ML20210N190
| ML20210N190 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210N167 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-99-07, NUDOCS 9908110042 | |
| Download: ML20210N190 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1999007
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ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.: 50-458
License No.: NPF-47
Report No.: 50-458/99-07 !
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Facility: River Bend Station
Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61
St. Francisville, Louisiana
Dates: May 30 through July 10,1999
Inspectors: N. P. Garrett, Resident inspector
M. E. Murphy, Senior Resident inspector (Acting)
Approved By: David N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch B
Attachment: Supplemental Information
9908110042 990004
PDR ADOCK 05000458
G PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
River Bend Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-458/99-07
- This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering,
maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
. Operations
The conduct of operations was generally professional and safety conscious
(Section 01.1).
- The plant startup was well controlled. Postmodification and surveillance tests were
properly conducted and well coordinated._ The control room supervisor provided good
direction to the crew during the reactor startup and poststartup testing (Section O1.2).
- The control room supervisor maintained good commanri and control in response to an l
onsite fire alarm caused by an overheated battery charger connected to a forklift in the
main warehouse. The fire brigade responded in a timely manner (Section O1.3).
Maintenance
- The conduct of maintenance and surveillances was generally thorough and professional
(Section M1.1).
- Plant material condition was generally good. Material condition concerns included an
out-of-service control building chiller. Material improvements included the replacement
of failed fuel assemblies and the repair and modification of the main steam isolation
valve poppet valves (Section M2.1).
- An apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was identified
regarding failure to provide adequate work instructions for maintenance of the Division I
emergency diesel generator. This apparent violation is in the licensee's corrective
action program as Conditior. Report CR 99-0366. The issue is being tracked by EA 99-
158 (Section M8.1).
- An apparent violation of Technical Specifications 3.8.1.b and -c was identified regarding
Divisions I and 11 emergency diesel generator inoperability. As a result of improper
maintenance on the Division I emergency diesel generator fuel oil pump coupling, the 1
Division i emergency diesel generator was inoperable for approximately 30 days and
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. During this period, the Division ll emergency diesel generator was removed
from service for approximately 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br />. This apparent violation is in the licensee's
corrective action program as Condition Report CR 99-0366. The issue is being tracked
by EA 99158 (Section M8.1).
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- Enaineerina
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The licensee, although unable to determine a single root cause, identified multiple
contributing factors for the failure of seven fuel elements during Fuel Cycle 8. The
investigation and analyses performed as a result of the fuel failures were extensive and
comprehensive (Section E2.1). l
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The inspectors conducted a review of the Year 2000 activities and documentation using
Temporary Instruction 2515/141, ." Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer
Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." Conclusions regarding the Year 2000 readiness of
. this facility are not included in this summary. The recults of this review will be combined
with reviews of Year 2000 programs at other plants in a summary report to be issued at
a later date (Section E8.1).
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-In July 1997, the licensee identified, and reported in Licensee Event Report
50-458/97-004, that proper design information for the Division lli battery had not been
used to determine the surveillance acceptance criteria. This was a violation of Technical
Specification 5.4.1. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited l
violation in accordance with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation
is addressed in the licensee corrective action program as Condition Reports 97-1079
and 97-1111 (Section E8.3).
Plant Suooort
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Licensee personnel were observed to be properly implementing radiological control
practices and procedures in the field (Section R4.1).
Emergency preparedness facilities were properly maintained (Section P2.1).
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a - Protected area illumumtion levels, maintenance of the isolation zone around the
protected area barriers, and the status of the security secondary power supply '
equipment were properly maintained (Section S1.1).
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Report Details
Summarv of Plant Status
- At the beginning of the inspection period the plant was in Operational Mode 5 for Forced
Outage 99-01. The plant entered Mode 2 on June 29 and was synchronized to the grid on
July 3. At the end of the period, the plant was at 80 percent power for rod sequence exchange.
I. Operations
01 Conduct of Operations I
01.1 General Comments (71707. 9370.2)
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The inspectors used inspection Procedure 71707 to conduct frequent reviews of
ongoing plant operations. The conduct of operations was generally professional and
safety conscious. Interviews with various operators confirmed that they were
knowledgeable of system conditions and were observed to be properly responsive to
recurring alarms.
01.2 Plant Startuo
a. Insoection Scoce ( 71707)
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The inspectors observed the reactor startup to criticality on June 29 and
postmodification and surveillance testing during the approach to full power.
b. Observations and Findinas ;
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The plant startup was well controlled and conducted in accordance with procedural
requirements. The control room supervisor provided appropriate and timely briefings
during the evolution. Criticality was achieved consistent with the estimated critical rod
position predicted by the reactor engineer.
The inspectors observed portions of the turbine control valve postmodification tests.
These tests were conducted in accordance with Procedures OSP-0102, " Turbine Valve
Testing," and STP-508-4514, " Turbine Stop Valve Channel Functional Test (C71-N006)
Channels A through H." The pre-test briefings were properly conducted. Coordination i
among operations, instrumentation and controls, and engineering personnel was
effectively established. Briefings were heVd for each power level at which portions of the
tests were conducted. Coordination during the conduct of the tests was excellent. The !
tests were completed satisfactorily. 1
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c. Conclusions
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The plant startup was well controlled. Postmodification and surveillance tests were
properly conducted and well coordinated. The control room supervisor provided good
direction to the crew during the reactor startup and poststartup testing.
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l 01.3 Operations Response to Fire Alarm '
a. Inspection ScoDe (93702)
The inspectors observed the control room response to an onsite fire alarm,
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors observed control room personnel response to the report of smoke in the !
main warehouse. The fire alarm was sounded, the fire brigade was summoned, and all
plant personnel were advised of the reported condition. The required notifications were
made in a timely manner. The fire brigade leader promptly informed the control room of
his observations when he reached the warehouse. The cause of the alarm was an
overheated battery charger attached to a forklift. The fire brigade completed a thorough
search for other signs of fire and reported all clear. The control room announced all
clear for the benefit of plant personnel.
c. Conclusions
The control room supervisor maintained good command and control in response to an
onsite fire alarm caused by an overheated battery charger connected to a forklift in the
main warehouse. The fire brigade responded in a timely manner.
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety related systems:
- Low Pressure Core Spray
a Residual Heat Removal, Trains A, B, and C
= Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
a Divisions I,11, and ill Emergency Diesel Generators
- Divisions I,11, and lll Switchgear and Battery Rooms
. Standby Gas Treatment System Trains A and B
= Standby Service Water System Trains A and B
The systems were found to be properly aligned for the plant conditions and generally in
good material condition.
During plant tours, housekeeping in readily accessible areas was observed to be good.
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Clearance Orders: The inspectors observed or walked down the following safety-related
clearance orders:
RB-99-0923, EGA-C2A EGA Corpressors (Division 11 EDG)
RB-99-0932, HVR-UC1 A Blower (Division i Unit Cooler)
The inspectors verified the restoration of the following safety-related clearance order
following maintenance:
- RB-99-1032, HVF-FLT2B Filter
No problems were noted during the review of the clearance orders.
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
~ 08.1 Violation Closure
The inspectors performed an in-office review of outstanding violations in the operations
area. The Severity Level IV violation listed below was issued in a Notice of Violation
prior to March 11,1999. On this date, the NRC changed the policy for treatment of
Severity Level iV violations (Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy). Because this
violation would have been treated as a noncited violation in accordance with
Appendix C, it is being closed out in this report, consistent with the new Enforcement
Policy for Severity Level IV violations. The inspectors verified that the licensee had
included this violation in their corrective action (CA) program. The CA program
reference for the vielation is listed below. In addition, the violation already has a
docketed response.
Violation Number Description CA Program
Reference
50-458/9710-0! Procedure not established for corrective CR 97-0873
lenses for operations donning SCBA
Corrective action effectiveness reviews for selected violations will be accomplished as a I
routine part of the NRC's CA program inspections. !
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II. Maintenance
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M1 Conduct of Maintenance ,
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M1.1 General Comments !
a. Inspection Scope (61726,62707) i
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance
activities: i
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mal 326464, Fuel Building Charcoal Filter 2B (Filter medium replacement)
STP 209-6310, RCIC Pump Quarterly Operability and Flow Test, Revision 12
STP 209-0601, RCIC Initiation Functional, Revision 10
STP 209-0602, RC'C System Flow Test, Revision 9 ,
STP-050-0702, Refueling Outage Reactor Pressure Vessel inservice Leakage
Test, Revision 4
STP-052-3701, Control Rod Scram Testing, Revision 14
b. Observations and Findinas
The performance of maintenance and surveillances was gerierally thorough and
professional.
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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours ,
a. Inspection Scoce (62707)
During this inspection period, the inspectors conducted interviews and routine plant
tours to evaluate plant material condition.
b. Observations and Findinas
Overall plant material condition was good, with one exception. The following material
condition problem was observed:
HVK "C" Chiller Inoperable: On May 18,1999, the "C" HVK chiller tripped
following restoration of offsite power during emergency core cooling system
testing. The chiller is required to continue operations following restoration of
power. Troubleshooting efforts continued; however the chiller has remained
inoperable during this period.
Material condition improvements included:
- Fuel Element Failures: During the outage, the licensee confirmed that seven
fuel bundles contained leaking fuel pins. The licencee replaced the failed fuel
elements with new fuel elements (see Section E2.1).
- Main Steam isolation Valves: One of the eight main steam isolation valvos failed
the 18-month localleak rate test. Displaying a good questioning attitude,
mechanical maintenance questioned the adequacy of using a single setscrew to
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secure the poppet valve retaining nut to the poppet valve. Upon further
investigation of the remaining valves, one poppet valve was identified in the early
stages of seat failure. The method of securing the poppet valve nut to the
. poppet valve was modified from the use of a single setscrew to welding the
poppet valve retaining nut to the poppet valve. This modification was completed
for all main steam isolation valves. The licensee was assessing the need to
disseminate this information to the industry,
c. Conclusions
Plant material condition was good. Material condition concerns included an out-of-
service control building chiller. Material condition improvements include the replacement I
of the failed fuel assemblies and repair and modification to the main steam isolation !
valve poppet valves.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-458/9903: Inoperable emergency diesel generator
due to inadequate maintenance. On March 24,1999, the Division i emergency diesel
generator failed a one-hour surveillance test. After running for 55 minutes, the engine
experienced load swings and was secured by the operator. The licensee identified that
the engine-driven fuel oil booster pump had failed as the result of a taper pin dislodging j
from the drive side of the engine-driven fuel oil pump coupling. The licensee also
identified that testing of the emergency diesel generator without reliance on a nonsafety-
related function had not been performed.
The Division i diesel engine had been removed from service on February 23,1999, for a
planned maintenance outage to repair a shaft sealleak on the fuel oil pump. The
maintenance was performed on February 24,1999, using Work Package MAI 319116.
The work package required disassembly of the engine-driven fuel oil pump coupling in 4
order to repair the leak. The work package was completed and the diesel engine was !
returned to service following the outage on February 25,1999, after successfully
completing a one-hour surveillance test run of the diesel generator. On March 23,1999,
the next monthly Technical Specification Surveillance run was initiated. Approximately
55 minutes into the run, erratic generator load indications were observed and the diesel !
generator was tripped by the Unit Operator at 12:04 a.m. on March 24. The load swings l
were determined to be caused by the fuel pump drive coupling separating, resulting in I
loss of fuel to the engine.
The licensee initiated an investigation into the event and determined that the fuel oil
pump coupling had been improperly reassembled. Specifically, the coupling had not
been staked properly nor had Loctite 680, a compound utilized to increase the coupling ;
bond shear strength, been applied as required by the vendor in Cooper-Enterprise
Service Information Memo #363, step 10.2.
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On March 25,1999, the fuel pump coupling was reassembled in accordance with the
vendor's requirements. The engine was started, tested satisfactorily, and declared
Further review by the licensee determined that the work package under which the work
was initially conducted, MAI 319116, did not provide direction to apply the Loctite 680
compound upon reassembly of the coupling. The planner that generated the work
package had reviewed prior job packages that accomplished the same task, but all were
deficient in the requirement to apply the Loctite 680 compound.
River Bend procedure, " Maintenance Planning Guideline", Revision 6. Section 6.5.9.5,
states, in part, " Reference all procedures, vendor procedures, and design documents
required to perform the work instructions and to return the . . . system . . . to operational
or desired status."
The vendor manual contained Cooper-Enterprise Service Information Memo, S.I.M. 363, l
Revision 1, dated December 2,19993, which states, in part, " Reports have been
received from the field that the overspeed governor / fuel booster pump couplings have
worked loose under certain operating conditions. Failure of this coupling will result in a
loss of fuel oil pressure . . ." Step 10 of Service Information Memo states, " Install fuel
pump drive couplings with Loctite 680."
The failure to provide adequate work instructions for reassembly of the fuel pump
coupling is an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V
(50-458/9907-01).
The engine is required to be able to operate a sufficient length of time to mitigate the
consequences of an accident, and Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.13 requires that the
emergency diesel generators be able to operate for 2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The diesel engine
demonstrated that it was able to run only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 55 minutes prior to failure of the
fuel pump coupling and, as such, was inoperable from the time it was taken out of
service for maintenance on February 23 until it was repaired and restored to operability
on March 25,1999. The total time the engine was inoperable was approximately
30 days and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The maximum allowable outage time for a single emergency
diesel generator is 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
During the period that the Division i emergency diesel generator was inoperable, the
Division ll emergency diesel generator was removed from service on two occasions for
a total period of 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> and 54 minutes. With two required emergency diesel
generators inoperable, the maximum time allowed to restore at least one of the diesels
to an operable status was 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
The Division lil emergency diesel generator, and/or systems to support the Division ill
emergency diesel generator, were also out of service for approximately 6 days and
11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> during the period that the Division I diesel generator was out of service.
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The failure to maintain the diesel generators operable consistent with the Technical I
Specification requirements is an apparent violation of Technical Specifications 3.8.1.b
and -c (50-458/9907-02).
Upon failure of the Division i emergency diesel generator, immediate corrective actions
were taken to ensure the operability of the Division 11 emergency diesel generator,
including inspection of the fuel pump coupling. This was previously documented in NRC
inspection Report 50-458/99-03. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence were being I
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generated and included updating vendor manuals, developing standard job plans for
use on the engine-driven fuel pump coupling that will include the appropriate
requirements, reviewing of proper pin staking techniques by maintenance personnel,
and reviewing service information memoranda to determine the applicability of previous l
work on the emergency diesel generators. l
This issue is in the licensee corrective action tracking system as Condition Report I
CR 99-0366. The issue is being tracked by EA 99-158. l
During investigation of the diesel generator failure, the licensee also identified that l
appropriate testing of the diesel generator to start and operate without reliance on a
nonsafety related function had not been demonstrated. When the diesel is started, the ,
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nonsafety-related auxiliary direct current fuel oil pump normally starts to prime the fuel
injectors. The licensee did not have documented evidence that the diesel engine would
start without the aid of the auxiliary fuel oil pump. On April 23,1999, the licensee i
performed a diesel generator start test with the auxiliary direct current fuel oil pump de- l
energized. The test was performed with the pump secured and the licensee concluded
that the engine-driven fuel oil booster pump alone was sufficient to start the diesel
engine.
Ill. Enaineerina
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment (37551)
E2.1 Failed Fuel
a. Inspec ion Scope (37551)
During Fuel Cycle 8, seven fuel element failures occurred. The inspector followed the
licensee evaluation of the failures.
b. Observations and Findinos
During Refueling Outage 8, the licensee confirmed that seven fuel element failures had
occurred during cycle operations. An extensive root cause analysis was performed
during the refueling outage. The licensee root cause analysis did not identify a single
specific cause for the failures, but did identify multiple possible causes and contributing
factors.
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As each potential fuel element failure was identified, the licensee took prompt action to
suppress the failures by inserting a control rod to minimize the potential damage.
During the recent refueling outage, the seven potential failures were confirmed. Some
of the fuelinspection findings were:
1. All of the failed rods were in new fuel bundles installed for Fuel Cycle 8 (HGE),
2. Six of the seven bundles were in symmetrical core cells,
3. All of the cladding perforations appeared to be due to cladding corrosion and
related to the thermal effects of high Chalk River unidentified deposits (CRUD) ,
loading,
4. The failed fuel rods had a heavy buildup of CRUD in clumpy formations,
5. The perforations occurred at approximately the 50-inch elevation on the fuel rods
under heavy CRUD formations. This is a region which is typically at the end of
the bulk boiling region within the bundles, and
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6. All of the failed bundles were in the high-power core ring.
The licensee's root cause investigation covered plant chemistry history and controls, the
CRUD deposit chemistry, core design and operation, comparison with other operating
boiling water reactors, chemical intrusions, and cycle operating differences. The
observations made included:
1. Use of different feedwater resins from previous fuel cycles,
2. Feedwater iron and copper content were higher than preceding fuel cycles,
3. Depleted zinc injection was used,
4. An extended control blade sequence exchange interval was used,
5. The core was operated in an extended operating domain using the maximum
extended load line limit analysis. This operating domain allowed a higher rod line
for the normal core flow,
6. At least two conductivity excursions occurred during the operating cycle. One of
the excursions was long term, lasting 21 days, and
7. The fuel assembly CRUD chemical analysis revealed a high iron content.
The licensee did not determine a single cause for the clad perforations. However, the
licensee fuel inspection team concluded that the fuel failures were caused by the
extreme CRUD loading on the fuel bundles which reduced heat transfer. The reduction
in heat transfer combined with high power operation resulted in cladding perforations.
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The licensee corrective actions included:
1. Discharging all of the General Electric HGE bundles from the core and replacing
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them with new fuel assemblies,
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tolerances. This included not using depleted zine during Fuel Cycle 9,
3. Reducing iron and copper introduction to the reactor,
4. Not operating in the extended operating domain using the maximum extended
load line limit analysis, and
5. Not introducing planned hydrogen water chemistry controls during Fuel Cycle 9.
The licensee could not determine a single specific root cause for the failure of the seven
fuel elements during Fuel Cycle 8. The conclusions drawn indicated that the failures
were related to conductivity excursions experienced during the fuel cycle, high power
bundles in high power regions, and increased injection of metals into the reactor. The
inspectors considered the corrective actions implemented prior to returning the plant to
operation to be acceptable,
c. Conclusions
The licensee, although unable to determine a single root cause, identified multiple
contributing factors for the failure of seven fuel elements during Fuel Cycle 8. The
investigation and analyses performed as a result of the fuel failures were extensive and
comprehensive.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness Review
a. Insoection Scone (Tl 2514/141)
-The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's preparations for the Y2K transition.
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b. Observation and Findinas
The inspectors conducted a review of Y2K readiness activities and documentation using
Temporary instruction (TI) 2515/141," Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of
Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," dated April 13,1999. The review I
addressed aspects of Y2K management planning, documentation, implementation
planning, initial assessment, detailed assessment, remediation activities, Y2K testing
and validation, notification activities, and contingency planning. The reviewers used
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NEl/NUSMG 97-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," dated October 1997, and
NEl/NUSMG 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," dated
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August 1998, as the primary references for this review.
Conclusions regarding the Y2K readiness of this facility are not included in this report.
The results of this review will be combined with reviews of Y2K programs at other plants
in a summary report to be issued at a later date.
E8.2 Violation Closure
The below violation is closed consistent with the guidance previously provided in
Section 08.1 of this report.
Violation Number Description CA Program
Reference !
50 458/9710-03 Failure to install criticality monitoring CR 97-1010
during new fuelinspection
E8.3 (Closed) License Event Report (LER) 50-458/97-04: Inadequate surveillance of
Division lli battery due to calculation error. This event report documented a failure to
perform an adequate surveillance on the Division ll1 battery as a result of a calculation
error of the battery profile. The issues identified in this LER were reviewed in NRC
Inspection Report 50-458/97-13. The failure to incorporate the proper design
information for the Division til battery into the surveillance acceptance criteria is a
violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 (50-458/9907-03). This Severity LevelIV
violation is being treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Appendix C of the
NRC Enforcement Policy. The circumstances addressed in the LER and the NRC
inspection report are addressed in the licensee corrective action program as Condition
Reports 97-1079 and 97-1111. The licensee's corrective actions were acceptable and
the battery was determined to be operable.
IV. Plant Support
R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Radiological Protection Controls
R4.1 Refuelina Outaae Radioloaical Controls (71750)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensee radiological control practices during plant tours, new
fuel receipt, and fuel movements in the upper fuel pool and the fuel building.
b. Observations and Findinas
Licensee personnel were observed to be properly implementing radiological control
practices and procedures in the field. The fuel receipt activity was properly monitored by
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radiological control technicians. During movements of spent fuelin the upper fuel pool,
proper radiological practices were demonstrated by the licensee personnel involved in
the fuel movement. Radiological control technicians provided continuous and
appropriate monitoring during fuel movements in the fuel building.
P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Facilities, Equipment, and Resources
P2.1 General Comments (71750) l
During routine plant tours, the inspectors verified that the emergency preparedness
facilities were properly maintained. No problems were found.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1 General Comments (71750)
During routine tours, the inspector observed protected area illumination levels,
maintenance of the isolation zones around protective area barriers, and the status of
security secondary power supply equipment. No problems were observed.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The exit meeting was conducted on July 19,1999. The licensee did not express a
position on any findings in the report. None of the material discussed in the exit meeting
was considered proprietary.
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ATTACHMENT
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
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R. Edington, Vice President-Operations
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B. Biggs, Licensing Engineer
P. Chapman, Superintendent, Chemistry
D. Dormady, Manager, Plant Engineering
J. Fowler, Director, Quality Programs
T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Maintenance
l J. Holmes, Manager Radiation Protection and Chemistry '
l H. Hutchens, Superintendent, Plant Security
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R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs I
- D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing
D. Mims, General Manager, Plant Operations
J. McGhee, Acting Manager, Operations
D. Pace, Director, Design Engineering
A. Wells, Superintendent, Radiation Control
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support
IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
Reactor Facilities
IP 92901: Followup - Operations
IP 92902: Followup-Maintenance
IP 93702: Prompt Response to Events
Temporary Instruction 2515/141: Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems
at Nuclear Power Plants
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
~ Opened
50-458/9907-01 eel An apparent violation of Criterion V of Appendix B
to 10 CFR Part 50 regarding failure to provide
adequate work instruction for the performance of
maintenance on the Division i diesel generator
(Section M8.1).
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50-458/9907-02 eel An apparent violation of Technical
Specification 3.8.1.b regarding diese generator
operability (Section M8.1)
50-458/9907-03 NCV Inadequate surveillance of Division lli battery due
to calculation error (Section E8.3)
Closed
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50-458/97-04 LER Inadequate surveillance of Division Ill battery due
to calculation error (Section E8.3)
50-458/9710-01 VIO Procedure not established for corrective lenses for
operations donning SCBAs (Section 08.1)
50-458/9710-03 VIO Failure to install criticality monitoring during new
fuel inspection (Section E8.2) l
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l 50-458/9903-03 URI Division I diesel failure due to inadequate
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maintenance (Section M8.1)
50-458/9907-03 NCV Inadequate surveillance of Division 111 battery due
to calculation error (Section E8.3)
I
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CRUD Chalk River unidentified deposits
LER licensee event report l
MAI maintenance action item
l NCV noncited violation
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OSP operations surveillance procedure
PDR public document room
RCIC reactor core isolation cooling
SCBA self contained breathing apparatus
STP sunteillance test procedure
URI unresolved item
VIO violation
Y2K Year 2000
,
l
1
)