W3P84-3130, Responds to 840806 Request for Addl Info Re Safety Parameter Display Sys.Responses Based Upon Present Sys Configuration. Sys Expected to Evolve to Meet Operator Needs

Responds to 840806 Request for Addl Info Re Safety Parameter Display Sys.Responses Based Upon Present Sys Configuration. Sys Expected to Evolve to Meet Operator Needs

ML20107H632
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	11/06/1984
From:	Cook K LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
W3P84-3130, NUDOCS 8411090179
Download: ML20107H632 (5)

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LOUISIANA POWER & L1GHT 242 o aAnoNoe sinEer P o. BOX 6008

• NEW ORLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174 * (504) 36E-2345 November 6, 1984 W3P84-3130 3-A1.01.04 A4.05 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. G.W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit 3 Docket No. 50-382 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)

REFERENCES:

(1) Letter dated August 6, 1984 from Knighton (NRC) to Leddick (LP&L)

(2) W3P84-2366 dated August 27, 1984

Dear Sir:

In your Reference (1) letter you requested additional information resulting from the Staff review of the Waterford 3 SPDS. By Reference (2) LP&L responded to the questions concerning SPDS isolation from safety-related systems.

Enclosed please find the remaining responses to the Human Factors Engineering Branch questions on SPDS. It is worthwhile to note that these responses are based upon the present configuration of SPDS. As operational experience is gained and the Control Room Design Review completed (Spring, 1985), LP&L expects the SPDS to evolve to meet the needs of the operators.

Should you have any questions or comments on this response please contact Mike Meisner at (504) 595-2838.

Yours very truly.

&L K.W. Cook Nuclear Support & Licensing Manager KWC/MJM/pcl Attachment cc: W.M. Stevenson, E.L. Blake, J.T. Collins, D.M. Crutchfield, J. Wilson, G. Lipinsky, G.L. Constable

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.a RESPONSE TO HFEB QUESTIONS

-U , ,0N THE WATERFORD 3 SPDS

.(a) The control _ room operators have two full function SPDS CRTs

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- 620.01;

for;their

use. Providing full function CRTs allows the operators _ faster access to.SPDS information.- When.the operator utilizes one CRT to display,information on a specific safety tunction, the second CRT can be used to display the associated trend display. This_will aid the.

Loperators in quickly determining the_ safety status of the

_ plant systems. Dedicating a CRT to just the. Parameter Summary display could delay the operator in accessing information he desires. By allowing operators the option of alternating between the Parameter Summary display and more detailed displays,'Lthe SPDS_can be utilized to its fullest extent. The operators can be trained to normally-display the

Parameter Summary mimic on'one of the CRTs. The Parameter

, f . Summary is also the default display when the main menu reset

. function is used.

.(b) The software driving the equipment for the TSC and EOF is-designed to preclude the possibility of actions taken on the TSC or EOF SPDS from affecting the display or operation of

,the-control room SPDS. No'on-line test or simulation

-software is planned for the SPDS. system..- Following operations, necessary testing will be performed on an off-line

. duplicate-system.

-(c) The draft EPRI Guidelines - Integrating Human factors

-Engineering into Nuclear Power Plant Design has been used to establish the' display conventions for the SPDS.

Orange'was' chosen as.the. color for the special messages listed in-response to Question 620.01(d). Orange is not used for any other function so as to enhance the significance of

-the~ message. The~ messages will notify the operator of-information which is of-a critical nature. Yellow was chosen as the color for indeterminate conditions. It is used to ensure the' operator is aware that position, flow, speed, etc.

'is not known. It is_important to notify the operator what information is not'available as well as what is available.

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L (d) The'following is a current list.of messages generated by the SPDS._ The messages.are easily understood when viewed on the applicable display.. A brief description is included here for clarity.

ALL CEAS! DROPPED

EFAS 1A This will indicate which EFAS

-EFAS IB signals are present EFAS 2A EFAS 2B-SIS LEAK DETECTED This will appear if the HPSI line reaches 1000 PSIG or the LPSI line

. reaches 300 PSIG.

CCW LEAK D}XC;TED This will appear if any CCW radiation monitor reading is high.

REACTOR VESSEL EJAD This will appear if the reactor head FLANGE LEAK DETECTED gasket pressure is-high.

RCP 1A This will indicate which RCP flange RCP IB is leaking.

RCP 2A RCP 2B CNTMT FAN COOLER This will appear when the condensate DRN FLOW DETECTED flow frcu coolers is high.

RX BLDG +46 These item: identify the general RX BLDG +21- location'of high radiation and RX BLDG -4 direct the operator to the more FHB +46 detailed second level display.

RAB +21

.RAB -4 RAB -34 FHB +46 FHB -1 PROCESS-CONTAINMENT SUMP This will appear when the sump level LEVEL is high.

CONTAINMENT SUMP This will appear when the sump RADIATION radiation level is high.

MAIN STEAM RADIATION This will appear when the main steam radiation level is high.

' CONDENSER CAS EXHAUST 'This will appear when the exhaust RADIATION radiation level is high.

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1(e) AlphabeticLcodes were used to keep the -display .

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'i dentifications-simple and, therefore, avoid errors. Plant spe'cific abbreviations usually require 4.to 6. letters and, "sometimes, more than one word. -Through the use of alphabetic codes the operator can'specify.a system display simply by typing'a single., letter. He can.specify the~ coordinating 7 trend display by typing the 1etter twice.- Each SPDS location T~

-will'.have a Users Manual available for reference to the

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, display: identifiers.

(f) ITheiinformation displayed in the Control Room, TSC, and EOF

'should be' duplicated. Communication between the plant

' operators and the personnel in the TSC and EOF will be greatly improved by,the availability of identical information

~in'the identical format at each locations. Situations which

- may result in confusion or miscommunication during an

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-emergency are--not considered desirable.

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'(g) One outgrowth of th'e detailed control room design review (DCRDR) will be plant-specific conventions for color codes,

. 'e t c . - Because of'the emphasis placed on the SPDS by NUREG 0737 Supplement 1, implementation of the_SPDS will predate completion of the DCRDR. However, the plant computer will be reviewed during the.DCRDR and resolution to human engineering

. discrepancies implemented as necessary.

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Sensor valid'ation-is' performed by comparing the sensor value'to

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j 620.02' 4 the applicable HI;or LOW setpoint. .The.SPDS.' software will only

- consider inputs whose quality.is either GOOD or INSERTED and

- adjust itself accordingly when performing any arithmetic operation-on the data'. .'If there are no GOOD.or INSERTED qualities in the

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- - input data, the software will tag the datalas BAD and place a series of asterisks-(*) on the.CRT screen.

/*: _620.03  : The hardware :and software is ct.rrently being- tested .via approved i procedures. ~Following the completion of all hardware-and software

-tests'the system integration test is planned. Transient test 1 -

cases will be used to drive the SPDS to confirm its capability to 3

. provide the plant operators with. sufficient information. Trained i plant operators will take part during the test to validate that ,

. the SPDS coordinates withltheir training and procedures, and l

. allows for.the rapid and reliable assessment of the safety status of'the plant.

'640.01' . As noted by the NRC,-the' demand signal Containment Isolation g . Actuation Signal.is used by the SPDS as a measure of contaimaent isolation. The question further implies that direct measures such as. valve position _should.also be provided on SPDS as "a sufficient indicator of containment isolation". The SPDS, being a non-safety related system, will not be employed by the operator as the sole means of confirmation of containment isolation. The 1 l

emergency. operating procedures require confirmation of CIAS actuations through qualified instrumentation indication in the 4

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control room;(with minor exceptions noted in W3P84-3029 dated'

' November 6, 1984). Regardless of the level of detail included in the SPDS, the. independent control room confirmation of containment isolation must still be perfocmed and, therefore, the present R information conveyed.by.the SPDS is sufficient for the operator.

640.02) System' testing of the plant ' computer is presently being performed.

This will1 include. validation testing of all plant input utilized

by the SPDS. It is important to note that the SPDS for Waterford 3;did not involve.new hardware implementation. The SPDS is a sof tware implementation on the pre-existing plant _ computer which utilizes data points in the plant computer's data base. The H validation of.that. data base is performed during testing of the

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plant computer _ independent of the SPDS. The SPDS will be tested, utilizing transient cases presently under development, as.

described in response to Question 620.03.

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