IR 05000482/2020013
| ML20338A282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/2020 |
| From: | Anton Vegel NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Reasoner C Wolf Creek |
| References | |
| EA-18-037 IR 2020013 | |
| Download: ML20338A282 (14) | |
Text
December 3, 2020
SUBJECT:
WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2020013
Dear Mr. Reasoner:
On October 22, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a traditional enforcement follow-up inspection at your Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station and discussed the results of this inspection and the implementation of your corrective actions with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC performed this inspection using Inspection Procedure 92722, Follow-up Inspection for Any Severity Level I or II Traditional Enforcement Violation Or For Two Or More Severity Level III Traditional Enforcement Violations In A 12 Month Period, to follow up on your staffs actions in response to a Severity Level II Traditional Enforcement Violation. Specifically, on December 17, 2018, the NRC issued a Severity Level II Notice of Violation for a 10 CFR 50.7 violation associated with employment discrimination as a result of an individual raising safety concerns. This violation was issued as EA-18-037 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18333A043).
On September 8, 2020, you informed the NRC that your station was ready for the follow-up inspection (ADAMS Accession No. ML20252A192). This follow-up inspection was conducted to provide assurance that the causes of the violation were understood, to independently assess the extent of condition and the extent of cause for the violation, to provide assurance that corrective actions for the violation are sufficient to address the causes and to prevent recurrence, and to review your evaluation of the contribution of safety culture to the violation.
The NRC determined that your actions to address the violation were effective. No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection; therefore, EA-18-037 and the associated violation (VIO 05000482/2018202-01) are closed.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room and in the NRCs ADAMS, accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Please contact Neil OKeefe at 817-200-1141 with any questions you have regarding this letter.
Sincerely, Anton Digitally signed by Anton Vegel Vegel Date: 2020.12.03 11:57:05 -06'00'
Anton Vegel, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000482 License No. NPF-42
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000482 License Number: NPF-42 Report Number: 05000482/2020013 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-013-0008 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: Burlington, KS 66839 Inspection Dates: October 19 through October 22, 2020 Inspection Team: T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector S. Janicki, Resident Inspector M. Keefe-Forsythe, Safety Culture Program Coordinator Approved By: Neil OKeefe, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a follow-up supplemental inspection - Inspection Procedure 92722 at Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). The ROP is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/
oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue number Title Report Status Section NOV 05000482/2018202-01 EA-18-037, Wolf Creek Nuclear 4OA5 Closed Operating Corporation - Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - $232,000 (Office of Investigations Report No. 4-2017-020)
INSPECTION SCOPE
Inspections were conducted using the inspection procedure (IP) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Documents reviewed by the inspection team are listed in the documents reviewed section of this report. The inspection team used the Commissions rules and regulations as the criteria for determining compliance along with established licensee standards as the criteria for assessing licensee performance.
4OA5
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL 92722 - FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION FOR ANY SEVERITY LEVEL I OR II TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT VIOLATION OR FOR TWO OR MORE SEVERITY LEVEL III TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT VIOLATIONS IN A 12-MONTH PERIOD On December 17, 2018, the NRC issued a Severity Level II traditional enforcement Notice of Violation for a 10 CFR 50.7 violation associated with employment discrimination as a result of an individual raising safety concerns. This violation was issued as EA-18-037 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18333A043).
The inspectors reviewed the licensees cause evaluations and corrective actions associated with this violation in order to determine whether the licensees actions met the Inspection Procedure 92722 inspection objectives, which include:
- (1) providing assurance that the causes of the violation are understood;
- (2) independently assessing the extent of condition and the extent of cause for the violation;
- (3) providing assurance that licensee corrective actions for the violation are sufficient to address the causes and to prevent recurrence; and
- (4) reviewing the licensee's evaluation of the contribution of safety culture to violation.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment: Problem Identification 92722 Determine that the evaluation identifies who and under what conditions the issue(s)was identified.
The inspectors determined that the licensees evaluation of this violation clearly identified how the issue was identified. Specifically, the NRC identified this problem to the licensee.
The licensees cause evaluation determined that a lack of a formal program to review safety conscious work environment (SCWE) concerns and site leaderships failure to maintain a strong nuclear safety culture were the reasons why the licensee failed to identify the problem prior to the violation.
Determine that the evaluation documents how long the issue existed and prior opportunities for identification.
The inspectors determined that the evaluation properly considered prior opportunities for identification. Specifically, the evaluation identified indications of safety culture issues, including opportunities for identification as early as 2010, leading to the NRC Chilling Effect Letter, dated August 19, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13233A208).
The inspectors concluded that the licensee adequately identified how this issue was identified and for how long the issue existed.
Assessment: Cause, Extent of Condition and Extent of Cause Evaluations 92722 Determine that the SLI or SLII violation or the group of SLIII violations received an evaluation at an appropriate level of detail using a systematic method(s) to identify cause(s).
The inspectors determined that the violation received an evaluation at an appropriate level of detail using systematic root cause evaluation methods to identify the causes. The licensee used a combination of Event And Causal Factors charts, GAP Analysis, Why Tree Analysis, and Organizational and Programmatic worksheet. Using these methods, the licensee arrived at the following root and contributing causes:
Root
Cause:
- An integrated formal method did not exist that directs the required actions for investigating retaliation and chilled work environment claims.
Contributing
Cause:
- Wolf Creek Leadership did not have adequate focus on the nuclear safety culture program to create a healthy nuclear safety culture.
Although the evaluation performed an adequate extent of cause evaluation, the inspectors remained concerned with the extent of revisions related to Procedures AP 18A-001, Employee Concerns Program, Revision 8, and AI 13C-003, Personnel Action Review Board, Revision 8, as described in the extent of condition and cause determination below, to prevent this and similar issues from recurring.
Determine that the evaluation included a consideration of prior occurrences of similar problems.
The inspectors determined that the evaluation appropriately included prior occurrences of similar problems. For example, the licensee included an evaluation of why corrective actions in response to the NRC Chilling Effect Letter, dated August 19, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13233A208) and a recent SCWE cross-cutting theme were not effective in preventing the violation.
From August 2013 through 2018, the licensee documented numerous instances of similar problems related to the failure to maintain a healthy SCWE. These problems were documented in NRC letters and inspection reports, condition reports, third-party law firm reports, employee concerns program writeups, and various independent oversight assessment reports. The inspectors determined that the licensees corrective actions for this violation effectively addressed the gaps with corrective actions of prior occurrences of similar problems.
Determine that the evaluation addresses the extent of condition and the extent of cause of the problem.
The inspectors determined that the licensee performed an adequate evaluation of the extent of condition and the extent of causes. The licensee determined that the violation was related to a discrimination claim by a contract employee that was not thoroughly investigated by the station leadership. The extent of condition was, therefore, focused on whether other station personnel, both contract and licensee employees, had either been discriminated against for raising safety concerns or whether any similar claims had not been thoroughly investigated.
To address the extent of cause, the licensee evaluated other processes that could be used to identify concerns related to equipment, security, and emergency response to ensure that they also contained requirements to investigate all similar claims of discrimination and chilled work environment. The licensee also reviewed these programs and procedures to ensure that the requirements to investigate all such claims were applicable to all station leadership personnel.
To address the extent of condition and cause, the licensee performed the following actions:
- Reviewed all Personnel Action Review Board (PARB) questionnaire forms since June 1, 2018, to ensure that all questionnaires were completed in accordance with Procedure AI 13C-003 in effect at the time. This was done to ensure that no other employees or contractors have been discriminated against as a result of raising safety concerns.
- Reviewed Procedure AI 13C-003 to ensure that issues affecting an employee or contractor that involve allegations of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination (HIRD) and allegations of actions that have the potential to result, or have resulted in a violation of regulatory requirements, are addressed for inclusion in the PARB process.
- Review of other processes such as, Conduct of Operations, Plant Issue Response Checklist, Team Leader Roles and Responsibilities, Emergent Work Checklist, Forced Outage Process, and Emergent Issues Response to ensure that they include requirements to investigate claims of HIRD and chilled work environment claims.
- Included the requirement that the emerging concerns process was applicable to all Wolf Creek directors, department managers, superintendents, supervisors, individual contributors and supplemental personnel.
One of the corrective actions to preclude recurrence was to add placing an individual on administrative leave to the existing list of examples of potential adverse actions in Procedure AP 18-001, Emerging Concerns Program, Revision 6. The inspectors identified that Procedure AP 18A-001, Employee Concerns Program, also contained a similar definition for adverse action with the only difference being that the definition in Procedure AP 18A-001 was not revised to include paid administrative leave as a potential adverse action. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 145749 to revise Procedure AP 18A-001 as needed.
The inspectors were also concerned that some potentially adverse actions were procedurally allowed to be exempted by Procedure AI 13C-003, Personnel Action Review Board, from a PARB review. The PARB was created to review proposed personnel actions to ensure that they did not involve the potential of being taken in response to a protected activity, so exempting potential examples of adverse actions from a PARB could negate the effectiveness of this corrective action in some situations. For example, the list included actions such as pay freezes, shift change assignments, and verbal/written warnings. The inspectors noted that, in some cases these actions could be considered adverse and could contribute to a repeat 10 CFR 50.7 violation. The licensee entered this concern into their corrective action program as Condition Report 145824 to benchmark the procedure against other licensees and to evaluate revising the procedure.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee adequately identified the cause, extent of condition, and extent of cause of this issue.
Assessment: Corrective Actions 92722 Determine that appropriate corrective action(s) are specified for each cause or that there is an evaluation that no actions are necessary.
The inspectors determined that appropriate corrective actions were specified for each cause identified for EA-18-037 including methods for long term sustainability for the corrective actions. The inspectors did not identify any deficiencies with the corrective actions. Specifically, corrective actions to address the root and contributing causes were related to the creation of a formal process to investigate and appropriately address all claims of HIRD and a chilled work environment. Corrective actions to address the root and contributing causes included:
Root Cause
- Created Procedure AP 18-001, Emerging Concerns, on May 21, 2019, to provide an integrated formal process to direct the required actions for investigating HIRD and chilled work environment claims.
- Revised Procedure AI 13C-003, Personnel Action Review Board, to ensure continuity with AP 18-001, to include paid administrative leave as a defined adverse action, and for legal counsel being contacted before actions are taken.
- Provided training to personnel on these new programs.
Contributing Causes
- Revised the Nuclear Safety Culture program by appointing a program owner and the establishment of a set of metrics to monitor the health of the program by revising Procedures AP 36-001, Nuclear Safety Culture, and AI 36-001, Nuclear Safety Culture Panel.
- Communicated the lessons learned from this event to all station personnel.
- Provided formal nuclear safety culture and SCWE training to all station personnel at all levels.
- Revised training programs to include nuclear safety culture and SCWE into various training structures such as: new leader development, in-processing of new employees, and continual yearly training requirements for all station leaders.
- Established a nuclear safety culture observation process to monitor station meetings to ensure that appropriate SCWE-focused leadership behaviors are demonstrated.
Determine that the corrective actions have been prioritized with consideration of the regulatory compliance.
The inspectors determined that the corrective actions for EA-18-037 have all been completed. The inspectors did not identify any deficiencies with the licensees corrective action prioritization.
Determine if a schedule has been established for implementing and completing the corrective actions.
The inspectors determined that the corrective actions for EA-18-037 have all been completed. The inspectors did not identify any deficiencies with the schedule for implementation of the corrective actions.
Determine if measures of success have been developed for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees completed and planned effectiveness reviews and determined that the licensee had established adequate measures of success to determine whether the corrective actions related to this violation would be effective to preclude repetition. At the time of this inspection, some of the planned effectiveness reviews were not complete. However, based on the totality of the actions taken to date and the results of completed effectiveness reviews, the inspectors determined that the remaining open effectiveness reviews were appropriate to identify and correct any weaknesses in the corrective actions to preclude repetition.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee adequately implemented effective corrective actions to address the cause and to prevent recurrence of this issue.
Assessment: Independent Assessment of the Extent of Condition and Extent of 92722 Cause The inspectors interviewed 43 employees and contractors regarding the SCWE and the HIRD environment at Wolf Creek. Nine of those employees were managers or supervisors. All interviewees stated that they felt free to raise nuclear and radiological safety concerns through all avenues. Interviewees indicated that safety is constantly reinforced in meetings, pre-job briefs, and all aspects of business at the site. The interviewees also indicated that the Wolf Creek Employee Concerns Program is viewed favorably by the entire organization. The site vice-president has integrated safety into the organization in many ways, including constant reinforcement of SCWE issues and improved communication about SCWE and HIRD to the entire station.
Based on the inspectors review of various documents and interviews, the licensee effectively leveraged the Severity Level II violation to implement nuclear safety culture improvements across the site and applied the lessons learned to place more emphasis on SCWE. The inspectors noted that the organization has been focused on making safety a priority, stopping when unsure, engaging in questioning attitude and empowering management and the line organization. The licensee has renewed emphasis on the use of the PARB which screens personnel and disciplinary actions for potential SCWE impacts. The PARB is used regularly and consistently and is viewed favorably by the organization.
Assessment: Safety Culture Consideration 92722 The inspectors determined that EA-18-037 was the result of a less than adequate safety culture that did not prioritize a healthy SCWE. The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions taken by the licensee to address this violation have been effective in creating a strong nuclear safety culture at the site and has effectively addressed and corrected the deficiencies that allowed the violation to occur.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee adequately considered safety culture in their evaluation and corrective actions for this issue.
Assessment: Conclusion 92722 The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to EA-18-037 and determined that the causes, extent of condition, corrective actions, and contribution of safety culture for the violation has been adequately addressed. This violation is closed.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
On October 22, 2020, the inspection team presented the supplemental inspection results to Mr. Cleve Reasoner, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspection team verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision
Procedure or Date
2799 Corrective Action Condition Reports 13800, 13806, 23032, 25899, 73241, 105230, 119954,
Documents 125270, 128024, 128143, 128709, 128909, 129792, 129796,
135873, 136801,136804, 136805, 142561, 142742, 142745,
2796, 142858, 142860
Procedures AI 13C-003 Personnel Action Review Board 8
AI 36-001 Nuclear Safety Culture Panel 9
AI 36-002 Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment 2
AP 18-001 Emerging Concerns Program 6
AP 18A-001 Employee Concerns Program 8
AP 28A-100 Corrective Action Program 25
AP 36-001 Nuclear Safety Culture 7
Miscellaneous Corporate Policy Manual 23
Nuclear Safety Culture & Safety Conscious Work Environment 12/6/18
Training For Executives
SCWE Blitz Communication Plan
New Employee SCWE and HIRD Training 2/26/20
Wolf Creek Leadership Training Requirements 10/7/20
All Hands March 2019 Presentation & Roster
SCWE Survey Spring
2019
SCWE Survey Fall
2018
Nuclear Safety Culture Meeting Minutes 7/1/20
Nuclear Safety Culture Meeting Minutes 3/25/20
Nuclear Safety Culture Meeting Minutes 12/9/19
Nuclear Safety Culture Meeting Minutes 9/12/19
GT1235502 Nuclear Safety Culture and SCWE Training Roster
PS1235401 Nuclear Safety Culture and SCWE Training Leadership Roster
SA-2016-0116 2016 WCNOC Nuclear Safety Culture Self Assessment
SA-2019-0147 2019 WCNOC Nuclear Safety Culture Self Assessment
WM 19-0001 Letter WM 18-0045, dated September 17, 2018, from C. 1/15/19
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