IR 05000458/1986023

Insp Rept 50-458/86-23 on 860615-0731.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Evaluation of Startup Test Results,Operational Safety Verification,Safety Sys Walkdown,Maint Witnessing & Surveillance Witnessing

ML20206M854
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	08/19/1986
From:	Chamberlain D, Jaudon J, William Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206M851	List: IR 05000458/1986023 ML20206M845
References
50-458-86-23, NUDOCS 8608260002
Download: ML20206M854 (10)

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APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/86-23 Docket: 50-458 ,

Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company _(CSU)

P. O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: June 15 through July 31, 1986 Inspectors: -

j / h' h'hb D. D. diamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector Date (pars. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) .

I w 8 - 13'B(o W. B. Jones, Resideht Inspecto Date (pars. 1,

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. f. Jaudfin? Chief,'l*roject Section A

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Ddte Rlmctor[ Projects Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted June 15through July 31, 1986 (Report 50-458/86-23)

> Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings. evaluation of startup test results, operational safety verification, safety system walkdown, maintenance witnessing, surveillance witnessing, and quality concern program revie Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie {DR ADOCK 05000458 PDR

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DETAILS

, Persons Contacted -

Principal Licensee Employees

• J. Beck, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering

• H. Cahill, Jr. , Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group

. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs T. C. Crouse, Manager, QA A. O. Fredieu, Assistant Operations Supervisor P. F. Gillespie, Senior. Compliance Analyst D. R. Gipson, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

• E. R. Grant, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing B. R. Hall, Supervisor, Plant Services

• R. W. Helmick, Director, Projects A. D. Kowalczuk, ' Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance

• M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Systems

• J. H. Mc Quirter, Engineer, Licensing

• R. E. Perkins, Resident Engineer, Cajun T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager

• Reynerson, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering (NUPE)

• R. R. Smith, Engineer, Licensing

• C. G. Sprangers, Engineer, QA

• R. B. Stafford, Director, Operations QA

• P. F. Tomlinson, Director, Quality Services D.' Williamson, Operations Supervisor The NRC senior resident inspector (SRI) and resident inspector (RI) also interviewed additional licensee personnel during the inspection perio * Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on August 11, 1986. NRC resident inspector (RI), W. B. Jones, also attended the exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (458/8608-01): Improper disposition of a startup test deficienc This violation involved the closure of a startup test exception based on a condition report response which was dispositioned by Nuclear Plant Engineering (NUPE) with an unsigned and unverified evaluation provided by Stone & Webster (S&W). The licensee has obtained a formal calculation from S&W, and the results are consistent with the unsigned evaluation. NUPE has revised procedure NUPE-AA-54 to

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-3-require that any documentation used as design input from a vendor or agent be officially signed and dated. NUPE sampled 70 other modification requests and no other cases of unsigned letters or unapproved documents were identifie ,

This violation is close (Closed) Open Item (458/8615-04): Additional procedural _ controls for rerelease of maintenance work requests (MWR).

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The licensee issued a change to administrative pEoce' dure-ADM-0028,.

" Maintenance Work Request," which states "The released for work signature is effective for five calendar days, after which time the MWR should be rereleased for work if the work it to be continue Any MWR to be rereleased.for workishall be reviewed in accordance with steps 5.9.1 through 5.9.5. The SS/C0F shall sign and date item No. 26 upon each release for work." The SRI believes that this change provides the necessary procedural controls for rerelease of MWR This open item is closed.

Evaluation of Startup Test Results During this inspection period the resident inspectors reviewed completed test packages for selected startup test For all test packages reviewed it was determined that the licensee startup organization and facility review committee had reviewed and~ accepted the test results and analyzed the test data to verify that the acceptance criteria was me The NRC review of each test is documented'belo Startup Test Procedure 1-ST-19, " Core Performance"

The purpose of this startup test was to evaluate the core thermal power and flow and to verify that core performance parameters are within limits. The core performance parameters are maximum linear heat generation rate (MLHGR), minimum critical power ratio (MCPR), and maximum average planar linear heat generation' rate (MAPLHGR). This startup i test was performed at all six startup test conditions-and the process computer was used to verify core performance parameters. The process computer was previously verified with the General Electric Backup Core Limits Evaluation (BUCLE) for all thermal parameters. The

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review of the test data revealed that no test exceptions were noted

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and core thermal power, flow and core performance parameters were all within Technical Specification limits for all six startup test condition No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.

! Test 1-ST-14, "RCIC System": The RI reviewed the completed test package for 1-ST-14, "RCIC System," and verified that the startup

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-4-test package had been properly reviewe All test exceptions (TE) to this startup test have been closed with the exception of TE-27. This TE was initiated to track the pending Technical Specification (TS)

RCIC high steam line flow isolation setpoint change. Based on the RCIC test results, for 300 percent steam line flow, the licensee has reset the RCIC steam line flow DP Switches to 127 inches of wate The initial TS setpoint for RCIC high steam line flow isolation was less than or equal to 222 inches of water. Tracking LC0 86-322 has also been initiated by the operations staff to track this TS chang Also during the performance of this test, one level 2 criteria violation was identified regarding the turbine governor controller decay ratio exceeding 0.25 during the stability demonstration. This condition was evaluated by General Electric Engineering and determined to be acceptable. This condition does not effect system operabilit No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio Test 1-ST-27, " Turbine Trip and Generator Load Reject": Durir.g this inspection period, the RI began a review of 1-ST-27, " Turbine Trip and Generator Load Reject," startup test result This review will be completed and documented in a subsequent NRC inspection repor No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio Test 1-ST-28, " Shutdown from Outside the Control Room": The RI reviewed the completed test package for 1-ST-28, " Shutdown from Outside the Control Room," and verified the startup package had been properly reviewed by the startup test engineers and Facility Review Committee. All test exceptions (TE) associated with this startup test have been closed. The test results confirmed that the reactor can be remotely shutdown and cooldown initiated and controlled from the remote shutdown pane No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Operational Safety Verification The SRI and RI observed operational activities throughoot the inspection period and closely monitored operational events. Contrsl room activities and conduct were observed to be well controlled and efficient. Proper control room staffing was maintained and access to the control room operational areas was controlled. The licensee was adhe, ring to limiting conditions for operation as they occurred. Operators were questioned regarding lit annunciators and they understood why the aanunciators were lit in all cases. Selected shift turnover meetings were. observed and information concerning plant status was being covered in these meeting ., .

-5-A walkdown of the '.'A" residual heat removal (RHR) system was conducted and the valves were observed to be in the' proper position for standby operation. Several plant tours were conducted and overall plant cleanliness was good. During these plant tours, radiation protection area postings were observed to be accurate. The resident inspectors also reviewed licensee actions on several operational events and problems. The results of reviews of selected items are described below: Reactor scram from turbine trip on high vibration: On June 14, 1986, a reactor scram had occurred when the main turbine tripped on high vibration. The high vibration on the turbine had occurred during the weekly surveillance testing of the turbine stop and control valve During this testing, the turbine load is lowered to approximately 75 percent power, and each stop valve and control valve is individually cycled closed. The testing of the stop valves had been completed and when the No. 1 control valve was tested the turbine tripped on high vibration. Subsequent investigation by the licensee revealed that the No. 1 bearing vibration exceeded the 10 mill trip setpoint during the valve cycling. The licensee, with support from General Electric, determined that testing the No. 1 control valve caused a momentary rise in vibration at the No. 1 bearing due to steam flow unbalance. The licensee revised the test procedure to bypass the high vibration trip function during the control valve testing to prevent recurrence of this problem. The unit was restarted and subsequent testing of the control valves with the vibration trip bypassed has been successful. Licensee Event Report (LER)86-041 issued for this event was reviewed by the SR In addition to the above corrective action, the licensee initiated a design modification request to evaluate the turbine trip logic'for potential improvement No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection and no further followup of this' event is planned by the SR Reactor scram from intermediate range monitor (IRM) upscale: On June 14, 1986, during the restart from the high vibration turbine trip, the unit had tripped on IRM upscale with reactor power at approximately one percent. A pressure / level transient had occurred when two, 3-inch steam drains were opened. The initial power decrease caused the operator to down range the IRMs. The subsequent vessel water level drop had caused cold feedwater to inject, which resulted in a flux increase to the IRMs, and the upscale trip had occurred before the operator could up range the IRMs. The licensee took immediate action to revise the operating procedures to include appropriate cautions when opening steam drains. Also, guidance and training was given to all operating crews as to the causes of the event. LER 86-042 issued for this event was reviewed by the SR No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection and no further followup of this event is planned by the SR . - _ ,

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^ Reactor scram from turbine building high tempe'rature main' steam line isolation: On July 8, 1986, with the unit at~approximately *

65 percent power, a reactor scram occurred when the main steam-isolation valves closed from a turbine building high temperature

isolation trip signa The source of the high temperature was found to be a steam leak from a manway flange gasket failure in a non-safety related moisture separator reheater drain receiver tan The unit remained shutdown while the licensee investigated the:cause of the manway gasket failure. The cause of the gasket failure was found to be' insufficient '.orquing of the manway cover during a previous gasket replacement and the use of inappropriate gasket material. Licensee corrective actions for this event included:

. replacing manway gasket material on both the "A" and "B" drain tanks with suitable material and proper torque application;

. revising General Maintenance Procedure GMP-0018 to clearly

require the appropriate use of torque tables;

. revising Administrative Procedure ADM-0028 to require documented engineering review and approval for all material substitutions;

. training of maintenance personnel on the revised procedures and on the details of the event; and

. reviewing work requests worked during the past two outages to determine if additional high pressure, high temperature work disturbed system boundaries with similar torquing or material deficiencies. No problems were found from this revie LER 86-044 issued for this event was reviewed by the SRI.

' Licensee actions with regard to this event are considered prompt and thorough and no further followup of this event is planned by the SRI.

Reactor scram from turbine trip on loss of condenser vacuum: On July 13, 1986, with the unit at approximately 55 percent power, a reactor scram occurred when the main turbine tripped in a loss of

condenser vacuu The low vacuum was caused by a malfunction in the steam' seal evaporator control system which resulted in a loss of

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steam supply to the turbine steam seal system. The unit remained shutdown while the licensee conducted an investigation of the cause of this event. The licensee determined the cause of the event to be

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a level indication transient in the steam seal evaporator level

indicator electronic circuitry which resulted in a condensate feed isolation. This problem was apparently compounded by the fact that timely operator action was not taken to reestablish proper level with manual control after the level alarm and isolation occurre Although the level alarm was found functional after the event, no record was found of the alarm occurring prior to the event. Also,

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-7-this isolation occurred on the previous operation shift and apparently the information was not provided to the oncoming shif The lack of timely operator action may have been affected by the high/ low level alarm indication being located well away from th eva? orator controls and by there being no annunciation for condensate feed isolatio Immediate licensee corrective action in response to this event included:

. recalibration of the level control and indicating instrumentation;

. operator training to assure appropriate knowledge of the event and required actions;

. condensate feed isolation actuation point was raised from +4 to

+7 inches above center;

. consequences of the thermal shock to the evaporator was evaluated and determined to be of no significance;

. main steam supply valve thermal overload circuitry was investigated and found to be as designed;

. deficiency tags were removed from all annunciators and standing orders given to operators for proper actions concerning both abnormal and valid annunciators;

. operators were given directions in regards to increasing the effectiveness of the shift turnover process; modification requests were written to address the noted design issue The SRI concluded that the licensee response to this event had been prompt and thorough; final closure of this event will be documented-during routine licensee event report revie No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Safety System Walkdown During this inspection period, the SRI and RI performed a walkdown of the

"A" residual heat removal (RHR) system to verify proper system alignment for operability as required by Technical Specifications for Operational Conditions 1, 2 and 3 during plant operations. It was observed that:

. system valves were properly aligned;

. no abnormal control room instrumentation readings or alarms were present;

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. no leakage from major components was present;

. the "A" RHR pump upper and lower bearing oil reservoirs were properly filled; accessible hangers and supports were_ intac No anomalies were noted that would have affected the "A" RHR system operability for low pressure coolant injection (LPCI).

It was noted during this system walkdown that the piping and instrument diagram (P&ID) did not always match the system lineup for valve positions, locked valves, and vent caps. This issue was noted on other systems by the resident inspectors during previous system walkdowns and violation 458/8620-02 was identified. This issue will be resolved after the licensee responds to the identified violatio It was noted that the licensee has taken action on the violation to develop a computer locked valve listing which identifies all locked valves and the reason for the valve being locke The P&ID versus system lineup differences had effect on system operabilit No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Maintenance Witness During this inspection period, the RI observed portions of selected preventive maintenance (PM) activities to verify that maintenance activities are being conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS and appropriate industrial codes and standards. The RI verified through direct observation and review of records that:

. maintenance activities did not violate limiting conditions of operation (LCO);

. redundant components were available;

. required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained before initiating work;

. procedures were adequate to control the work; and

. quality control (QC) hold points were established and observe On July 23, 1986, the licensee conducted PM activities on the Division I diesel generator (D/G) in accordance with the licensee's established PM program. The following PM activities were observed:

. TASK ME 00237 IEG0*FLT1A Duplex 011 Filter

. TASK ME 00241 IEG0* STRIA Lube Oil Pressure Strainer

. TASK ME 00221 IEGA*STR4A Start Air Y Strainer s

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-9-Prior to beginning the maintenance activities, the operations staff initiated LC0 86-596 and carried out the action requirements of TS 3.8.1.1.b for an inoperable D/G because of preventive maintenance activities as required for operational condition The nuclear equipment operator (NED) then obtained clearance numbers 1RB-1-86-1438 and 1RB-1-86-1439 and isolated the Division I D/G air start system from the air start motors by closing valves 1EGS*V161A and 1EGS*V162A respectivel During the performance of the PMs, the RI noted the maintenance personnel demonstrated proficiency in performing the PM tasks and had obtained the applicable general maintenance procedures for each task. When removal of permanently installed strainers for cleaning was necessary, the maintenance personnel initiated the required equipment removal tag Upon completion of the PM activities the coerations staff restored the Division I D/G to operable status and closed LC0 86-59 No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Surveillance Witness The RI witnessed surveillance testing conducted by the licensee during the inspection period and the following observations were made:

. Surveillance Test STP-207-4206 The RI observed the performance of STP-207-4206, "NSSSS/RWCU/RCIC System Isolation Main Steam Line Tunnel Differential Temperature Monthly Chfunct,18 Month Chcal, and 18 Month LSFT (E31-N605B and E31-N605F)," conducted on July 31, 1986. This surveillance is designed to demonstrate the operability of the isolation actuation instrumentation as required by TS Section 4.3.2-1 Tables 4.3.2.1-1-2g, 4.3.2.1-4g, and 4.3.2.1-1.S The portion of the test observed involved the channel functional test for RWCU, NSSSS and RCIC main steam line tunnel differential temperature. Previous performances of this test have resulted in-inadvertent reactor water cleanup (RWCU) isolations. The RI verified through discussions with the technicians performing the test that they were familiar with the test procedure and that an inadvertent RWCU isolation could occur if the procedure steps were not strictly followed. The RI noted that the technicians maintained close communications with the operations staff and insured that all half isolations were cleared prior to resuming wor No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Surveillance Test STP-309-0201

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-10-The RI observed the performance of STP-309-0201, " Diesel Generator Division I Operability Test," conducted on July 31, 1986, while in operational condition 1. This surveillance is designed to demonstrate the operability of the Division I diesel generator (D/G)

and satisfies TS Sections 4.8.1.1.2.a.1 through 4.8.1.1.2.a.7, 4.8.1.1.2.C.1, and The licer:see performed this surveillance test to restore the Division I D/G to operable status after having declared the D/G inoperable at 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> (CDT) on July 31, 1986, because of loss of power to the Division I fuel oil transfer pum Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO)86-617 was initiated at the time the D/G was declared inoperable to track the actions required by TS 3.8.1.1.b as applicable for operational conditions 1, 2 and Prior to initiating the test, communications were established between the nuclear control operator (NCO) in the control room and the NCO at the remote D/G panel. Upon initiation of the STP, the D/G was observed to attain rated frequency and voltage within the required 10 seconds. The D/G was then successfully paralleled to the offsite power supply and loaded to 3000KW for 60 minutes. LC0 86-617 was subsequently closed based on the satisfactory performance of STP-309-201 and TS Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2. No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio . Quality Concern Program The SRI monitored the licensee quality concern program during the inspection period and it was noted that the number of open quality concerns has increased significantly during the last two months. This apparently is due to a significant increase.in scheduled interviews with licensee personnel. The SRI was concerned that the large number of open concerns would dilute the resources of the quality concern group and concerns would not be addressed expeditiously. This was discussed with licensee management, and the SRI was assured that the concerns are being-prioritized so that nuclear safety issues are being addressed expeditiously. The SRI will monitor open quality concerns during' future NRC inspections as an open item (458/8623-01) in order to evaluate the effect on the resources of the quality concern grou No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspectio . Exit and Inspection Interview An exit interview was conducted on August 11, 1986, with licensee representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.