IR 05000458/1989031

Insp Rept 50-458/89-31 on 890701-31.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint & Surveillance Test Observation,Esf Walkdown & Emergency Preparedness Drill

ML20247B084
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	08/29/1989
From:	Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247B045	List: IR 05000458/1989031 ML20247B038 ML20247B075
References
50-458-89-31, NUDOCS 8909120342
Download: ML20247B084 (10)

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APPENDIX Bi

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':U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY?C0hMISSION w

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REGION.IV J x y 4

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t NRC Insp ction' Report: 50-458/89-31:

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Operating License: NPF-47; -

Dock'et; j 50-458 :

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Licensee:  ;

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Gulf States Utilities (GSU).

P.O.: Box 220 _

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Sth Francisville,. Louisiana 70775"

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T a 4 Facility Name: River Bend' Station (RBS)

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fInspection;Ati 'RBS, St. Francisville, Louisiana i Inspec. tion 'Co.nducted: July.1-31,1989

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-Inspectors:, , E; J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector:. .~,

4 W. B. Jones, Resident Inspector y .~

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.. Approved: #, _- __

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O.;L. CUnitable, Chief, Project Section C Date -'

M , s Division of Reactor. Projects-

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' Inspection Coriducted July 1-31, 1989 (Report.50-458/89-31)

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7 AreasInspectedi Routine, unannounced--inspection'of operational safety -

verification, maintenance and surveillance < test observation, engineered safety

. features walkdown,. emergency preparedness drill, and licensee action on a

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Results': _ Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to y . implement adequate corrective action, paragraph 4). ' Two orevious event s

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involving Stones.& Webster (S&W) Projects personnel wer' .dentified by the licensee to have occurred in part because of.a breakdown in communication C ' between S&W supervisors,' craft foremen, and crr.ft personnel. Correctivt

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actions to ensure that craft personnel received the correct maintenance instructions were not implemented. This resulted in the loss of a statio ' ,e -transformer,on June ~14,;1989, during the performance of a maintenance activit The: licensee's review of the-subsequent event was not complete in that a11Jthe X  : facts relevant were'notl ascertained. Specifically, the licensee did not.

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determine whereithe' communication breakdown occurred and whether the craftsman was cognizant of the status of:the' trip" rela A

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8909120342 890901

{DR ADOCK 05000458 PDC

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t DETAILS- *

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1.- ' Persons Contacted *

J. E. Booker, Manager, Oversight

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p" E. M.' Cargill,. Supervisor,' Radiation Programs

, '*J. W. Cook, Lead Environmental Analyst, Nuclear Licensing:

p *T. C.LCrouse, Manager, Quality Assurance (QA)

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• J. C.'Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Grou D. R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant' Manager, Maintenance L. A. England, Director Nuclear Licensing '

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n A. O. Fredieu,' Supervisor, Operations,

-P. E. Freehill, Outage; Manager ..

• P..D. Graham,, Executive Assistant', Senior Vice President

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-D. E. Jernigan, Instrumentation and Control-Supervisor

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J.1 King, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing',

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H. Odell, Manager,-Administration

• T.LF. Plunkett,. Plant Manager

'*J.:P. Schippert, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Radwaste K. E.'Suhrke, Manager, Project Management R. J. Vachon, Senior Compliance = Analyst J. Venable, Assistant Operations Supervisor .

G._ West,. Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Services

'The NRC also interviewed. additional licensee personnel during~the

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. inspection perio * Denotes those persons-that attended-the exit.' interview conducted'on

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August 10,.198 ,

2. - ' Plant' Status The reactor was taken critical on July 1, 1989, following a 2-day. forced'

outage to repair an electrohydraulic control fluid leak on a combined

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intercept control valve. The main generator was synchronized to the grid-tthe same day. Following repairs to one of the three reactor feedwater

. pumps, the' reactor was operated.at essentially full power through the end of the inspection perio During the week of July 23, 1989, an increase in unidentified leakage was

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noted. The unidentified leakage increased at' a linear rate to approximate 1y'2.5 gpm at the end of the inspection period. The licensee-planned to begin-an orderly shutdown when the unidentifiedileakage reaches

, 4 gpm. The' Technical Specification limit is 5:.gpm. The licensee believed the leakage was coming from the recirculation "A" pump sea . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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The. inspectors observed operational activities throughout the inspection period'and closely monitored operational events. Control room conduct and

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y -3-activities'were generally observed to be well controlled. Proper control h Lroom staffing was maintained and access to the control room was well controlled. Selected shift turnover meetings were observed and it was .

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'found that detailed information concerning plant status.was being covered.

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Several control board walkdowns were conducted by the inspectors. In all

. cases, the responsible operators were cognizant as to why an alarm was lit and the reason for each plant configuration. Operational conditions and events, identified.through discussions with-the reactor operators and p review of condition reports, were identified in the main control room log.

l Inoperable equipment identified during the main control board walkdowns

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were identified by the- applicable limiting condition for operatio The inspectors conducted several tours of accessible areas of the facility

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during this inspection period. General housekeeping practices have improved since the completion of the refueling outage. Walkdowns of the low pressure core spray, low pressure coolant injection, and high pressure core spray systems were conducted. This included verifying that the required valves were locked open and the' associated power supplies for the electrical components were energize The inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological program.were implemented in conformance with facility

' policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements. Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled. Radiation work

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permits contained appropriate information to ensure that work could be

, . performed in a safe manner. During plant tours, the inspectors verified that selected very high radiation area access doors were locked and close The inspectors observed security personnel perform their duties of personnel and package. searc Personnel access was observed to be controlled in accordance with established procedures. The inspectors conducted site tours'to ensure that compensatory posts were properly implemented as required because of equipment failure or degradatio '

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the

. inspectio . Maintenance Observation (62703)-

During this inspection period, the inspector observed corrective maintenance activities on the Division I standby gas treatment system (GTS) and reviewed the maintenance work order (MWO) package associated with the installation of the Preferred "F" station transformer and its auxiliary component ~

MWO R056336 was initiated to investigate and repair the Division I standby GTS fan motor (1GTS*FN1A) supply breaker which was identified to have an inoperable charging motor. This condition was identified on July 24, 1989, and a prompt MWO request was initiated to troubleshoot the breaker. Prior to beginning work, the breaker was I

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• , -4-logged out of service utilizing Clearance Number RB-1-89-2177 A quality control (QC) inspector was contacted prior to beginning work

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as is required for a prompt MWO. . The QC inspector documented hi inspection results in Inspection Report 89-IR-27270. Troubleshooting

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of the breaker" identified that the charging motor was inoperable and, the breaker subassembly appeared to be warped. The inoperable

. breaker'was subsequently replaced with a rebuilt breaker. The functional / operability ~ test was completed in accordance with Corrective Maintenance Procedure CMP-1023, " Maintenance and Functional Testing of G.E. 480 volt Switchgear Breaker," Revision The inspectors are reviewing the breaker failure as part of the followup to Open Item 458/8813-02; which will remain open'pending further NRC revie *

.MWO R125591 was initiated to replace the Preferred "B" station transformer and the associated support equipment with a new transformer designated as Preferred "F" station transformer. On May 29, 1989, the Preferred "B" station transformer failed when the operators attempted to energize the transformer. (An additional writeup of the Preferred "B" station transformer failure is provided

.in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/89-28 ) Clearance No. ERB-1-89-1855 was initiated on May 30, 1989, to ground the offsite power feed line to both.the Preferred "B" and "D" station transformer. On June 12, 1989, a partial clearance release was granted-to-allow energizing the Preferred "D" station transformer. The loads on the Division II emergency bus were subsequently transferred to the Preferred "D"

-station transforme On June 13, 1989, a S&W craftsperson was dressing and relugging cables in Junction Box 1-JB9168. This junction box provides the terminator points for cables from the Preferred "F" station transformer control cabinet and the transformer relay cable An intermediate junction box is provided between 1-JB9168.and the sudden pressure trip relay where the trip wires from the Preferred "D" station transformer are terminated. This establishes a parallel trip'

circuit from the same sudden pressure relay for both the Preferred

"D" and "F" station transformers. Although the sudden pressure trip wire to 1-JB9168 had been. determinate, the wire end was taped and left energized. On June 14, 1989, while dressing a cable associated with the transformer sudden pressure trip relay, a trip'of the Preferred "D" station transformer occurred. This resulted in a loss of offsite power to-the Division 11 emergency bus and a start of the Division 11 emergency diesel generator.

L The individual had cut through two cables on the relay side of the junction box, one of which was the sudden pressure trip. This actuated the sudden pressure trip relay and caused the supply breakers to the Preferred "D" and station transformer to ope On June 12, 1989, following energizing of the Preferred "D" station transformer, a GSU representative instructed an S&W supervisor to I - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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c 5-only land ?eads from the control cabinet to the junction box. The leads

from the junction box to the plant relays were to be landed by GSU relay personnel. This instruction was not passed down to the S&W orange book craftsman performing the work. The individual was following the work instruction identified in MWO R125591. Step AK cf M -the job plan instructed the worker to " Terminate all cables in the

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. junction box (1-JB9168) and control cabinet per Step 6 of MR-89-0128 - GSU assist as necessary and may term in cont. cab." Two side notes to the instructions were: " Dressed and lugged onl Relay people to land," and "GSU to terminate control cabinet." No cautions were given to advise that the relay wires were energize The inspector reviewed two previous events involving S&W Projects

. personnel where apparent miscommunication resulted in events during maintenance activities. The first event occurred on March 22, 1989, when the . incorrect circulating water system valve was removed resulting in 4,000-5,000 gallons of water entering the floor drain system.' The second event occurred on March 24, 198 This event

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involved the cutting of the incorrect residual heat removal test

. return spool inside the containment building. This second event is documented in' Condition Report (CR)89-026 The licensee reviewed the above two events and established corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence of the events. The corrective

actions to be taken are described in the Block 10 response to CR 89-0262. The Block 10, " Investigation,' Analysis, Corrective Action, Disposition Details, . Work Instructions," corrective actions included:

effective immediately, a verbal / written turnover between S&W supervision an all Orange Book Craft supervision will no longer be adequate;

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the S&W supervisor and the craft foreman will be required to assure that any component being worked on is the correct component and has been removed from service per all applicable GSU site procedures; and

all work released MWO's in possession of S&W Projects have been revised for the addition of equipment identification hold points for QC verification regardless of QA category. In addition, all future MWO's, either processed or assigned to S&W Projects, will be routed through QC for the same verificatio During the review of the event, the inspector learned that verbal instructions between GSU personnel and S&W supervision were given for work associated with dressing, lugging, and landing leads between the control cabinet and the junction box onl This instruction was not given to the worker performing the activit The licensee's investigation of the Preferred "D" station transformer trip did not determine where the subsequent breakdown in communications nccurred.

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-6-The'S&W supervisor and foreman did.not assure that the correct component was being worked. ' Review of MWO R125591 revealed that the QC notification / review had been marked "N/A." This failure to implement the corrective actions from.the previous two events wa identified by the inspector'as an apparent' violation (458/8931-01).

Although implementation of previous corrective actions should have prevented the sudden pressure trip of the' Preferred "D". station

transformer, the inspector noted that the work controls should have been more extensive. Because the sudden pressure trip relay is a parallel for both the Preferred "F".and "D" station transformers, the failure to, completely isolate the trip circuit from the maintenance activity provided the opportunity for the event to occur. -The apparent inadequacies in the maintenance job. plan were discussed with licensee management personnel. The adequacy of the job planning should be considered by the licensee in their response to the above I

violatio . Surveillance Test Observation (61726)

During this inspection period, the inspectors! observed the. performance of-the following surveillance procedures:

Surveillance Test Procedures STP-511-4501, "RPS/ Isolation Actuation-MSLI-Main Steam Line Radiation-High Monthly

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CHFunctional (D17-K601A)"

l This surveillance test procedure was performed on July 29, 1989, with l- the reactor at 100 percent thermal powe This monthly channel

functional test is used to verify operability of the reactor

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protection system (RPS)/ main steam line isolation (MSLI) main steam i

line high radiation instrumentation (D17-K601A). The surveillance test meets the Technical Specification requirements of Sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1, Tables 4.3.1.1-1.7 and 4.3.2.1-1.2.b.

l l Prior to beginning the test, the main steam line area full power

! background radiation levels were obtained and used to calculate the desired upscale alarm and maximum upscale trip values. The inspector independently verified the minimum and maximum upscale alarm and trip values as being correct. The licensee's calculated minimum and maximum upscale alarm and trip values were then used to verify the instrument trip setpoints were within the required rang During the performance of the surveillance test, the I&C technicians informed the operators when half scrams should be expected. The half scrams were quickly reset to minimize the time the plant was operated in this condition. The test was completed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after placing the trip system in an inoperable status with one operable channel in the'same trip system monitoring the same parameter as allowed by the Technical Specification _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

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STP-599-4201, " Loose' Parts Monitoring System CRD Housing Monthly CHFunct, 18 Month CHCal (ILPM-NBEIA; ILPM-NBIIA)"

STP-559-4203, " Loose Parts Monitoring System 1B33*C001A Suction Monthly CHFunct, 18 Month CHCal (ILPM-NBElB; ILPM-NBI2A)"

STP-511-4205, " Loose Parts Monitoring System Feedwater Inlet Monthly CHFunct, 18 Month CHCal (ILPM-NBE3A; ILPM-NBI3A)"

.STP-511-4207, " Loose Parts Monitoring System Main Steam Outlet Monthly CHFunct, 18 Month CHCal (ILPM-NBE4A; ILPM-NB14A)"

These monthly surveillance tests were performed with the reactor in Operational Condition 1. The tests satisfy the Technical Specification Section 4.3.7.9.b requirement to perform a channel functional test of the loose parts monitoring system instrumentation for the control rod drive (CRD) housing, reactor water cleanup system suction, feedwater inlet, and steam outlet pipin The' inspector discussed the procedures with the technicians who were able to explain the technical intent of the procedure and had a working knowledge of the involved plant syste The test equipment being utilized was verified to be within its calibration due dat The inspector noted that the control operating foreman (C0F) had granted permission to perform the test, and the technicians conducted the test utilizing the latest revision of an approved procedur Independent verification and lifted lead control were performed as required by General Maintenance Procedure (GMP)-0042, " Circuit Testing and Lifted Leads and Jumpers." The test results were reviewed and approved by the C0 STP-511-4503, "RPS/ Isolation Actuation-MSLI-Main Steam Line Radiation-High Monthly CHFunct (D17-K6010)"

The inspector reviewed this surveillance test which was performed on July 30, 1989, with the reactor at 100 percent thermal power. This monthly channel .Nnctional test is used to verify operability of the RPS/MSLI main steam line high radiation instrumentation (D17-K601C).

The surveillance test meets the Technical Specification requirements of Sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1, Tables 4.3.1 1-1.7 and 4.3.2.1-1.2.6.

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The inspector verified that the calculated values used to verify the

+. as-found high radiation upscale alarms and trip setpoints were correc The as-left setpoints were within the specified low and

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high value setpoints for the applicable alara or tri After completion of the surveillance test, the test results were reviewed j and accepted by the C0F.

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-8-6. Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)

During this inspection period, the inspector performed a walkdown of the standby liquid control system (SLCS) with the plant in Operational l Condition ,

l The inspector confirmed that the. licensee's system lineup procedure matches plant drawings and the as-built configuration. The following controlled documents were used to make this confirmation:

Station Operating Procedure (50P)-0028, " Standby Liquid Control Sys #201," Revision 5, dated December 28, 198 *

Engineering Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, System 201, " Standby Liquid Control System," dated November 9, 198 The inspector identified a problem with nomenclature on a field key switch panel. The need to properly identify key switch positions on Panels ISLS-PNL120 and -121 as well as to be consistent in use of. panel nomenclature was discussed with the licensee. Appropriate corrective actions will-be take The inspectors made the following observations with regard to the SLCS:

Electrical breakers were properly positioned and control boards in the main control room reflected the appropriate indication Valves in the flow path were in the correct positions (as required by the SOP) as observed locally and confirmed at remote positions indication System valves appeared to be installed correctly and did not exhibit packing leakage, bent stems, missing handwheels, or improper labelin Hangers and suppotts were aligned correctl *

Calibration dates on observed instruments were curren *

No pro!1bited ignition sources or flammable materials were present in the viriaity of the inspected syste Equipment area housekeeping was adequate and appropriate levels of cleanliness were maintaine No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio , . ,.

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-9- Emergency Preparedness Drill (82301)

On July 13, 1989, the licensee conducted an emergency preparedness dril This drill _was part of corrective actions to remedy weaknesses identified-during an exercise previously conducted on March 1, 1989, and described in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/89-09. Significant among these weaknesses-were the functions of command and control in the technical support Y

center (TSC). Also at issue was the adequacy and timeliness of plant data i and its availability for utilization by TSC staf r/aring the drill, the inspector made observations in the control room, thel TSC, the operations support center (OSC), and the plant simulator roo Command and control functions in the TSC appeared to be exercistd in a firm, authoritative, and productive manner. It was evident that the emergency director had placed a high priority on receiving timely plant status information and on reacting to that information by decisively dispatching plant personnel. The_ inspector also noted a take-charge-manner displayed at the appropriate times by the TSC manage . The! inspector noted some minor information discrepancies on data display boards in the TSC. These discrepancies. were identified by the licensee during the exercise and corrected. In general, the displayed information was adequate and timely and sufficient to correct a problem area previously identifie .The inspector observed that the OSC staffing appeared adequate, informational displays and status boards were maintained, logs appropriately reflected the latest information, and various instruments were calibrated within the due dat In the past, the emergency drills originated in the main control room and utilized an exercise operating crew (in addition to the re0ular shift complement). This resulted in increased noise levels and traffic into the area because of the extra operators, the drill controllers and observers, and operations and maintenance support exercise personne This distracted the operating crew. Furthermore, the additional personnel (occasionally) in and around the operating panels created a vulnerability for inadvertent equipment actuation. This problem has been remedied by-the licensee's use of the plant simulator as the exercise / drill point of-origin. The result is miniinal interference with real-time operation of the plant because of the drill, thus enhancing overall safety of the operating plant. The inspector confirmed these observations by discussion i with the C0F and inspector observations of the control room environmen !

Although the simulator room was used to originate the drill, the simulator itself'was not used. A licensee emergency preparedness representative I explained that, in the future, the simulator will be utilized to the )

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As the drill progressed in the simulator room, it became necessary to utilize the emergency operating procedure (EOP) flow charts. As there was no other convenient location, they were placed on the work table thus covering up messages. procedures in use, Technical Specification, phones, etc. This could also be a problem in the main control room in an actual event. This inspector's observation has been noted by the licensee and solutions are being sough On July 12,.1989, the inspector attended the controllers meeting (prior to the drill) and on July 14, 1989, attended the postdrill meeting to monitor the process of problem self-identification and resolutio Overall, personnel in all observed areas displayed a serious, professional attitude and appeared to be a team which would perform well in an emergency. Open items identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/89-09 will remain open pending further inspectio No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

(Closed) Violation (458/8801-01): Failure to Initiate Timely Followup Review to Verify Completion of Corrective Action - A corrective action to correct a wiring discrepancy on standby gas treatment damper controls had not been taken 21 months after the needed corrective action was identified. -The licensee responded by pointing out that the needed modification was not saf ety significant or needed for system operabilit Therefore, other modification requests were given higher priority. In order to improve overall corrective actions, the licensee has developed River Bend Nuclear Procedure RBNP-0047, " Corrective Action Program," which combines elements of ttu overall corrective action program. The procedure establishes the requirement for timely closecut of corrective action document Nonconformance-related modification requests (MRs) have been reviewed for implementation. The MRs have been presented to the work scope committee and either approved and scheduled or recommended for cancellatio . Exit Interview An exit interview was cond;cted with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 on August 10, 1989. During this interview, the inspectors reviewed the scope and finding of the inspection. Other meetings between the inspectors and licensee management were held periodically during the inspection period to discuss identified concerns. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector _ _ _

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