Text

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2016003
	ML16314B839
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	11/08/2016
From:	Nick Taylor; NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
To:	Heflin A; Wolf Creek
	Nick Taylor
References
	IR 2016003
	Download: ML16314B839 (48)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

1600 E. LAMAR BLVD.

ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511

November 8, 2016

Adam C. Heflin, President and

Chief Executive Officer

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating

Corporation

P.O. Box 411

Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT:

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000482/2016003

Dear Mr. Heflin:

On September 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On October 19, 2016, the NRC inspectors

discussed the results of this inspection with Jaime McCoy, Vice President, Engineering, and

other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the

enclosed inspection report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a

non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within

30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with

copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident

inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a

response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your

disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the

Wolf Creek Generating Station.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public

Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your

response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public

Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's

A. Heflin

- 2 -

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible

from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic

Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Nicholas H. Taylor, Branch Chief

Project Branch B

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-482

License No.: NPF-42

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000482/2016003

w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution

SUNSI Review

By: NTaylor

ADAMS

Yes No

Non-Sensitive

Sensitive

Publicly Available

Non-Publicly Available

Keyword:

NRC-002

OFFICE

SRI/DRP/B

RI/DRP/B

C:DRS/PSB2

C:DRS/EB1

C:DRS/EB2

TL/DRS/IPAT

NAME

DDodson

FThomas

HGepford

TFarnholtz

GWerner

THipschman

SIGNATURE

/RA/

DATE

11/7/2016

11/07/2016

11/1/16

11/2/16

11/3/16

OFFICE

C:DRS/OB

C:DRP/B

NAME

VGaddy

NTaylor

SIGNATURE

/RA/KDC

for

/RA/

DATE

11/01/16

11/8/16

Letter to Adam C. Heflin from Nicholas H. Taylor dated November 8, 2016

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000482/2016003

DISTRIBUTION:

Regional Administrator (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Scott.Morris@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Ryan.Lantz@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Douglas.Dodson@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Fabian.Thomas@nrc.gov)

Administrative Assistant (Susan.Galemore@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/B (Nick.Taylor@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B (David.Proulx@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/B (Steven.Janicki@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/B (Jim.Melfi@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Project Manager (Balwant.Singal@nrc.gov)

Team Leader, DRS/IPAT (Thomas.Hipschman@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRS/IPAT (Eduardo.Uribe@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

RIV Congressional Affairs Officer (Angel.Moreno@nrc.gov)

RIV/ETA: OEDO (Jeremy.Bowen@nrc.gov)

RIV RSLO (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov)

ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov

ROPassessment.Resource@nrc.gov

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket:

05000482

License:

NPF-42

Report:

05000482/2016003

Licensee:

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

Facility:

Wolf Creek Generating Station

Location:

1550 Oxen Lane NE

Burlington, KS 66839

Dates:

July 1 through September 30, 2016

Inspectors: D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector

F. Thomas, Resident Inspector

M. Bloodgood, Operations Engineer

G. Guerra, CHP, Emergency Preparedness Inspector

C. Steely, Operations Engineer

Approved

By:

Nicholas H. Taylor

Chief, Project Branch B

Division of Reactor Projects

- 2 -

SUMMARY

IR 05000482/2016003; 07/01/2016 - 09/30/2016; Wolf Creek Generating Station; Maintenance

Effectiveness

The inspection activities described in this report were performed between July 1 and September

30, 2016, by the resident inspectors at Wolf Creek Generating Station and inspectors from the

NRCs Region IV office. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in

this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The significance of

inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is

determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Their

cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within

the Cross-Cutting Areas. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with

the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of

commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to adequately adjust testing and preventive maintenance

activities in accordance with Procedure AP 16B-003, Planning and Scheduling Preventive

Maintenance, Revision 5. Specifically, the licensee did not adjust a preventive

maintenance task for a General Electric HEA 86 lockout relay and test the relay in

accordance with vendor recommendations and industry operating experience, which

resulted in the NB0215 186/M lockout relay associated with the B essential service water

pump motor breaker failing as-found testing on August 2, 2016. The inspectors identified a

Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to

adequately adjust testing and preventive maintenance activities in accordance with

Procedure AP 16B-003, Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance, Revision 5.

Specifically, the licensee did not adjust a preventive maintenance task for a General Electric

HEA 86 lockout relay and test the relay in accordance with vendor recommendations and

operating experience, which resulted in the NB0215 186/M lockout relay associated with the

B essential service water pump motor breaker failing as-found testing on August 2, 2016.

The licensees corrective actions included replacing the armature assembly associated with

the relay and retesting the relay satisfactorily. Additional corrective actions to address the

preventive maintenance activities are expected as a result of Condition Reports 108440 and

108548.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance

attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to

ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events

to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, with the NB0215 186/M lockout relay

failed on or before August 2, 2016, the safety-related 4160 volt NB02 bus was susceptible to

locking out as a result of an overcurrent condition. In accordance with NRC Inspection

Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the

inspectors determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a

mitigating structure, system, or component that maintained its operability or functionality; the

finding does not represent a loss of system and/or function; the finding does not represent

an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its Technical Specification-

allowed outage time; and the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of one or

more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant.

- 3 -

The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution,

operating experience, because the organization did not systematically and effectively

evaluate relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. This issue

is indicative of current performance because the station did not take corrective actions to

address the stations failure to adequately consider operating experience, the station did not

recognize the need to revise the testing and maintenance strategy following the August 2,

2016, failure, and the same failure would be expected to occur [P.5]. (Section 1R12)

- 4 -

PLANT STATUS

Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period operating at full power. On July 5,

2016, operators reduced power to approximately 68 percent after load swings were observed on

the main generator and the La Cygne transmission line was disconnected from Wolf Creek. On

July 6, 2016, operators increased power to approximately 85 percent and completed main

turbine valve cycle testing. Plant power was restored to approximately full power later on July 6,

2016. On September 2, 2016, reactor coolant system unidentified leakage was calculated to be

greater than 1 gallon per minute, Technical Specification 3.4.13 was entered, and a plant

shutdown was completed, after which the licensee remained shut down to begin refueling

outage 21.

REPORT DETAILS

1.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

Partial Walk-Down

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant

systems:

July 13, 2016, centrifugal charging pump A

August 2, 2016, emergency diesel generator A

The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to

determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions

of the systems and/or trains were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constituted two partial system walk-down samples as defined in

Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

Quarterly Inspection

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status

and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on six plant areas

important to safety:

- 5 -

July 19, 2016, fire areas A-2 and A-4, safety injection pump rooms A and B,

elevation 1,974 feet

August 1, 2016, fire area ESWC, essential service water vertical loop chase,

elevation 1,974 feet through 2087 feet

August 15, 2016, fire areas C-13, C-14, and C-35, control building and

communications corridor - trains A and B safety related electrical equipment air

conditioning units, elevation 2,016 feet

September 27, 2016, fire area RB-6, reactor building - general area, elevation

2,068 feet

September 27, 2016, fire area RB-10, reactor building - general area, elevation

2,047 feet

September 28, 2016, fire area C-16, control building and communications

corridor - trains A and B safety related battery and switchboard rooms, elevation

2,016 feet

For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and

defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors

evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and

suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire

protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.

These activities constituted six quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection

Procedure 71111.05.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a.

Inspection Scope

On July 20, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations ability to

mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensees flooding analysis,

the inspectors chose two plant areas containing risk-significant structures, systems, and

components (SSCs) that were susceptible to flooding:

Auxiliary feedwater pipe chase room 1206

Auxiliary feedwater pipe chase room 1207

The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures related to

internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design

features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The

inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be

successfully accomplished.

- 6 -

These activities constituted completion of one flood protection measures sample, as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

a.

Inspection Scope

On September 14, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of the readiness and

availability of risk-significant heat exchangers. The inspectors observed the licensees

inspection of the ultimate heat sink and the material condition of the ultimate heat sink.

Additionally, the inspectors walked down the ultimate heat sink to observe its

performance and material condition and verified that the ultimate heat sink was receiving

the required maintenance.

These activities constituted completion of one heat sink performance annual review

sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

(71111.11)

.1

Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

a.

Inspection Scope

On July 7, 2016, and September 8, 2016, the inspectors observed a portion of an annual

requalification test for licensed operators and simulator training for an operating crew,

respectively. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the

evaluators critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling

and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities and simulator

training activities.

These activities constituted completion of two quarterly licensed operator requalification

program samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

- 7 -

.2

Review of Licensed Operator Performance

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants

main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of

heightened activity and risk due to control rod parking and chemical and volume control

system inservice check valve testing. The inspectors observed the operators

performance of the following activities:

July 5, 2016, performance of STS AC-001, Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test, and

reactor power ascension from 68 percent power

August 18, 2016, control rod parking and chemical and volume control system

inservice check valve testing

In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures,

including the conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.

These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance

sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

.3

Biennial Review

a.

Inspection Scope

The licensed operator requalification program involves two training cycles that are

conducted over a 2-year period. In the first cycle, the annual cycle, the operators are

administered an operating test consisting of job performance measures and simulator

scenarios. In the second part of the training cycle, the biennial cycle, operators are

administered an operating test and a comprehensive written examination.

To assess the performance effectiveness of the licensed operator requalification

program, the inspectors reviewed both the written examination and operating test quality

and observed licensee administration of an annual requalification test while onsite. The

operating tests observed included five job performance measures and two scenarios that

were used in the current biennial requalification cycle. These observations allowed the

inspectors to assess the licensee's effectiveness in conducting the operating test to

ensure operator mastery of the training program content and to determine if feedback of

performance analyses into the requalification training program was being accomplished.

On July 26, 2016, the licensee informed the inspectors of the completed cycle results for

Wolf Creek Generating Station for both the written examinations and the operating tests:

9 of 9 crews passed the simulator portion of the operating test

53 of 53 licensed operators passed the simulator portion of the operating test

- 8 -

53 of 53 licensed operators passed the job performance measure portion of the

operating test

51 of 53 licensed operators passed the written examination

Two individuals failed the written examination. One individual was remediated, retested,

and passed their retake examinations. One individual was not remediated and the

individuals license was terminated by the licensee.

The inspectors observed examination security measures in place during administration

of the exams (including controls and content overlap) and reviewed any remedial training

and re-examinations, if necessary. The inspectors also reviewed medical records of

six licensed operators for conformance to license conditions and the licensees system

for tracking qualifications and records of license reactivation for four operators.

The inspectors reviewed simulator performance for fidelity with the actual plant and the

overall simulator program of maintenance, testing, and discrepancy correction.

The inspectors completed one inspection sample of the biennial licensed operator

requalification program.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-

related SSCs:

August 2, 2016, NB0215 186/M lockout relay failed to trip during as-found testing

August 8, 2016, train B 480 VAC electrical power distribution subsystem,

excessive voltage

September 19, 2016, trains A and B safety injection system, unplanned outages

The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures

and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors

reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a

role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees

characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance

Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance

and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.

These activities constituted completion of three maintenance effectiveness samples, as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.

- 9 -

b.

Findings

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical

Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to adequately adjust testing and

preventive maintenance activities in accordance with Procedure AP 16B-003, Planning

and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance, Revision 5. Specifically, the licensee did not

adjust a preventive maintenance task for a General Electric HEA 86 lockout relay and

test the relay in accordance with vendor recommendations and operating experience,

which resulted in the NB0215 186/M lockout relay associated with the B essential

service water pump motor breaker failing as-found testing on August 2, 2016.

Description. During performance of Procedure STN NB-215, DPEF01B Feeder Breaker

Trip Circuit Verification, Revision 1A on August 2, 2016, while the B essential service

water pump and breaker were out of service for maintenance, the 186/M lockout relay

failed to trip during as-found testing. The lockout relay provides protection to the B

essential service water pump motor and 4160 volt safety-related bus NB02 in the event

of an overcurrent condition. If the lockout relay fails to actuate and trip the B essential

service water pump motor breaker, it could result in damage to the B essential service

water pump motor or cause the NB02 bus to lockout due to an overcurrent condition on

the bus, which would be recognized by the NB02 bus protection circuitry.

During the test in accordance with Section 8.2, NB0215 186/M Lockout Relay Tests, of

STN NB-215, a direct current test voltage of 82.5 volts is momentarily applied. The relay

is expected to actuate at 80 volts or less, but it is considered within tolerance if it

actuates at less than or equal to 87.5 volts, and the licensee determined that it is

acceptable for the relay to actuate up to 95 volts. During the performance of STN NB-

215 on August 2, 2016, the test voltage was increased up to 125 volts, but the relay did

not trip. The licensee did not test the relay past this point and replaced the armature

assembly associated with the relay, calibrated it, and retested it prior to returning the

relay and system to service.

This test was last performed successfully using Procedure RNM C-1301, Miscellaneous

Relay and Meter Equipment, Revision 6, on August 10, 2009, and the NB0215 186/M

lockout relay passed. The current testing and preventive maintenance task is performed

every six years, and the August 2, 2016, test was conducted within the grace period for

the current preventive maintenance task frequency.

The inspectors reviewed applicable vendor documentation, GEH-2058, Auxiliary

Relays, Revision E, for type HEA61 relays. This vendor documentation states, During

any scheduled outage of the equipment and preferably at yearly intervals, the relay

should be tripped electrically to insure that it is in good operating condition, and that all

the circuits are complete so that the breakers can be tripped. The inspectors also

reviewed Wolf Creek corrective action document Performance Improvement Request

(PIR) 2003-2708, which evaluated OE16724 - General Electric Type HEA Lockout

Relay Test Interval. The PIR discussed contact made with General Electric, HEA relays

tend to be sluggish during the first operation when tested on a 3 to 5 year interval. The

problem applies to the whole family of HEA relays, and General Electric recommends

testing yearly. Wolf Creeks lockout relays were tested on a 6-year frequency.

The inspectors also reviewed industry operating experience from June 19, 2012, which

was evaluated by Wolf Creek Condition Report 54212. The industry operating

- 10 -

experience made two recommendations that included determining the total population

of General Electric HEA 86 relays and the subset of General Electric HEA 86 relays that

are not normally actuated each cycle or within the [preventive maintenance] frequency.

Additionally, the event report recommended, Any that can be tested on line should be

tested as soon as practicable. The functional test should be an electrical trip that

actuates the relay coil. Replace any test failure with modified [General Electric] HEA 86

relays or suitable alternative. Corrective actions did not identify any necessary changes

to the testing or maintenance activities for the NB0215 186/M lockout relay.

The inspectors noted that Section 6.2, Establishing [Preventive Maintenance] Activities,

of Procedure AP 16B-003, Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance,

Revisions 2 through 7, provided direction for implementing the preventive maintenance

program including consideration of vendor recommendations and operating experience.

The inspectors determined that the August 2003 and June 2012 operating experience

documents were not adequately evaluated, in that the licensees relay testing and

preventive maintenance activities were not adjusted after considering vendor

recommendations and industry experience. The failure to appropriately adjust testing

and maintenance activities for HEA relays resulted in the failure of the 186/M lockout

relay on August 2, 2016. Additionally, neither the licensees evaluation of Condition

Report 106164, which was written to address the equipment failure on August 2, 2016,

nor any other condition report identified the need to revise the testing and preventive

maintenance frequency.

The licensees corrective actions for the August 2, 2016, relay failure included replacing

the armature assembly associated with the relay, retesting the relay satisfactorily, and

returning the relay and system to service. The station entered the equipment condition

into the corrective action program as Condition Report 106164, and the licensee entered

Condition Reports 108440 and 108548 into the corrective action program to address the

inspectors concerns associated with the need to revise the testing and preventive

maintenance activity frequency for the subject relay.

Analysis. The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately adjust a testing and

preventive maintenance task for the NB0215 186/M General Electric HEA 86 lockout

relay in accordance with Procedure AP 16B-003, Planning and Scheduling Preventive

Maintenance, was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it

is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability,

and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences. Specifically, with the NB0215 186/M lockout relay failed on or before

August 2, 2016, and the safety-related 4160 volt NB02 bus was susceptible to locking

out as a result of an overcurrent condition. The inspectors evaluated the finding using

Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,

issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design

or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component that maintained its

operability or functionality; the finding does not represent a loss of system and/or

function; the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train

for greater than its Technical Specification-allowed outage time; and the finding does not

represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of

equipment designated as high safety-significant. Therefore, the inspectors determined

the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

- 11 -

The inspectors determined that the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of

problem identification and resolution, operating experience, because the organization did

not systematically and effectively evaluate relevant internal and external operating

experience in a timely manner. Specifically, PIR 2003-2708 and Condition Report 54212

documented vendor recommendations and industry operating experience regarding HEA

relay failures, and neither the vendor recommendations nor the industry operating

experience were effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to station

processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs, and testing and preventive

maintenance activities were not adequately adjusted. This issue is indicative of current

performance because the station did not take corrective actions to address the stations

failure to adequately consider operating experience, the station did not recognize the

need to revise the testing and maintenance strategy following the August 2, 2016,

failure, and the same failure would be expected to occur [P.5].

Enforcement. Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that procedures shall be

established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures

recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Section 9.b of

Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, requires that preventive maintenance

schedules be developed to specify inspections of equipment and inspection or

replacement of parts that have a specific lifetime. The licensee established Procedure

AP 16B-003, Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance, which provides

direction for implementing the preventive maintenance program to meet the Regulatory

Guide 1.33 requirement. Section 6.2 of Procedure AP 16B-003 requires, in part, that

preventive maintenance activities be developed by considering vendor

recommendations and operating experience. Contrary to the above, until October 16,

the licensee did not ensure that preventive maintenance activities were developed by

considering vendor recommendations and operating experience. Specifically, the

licensee did not ensure that adequate preventive maintenance activities were developed

for the NB0215 186/M lockout relay by considering vendor recommendations to trip the

relay electrically during any scheduled outage of the equipment and operating

experience documented in PIR 2003-2708 and Condition Report 54212. As a result, the

NB0215 186/M lockout relay failed on or before August 2, 2016, and the safety-related

4160 volt NB02 bus was susceptible to locking out as a result of an overcurrent

condition. The licensee entered this condition into its corrective action program as

Condition Reports 106164, 108440, and 108548. The licensee replaced the relay

armature assembly and retested the relay satisfactorily. Additional corrective actions to

address the preventive maintenance activities are expected as a result of Condition

Reports 108440 and 108548. This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation

consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000482/2016003-01,

Failure to Adequately Adjust Testing and Preventive Maintenance for Safety-Related

Lockout Relays.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to

changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in

response to elevated risk:

- 12 -

July 15, 2016, condensate storage tank valve housing lift near the condensate

storage tank and auxiliary building

July 19, 2016, planned A safety injection pump maintenance

August 10, 2016, planned maintenance on train B motor driven auxiliary

feedwater pump

The inspectors verified that these risk assessment were performed timely and in

accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant

procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees

risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk

management actions based on the result of the assessments.

The inspectors also observed portions of three emergent work activities that had the

potential to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems:

July 1, 2016, unplanned maintenance on the non-safety auxiliary feedwater

pump

July 6, 2016, weekly risk assessment and emergent reactor power changes in

response the La Cygne transmission line out of service

August 15, 2016, unplanned maintenance on the train B class 1E electrical air

conditioning unit

The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work

plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to

minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.

These activities constituted completion of six maintenance risk assessments and

emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four operability determinations that the licensee performed for

degraded or nonconforming SSCs:

July 1, 2016, operability determination of auxiliary feedwater system equipment

while the condensate storage tank valve house was removed

August 2, 2016, operability determination of B essential service water traveling

screen foot sprocket and collar set screw degradation

- 13 -

August 10, 2016, operability determination of shutdown and control bank rod

insertion limits in the cycle 21 safety analysis

August 15, 2016, operability determination of Class 1E electrical equipment air

conditioning unit SGK05B out of service as a result of a clogged condensation

drain line

The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees

evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the

inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to

provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee

had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the

degraded SSC.

The inspectors reviewed operator actions taken or planned to compensate for degraded

or nonconforming conditions. The inspectors verified that the licensee effectively

managed these operator workarounds to prevent adverse effects on the function of

mitigating systems and to minimize their impact on the operators ability to implement

abnormal and emergency operating procedures.

These activities constituted completion of five operability and functionality review

samples, which included one operator work-around sample, as defined in Inspection

Procedure 71111.15.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two permanent plant modifications that affected risk-significant

SSCs:

August 30, 2016, station black out diesel generator permanent electrical feed to

non-safety auxiliary feedwater pump

August 30 and 31, 2016, revision of SYS GK-122, Manual CRVIS Line-Up,

impacting the control room air conditioning unit 4A control room discharge

isolation damper

The inspectors reviewed the design and implementation of the modifications. The

inspectors verified that work activities involved in implementing the modifications did not

adversely impact operator actions that may be required in response to an emergency or

other unplanned event. The inspectors verified that post-modification testing was

adequate to establish the operability or functionality of the SSCs as modified.

These activities constituted completion of two samples of permanent modifications, as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.

- 14 -

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed seven post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-

significant SSCs:

July 13, 2016, B centrifugal charging pump

July 25, 2016, A pressure relief isolation valve breaker

August 3, 2016, B emergency diesel generator and fuel oil transfer pump

August 10, 2016, B auxiliary feedwater pump

August 31, 2016, train B auxiliary building and control room pressure testing

September 21, 2016, post-accident monitoring nuclear instrumentation testing

September 22, 2016, intermediate range nuclear instrument cable testing

The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the

maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the

performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests

in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria,

and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.

These activities constituted completion of seven post-maintenance testing inspection

samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)

a.

Inspection Scope

On September 2, 2016, reactor coolant system unidentified leakage was calculated to be

greater than 1 gallon per minute, Technical Specification 3.4.13 was entered, and a plant

shutdown was completed, after which the licensee remained shut down to begin

refueling outage 21. During the stations refueling outage that was in progress at the

end of the inspection period, the inspectors evaluated the licensees outage activities.

The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing

the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation

strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:

Review of the licensees outage plan prior to the outage

- 15 -

Monitoring of shut-down and cool-down activities

Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities

Observation and review of reduced-inventory and mid-loop activities

Observation and review of fuel handling activities

These activities constituted partial completion of one refueling outage sample, as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed four risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results

to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of

performing their safety functions:

In-service tests:

September 6, 2016, STS MT-008, Spring Loaded Safety Valve Settings,

Revision 25

Reactor coolant system leak detection tests:

September 1 and 2, 2016, STS BB-006, Water Inventory Balance Using the

NPIS Computer, Revision 14

Other surveillance tests:

July 28, 2016, STS IC-211A, Actuation Logic Test Train A Solid State Protection

System, Revision 36A

August 31, 2016, STN AP-102, NSAFP Full Flow Test, Revision 7

The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the

licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of

the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the

licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.

These activities constituted completion of four surveillance testing inspection samples,

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.

- 16 -

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation (71114.02)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspector verified the adequacy of the licensees methods for testing the primary

and backup alert and notification system. The inspector also reviewed the licensees

program for identifying emergency planning zone locations requiring tone alert radios

and for distributing the radios, and reviewed audits of distribution records. The inspector

interviewed licensee personnel responsible for the maintenance of the primary and

backup alert and notification system and reviewed a sample of corrective action system

reports written for alert and notification system problems. The inspector compared the

licensees alert and notification system testing program with criteria in NUREG-0654,

Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and

Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1; FEMA Report REP-10,

Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,

and the licensees current FEMA-approved alert and notification system design report,

dated May 7, 2008.

These activities constituted completion of one alert and notification system evaluation

sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.02.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System (71114.03)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspector verified the licensees emergency response organization on-shift and

augmentation staffing levels were in accordance with the licensees emergency plan

commitments. The inspector reviewed documentation and discussed with licensee staff

the operability of primary and backup systems for augmenting the on-shift emergency

response staff to verify the adequacy of the licensees methods for staffing emergency

response facilities, including the licensees ability to staff pre-planned alternate facilities.

The inspector also reviewed records of emergency response organization augmentation

tests and events to determine whether the licensee had maintained a capability to staff

emergency response facilities within emergency plan timeliness commitments.

These activities constituted completion of one emergency response organization staffing

and augmentation testing sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.03.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

- 17 -

1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (71114.05)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following for the period November 2014 to July 2016:

After-action evaluation reports for licensee drills and exercises;

Independent audits and surveillances of the licensees emergency preparedness

program;

Self-assessments of the emergency preparedness program conducted by the

licensee;

Licensee evaluations of changes made to the emergency plan and emergency

plan implementing procedures;

Drill and exercise performance issues entered into the licensees corrective

action program;

Emergency preparedness program issues entered into the licensees corrective

action program;

Maintenance records for equipment supporting the emergency preparedness

program; and

Emergency response organization and emergency planner training records.

The inspector reviewed summaries of corrective action program reports written by the

licensee between November 2014 and July 2016 associated with emergency

preparedness and selected 23 to review against program requirements, to determine the

licensees ability to identify, evaluate, and correct problems in accordance with planning

standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F. The inspector

verified that the licensee accurately and appropriately identified and corrected

emergency preparedness weaknesses during critiques and assessments.

The inspector reviewed one licensee evaluation of the impact of changes to the

emergency plan and implementing procedures to determine the licensees ability to

identify reductions in the effectiveness of the emergency plan in accordance with the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspector verified that the

evaluation of proposed changes to the licensee emergency plan appropriately identified

the impact of the changes prior to being implemented.

The inspector reviewed records pertaining to the maintenance of equipment and facilities

used to implement the emergency plan against program requirements to determine the

licensees ability to maintain equipment in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR

50.47(b)(8) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.E. The inspector verified that

equipment and facilities were maintained in accordance with the commitments of the

licensees emergency plan.

- 18 -

These activities constituted completion of one sample of the maintenance of the

licensees emergency preparedness program as defined in Inspection

Procedure 71114.05.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

Training Evolution Observation

a.

Inspection Scope

On July 7 and August 11, 2016, the inspectors observed simulator-based licensed

operator requalification training that included implementation of the licensees

emergency plan. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications,

off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and

timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were

appropriately identified by the evaluators and entered into the corrective action program

for resolution.

These activities constituted completion of two training observation samples, as defined

in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency

Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and

Security

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1

Mitigating Systems Performance Index: High Pressure Injection Systems (MS07)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees mitigating system performance index data for the

period of July 1, 2015, through September 12, 2016, to verify the accuracy and

completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance

contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported

data.

These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for

high pressure injection systems, as defined in Inspection procedure 71151.

- 19 -

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

.2

Mitigating Systems Performance Index: Cooling Water Support Systems (MS10)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees mitigating system performance index data for the

period of July 1, 2015, through September 12, 2016, to verify the accuracy and

completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance

contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported

data.

These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for

cooling water support systems, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

.3

Drill/Exercise Performance (EP01)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensees evaluated exercises and selected drill and training

evolutions that occurred between October 2015 and June 2016 to verify the accuracy of

the licensees data for classification, notification, and protective action recommendation

opportunities. The inspector reviewed a sample of the licensees completed

classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations to verify their

timeliness and accuracy. The inspector used definitions and guidance contained in

Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance

Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. The

specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constituted verification of the drill/exercise performance indicator as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

.4

Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (EP02)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensees records for participation in drill and training

evolutions between October 2015 and June 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensees

data for drill participation opportunities. The inspector verified that all members of the

licensees emergency response organization in the identified key positions had been

counted in the reported performance indicator data. The inspector reviewed the

- 20 -

licensees basis for reporting the percentage of emergency response organization

members who participated in a drill. The inspector reviewed drill attendance records and

verified a sample of those reported as participating. The inspector used definitions and

guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of

the data reported. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to

this report.

These activities constituted verification of the emergency response organization drill

participation performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

.5

Alert and Notification System Reliability (EP03)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensees records of alert and notification system tests

conducted between October 2015 and June 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensees

data for siren system testing opportunities. The inspector reviewed procedural guidance

on assessing alert and notification system opportunities and the results of periodic alert

and notification system operability tests. The inspector used definitions and guidance

contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data

reported. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this

report.

These activities constituted verification of the alert and notification system reliability

performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b.

Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)

Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items

entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the

licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee

personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these

problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that

the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the

significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees

problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other

inspection activities documented in this report.

- 21 -

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

Plant Events

a. Inspection Scope

For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant

parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating

systems. The inspectors communicated the plant event to appropriate regional

personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309,

Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors, issued October 28, 2011, for

consideration of potential reactive inspection activities. As applicable, the inspectors

verified that Wolf Creek staff made appropriate emergency classification assessments

and properly reported the events in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73.

The inspectors reviewed Wolf Creeks follow-up actions related to the events to assure

that Wolf Creek implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their

safety significance.

Excessive unidentified reactor coolant system leakage resulting in

commencement of technical specification required shutdown on September 2,

2016 (event notice 52218)

Seismic monitor triggered on September 3, 2016, due to seismic event during

plant shutdown

These activities constituted completion of two event follow-up samples, as defined in

Inspection Procedure 71153.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)/Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

(INPO) Report Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the final report for the WANO/INPO assessment conducted in

September 2015. The inspectors evaluated this report to ensure that NRC perspectives

of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation performance were consistent with any

issues identified during the assessments. The inspectors also reviewed this report to

determine whether any significant safety issues were identified that required further NRC

follow-up.

- 22 -

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Site Vice President, and

other members of the licensee's staff of the results of the licensed operator requalification

program inspection on June 30, 2016. The final results of the inspection were telephonically

presented to Mr. R. Meyer, Licensed Supervising Instructor, Simulator and Exam Group, and

other members of your staff on August 8, 2016. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any

materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary

information was identified.

On August 4, 2016, the inspector presented the results of the onsite inspection of the

emergency preparedness program to Mr. A. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer, and

other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The

licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspector had been returned

or destroyed.

On October 19, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. McCoy, Vice

President, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged

the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the

inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

Attachment

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

R. Acree, Licensed Instructor

T. Baban, Manager, System Engineering

W. Brown, Superintendent, Security Operations

T. Broyles, Manager, Information Services

D. Campbell, Superintendent, Maintenance

J. Dagenette, Emergency Planning

M. Dale, Emergency Planning

T. Damashek, Simulator Fidelity Coordinator

T. East, Superintendent, Emergency Planning

J. Edwards, Manager, Operations

D. Erbe, Manager, Security

R. Fincher, Manager, Quality

R. Flannigan, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

J. Fritton, Oversight

B. Gagnon, Supervisor, Security

N. Good, Licensing Engineer

C. Gross, Manager, Chemistry

C. Hafenstine, Manager, Regulatory Affairs

A. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer

S. Henry, Manager, Integrated Plant Scheduling

R. Hobby, Licensing Engineer

J. Isch, Superintendent, Operations Work Controls

J. Knapp, Superintendent, Operations Training

B. Lee, Licensed Supervising Instructor, Operator Requalification

D. Mand, Manager, Design Engineering

J. McCoy, Vice President, Engineering

R. Meyer, Licensed Supervising Instructor, Simulator and Exam Group

W. Muilenburg, Supervisor, Licensing

L. Ratzlaff, Manager, Maintenance

C. Reasoner, Site Vice President

A. Servaes, Licensed Instructor

M. Skiles, Manager, Radiation Protection

T. Slenker, Supervisor, Operations Support

S. Smith, Plant Manager

M. Storts, Engineer

A. Stueve, Engineer

A. Stull, Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer

M. Tate, Superintendent, Security Operations

J. Yunk, Manager, Training

A-2

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed 05000482-2016003-01

NCV

Failure to Adequately Adjust Testing and Preventive

Maintenance for Safety-Related Lockout Relays

(Section 1R12)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

CKL BG-120

Chemical and Volume Control System Normal Valve Lineup 41

CKL BG-130

Chemical and Volume Control System Switch and Breaker

Lineup

31A

CKL JE-120

Emergency Fuel Oil System Lineup

19

CKL KJ-121

Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Valve Checklist

39

STS BG-100B

Centrifugal Charging System B Train Inservice Pump Test

51

SYS BG-201

Shifting Charging Pumps

66

SYS EG-120

Component Cooling Water System

39

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

M-12BG03

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical & Volume

Control System

48

M-12JE01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Emergency Fuel Oil

System

19

M-12KJ01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel

Generator A Cooling Water System

13

M-12KJ02

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel

Generator A Intake Exhaust. F.O. and Start . Air Sys.

22

M-12KJ03

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel

Generator A Lube Oil System

17

M-13BG02

Piping Isometric CVCS-Max. Charging Flow A & B Train-

Auxiliary Bldg.

11

M-13BG09

Small Piping Isometric CVCS Seal Water Injection Auxiliary

Building

15

A-3

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

M-12BG03

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical & Volume

Control System

48

M-13BG10

Small Piping Isometric RC PP Seal Water Return & Excess

Letdown Flow-Auxiliary Bldg.

2

Condition Reports

106338

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 10-102

Control of Combustible Materials

19

AP 10-106

Fire Preplans

17

Condition Reports

106124

106133

106335

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision

E-1F9905

Fire Hazard Analysis

7

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 10-104

Breach Authorization

35

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

M-120103

Symbols and Legend for System Flow and Piping and

Instrumentation Diagrams

1

M-12FC02

Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Turbines

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine

23

M-12LE01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Turb. Bldg. and Aux.

Feedwater Pump Rooms Oily Waste System

8

A-4

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

M-13FC06

Small Piping Isometric Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine

Drains - Aux. Bldg.

8

M-13LE01

Piping Isometric Oily Waste Sump Discharge Tendon

Access & Aux. Building

3

M-17LF01

Plumbing and Drainage System Notes, Symbols and

Schedules

2

M-17LF02

Plumbing and Drainage System Details

2

M-OP1151

Drainage Systems (LE) Auxiliary Building El. 1974-0, El.

1989-0 & El. 2000-0 Area 5

6

Condition Reports

90879

100653

100654

100655

106165

Work Orders

08-303899-000

15-397860-000

16-416247-000

16-416247-001

16-416247-002

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision

FL-01

Flooding of the Auxiliary Building

2

FL-04

Summary of Flood Levels in All Aux. Bldg Rooms Due to

Pipe Break or Crack

2

LE-M-002

Flood Level in Auxiliary Building Rooms 1206 & 1207 Due

to Pipe Break

1

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

STN MT-004

Ultimate Heat Sink Dam Surveillance Vertical Movement

And Sedimentation

5

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

S-0080

Ultimate Heat Sink Plan & Sections

16

A-5

Work Orders

15-409222-000

15-409921-000

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision

C-404

Periodic Surveillance of Safety Related Water Control

Structures and Reservoir

8

WR-WC-UH-1

Area Capacity - Ultimate Heat Sink

1

WR-WC-UH-1A

Elevation-Area-Capacity of UHS

0

Z065-C-001

Evaluation of Annual UHS Sediment Measurements

10

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AI 28A-100

Condition Report Resolution

10A

AI 30B-015

Licensed Operator Requalification Examination Guidelines

10A

AI 30C-001

Continued Assurance of Simulator Fidelity

16A

AI 30C-004

Simulator Real Time Capacity Testing

5B

AI 30C-005

Simulator Steady State Testing

9A

AI 30C-007

Simulator Core Testing

3

AI 30C-008

Scenario Based Testing

2A

AI 30C-010

Post Event Testing

1

AI 30E-002

Evaluation

42

AI 30E-013

Written and Oral Examinations

24

AI 30E-015

Just-In-Time Training

11

AI 30E-023

Remediation

3

AI 30E-23-01

Remediation Plan

2

AP 15C-002

Procedure Use and Adherence

42

AP 15C-003

Procedure Users Guide for Abnormal Plant Conditions

33

AP 21-001

Conduct of Operations

77

AP 22-001

Conduct of Pre-Job and Post-Job Briefs

19

AP 30B-001

Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program

28

A-6

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

EPP 06-006

Protective Action Recommendations

9

GEN 00-004

Power Operation

86

GEN 00-008

RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations

29

OFN MA-038

Rapid Plant Shutdown

28

STN SF-001

Control Rod Parking

18A

STS AC-001

Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test

52

STS BG-210

CVCS Inservice Check Valve Test

33

Condition Reports

70423

76993

76995

88178

94596

96734

99058

99576

100662

101655

102267

106525

106526

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision/Date

Reactivity Maneuver Plan

July 6, 2016

Simulator Differences List

April 13, 2016

Simulator Steady State Testing

Transient Test 3 - Simultaneous Closure of All Main

Steam Isolation Valves

Transient Test 5 - Trip of a Single RCP

Transient Test 7 - Maximum Rate of Power Ramp

Week 0 - SRO and RO Written Examination

Week 0 - 5 JPMs, 2 Scenarios

Week 1 - 5 JPMs, 2 Scenarios

Week 4 - 5 JPMs, 2 Scenarios

Week 7 - 5 JPMs, 2 Scenarios

APF 06-002-01

Emergency Action Levels

17A

DTI 212

Maintaining Simulator Setup Current with the Plant

1

DTIF 212-01

Maintaining Simulator Setup Checklist and Index Sheets

April 11, 2016

LR5004009

Mid Loop Operations

6

A-7

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision/Date

Scenario 16-11

2016 Biennial Requalification Exam

0

Scenario 16-12

2016 Biennial Requalification Exam

0

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 16B-003

Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance

7

MGE EOOP-05

Insulation Resistance Testing

23

MPE E009-01

Siemens Breaker Cubicle Maintenance, Testing and

Swapping

5

MPE E009Q-01

13.8 KV and 4.16 KV Switchgear Inspection and Testing

34A

STN NB-215

DPEF01B Feeder Breaker Trip Circuit Verification

1A

STS KJ-015B

Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02

42

STS NB-005

Breaker Alignment Verification

29

SYS NG-132

Energizing NG02, NG04 and NG06E

22

SYS NG-332

Deenergizing NG02, NG04 and NG06E

20

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

E-K3EF01A

Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump B

12

KD-7496

One Line Diagram

59

Condition Reports

29718

54212

54926

64870

64999

65676

66396

66398

77718

83510

85417

85309

88661

95773

97335

98587

98588

100088

100380

100384

100629

100716

102162

104411

104413

104869

106164

106180

106211

106273

106286

108440

108548

A-8

Work Orders

08-303899-000

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision/Date

54926