IR 05000482/2021002
ML21218A173 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Wolf Creek ![]() |
Issue date: | 08/09/2021 |
From: | O'Keefe N NRC/RGN-IV/DNMS/NMSB-B |
To: | Reasoner C Wolf Creek |
References | |
EA-21-037 IR 2021002 | |
Preceding documents: |
|
Download: ML21218A173 (36) | |
Text
August 9, 2021
SUBJECT:
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2021002
Dear Mr. Reasoner:
On June 30, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station. On July 8, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, one Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report (EA-21-037). We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Neil F. O'Keefe, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000482 License No. NPF-42
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000482
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-002-0037
Licensee:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
Facility:
Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location:
Burlington, KS
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2021 to June 30, 2021
Inspectors:
C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Vera, Resident Inspector
R. Alexander, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
D. Antonangeli, Health Physicist
J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector
N. Greene, Senior Health Physicist
J. Melfi, Project Engineer
D. Proulx, Senior Project Engineer
Approved By:
Neil F. O'Keefe, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch B
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Perform Required Inservice Testing of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Pneumatically (Air) Operated Outlet and Bypass Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2021002-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.22 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.8, Inservice Testing Program, for the failure to perform the required inservice testing in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants Code for trains A and B residual heat removal heat exchanger air operated outlet and bypass valves. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform required testing of the four valves due to incorrectly classifying them as passive valves.
Failure to Maintain Quality Records Complete and Accurate in All Material Respects Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000482/2021002-02 Open/Closed EA-21-037 Not Applicable 71152 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 50.9(a), for the licensees failure to ensure information required by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions was maintained complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain complete and accurate information when documenting the completion of Procedure SYS EJ-110A,
A Residual Heat Removal Train Fill and Vent, Revision 3A.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period shutdown for Refueling Outage 24, which started on March 25, 2021. On May 12, 2021, the unit commenced reactor startup, the reactor was made critical, and an automatic reactor trip occurred due to low water level in steam generator C. This condition was caused by feedwater flow oscillations with the new steam generator water level control system in automatic. On May 14, 2021, the unit commenced reactor startup, and the reactor was made critical. The unit was returned to full power on May 19, 2021. On June 5, 2021, the unit was shut down to begin Forced Outage 25-01 to repair a main generator stator water cooling leak. On June 11, 2021, the unit commence reactor startup, and the reactor was made critical. The unit was returned to full power on June 13, 2021, where it remained for the rest of the reporting period
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.
As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk-significant activities; and completed onsite portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and onsite. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated that flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding on June 9, 2021.
- Essential service water pump house roof leak
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Train B engineering safety feature switchgear (NB02) offsite power alignment during transformer XNB02 replacement on April 5, 2021
- (2) Alternate spent fuel pool cooling on April 13, 2021
- (3) Train A shutdown cooling on April 27, 2021
- (4) Condensate system valve lineup after water hammer on May 8, 2021
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Trains A and B residual heat removal heat exchanger room, fire areas A-9, A-10, on May 28, 2021
- (2) Residual heat removal pump room A, fire area A-2, on May 28, 2021
- (3) Residual heat removal pump room B, fire area A-4, on June 2, 2021
- (4) South piping penetration room B, fire area A-25, on June 2, 2021
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 22-May 4, 2021:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.
1. Ultrasonic Examination
a. Auxiliary Turbines, FC-01-S021-C 4" Pipe To 4" Elbow b. Main Steam, AB-01-S018-L 6" Outlet on MS Header to 6" flange c. Main Steam, AB-01-S046-L 6" Outlet on MS Header to 6" flange d. Main Steam, AB-01-S049-D / 10" Elbow to 10" x 8" reducer e. Main Steam, AB-01-S020-B / 10" Pipe to 10" Elbow f. Main Steam, AB-01-F028-A / 28" Pipe to Torsional Restraint g. Main Steam, AB-01-F026 / 28" Main Steam Header to Flued Head (P-3)
2. Dye Penetrant Examination
a. Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Nozzle 42 J Groove Weld
3. Visual Examination
a. Reactor Coolant System, BB-02-H001, Piping Support b. Containment Cooling, M-620-003-10, Piping Support c. Containment Cooling, M-620-003-10, Piping Integral Attachment d. Containment Cooling, M-620-003-9, Piping Support e. Main Steam, AE-04-C002, Piping Support
The weld package for the following welds was reviewed:
- Essential Service Water Welds FW-1, FW-2, FW-3, FW-4, FW-5
03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities.
1. The inspector reviewed the reactor vessel head inspection report. The
inspection covered 78 RVCH penetrations and the RVCH Vent line penetration.
a. Ultrasonic examination techniques were used for the 78 CRDM penetrations.
b. The Eddy Current examination method was used for the vent line penetration.
c. The bore and shell side of the vent line was examined using two Eddy Current testing techniques to satisfy the requirement of N-729-6 as modified by 10 CFR 50.55(a).
2. RVCH, CRDM Nozzle 42 J Groove Weld had a relevant indication that was
determined to not be surface connected by dye penetrant examination. The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation per ASME Code requirements which determined that the indication was acceptable for continued service.
03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities.
The inspector reviewed the following boric acid evaluations and associated condition reports:
===00138275, 00141260, 00141261, 00141262, 00141894, 00143090, 00143408, 10000076
03.01.d - Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator (SG) Tube Examination Activities.
The inspector reviewed the report for the primary side inspection which consisted of the following:
- Bobbin probe examination of 100 percent of the tubes in all four SGs
- Full length except for Rows 1 and 2, which were inspected with the bobbin from tube end to tube support plate (TSP) #7 on both Hot Leg and Cold Leg
- Sludge height mapping in all four SGs
- All prior indications with Percent Through Wall evaluations located at Anti Vibration Bars and baffle plates in each SG
- X-PROBE examination of 100 percent of the hot leg Top of Tube Sheet
+3 inches/-15.21 inches of tubes in all four SGs
- 100 percent hot leg bulges/over-expansions within Top of Tube Sheet -15.21 inches (H* region) in all four SGs
- Additional examinations with Rotating Pancake/+POINT Probes were completed as follows:
o examinations of 50 percent of Row 1 and Row 2 U-bends o mid-range +POINT probe examination o +POINT probe examination of dents and dings in each SG
- Visual inspections of all plugs, including factory installed plugs, or their replacements from the primary side
- Visual inspection of primary channel head cladding, divider plate, stub runner and associated welds
Problem Identification and Resolution review of Inservice items The inspector evaluated a sample of 31 condition reports associated with inservice inspection activities. No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
=
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Cycle 25 reactor startup and low power physics testing, on May 12, 2021.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated just-in-time training for reactor startup from Refueling Outage 24 on May 3, 2021.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated just-in-time training for reactor startup following the May 12, 2021 reactor trip on May 13, 2021.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Containment isolation fire protection check valve repeat local leak rate testing failures on June 7, 2021
- (2) Residual heat removal system maintenance effectiveness review on June 30, 2021
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Train B engineering safety features transformer (XNB02) planned replacement on April 5, 2021
- (2) Defueled window plant risk assessment with reactor core offloaded to spent fuel pool, on April 26, 2021
- (3) Train B containment spray room watertight door emergent work activities on June 9, 2021
- (4) Train A essential service water and emergency diesel generator planned maintenance activities, on June 23, 2021
- (5) Train B engineering safety transformer planned activity to shift load tap changer to automatic, on June 24, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Emergency diesel generator A valve cover housing locating hole/casting broken off past operability determination, on May 11, 2021
- (2) Non-safety service water supporting operability of residual heat removal and component cooling water in Mode 5 and 6 operability determination, on May 13, 2021
- (3) Emergency diesel generator when in parallel with offsite operability determination on June 15, 2021
- (4) Train A engineered safety switchgear room 1 missile door past operability determination on June 24, 2021
- (5) Containment aluminum limit exceeded operability determination on June 30, 2021
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Train B engineering safety features transformer (XNB02) replacement on April 19, 2021
- (2) Pressurizer power operated relief valve block valve A wiring modification on May 17, 2021
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Train A emergency diesel generator maintenance window, on April 20, 2021
- (2) Train A residual heat removal maintenance activities on April 21, 2021
- (3) As-left local leak rate test for reactor coolant pump seal water return containment isolation penetration 24 valve BGHV8112 following maintenance activities, on April 21, 2021
- (4) Essential service water orifice and pipe replacement, on April 28, 2021
- (5) Train B emergency diesel generator maintenance window, on May 3, 2021
- (6) Train B engineering safety feature transformer (XNB02) replacement, on May 4, 2021
- (7) Train B residual heat removal maintenance activities on May 8, 2021 (8)7300 ovation digital control upgrade, on May 15, 2021
- (9) Containment coating and liner repair post maintenance testing, on June 4, 2021
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 24 activities from March 25-May 15, 2021.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated Forced Outage 25-01 activities from June 5-12, 2021.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Train A essential service water post loss-of-coolant accident flow balance, on May 4, 2021
- (2) Train B integrated diesel generator and safeguards actuation test, on May 18, 2021
- (3) Train A and B Engineering safety feature 4160 volt bus undervoltage and degraded voltage surveillance testing, on June 10, 2021
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Trains A and B residual heat removal temperature control valves and heat exchanger bypass valves, on May 14, 2021
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Fire protection to containment check valve KCV0478, on May 18, 2021
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following Emergency Action Level and/or Emergency Plan changes, of which summaries of the changes were submitted to the NRC on April 8, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21098A054):
- AP 06-002, Wolf Creek Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Revision 21A (effective 3/11/2021)
- EPP 06-012, Dose Assessment, Revision 17A (effective 3/11/2021)
This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Emergency preparedness drill involving a complete loss of core exit thermocouple indication, loss of control room indications, and loss-of-coolant accident on June 15,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas.
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee radiological protection related instructions to plant workers.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material.
- (1) Observed licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA).
- (2) Observed workers exiting the RCA during Refueling Outage 24.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.
- (1) Electric Discharge Machining work under the reactor head on Radiation Work Permits (RWP) 213057. This work had Alpha Level II, High Contamination, and Locked High Radiation Area controls.
- (2) Peening work under the reactor head on RWP 213057. This work had Alpha Level II, High Contamination, and Locked High Radiation Area controls.
- (3) Fuel offload and movement under RWP 216060. This work involved the movement of highly irradiated fuel within the pools and work in contaminated areas.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:
(1)2000' Containment Bio-Shield Incore Tunnel Access (2)2000' Radwaste High Level Storage - Room 7235 (3)2000' Radwaste Low Level Storage - Room 7225
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (4 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed as low as reasonably achievable practices and radiological work controls. The inspectors reviewed the following activities:
- (1) RWP 211000, "RP Rover Coverage RF24," Orange Risk, radiological protection outage activities inside the RCA, when the plant is de-fueled
- (2) RWP 213057, "Under Rx Head Entries," Red Risk, under reactor head entries for electrical discharge machining (EDM) and peening activities
- (3) RWP 216000, "Lower Refueling Cavity Pre & Post Flooding Maintenance Activities,"
Orange Risk, general maintenance activities in the containment building and lower/upper levels of the reactor cavity
- (4) RWP 216060, "Refueling Team Activities," Yellow Risk, fuel movement and related support activities
Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during:
(1)
- Reactor vessel under-head work to decontaminate equipment and conduct EDM activities within a High Contamination Area, using multipack dosimetry and respirators
- Fuel movement using the crane and bridge to move fuel assemblies
- Shipment activities for an LSA-II, dry active waste, radioactive material shipment, 21R10, being prepared for transport to Energy Solutions
- General worker activity within containment on multiple tasks in both Radiation Area and High Radiation Area zones
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &
Transportation
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors observed that a shipment containing radioactive material was prepared according to requirements.
- Shipment 21R10, a dry active waste shipment being prepared for transport to Energy Solutions, April 6, 2021
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
- (1) Shipment 21R10, UN3321, Radioactive Material, Low Specific Activity (LSA-II),7 - Two metal boxes of dry active waste, April 6,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 03.06)===
- (1) April 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 03.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 03.10) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 03.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 03.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) December 31, 2019, through March 31, 2021
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 03.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) December 31, 2019, through March 31, 2021
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in operator and nuclear professional fundamentals that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue on June 23, 2021.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Residual heat removal drain line valve misposition corrective actions and extent of condition review on June 24, 2021
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a reactor trip due to steam generator oscillation in automatic control and the licensees response on May 12,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Perform Required Inservice Testing of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Pneumatically (Air) Operated Outlet and Bypass Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000482/2021002-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.22 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.8, Inservice Testing Program, for the failure to perform the required inservice testing in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (ASME OM) Code for trains A and B residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger air operated outlet and bypass valves. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform required inservice surveillance testing of the four pneumatically (air)operated valves due to incorrectly classifying them as passive valves.
Description:
As part of a surveillance testing sample, the inspectors questioned why several RHR system valves were being excluded from certain inservice testing. The inspectors reviewed the licensees licensing and design basis, Procedure GEN 00-006, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown," Revision 104; Basis Document WCRE-34, Fourth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Basis Document, Revision 11; and the ASME OM Code to determine the inservice testing requirements for the trains A and B RHR heat exchanger air operated outlet (EJHCV0606 and EJHCV0607) and bypass (EJHCV0606 and EJHCV0607) valves. From this review the inspectors identified the following:
- Technical Specification (TS) and Bases 3.5.3, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) - Shutdown, requires one train of ECCS shall be operable in Mode 4. This includes a note stating a RHR subsystem may be considered operable during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if the system is capable of being manually realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. This allowance for manual realignment is to respond to a limited design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
o Active valves: Valves that are required to change position to accomplish a specific function in shutting down a reactor to the safe shutdown condition, maintaining the safe shutdown condition, or mitigating the consequences of an accident.
o Passive valves: Valves that maintain position and are not required to change position to accomplish the required function(s) in shutting down a reactor to the safe shutdown condition, maintaining the safe shutdown condition, or mitigating the consequences of an accident.
o Section ISTC-5132 required, in part, that active pneumatically operated active valves shall have strokes times measured when exercised on a quarterly basis in accordance with Section ISTC-3500.
- WCRE-34 states that valves EJHCV0606, EJHCV0607, EJFCV0618, and EJFCV0619 are ASME Code Class 2 components that were classified by the licensee as passive valves because the valves are not required to change position to perform their safety function in the event of a LOCA. Specifically, EJHCV0606 and EJHCV0607 are required to be open during a LOCA and are normally open, and EJFCV0618 and EJFCV0619 are required to be closed during LOCA and are normally closed. Additionally, the valves are required during normal RHR operation to control reactor coolant system (RCS) cool down rate and this function was not required for safe shutdown or accident mitigation. Therefore, the licensee concluded the only ASME OM Code inservice testing that was required was position indication test.
- During a normal plant cool down, Procedure GEN 00-006 places the first train of RHR into shutdown cooling mode of operation when RCS temperature is less than 350 degrees Fahrenheit and places the second train of RHR into shutdown cooling mode of operation when RCS temperature is less than 225 degrees Fahrenheit.
- This repositions valves EJHCV0606, EJHCV0607, EJFCV0618, and EJFCV0619 out of their accident positions.
The inspectors noted that because the four valves in question would have to be repositioned manually to their accident positions in the event of a LOCA in MODE 4, the valves should have been classified as active valves in accordance with ASME OM Code, contrary to the WCRE-34 classification.
Based on the information above, the inspectors determined the licensee failed to correctly classify trains A and B RHR heat exchanger air operated outlet and bypass valves as active valves and perform required inservice surveillance testing in accordance with the ASME OM Code. The inspectors questioned the classification and testing requirements of RHR heat exchange air operated outlet and bypass in accordance with WCRE-34. In response, the licensee initiated Condition Report 10004589 and concluded they failed to classify trains A and B RHR heat exchanger air operated outlet and bypass valves as active valves and perform required inservice surveillance testing in accordance with the ASME OM Code.
Corrective Actions: The licensee reclassified the trains A and B RHR heat exchanger air operated outlet and bypass valves as active valves and placed trains A and B RHR heat exchanger and bypass air operated valves into the inservice testing program in accordance with the ASME OM Code.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report 10004589
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to perform required inservice surveillance testing for trains A and B RHR heat exchanger air operated outlet and bypass valves in accordance with the ASME OM Code was a performance deficiency. The failure to test the valves in accordance with the ASME OM Code was due to the licensee failing to classify them as active valves.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern because degraded valve performance could go undetected without periodic testing and trending in accordance with the ASME OM Code. This finding was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix G, Shutdown Safety SDP because the valves were only out of their accident positions when the plant was shut down and meeting the entry conditions for RHR to be in operation. The finding:
- (1) was not a design or qualification deficiency,
- (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function,
- (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time,
- (4) did not represent loss of one or more non-TS trains of equipment during shutdown designated as risk-significant for greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />,
- (5) did not degrade RCS level indication and/or core exit thermal couples,
- (6) did not involve an open cold leg penetration, and
- (7) did not involve a seismic, flooding, internal fire, or severe weather initiating event. Specifically, the valves in question had never been incapable of being manually repositioned during shutdown conditions. As a result, the Appendix G revision dated 03/01/2020, directed the inspectors to go to IMC 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria.
A senior reactor analyst was requested to review the characterization of this finding. In consultation with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation lead for Appendix G, and utilizing previous revisions of Appendix G, the analyst determined that an administrative error had been incorporated into the 03/01/2020 revision. Inspectors should have been directed to screen out this finding and only been directed to Appendix M if the finding was related to external event initiators. Therefore, the analyst determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because the subject valves were always capable of performing their risk-significant function.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to the finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance because the mis-classification had occurred in 2004.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.5.8, Inservice Testing Program, requires inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components. The program shall include testing frequencies applicable to the ASME OM Code and applicable Addenda. The Wolf Creek testing basis document was developed to meet the requirements of ASME OM Code 2004 edition with Addenda through OMb-2006, for all valve inservice testing. Section ISTC-5132 required, in part, active pneumatically operated active valves shall have strokes times measured when exercised in accordance with Section ISTC-3500.
Contrary to the above, since 2004, the licensee failed to test four active pneumatically operated ASME OM Code Class 2 valves in accordance with the ASME OM Code Section ISTC-5132. Specifically, the licensee failed to measure strokes times for trains A and B RHR heat exchanger outlet and bypass valves in accordance with Section ISTC-5132.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Maintain Quality Records Complete and Accurate in All Material Respects Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000482/2021002-02 Open/Closed EA-21-037 Not Applicable 71152 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 50.9(a) (10 CFR 50.9(a)), for the licensees failure to maintain information required by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain complete and accurate information when documenting the completion of Procedure SYS EJ-110A, A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Train Fill and Vent, Revision 3A.
Description:
On November 8, 2019, inspectors performed a system alignment walkdown of train A RHR and identified that valve EJV-0244, RHR A to accumulator injection vent isolation valve, was not in the required position of closed in accordance with Procedure CKL EJ-120, RHR System Lineup, Revision 46. The inspectors informed control room operators of the mispositioned valve.
Upon further investigation, the licensee determined that operators failed to restore valve EJV-0244 to its required closed position when performing Procedure SYS EJ-110A on October 15, 2019. However, the non-licensed operators assigned as initial positioner and independent verifier each initialed in the official copy of the procedure to indicate that they had performed their specified actions, documenting that valve EJV-0244 was in the closed position in Procedure SYS EJ-110A. When completed, this became a quality record in accordance with Procedure AP 15A-003, step 4.12.1, because the procedure furnished documentary evidence of an activity affecting quality as described in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
The inspectors interviewed both operators and were told that since their part of the procedure was performed in a contaminated high radiation area, the normal requirement to perform a peer check on each component was waived by the control room and that they had decided to alternate who acted as positioner and who acted as independent verifier. However, the inspectors noted that the documented completed procedure only showed the initials of one performer and one independent verifier performing their assigned functions, and that all valves had been verified in the correct as-left position.
Based on these discrepancies, the NRC entered its process to determine if there was willfulness associated with the mispositioning of EJV-0244 and the documentation of it in the closed position. On June 24, 2021, the NRC completed its review of the misposition of valve EJV-0244 and decided that the mispositioning of the valve was not the result of willful actions because the licensee had not established and enforced clear standards for performing valve lineups in contaminated high radiation areas and both operators believed the way they performed the procedure was an acceptable practice. However, the NRC concluded that both operators caused the licensee to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a)because their initials in Procedure SYS EJ-110A had caused this quality record to be incomplete and inaccurate in material respects in that the record did not reflect the actions each person took and the record showed the operators had closed a valve when they had failed to close it.
Corrective Actions: The licensee immediately closed the valve when informed by the inspectors, issued a required reading in the control room, and issued a Human Performance Flash for the entire station to discuss this issue. The licensee also performed a valve position verification on the rest of the system to determine the extent of condition.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report 138420
Performance Assessment:
The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency. Specifically, the operators failed to follow procedure SYS EJ-110A which resulted in a valve being out of position. The safety significance of having one of two vent valves in the same vent line in the incorrect (open) position was minor.
Enforcement:
The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.9(a) requires, in part, that information required by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, Quality Assurance Records, requires, in part, that sufficient records shall be maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality.
Procedure AP 15A-003, Records, Revision 15, a quality related procedure, Step 4.12.1 defined, in part, that quality records include those which furnish documentary evidence of activities affecting quality. A document shall be considered a quality record when it has been completed, authenticated, and has had the review required by the procedure governing that document.
Contrary to the above, on October 15, 2019, the licensee failed to maintain information required by the Commissions regulations to be complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain complete and accurate information concerning the position of valve EJV-0244 and the actions of each non-licensed operator when documenting the completion of Procedure SYS EJ-110A, A RHR Train Fill and Vent, Revision 3A, which is a quality record in accordance with the licensees Procedure AP 15A-003, Records, Revision 15.
Severity: The inspectors determined the significance of this violation was a Severity Level IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The determination involved considerations of the potential for willfulness, the impact to the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory oversight functions, and the potential for safety consequences as a result of the valve being out of position, as well as an examination of the applicable corrective actions which were being implemented at the time as a result of a Confirmatory Order related to a previous violation which involved inaccurate information. Section 6.9.c.1 of the Enforcement Policy states that a Severity Level III violation involves inaccurate or incomplete information being provided or maintained and which, if accurately provided or maintained, would likely have caused the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake a substantial further inquiry. The violation did not reach this level of impact, resulting in a determination of Severity Level IV.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review 71152 The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program, performance indicators, system health reports, and other documentation available to help identify performance trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors verified that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address the identified adverse trends. The inspectors did not review any cross-cutting themes because none existed at the site.
To verify the licensee was taking corrective actions to address identified adverse trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue, the inspectors noted an apparent negative trend in nuclear fundamentals that resulted in human performance errors and reviewed the corrective action program documentation from January to June 2021.
Selected examples of these events that illustrate the performance included:
- Condition Report (CR) 10001954: During an emergency plan drill, the full extent of the scenario was not communicated during emergency response organization turnover which resulted in complications later in the drill.
- This was evaluated as a minor issue because it was identified by the licensee during emergency plan drill critiques.
- CR 10001955: During an emergency plan drill, the protective action recommendation performed by the emergency offsite facility was not communicated to the technical support center radiation coordinator. This was evaluated as a minor issue because it was identified by the licensee during emergency plan drill critiques.
- CR 10001964: During an emergency plan drill, the licensed operators in the simulator misdiagnosed a steam line break in containment as a loss-of-coolant accident. This resulted in declaring the incorrect emergency action level during the drill. Specifically, ineffective teamwork regarding sharing of plant information and failure to validate plant condition resulted in the misclassification. This was evaluated as a minor issue because it was identified by the licensee during emergency plan drill critiques.
- CR 10002936: Supplemental personnel failed to follow licensee procedures for adjusting the open torque switch of the train A excess letdown motor operated valve. Specifically, supplemental personnel failed to properly secure the closed torque switch adjustment which allowed it to slide to maximum torque setting. The licensees procedural guidance does not require adjustment of the closed torque switch when adjusting the open torque switch. This resulted in an overthrust condition occurring during motor operated valve post-maintenance testing. This was evaluated as a minor issue because it was identified and corrected during maintenance-in-progress.
o CR 10003119: Operations personnel operated a breaker under local control tag prior to maintenance activities being completed by maintenance personnel, creating the potential of an industrial safety incident. This was evaluated as a minor issue because it was identified and corrected during maintenance-in-progress.
- CR 10004909: During Refueling Outage 24, the licensee identified a negative trend in human performance behaviors in the area of radiation safety. Specifically, individuals and leadership failed to validate qualifications in the area of response checking instrumentation prior to performing/assigning work activities; licensee personnel entered a posted contaminated area without the proper protective clothing.
- CR 10005580: Operations personnel did not fully open condensate pump C recirculation valve during clearance order restoration. This was evaluated as a minor issue because it did not result in a plant transient.
The inspectors noted that the licensee identified several other trends associated with nuclear fundamentals behaviors, including:
- CR 10004622: A negative trend in maintenance human performance behaviors during Refueling Outage 24. This condition report was closed to CR 10001895.
- CR 10001895: The maintenance department has had seven human performance issues since the beginning of calendar year 2021. In response, the licensee performed a common cause evaluation and developed a corrective action plan to address human performance issues in the maintenance department.
- CR 10006689: The licensee initiated a trend condition report for the potential adverse trend in human performance in the operations department during Operations Cycle 24 and Refueling Outage 24.
The inspectors performed an independent assessment of the continued human performance issues at the station. As part of the independent assessment, the inspectors reviewed the above condition reports, observed licensee activities and drills, and reviewed the requirements of station procedures: AP 21-001, Conduct of Operations, Revision 85, APF 21-001-23, Crew Operator Fundamentals - Think, Revision 0, and APF 21-001-24, Your Role in Operator Fundamentals - Think, Revision 0. From this independent assessment, the inspectors identified the key attributes that have contributed to the potential adverse trend in nuclear fundamentals. The inspectors identified these key attributes also contributed to the potential adverse trend in nuclear professional fundamentals. These key attributes include:
- Field Presence: Leaders are commonly seen in working areas of the plant observing, coaching, and reinforcing standards and expectations. Deviations form standards and expectations are corrected promptly. Examples include:
o Senior managers ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors and supplemental personnel, such that nuclear safety is supported.
o Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities.
o Managers and supervisors practice visible leadership in the field and during safety significant evolutions by placing eyes on the problem, coaching, mentoring, reinforcing standards and reinforcing positive decision-making practices and behaviors.
o Managers encourage informal leaders to model safe behaviors and high standards of accountability.
o Managers and supervisors discuss their observations in detail with the group they observe and provide useful feedback about how to improve individual performance.
- Role: Licensee personnel fulfill their assigned role and do not assume another team role without a proper turnover, and individuals maintain their assigned role as a supervisor or oversight role for assigned activities. Specifically, the inspectors observed a shift manager not maintaining their supervisor oversight role prior to train B integrated diesel generator and safeguards actuation test. The inspectors questioned if the shift manager was maintaining their oversight role and prior to performing the test another licensed operator was assigned the task to be performed by the shift manager. Therefore, restoring the shift manager to their supervisor oversight role.
- Turnover: Licensee personnel provide thorough and accurate turnovers when relieved during or at the completion of a duty shift.
- Communications: Licensee personnel provide thorough and accurate communications and do not assume another team member received the message when communicating relevant information.
- Work/Risk Management: Licensee personnel manage scheduled activities and emergent work to avoid simultaneous evolutions that have the potential to overload control room personnel and hamper plant monitoring.
- Validation: Licensee personnel validate expected system response to equipment operation, status changes, verifying component alignment and status in the field are as discussed during pre-job briefs.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 8, 2021, the inspectors presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 4, 2021, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. J.
McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 21, 2021, the inspectors presented the emergency plan changes inspection results to Mr. M. Dekat, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 8, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
EC-M-004
EC-M-006
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10003231, 10003435, 10003941, 10004330, 10005362,
10005368, 10005370, 10005371, 10005378, 10005400,
10005401, 10005402, 10005403, 10005445, 10005498,
10005580
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10004053, 10005016
Drawings
KD-7496
One Line Diagram
M-12EC01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling
and Clean-up System
M-12EC02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling
and Clean-up System
Engineering
Changes
DCP 15241
Procedures
CKL AD-120
Condensate System Valve and Breaker Lineup
CKL EA-120
Service Water System Normal Lineup
OFN EC-046
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Malfunctions
SYS EC-202
Staging Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
SYS NB-202
Transferring NB02 Power Sources
Work Orders
19-455381-008
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Report
10004914
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
10005721
Miscellaneous
E-1F9905
Fire Hazard Analysis
FPIP-21-0114
Fire protection Impairment Permit, FPIP-21-0114
Procedures
ALR KC-888
Fire Protection Panel KC-008 Alarm Response
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AP 10-103
Fire Protection Impairment Control
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
138495, 138509, 138583, 138662, 138927, 138950,
139291, 139411, 139771, 140114, 140115, 140266,
140447, 140731, 141259, 141260, 141261, 141262,
141756, 141172, 142175, 143771, 141894, 143983,
143090, 143091, 143408, 146719, 10001194, 10001282,
10001337
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10004298, 10003526, 10003031, 10003217, 10003935,
10004298, 10004299, 10004300, 10004301, 10004411,
10004430, 10004447, 10004484, 10004832
Miscellaneous
51-9323938-000
Scan Plan
Wolf Creek Unit 1, RVCH Penetration Inspection Plan and
Coverage Assessment for Spring Outage (RF24)
08/12/2020
RV Nozzle DM Weld and RVCH Nozzle Examination
Tools
Procedures
54-ISI-413-004
Multi Frequency Eddy Current Two Row Pancake Coil
Array Probe Examination of the Inside Diameter Surfaces
of Weld Nozzles and Weld Regions
54-ISI-460-007
Multi-Frequency Eddy Current Orthogonal Coil Array
Probe Examination of Nozzle Welds and Regions
54-ISI-494-003
Multi-Frequency Eddy Current Array Probe Examination of
Vent Line and RVLIS Nozzle Bores
54-ISI-603-011
Automated Ultrasonic Examination of RPV Closure Head
Penetrations Containing Thermal Sleeves
54-ISI-604-016
Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Open Tube RPV
Closure Head Penetrations
54-ISI-874-000
Automated Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of Large
Diameter Austenitic and Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds
from the Inside Surface for Detection and Length Sizing
54-ISI-875-001
Automated Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of Large
Diameter Austenitic and Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds
from the Inside Surface for Depth Sizing
54-ISI-878-000
Inside Surface Profiling of Piping Welds with Immersion
Phased Array
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
54-PT-200-023
Color Contrast Solvent Removable Liquid Penetrant
Examination of Components
AI 16F-001
Evaluation of Boric Acid Leakage
AI 16F-002
Boric Acid Leakage Management
Boric Acid Evaluation Form
ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Program
20A
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
10A
CWD-1
Control of Welding Documentation
GWS-ASME
ASME General Welding Standard
LMT-08-PDI-UT-1
Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds
LMT-08-PDI-UT-2
Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds
LMT-08-PDI-UT-8
Ultrasonic Examination of Weld Overlaid Austenitic Piping
LMT-08-UT-004
Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds and Adjacent
Base Metal > 2.0 in Thickness
LMT-08-UT-005
Examination of Vessel Welds and Adjacent Base Metal
Less Than or Equal to 2in. in Thickness
QCP 20-501
Visible Dye Penetrant Examination
10A
QCP-20-520
Pressure Test Examination
11A
QCP-20-540
VT-1 Visual Examination
QCP-20-541
VT-3 Visual Examination
STN PE-040G
Transient Event Walkdown
STS PE-040E
RPV Head Visual Inspection
WCRE-30
Inservice Inspection Program Plan Wolf Creek Generating
Station Interval
WCRE-31
Risk Informed Inservice Inspection (RI-ISI) Interval 4 Basis
Document
WDI-PJF-1318261-
FSR-001
Reactor Vessel Head Inspection Final Examination Report
Fall 2016
WPS1-0101C01
GTAW/SMAW of P1 Materials, As-welded and PWHT
Below the Lower Transformation Temperature
WPS1-0101S01
SMAW of P1 Materials, As-Welded and PWHT Below the
Lower Transformation Temperature
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
WPS1-0101T01
GTAW of P1 Materials, As-Welded and PWHT Below the
Lower Transformation Temperature
Work Orders
19-132489, 19-132498, 19-132499, 19-132500,
19-132501, 20-133335, 20-134532, 20-458110,
20-458111, 20-458117, 20-458120, 20-458123
71111.11Q Procedures
GEN 00-003
Hot Standby to Minimum Load
105
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
68937, 82058, 93525, 109252, 136305, 136751, 143140,
146615, 144423, 10002827, 10002847, 10003062,
10003064, 10003065, 10003067, 10003068, 10003377,
10003381, 10003385, 10003430, 10003431, 10003513,
10003781, 10004093, 10004142, 10004368, 10004626,
10004871, 10004997, 10005111, 10005506, 10005555,
10005649, 10005691, 10005986
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
10006945
Drawings
M-12GT01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Containment Purge
Systems HVAC
M-12SJ04
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Nuclear Sampling
System
Procedures
Program Plan for Containment Leakage Measurement
STS PE-015
Containment Purge Valve Leakage Testing
STS PE-043A
RHR Train A Normal Operation Pressure Test
STS PE-055W
Pressure Test of Nuclear Sample Piping through P-64,
P-69, P-93
STS PE-193
LLRT Valve Lineup for Penetration 93
STS PE-260
LLRT Valve Lineup for Penetration 160
Work Orders
18-440459-027, 20-461977-000, 20-462001-018-001,
20-462061-015, 20-462202-000, 20-462469-000,
20-462470-000, 20-467078-000, 21-470660-000,
21-470660-001
Calculations
FL-01
Flooding of the Auxiliary Building, 1974 Elevation
3, CN001
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10006484, 10006524, 10006963, 10006980, 10006979
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
10003948
Drawings
M-12EM01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Injection System
Miscellaneous
WCRE-35
Boundary Matrix
Procedures
AFP 22B-001-09
Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled
AI 22C-013
Protected Equipment Program
23A
ALR 00-022D
XNB02 XFMR Trouble
ALR 832
ESF XFMR XNB02
AP 10-104
Breach Authorization
Safety Function Determination Program
Equipment Out-of-Service Control
Outage Risk Management
FL-02
Flooding of Auxiliary Building Rooms 1107-1114
OFN AF-025
Unit Limitations
OFN EC-046
Fuel Cooling and Cleanup Malfunctions
OFN EF-033
Loss of Essential Service Water
OFN NB-030
Loss of AC Emergency Bus NB01 (NB02)
OFN NB-034
Loss of All AC Power - Shutdown Conditions
OFN NB-035
Loss of Off-Site Power Restoration
OFN SG-003
Natural Events
SYS NB-204
XNB02 Load Tap Changer Operation
Work Orders
21-471095-000, 21-471095-001, 21-471095-002,
21-471065-003
Calculations
JE-321
Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank and Day Tank
Volumes and Level Limits
CN002
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10002336, 10002516, 2007-000368, 2007-01786,
10002936, 10003075, 10003078, 10003080, 10003081,
10003082, 10003083, 10003084, 10003086, 10003087,
10003088, 10002716, 10002997, 10002951, 10003004,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
10004347, 10004738, 10002863
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
10004540
Drawings
KD-7496
One Line Diagram
Miscellaneous
APF 26A-003
OFN NB-042
OE 23563
Diesel Generator Response While Connected to Electrical
Grid (River Bend)
11/06/2006
Procedures
ALR 00-013A
13-48 BKR Trip
ALR 00-013C
- 1 SWGR BKR Trip
ALR 00-018B
NB01 Bus UV
ALR 00-020B
8A
ALR 00-023B
9A
CFR 50.59 Reviews
Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment
GS-M-004
Hydrogen Generation Analysis
GS-M-005
Aluminum in Containment
MPM M018Q-01
Standby Diesel Generator Inspection
OFN EF-033
Loss of Essential Service Water
OFN NB-042
Loss of Offsite Power to NB01 (NB02) with EDG
Paralleled
STS KJ-005A
Manual/Auto Start, SYNC and Loading of EDG NE01
STS KJ-011A
ENG NE01 24 Hour Run
37, 38
SYS NB-200
Transferring XNB01 Supply Between SL7 and #7
Transformer
Work Orders
20-458833-000, 20-459341-000, 20-461998-000
Calculations
H-08
System NB Protective Relays
CN013
XX-E-006
AC System Analysis
CN012
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
145078, 115454, 141849, 10003596, 10003607,
10003884, 10003838, 10004039, 10004040, 10004098,
10004104, 10003002, 10003106, 10003334, 10003523,
10003525, 10003731, 10004244, 10004269, 10004689,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
10004707, 10004795, 10004743, 10004943, 10004944,
10005046, 10005054, 10005063
Drawings
E-11NB02
Lower Medium Voltage SYS Class 1E 4.16 kV Single Line
Meter and Relay Diagram
Engineering
Changes
DCP 012513
ESF XNB02 Transformer Replacement
DECP 020191
BBHV8000A PFSSD Modification to Address IN 92-18
Miscellaneous
E-074
Technical Specification for Station Service and ESF
Transformers for the SNUPPS
Procedures
STS KJ-001B
Integrated D/G and Safeguards Actuation Test - Train B
Work Orders
17-431679-045, 17-432820-003, 17-434046-147,
17-431679-107, 19-448431-000, 21-21-470398-000,
21-470398-002, 21-470398-005, 21-470398-016,
21-470398-019, 21-470398-004, 21-470398-023
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
138052, 1142175, 10002884, 10002951, 10002976,
10003004, 10003008, 10003020, 10003075, 10003078,
10003080, 10003081, 10003082, 10003083, 10003084,
10003086, 10003087, 10003088, 10003700, 10004273,
10004289, 10004335, 10004339, 10004345, 10004347,
10004348, 10004349, 10004367, 10004374, 10004414,
10004418, 10004426, 10004448, 10004460, 10004461,
10004471, 10004482, 10004538, 10004579, 10004595,
10004637, 10004656, 10004665, 10004745, 10004771,
10004839, 10004847, 10004852, 10005001, 10005157,
10005162, 10005118, 10005308, 10005445
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10004859
Drawings
E-025-00007 Sheet
138
RCP Seal Water Return Cont ISO, Valve BGHV8112
W13
Miscellaneous
Pictures
Pictures of Containment Sump Incore Liner, IMG-0814
thru IMG-0828
5/18/2021
Procedures
Post Maintenance Testing Development
20A
CKL ZL-005B
B EDG Operating Log
6A
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
MPM M018Q-01
Standby Diesel Generator Inspection
QCP-20-519
IWE/IWL Visual Examination
STN BG-205
CVCS Valve Test
STS KJ-005A
Manual/Auto Start, SYNC and Loading of EDG NE01
STS KJ-011B
DG NE02 24 Hour Run
STS PE-124
LLRT Valve Lineup for Penetration 24
11A
STS VT-001
Verification of OMN-1, MOV Exercise Requirements
SYS KJ-123
Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator A
Work Orders
17-423318-011, 17-423318-006,19-456002-000,
19-456002-001, 20-462176-009, 20-462176-020,
20-462176-021, 20-458883-000, 20-459341-000,
20-460185-000, 20-460185-004, 20-460185-006,
20-460185-007, 20-462203-000, 20-464855-001,
20-464275-000, 21-470332-000, 21-470643-000
Calculations
20517.01-C-001
Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) Simplified Head
Assembly (SHA) Drop Analysis
EC-M-006
Time to Boil the Spent Fuel Pool
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10002449, 10002793, 10003008, 10003957, 10004289,
10003700, 10004448, 10004836, 10004708, 10003414,
10002900, 10002896, 10005017, 10005074, 10005768,
10006327, 10006418, 10006499
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10003952, 10004150, 10005412, 10005451, 10005454,
10005468, 10005471, 10005472
Procedures
AI 15C-006
Management Oversight Requirements for Infrequently
Performed and Potentially Degrading Evolutions
ALR 00-068A
Loop 3 Delta T Hi Dev
FHP 02-007A
Reactor Vessel Closure Head Removal
FHP 02-016
Reactor Vessel Lower Internals Removal and Installation
Work Orders
20-459918-000, 21-470575-000
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
139748, 142288, 142515, 145234, 10000718, 10002827,
10004376, 10004428, 10004429, 10004626
Corrective Action
Condition Report
10004589, 10004974, 10005083, 10005092
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Drawings
M-12EC01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling
and Clean-up System
M-12EF01
Piping Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water
M-12EF02
Piping Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water
M-12EG01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling
Water
M-12KC02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Fire Protection
System
Engineering
Changes
CCP 011047
KCHV253 to KCV0427 Wet/Dry Boundary
Miscellaneous
WCRE-34
Fourth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Basis Document
Procedures
Procedure Use and Adherence
46D
Control of Locked Component Status
78A
Surveillance Testing
Program Plan for Containment Leakage Measurement
CKL KC-101
Fill and Vent Aux BLDG Fire Protection System Lineup
GEN 00-006
Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown
104
I-ENG-026
Local Leak Rate Test
STN EF-022A
ESW Train A Post-LOCA Flow Balance
STN PE-037A
ESW Train A Heat Exchanger Flow and DP Trending
20A
STN PE-056
ESW Emergency Make-Up Piping Flow Test
STS EJ-209A
Train A RHR System Inservice Valve Testing
STS EJ-209B
Train B RHR System Inservice Valve Test
STS IC-802A
4KV Loss of Voltage and Loss of Offsite Channel
Calibration Train A
STS IC-802B
4KV Loss of Voltage and Loss of Offsite Channel
Calibration Train B
STS IC-803A
4KV Undervoltage - Grid Degraded Voltage Channel
Calibration of NB01 Bus
STS IC-803B
4KV Undervoltage - Grid Degraded Voltage Channel
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calibration of NB02 Bus
STS IC-805A
Channel Calibration of NB01 Grid Degraded Voltage,
Time Delay Trip
STS IC-805B
Channel Calibration of NB02 Grid Degraded Voltage Time
Delay Trip
STS IC-806A
4KV Undervoltage-Loss of Voltage-Channel Calibration of
Second Time Delay Circuit NB01
STS IC-806B
4kV Undervoltage - Loss of Voltage - Channel Calibration
of 1 Second Time Delay Circuit NB02
STS KJ-001B
Integrated D/G and Safeguards Actuation Test - Train B
66A
STS PE-167
LLRT Valve Lineup for Penetration 67
16A
Work Orders
17-423318-006, 20-459444-000, 20-462076-000,
20-462475-000, 20-465658-000, 20-465658-02
Miscellaneous
E-Plan Screening - AP 06-002, Radiological Emergency
Response Plan (RERP), Rev. 21A
03/10/2021
Applicability Determination - EPP 06-012, Dose
Assessment, Rev. 17A
03/09/2021
E-Plan Screening - EPP 06-012, Dose Assessment, Rev.
17A
03/09/2021
Applicability Determination - AP 06-002, Radiological
Emergency Response Plan (RERP), Rev. 21A
03/10/2021
DRR 21-0215
Administrative Correction - EPP 06-012, Dose
Assessment, Rev. 17A
03/10/2021
DRR 21-0217
Administrative Correction - AP 06-002, Radiological
Emergency Response Plan (RERP), Rev. 21A
03/10/2021
Procedures
AI 26A-003
Regulatory Evaluations (Other than 10 CFR 50.59)
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
141288, 142229, 142589, 143807, 10003370
Miscellaneous
RWP Entries where entries had self-reading dosimeters
alarms
04/08/2021
Air samples with associated radiation work permits
03/08/2021
Procedures
Radiation Protection Manual
18A
Access to Locked High Radiation or Vey High Radiation
Areas
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Radiation Worker Guidelines
RPF 03-406-12
Radiation Survey Methods
49B
RPP 01-105
Radiation Protection Organization, Responsibilities and
Code of Conduct
RPP 02-105
RPP 02-205
Radiological Survey Frequency Requirements
RPP 02-215
Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas
34B
RPP 02-405
RCA Access Control
RPP 02-605
Control & Inventory of Radioactive Sources
RPP 03-205
DAC-Hour Tracking
17A
RPP 03-310
Respiratory Protection Equipment
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
RWP 194420
Scaffolding Work for Refueling Outage 23
RWP 213057
Under Reactor Head Entries
RWP 213220
Primary Side Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing
RWP 216060
Fuel Movement and Related Support Activities
Self-
Assessments
Audit Report # 20-
01-RP/PC
Quality Assurance Audit Report - QA Radiological
Protection & Process Control Programs Audit
03/02/2020
ALARA Plans
RWP 191000
Radiation Protection Rover Coverage RWP for
Pre-Outage and Outage Activities
RWP 194420
Scaffolding Erection / Removal Activities for RF23
RWP 194482
Remove/Install Canopy Seal Weld Clamps from the Top of
the Seismic Platform at CRDM Nozzles
RWP 211000
RP Rover Coverage RF24
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
131535, 136492, 136645, 136936, 137332, 140626,
140629, 140639, 140656, 140657, 140661, 00140676,
140679, 141232, 144502
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
10003581, 10003582, 10003584, 10003627, 10003659,
10003660
Miscellaneous
20 NRC Year End Dosimetry Report
03/11/2021
WOLF CREEK DOSE EXCELLENCE PLAN 2017 - 2021
03/26/2018
RF (Refueling Outage) 24 OCC Shift Update
04/08/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Refuel Outage 23 Report
01/27/2020
493285001
Radwaste Resin Nuclide Distribution Report
11/18/2019
503910001
Dry Active Waste Nuclide Distribution Report
01/30/2020
503910003
Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Filters Nuclide Distribution Report
01/29/2020
503910004
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Filters
01/29/2020
RPF 02-305-04
Personnel Contamination Log
04/08/2021
Procedures
Radiation Protection Manual
18A
ALARA Program
ALARA Committee
RWP Program
RPP 02-105
Radiation
Surveys
21-0167
Airborne Radioactivity Record: Post Under Reactor Head
04/06/2021
21-0172
Airborne Radioactivity Record: Containment 2047'
Elevation
04/07/2021
21-0180
Airborne Radioactivity Record: Containment 2047' Head
04/07/2021
M-20210405-5
Reactor Vessel Head on Head Stand
04/05/2021
M-20210408-3
Reactor Vessel on Head Stand
04/08/2021
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
RWP 213057
Under Rx Head Entries
RWP 216000
Lower Refueling Cavity Pre & Post Flooding Maintenance
Activities
RWP 216060
Refueling Team Activities
Self-
Assessments
20-01-RP/PC
Quality Assurance Audit Report: QA Radiological
Protection & Process Control Programs Audit
03/02/2020
Miscellaneous
RPF 07-123-16
Radioactive Shipment Checklist - UN 3321: Shipment
21R10
04/06/2021
Shipping Records 21R10
UN3321, Radioactive Material, Low Specific Activity
(LSA-II), 7 - Dry Active Waste
04/06/2021
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicators
WCNOC-163
Mitigating System Performance Index Basis Document
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
139748, 142288, 142515, 145234, 10000597, 10000718,
10000932, 10001087, 10003119, 10004489, 10004490,
10004535, 10004652, 10005580
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report
10005098
Miscellaneous
APF 21-001-23
Crew Operator Fundamentals - Think
APF 21-001-24
Your Role in Operator Fundamentals - Think
Procedures
AP 21-001
Conduct of Operations
MGE LT-008
Routine Electrical Limitorque Operator Maintenance
8B
MPM LT-001
Limitorque Operator Minor Maintenance, Lubrication, and
Inspection
Work Orders
18-442246-000
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10005735, 10005736, 10005737, 10005767, 10005953,
10005987, 10005991, 10005992, 10005994, 10006419
Drawings
M-744-00032
SNUPPS, Projects Functional Diagram Auxiliary
Feedwater Pumps Startup
W06
Procedures
AP 20-002
Post-Trip Review
EMG E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
EMG ES-02
Reactor Trip Response
GEN 00-003
Hot Standby to Minimum Load
105
GEN 00-005
Minimum Load to Hot Standby
SYS AL-120
Motor Driven or Turbine AFW Pump Operations
55A