Levels in Battery Cells Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2020001-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.13 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, when the licensee failed to identify a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, maintenance technicians discussed low electrolyte level in safety-related cells from battery bank NK014 with the battery system engineer, but this condition was not entered into the corrective action program or corrected.
The inspector subsequently identified two cells with electrolyte level below the Technical Specification Category B limits, which necessitated entry into a Technical Specification action statement to promptly correct this degraded condition.
Description:
On February 25, 2020, the inspectors were walking down protected equipment during turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater train maintenance, which included walking down the safety-related 125 Vdc battery banks. The inspectors identified that cells 20 and 42 (non-pilot cells) associated with battery bank NK014 had electrolyte level at and below the minimum level indication mark. Technical Specification 3.8.6 requires battery cell parameters for train A and train B batteries to be within limits of Table 3.8.6-1, Battery Cell Parameters Requirements. Table 3.8.6-1 specifies that electrolyte level for each connected cell (non-pilot cells) shall be greater than the minimum level indication mark.
The inspectors promptly informed the shift manager and noted that other cells were also very close to the minimum level indication mark. At 8:42 p.m., on February 25, 2020, the licensee entered Technical Specification 3.8.6, Condition A. The required actions of Technical Specification 3.8.6 were completed on February 26, 2020, after battery cell parameters were restored to within limits.
As a result of the inspectors questions, on February 27, 2020, the licensee also documented Condition Reports 140916 and 140931, which identified an additional cell on safety-related battery bank NK011 below Technical Specification 3.8.6 electrolyte level requirements and numerous other cells near the lower limit on safety-related battery bank NK012.
The inspectors reviewed the results of the weekly battery surveillance, Procedure STS MT-018, Weekly Inspection of 125 VDC Lead-Calcium Batteries, Revision 23A, for battery NK014 performed on February 24, 2020. The inspectors determined that the procedure required checking parameters for the four pilot cells, but was vague with respect to how to check for abnormal conditions in the rest of the battery. Additionally, licensee interviews determined that maintenance technicians had noted that the electrolyte level in a number of cells was close to the low limit and called the system engineer to report this, but neither the technicians, nor the system engineer, wrote a condition report.
Corrective Actions: The licensee completed the required actions of Technical Specification 3.8.6, which included verifying pilot cell electrolyte level and float voltage within limits, verifying each cell met the Category C limits of Table 3.8.6-1, and restoring battery cell parameters to within Category A and B limits. Additionally, the licensee performed extent of condition walkdowns and maintenance activities and documented an Operations Department Essential Required Reading associated with operator walkdowns of protected equipment.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 140860, 140916, 140931, and 141859
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The station failed to adequately monitor, identify in the corrective action program, and correct safety-related battery parameters approaching and exceeding technical specification limits in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, which was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, normal evaporation in battery cells along with the failure to identify the low electrolyte level in battery cells could lead to the battery becoming inoperable.
Significance: Using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued December 20, 2019, the inspectors determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, and component; does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of a single train technical specification system or a multi-train technical specification system; does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or a probabilistic risk assessment system and/or function for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, maintenance and engineering department personnel did not demonstrate an understanding of the decision-making process and use it consistently. As a result, the licensee failed to identify and correct a degrading condition before battery cells electrolyte levels fell below Technical Specification required ranges [H.13].
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10 CFR Part 50), Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, from February 24-25, 2020, the licensee failed to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, until the inspectors reported the condition to the shift manager, the licensee failed to identify and promptly enter into the corrective action program low electrolyte levels in safety-related 125 Vdc battery NK014 cells, which was a condition adverse to quality.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Inappropriate Use of Informal Processes to Complete Maintenance that Rendered Safety-Related Equipment Inoperable Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2020001-02 Open/Closed
[P.5] -
Operating Experience 71111.13 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified when the licensee failed to properly preplan and perform maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, a non-licensed operator identified a burned-out light bulb on a local status panel associated with the safety-related train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump and replaced the bulb. The bulb broke, creating a short circuit that blew fuses that rendered the pump and the associated emergency diesel generator inoperable. The inspectors determined that this maintenance activity was performed informally using skill-of-the-craft despite the existence of operating experience at Wolf Creek indicating that this type of activity was known to render associated safety-related equipment inoperable.
Description:
On February 3, 2020, a non-licensed operator noted a burnt-out bulb associated with the train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump motor. In the process of removing the bulb, the glass shattered, and the fuel oil transfer pump control circuitry was shorted, which blew the breakers fuses. Control room operators declared the train B emergency diesel generator inoperable. Following troubleshooting, the blown fuses were replaced, and the train B emergency diesel generator was returned to service about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes later.
The inspectors noted that the non-licensed operator replaced the bulb with the panel energized and without entering the maintenance process. In subsequent discussions with the inspectors, the operations manager, current and former shift managers, and licensed and non-licensed reactor operators indicated that they expected non-licensed operators to replace light bulbs as part of their rounds without the use of a work order.
The inspectors interviewed multiple licensed and non-licensed operators and noted that the only instruction or procedure operators referenced for changing out light bulbs was Work Order 19-451293-000, which is an open-ended preventive maintenance work order for changing out safety-related panel indicating light bulbs in the control room and applicable remote panels as required. The inspectors noted that Work Order 19-451293-000 did not identify any safety-related functions that may be adversely impacted by light bulb changes or identify precautions to be used when safety-related functions may be impacted. This work order was not utilized for changing out the subject bulb.
Interviewees also indicated that normal station practice is for non-licensed operators to replace burnt out local light bulbs unless the non-licensed operator notes a reason to elevate the light bulb changeout activity. The licensee noted that AP 21-001, Conduct of Operations, Revision 84, Attachment C, General Inspection Items, describes non-licensed operator tour activities, and includes validating that local control panel lights are not burned out and that replacement bulbs are correct size and style. However, Procedure AP 21-001 does not include instructions, precautions, or limitations to be used when safety-related functions may be impacted when light bulbs are changed. The inspectors noted that this guidance appeared to rely on the individual operator to recognize the risk and act appropriately to mitigate that risk rather than properly preplanning those light bulb replacements that involved risk.
The inspectors and the licensees equipment performance evaluation also noted substantial internal and external operating experience existed related to light bulb changes impacting safety-related equipment. However, this operating experience was not used to ensure this activity was properly preplanned and implemented or to identify equipment where a safety-related function could be adversely affected. For example, the licensee did not provide instructions or establish precautions or limitations that might help minimize the chances of breaking the bulb or blowing the fuse(s), nor were the susceptible components identified and required to have light bulb changes properly preplanned.
Corrective Actions: The licensee performed troubleshooting, replaced the blown fuses, restored the emergency diesel generator transfer pump to service, and declared the train B emergency diesel generator operable on February 3, 2020. On February 6, 2020, the licensee issued an essential required reading entry and an Operations News to operators directing that light bulbs associated with the main feedwater isolation valve hand switches, main steam isolation valve hand switches, and condenser vacuum breaker valve hand switches not be changed until additional evaluation is conducted.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 140271, 140353, 140866, and 141862
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to properly preplan maintenance that could affect safety-related equipment in accordance with Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was a performance deficiency. Specifically, a non-licensed operator changed a light bulb relying on skill-of-the-craft that rendered the train B fuel oil transfer pump and emergency diesel generator inoperable despite having internal and industry operating experience that indicated that replacement of certain incandescent light bulbs can cause blown fuses that render associated safety-related equipment inoperable.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the lack of appropriate preplanning and procedures led to an emergency diesel generator being inoperable for a period of approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes.
Significance: Using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued December 20, 2019, the inspectors determined this finding: is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, and component; does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of a single train technical specification system or a multi-train technical specification system; does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or a probabilistic risk assessment system and/or function for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.5 - Operating Experience: The organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. Specifically, internal and external operating experience associated with light bulb changeouts impacting safety-related equipment was not effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs. As a result, the train B emergency diesel generator was inoperable for a period of approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes [P.5].
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Section 9.a of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, which requires, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
Contrary to the above, on February 3, 2020, maintenance that could affect the performance of safety-related equipment was not properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the safety-related train B emergency diesel generator and emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump functions were affected by a light bulb changeout completed by relying on skill-of-the-craft rather than with appropriate work instructions to prevent an unintended functional impact. As a result, an emergency diesel generator became inoperable for a period of approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Control the Work Hours of Maintenance of Supervisors Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2020001-03 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71111.20 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 26.205(d) when the licensee failed to control work hours as required by the licensees Procedure AP 13-001, Fatigue Management, Revision 20D. Specifically, four maintenance department supervisors had instances of excessive turnover and 35 instances when work hour requirements were exceeded were identified.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed a sample of reported work hours by operations, maintenance, and fire brigade personnel following the fall 2019 refueling outage. In response to the inspectors questions, the licensee identified a temporary maintenance supervisor that had greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of turnover per day on three separate occasions. The individual and individuals supervisor were coached, and the licensee performed an extent-of-condition review of all maintenance personnel. Three additional maintenance supervisors with excessive turnovergreater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of turnover on any given daywere also identified.
Of these three, two of the supervisors also had one instance of greater than 26 work hours in any 48-hour period. One of these two supervisors also had 33 instances when the supervisors work hours exceeded 72 work hours in any 7-day period.
The licensee determined that the supervisor with 33 instances when work hours exceeded 72 work hours in any 7-day period was heavily loaded with lifting/rigging duties and did not understand how working on administrative tasks following turnover impacted work hour limits. The supervisors activities were described as heavily loaded and overloaded in a performance assessment worksheet and during inspector interviews of the maintenance manager. The licensee also determined that the individuals supervisor did not identify the issue during timesheet review.
Corrective Actions: The licensee performed extent-of-condition reviews of maintenance supervisor work records, the supervisors were coached, and performance assessment worksheets were completed. Additionally, the licensee documented Condition Report 141125 to capture lessons learned associated with the fatigue rule compliance issues.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 139349, 139867,141125, 141623, 141625, and 141860
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to ensure that four maintenance supervisors understood and implemented work hour controls in accordance with 10 CFR 26.205(d) during the refueling outage, which was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, exceeding the allowable work hours increased the likelihood of human error and associated potential to adversely impact equipment maintenance such that these systems would not be available, reliable, and capable to respond to an initiating event and prevent undesirable consequences.
Significance: Using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued December 20, 2019, the inspectors determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system and component (SSC); does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of a single train technical specification system or a multi-train technical specification system; does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or a probabilistic risk assessment system and/or function for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Specifically, managers did not ensure there were sufficient qualified personnel to maintain work hours within working hour guidelines during all modes of operation. As a result, maintenance supervisor work hours were not controlled adequately [H.1].
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 26.205(d) requires, in part, that licensees control the work hours of individuals who are subject to the section.
- (1) Except as permitted in § 26.207, licensees shall ensure that any individual's work hours do not exceed the following limits:
- (ii) 26 work hours in any 48-hour period, and (iii) 72 work hours in any 7-day period.
Contrary to the above, from September 28-November 4, 2019, the licensee failed to control the work hours of individuals who are subject to the section. Specifically, the licensee did not control the work hours of two maintenance supervisors that directed the maintenance of SSCs, and the individuals exceeded 26 work hours in any 48-hour period and one of the individuals exceeded 72 work hours in any 7-day period on 33 occasions. As a result, the likelihood of human error and associated potential to adversely impact equipment maintenance increased the likelihood these systems would not be available, reliable, and capable to respond to an initiating event and prevent undesirable consequences.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On March 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 139871, 139875, 139876, 139877
Drawings
M-12EM01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
Drawings
M-12EM02
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
Drawings
M-12EM03
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System Test Line
Procedures
Control of Locked Component Status
77A
Procedures
Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment
38A
Procedures
CKL EF-120
Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup
55A
Procedures
CKL EM-120
Safety Injection System Lineup Checklists
Procedures
CKL EN-120
Containment Spray System Lineup
15A
Procedures
STN LV-001
Weekly Audit of Selected Accessible Locked Valves
Procedures
STS EN-100B
Containment Spray Pump B Inservice Pump Test
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 139621, 140393, 140394, 140395, 140396, 140397, 140767,
140768
Drawings
E-1F3301
Fire Detection/Protection System Control Bldg., Diesel Gen.
Bldg. & Comm. Corr. - El. 2000'-0" & El. 2016' -0"
Miscellaneous
APF 10-105
Fire Drill Scenario and Critique Report: 2000' B Diesel Room
2/05/2020
Miscellaneous
APF 21-001-02
Control Room Turnover Checklist: On-Coming CRS/WC
SRO/RO/BOP Review
2/05/2020
Miscellaneous
CPIP 18 - Fire
Leader
Coffey County Emergency Management Office Contingency
Plan Implementing Procedure No. 18
Miscellaneous
K02-001A
Shift Manager Relief Checklist: Shift Composition
01/30/2020
Procedures
AI 10-001
Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory, Maintenance and
Cleaning
13A
Procedures
AI 10-107
Care & Maintenance of Firefighting Personal Protective
Ensembles
2A
Procedures
AI 21-017
Timed Fire Protection Actions Validation
Procedures
ALR KC-888
Fire Protection Panel KC-008 Alarm Response
30A
Procedures
AP 10-105
Fire Protection Training and Drills
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
AP 10-106
Fire Preplans
18A
Procedures
AP 10-106
Fire Preplans
Drawings
C-K209
E.S.W.S. Electrical Manholes Plan Sections & Details
71111.11Q Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 140845
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
APF 30E-003-05
Lesson Plan Cover Sheet: Control Room Not Habitable Lab
(OFN RP-013)
01/09/2020
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
APF 30E-003-05
Lesson Plan Coversheet: Crew Team Building
2/03/2020
71111.11Q Procedures
AI 30B-005
Development and Conduct of Simulator Activities for
Licensed Operator Training
71111.11Q Procedures
Superintendent Operations Support (Training) Duties and
Responsibilities
71111.11Q Procedures
AP 21-001
Conduct of Operations
83A
71111.11Q Procedures
Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program
71111.11Q Procedures
Systematic Approach to Training
71111.11Q Procedures
STN SF-001
Control Rod Parking
21A
71111.11Q Procedures
STS AC-001
Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test
71111.11Q Procedures
STS SF-001
Control and Shutdown Rod Operability Verification
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 125201, 125518, 127109, 129174, 129920, 136650, 140135
Drawings
M-K2GD01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water
Pump House HVAC
Procedures
Shift Engineer/Shift Technical Advisor Requalification
Training Program
Work Orders
07-293274-000, 07-293274-001, 07-293274-002,
18-434809-000, 18-445407-016, 18-445407-017,
18-445407-020, 19-451102-000, 19-451102-002
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 7324, 18933, 24748, 130400, 140353, 140844, 140852,
140855, 140860, 140866, 140872, 140881, 140902, 140916,
140931, 2006-003632
Drawings
E-13JE01A
Schematic Diagram Emergency Fuel Oil Transfer Pump
PJE01B
Miscellaneous
APF 22C-003-01
On-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment:
Schedule Week 2020-0109
2/06/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
AI 05-023
Conduct of Engineering
Procedures
AI 22C-013
Protected Equipment Program
Procedures
MPAC Work Request/Work Order Process Controls
Procedures
On-Line Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment
Procedures
Risk Management and Contingency Planning
Procedures
STS MT-018
Weekly Inspection of 125 VDC Lead-Calcium Batteries
23A
Procedures
SYS FP-280
Temporary Diesel Fire Pump Installation and Removal
Procedures
SYS FP-290
Temporary Diesel Fire Pump Operations
Work Orders
19-451293-000, 19-456699-000, 20-457980-000,
20-460333-000, 20-460333-001, 20-460333-002,
20-460333-003
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 102840, 140460, 140475, 140729, 140736, 140775
Drawings
M-12BM01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Steam Generator
Blowdown System
Drawings
M-12BM02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Steam Generator
Blowdown System
Drawings
M-12BM03
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Steam Generator
Blowdown System
Drawings
M-12BM04
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Steam Generator
Blowdown System
Miscellaneous
Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department
Radiochemistry Lab: BM-SJ144 - Effluent Liquid
Miscellaneous
APF 29B-003-01
Surveillance Test Routing Sheet: Steam Generator
Blowdown Inservice Valve Test - STS BM-205
2/11/2019
Miscellaneous
M-620-00060C
Instruction Manual for Drip Pan/Drain Modification
Addendum
W09
Procedures
MGE EOOP-05
Insulation Resistance Testing
Procedures
STN EG-205A
Component Cooling Water System Valve Test
Procedures
STS PE-004
Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test
17A
Work Orders
14-386658-000, 16-411494-000, 19-449158-000,
20-457566-000, 20-457962-000
Procedures
MGE LT-099
MOV Diagnostic Testing
Procedures
RNM C-0563
Auxiliary Time Delay Relay
9A
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
STN EG-205A
Component Cooling Water System Valve Test
Procedures
STN EM-201
Safety Injection System Valve Test
Procedures
STS GN-001
CTMT Cooling Fans Operability Test
Procedures
STS KJ-005B
Manual/Auto Start, Sync, & Loading of EDG NE02
65A
Procedures
STS PE-007
Periodic Verification of Motor Operated Valves
5A
Procedures
SYS GN-120
Containment Cooling System Operation
Work Orders
19-449132-000, 19-449504-003, 19-450076-000,
19-450076-001, 19-452140-048
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 139314, 139349, 139867, 140214, 140215, 140216, 140250,
140251, 141125
Procedures
AP 21-001
Conduct of Operations
83A
Procedures
GEN 00-003
Hot Standby to Minimum Load
103
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 139631, 140703, 140708, 140712
Drawings
E-K3GD01
Schematic Diagram [Essential Service Water] Pump Room
Supply Fan A
Drawings
M-12GT01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Containment Purge
Systems HVAC
Procedures
MPM EF-002
[Essential Service Water] Traveling Water Screens
Preventive Maintenance Activity
Procedures
STN IC-460
Channel Calibration Spray Additive Tank Level Loop
ENLPL0016
7C
Procedures
STN IC-461
Channel Calibration Spray Additive Tank Level Loop
ENLPL0017
Procedures
STS AL-210A
MDAFW Pump A Inservice Check Valve Test
Procedures
STS BG-100B
Centrifugal Charging System B Train Inservice Pump Test
Procedures
STS EF-100A
[Essential Service Water] System Inservice Pump A &
[Essential Service Water] System A Check Valve Test
Procedures
STS EF-210A
ESW System Inservice Check Valve Test
2A
Procedures
STS EN-100A
Containment Spray Pump A Inservice Pump Test
Procedures
STS PE-015
Containment Purge Valve Leakage Test
Procedures
STS PE-261
LLRT Valve Lineup for Penetration 161
Procedures
SYS EF-200
Operation of the [Essential Service Water] System
44A
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
SYS EG-201
Transferring Supply of CCW Service Loop and CCW Train
Shutdown
Procedures
SYS EN-120
Spray Additive Tank Operations
Work Orders
19-452834-000, 19-452895-000
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 136814, 137016, 137107, 137327, 137866, 137868, 138044,
138067, 138396, 138625, 138668, 138806, 139132, 139488,
139761, 139938, 140048, 140667, 140670
Miscellaneous
Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) Door Checks
7B
Miscellaneous
Non-Fuel Items in Spent Fuel Pool
2/17/2020
Procedures
Radiation Protection Manual
18A
Procedures
Access to Locked High or Very High Radiation Areas
Procedures
Radiation Worker Guidelines
Procedures
RPP 01-105
Radiation Protection Organization, Responsibilities and
Code of Conduct
Procedures
RPP 02-105
49A
Procedures
RPP 02-210
Radiation Survey Methods
49B
Procedures
RPP 02-215
Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas
34B
Procedures
RPP 02-405
RCA Access Control
Radiation
Surveys
19-0164
Airborne Radioactivity Record
09/23/2019
Radiation
Surveys
19-0483
Airborne Radioactivity Record
10/19/2019
Radiation
Surveys
M-20191027-3
Lower Cavity: Rinse and Run, Blind Flange, Bird Cages
10/27/2019
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
191101
Under RV Cavity Seal Ring Inspections (Annulus) Access.
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
191102
Incore Tunnel Inspections, Maintenance & Decon. This RWP
to be used for all entries into Incore Tunnel.
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
2220
Insulation removal and replacement for outage activities.
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
196000
Lower Refueling Cavity Pre & Post Flooding Maintenance
Activities
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
196031
RV Head Lift, Transfer, & Set.
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
200001
Radiation Protection Activities
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
200007
I&C and Electrical Maintenance Activities
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
200008
NRC Access to the RCA for Surveillances and Inspections
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
200016
Routine SFP Activities & New Fuel Receipt
Miscellaneous
19-03566
Trace Analytics, LLC - Certificate of Analysis NFPA 1989-
2019(N)
2/05/2019
Miscellaneous
19-15057
Trace Analytics, LLC - Certificate of Analysis NFPA 1989-
2019(N)
05/10/2019
Miscellaneous
19-28277
Trace Analytics, LLC - Certificate of Analysis NFPA 1989-
2019(N)
08/20/2019
Miscellaneous
19-40085
Trace Analytics, LLC - Certificate of Analysis NFPA 1989-
2019(N)
2/12/2019
Miscellaneous
Posi3 USB Test
Results -
Functional Test
115S1542005578-FO-11, 115S1543010751-FO-15,
115S1543010757-FO-19, 115S1543010756-FO-31,
115S1543010758-FO-16, 115S1543010759-FR-04,
115S1543010761-FO-03, 115S1543010762-FO-01,
115S1543010764-FO-10, 115S1543010765-F,
115S1543010766-FO-18, 115S1543010768-FO-24,
115S1543010769-SO-30, 115S1543010779-FO-26,
115S1543010787-FO-22, 115S1543010804-FO-17,
115S1543010805-FO-21, 115S1543015307-CR-04,
115S1543015308-CR-02, 115S1543015309-CR-06,
115S1543015315-CR-03, 115S1543015331-CR-12,
115S1543016861-CR-13, 115S1546088357-01,
115S1547008391-03, 115S1547008384-02
08/15/2019
Miscellaneous
Posi3 USB Test
Results -
Functional Test
115S1534010749-FR-08, 115S1536136471-CR-01,
115S1536141987-FO-23, 115S1543010748-FO-14,
115S1543010750-FO-12, 115S1543010752-FO-09,
115S1543010753-FO-27, 115S1543010755-FO-20,
115S1543010767-FR-02, 115S1543010770-FO-06,
08/14/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
115S1543010774-FO-28, 115S1543010775-FO-29,
115S1543010778-FO-25, 115S1543010782-FO-05,
115S1543015313-CR-11, 115S1543015316-CR-05,
115S1543015329-CR-08, 115S1543016859-CR-09,
115S1543016860-CR-10, 115S154003219-02,
115S154003221-01
Procedures
AI 10-004
Air Fill Station Operation
Procedures
Radiation Protection Manual
18A
Procedures
Respiratory Protection Program at Wolf Creek
Procedures
RPP 02-210
Radiation Survey Methods
49B
Procedures
RPP 02-215
Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas
34B
Procedures
RPP 03-310
Respiratory Protection Equipment
Procedures
RPP 05-205
AMS-4 Operation
Procedures
RPP 05-920
Use of Vacuum Cleaners and Portable HEPA Ventilation
Units in the RCA
6A
Procedures
STS PE-001
Visual Inspection of Nuclear Safety Related Filter/Adsorber
Units
8A
Procedures
STS PE-002
Charcoal Adsorbent Sampling for Nuclear Safety Related
Units
Procedures
STS PE-005
HEPA Filter In-Place Leak Test Safety Related Units
Procedures
STS PE-006
Charcoal Adsorber In-Place Leak Test Safety Related Units
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 141111
Procedures
STN IC-417F
Calibration of Steam Flow Transmitters
Work Orders
19-456165-000
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports 140565, 140866, 140894, 140899, 141138