IR 05000458/1997010
| ML20198F650 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198F601 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-97-10, NUDOCS 9708130108 | |
| Download: ML20198F650 (61) | |
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l ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-458 License No.:
NPF-47 Report No.:
50-458/97 010 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
River Bend Station Location:
5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Dates:
June 8 through July 19,1997-Inspectors:
W. F. Smith, Senior Resident inspector D. L. Proulx, Resident inspector T. W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist Approved By:
F. Randall Huey, Chief, Project Branch G ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment.1:
Supplemental Information Attachnient 2:
Slides of Licensee Presentation i
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9708130108 970906 PDR ADOCK 05000458 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY River Bend Station NRC Inspection Report 50-458/97-010 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6 week period of resident inspection.
Operations In general, the performance of plant operators was professional and reflected a
focus on safety (Section 01.1).
The licensee did not have effective provisions to ensure that licensed operators
satisfied their license restrictions to wear corrective eyewear at all times when performing licensed duties. A violation was identified for fa!!ure to establish procedures prescribing self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) corrective lens inserts for licensed operators (Section 01.2).
The licensee's strike contingency plan was comprehensive and informative.
- Sufficient qualified personnel were identified in the plan to support continued safe operation of the plant in accordance with the operating licensa (Section 01.3).
Maintenance Maintenance activities observed during this inspection period were well conducted.
- Instructions were followed and the technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude (Section M1.1).
The performance of surveillance testing observed during this inspection period was
generally good, with minor exceptions (Section M1.2).
Overall, the Reactnr Core isolation Cooling (RCIC) steam line high flow channel
surveillance test was performed very well except for an isclated case of a sequence error in one section of the procedure. A noncited violation (NCV) was identified for failure to conduct surveillance testing in the sequence specified (Section M1.3).
Enaineerino A violation with three examples was identified for failure to implement the criticality
accident monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. The licensee's response to a previous condition report (CR) concerning criticality monitoring was not thorough in that the review was focused on the new fuel vault and did not perform an in depth evaluation of all new fuel receipt inspection activities (Section E1.1).
Plant Sucoort An NOV was identified for two examples of individuals entering a high radiation area
without being informed of the radiological conditions. Managemer't did not adequately communicate the appropriate interpretation of the radiation work permit
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2-(RWP) requirement to obtain Radiation Protection (RP) permist, ion for each entry into a high radiation area (Section R1.1).
During routine tours, the inspectors noted that the security officers were alert at
their posts, security boundaries were being maintained properly, and screening processes at the Primary Access Point were performed well, in general, lighting was being adequately maintained (Section S1.1).
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[LEPORT DETAll_S Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power for the duration of this inspection period, l. Qp_ elations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations including control room observations, attendance at plan-of the-day m3etings, and plant tours.
in general, the performance of plant operators was professional and reflected a-focus on safety. Three-way communications were frequently utilized, and operator response to alarms was observed to be prompt and appropriate to the circumstances, Housekeeping practices continued to be excellent.
01.2 Corrective Evewear for Operators Donnina SCBAs a.
Inspection Scone (71707)
Based on a problem identified at another nuclear facility, the inspectors questioned whether licensed operators were supplied with corrective eyewear suitable for SCBAs in the event that a toxic gas event or airborne radioactive release occurred affecting the control room atmosphere. The inspectors also reviewed the procedural controls in place, b.
Observations and Findinos in April 1997 the inspectors requested the licensee to provide a listing of licensed operators, if any, that did not have corrective eyewear suitable for SCBAs, if it became necessary to don SCBAs and perform licensed activities, in response, the licensee provided a listing of alllicensed operators who were required to wear corrective lenses as a license condition. One of the operators did not have suitable eyewear, and he was promptly removed from duties that may have required him to don a SCBA.
By June 11,1997, the licensee's quality assurance personnel completed a surveillance of the licensee's provisions and controls over all site personnel qualified to don SCBAs and requiring corrective eyewear. The licensee discovered that only one person on site had the correct corrective eyewear adapter kit suitable for the
" Ultra-Elite" (wide vision) SCBA masks. This amounted to two licensed operators and 15 other personnel without proper eyewear. CR 97-0873 was initiated and the licensee promptly obtained the required kits. The licensed operators were removed from the watch bill until they had the proper eyewear and passed a visual acuity examination with the masks o _ C.-
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2-nThe NRC inspectors found there were no instructions or procedures to ensure that alllicensed operators, who were required to wear corrective eyewear as a condition of their individual licenses, had corrective eyewear of the appropriate type available
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should these individuals be required to wear a SCBA while performing licensed duties. The failure to establish procedures regarding the wearing of corrective eyewear when using a SCBA is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (50-458/97010-01).
-On July 1, the licensee issued Standing Order No. 41, " Licensed Operator Restrictions,". Revision 40, which reinforced the licensed operator's responsibility to ensure that his or her license conditions and restrictions are met. This was appropriate as an interim corrective action. The licensee stated that they were in the process of developing instructions and processes to ensure that all personnel required to wear corrective eyewear with respirators or SCBAs will have them, c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not have effective provisions to ensure that licensed operators satisfied their license restrictions to wear corrective eyewear at all times when performing licensed duties. A violation was identified for failure to establish procedures prescribing SCBA corrective lens inserts for licensed operators.
01.3 Licensee Strike Continoency Plans a.
insoection Scoce (92709)
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's labor union strike contingency plan as the date of contract expiration approached, b.
Observations and Findinas On June 27,1907, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's confidential strike
- contingency plan titled, " Work Stoppage Plan," to determine if the minimum number
.of qualified personnel was available as required for the proper operation and safety of the facility. The labor contract was to expire on June 28 at midnight.
The_ inspectors determined that the plan addressed prework stoppage conditions,
- security and safeguards, emergency response organization, and employee relations with other employees, customers, and the news media. The plan established a -
work stoppage coordination center for resolving work stoppage-related problems.
The plan contained attachments with compmhensive instructions on communications, shift assignments, and specific job assignments for replacement management personnel, including their emergency response positions. There appeared to be sufficient qualified personnel available to safely operate the plan..
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The bargaining unit did not call for a work stoppage at the time of contract expiration. An agreement was reached pending acceptance of the union membershipi On July 2, the union membership voted in favor of the new 2 year contract; therefore, the licensee's contingency plan was not implemented, c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's strike contingency plan was comprehensive and informative.' Sufficient qualified personnel were identified in the
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plan to support continued safe operation of the plant in accordance with the operating license, 11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments on Maintenance Activities a.
Insoection Scone (62707)
The inspectors observed portions of work activities covered by the following maintenance action items (MAI):
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MAI P593514:
Inspect and perform preventive maintanarece on the Limitorque actuator for Valve E12 MOVF024B (June 30,1997).
MAI P594697 Division 1 emergency diesel generator web deflection
preventive maintenance (July 16).
- MAI 312578 Replacement of failed reset coil and mechanism on the Division i emergency diesel generator field collapse K-1 telay (July 18).
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Observations and Findinos The inspectors found the work performed under the above listed MAls to be professional and thorough. Maintenance technicians demonstrated good foreign
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--material exclusion practices, and good attention to detail by following the work instructions and peer checking.- The technicians _were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. Appropriate clearances were utilized for personnel and equipment safety, and the operators entered the correct Technical Specifications (TS) limiting conditions for operation, o
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Cpl 1clusiors Maintenance activities observed during this inspection period were well conducted.
Instructions were followed and the technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude.
M1.2 Surveillance Observations a.
insocction Scope (61726)
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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance test procedures (STP) during this inspection period:
STP-204-6302:
Division ll low pressure coolant injection quarterly pump and valve inservice testing (June 30, 1997).
STP-3021203:
Switchgear ENS-SWGR1B Loss of Voltage Channel Functional Test (July 2).
STP-302-1205:
Switchgear ENS-SWGR1B Degraded Voltage Channel Functional Testing (July 2).
STP 207-4236 RCIC isolation - RCIC Steam Line Flow High Channel Calibration Test and Logic System Functional Test,"
Revision 11 (July 9),
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the surveillance tests listed above were conducted properly such that meaningful results were obtained. Self-checking and peer-checking were evident, when it was appropriate to do so. During independent verification, the verifiers demonstrated a conscious effort to maintain independence from the performers. TS limiting conditions for operation were entered when required. Measuring and test equipment was verified to have been in calibration.
The inspectors reviewed the completed test documentation and noted that it was legible and all acceptance criteria were met.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the performance of surveillance testing observed during this inspection period was generally good, with minor exceptions as discussed below.
M1.3 RCIC Steam Line Hiah Flow Isolation Testina a.
in_soection Scope (61726)
On July 9,1997, the inspectors observed the performance of STP 207-4236,
"RCIC isolation RCIC Steam Line Flow High Channel Calibration Test and Logic System Functional Test," Revision 11.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted that the technicians conducted a briefing in the control room with allinvolved personnel to ensure that the participants and control room personnel understood the test. As the channel calibration of the master trip unit proceeded, the inspectors found that the technicians performed the test in a step-by step, deliberate manner, with good communications between personnel involved. The operators entered the appropriate TS limiting conditions for operation, but minimized the time in effect by coordination with the technicians.
The inspectors verified that the metering and test equipment was in calibration.
The inspectors observed that, although the procedure had been revised since the last performance and was observed to be successfully performed as written, it included areas for further improvement. The inspectors discussed the following comments with maintenance supervision:
Section 6.3 directed the technicians to check that no other testing or
maintenance was being performed on Valves E51-F064 and -F031. Valve E51 C002, the RCIC trip and throttle valve was not included, although the valve received a trip signal during this test. Valve E51-C002 should have been listed for personnel safety.
Sections 7.1.11 and 7.1.20 identified annunciators and status lights for
which operators should be aware would trip as a result of performing this test. This information was bulletized, and each bullet had its own signature block to be signed by the technicians. On the other hand, Section 7.3.1 contained 21 numbered steps, each of which required an action to be performed by the technicians, yet only one signature block was provided for the technicians to indicate completion of all 21 steps. It appeared that the level of importance was reverse.:
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Section 7.1.43 reversed the_ test lead plug at the transmation, but in
subsequent steps, the procedure-did not restore the plug to its original configuration. Later, during Section 7.2.15, the technician remembered ' hat the plug was reversed and restored it for use as intended by the procedure.
The restoration could have been forgotten and unsatisfactory test results obtained.
The technicians submitted a change request to address the above comments.
During the channel calibration of Transmitter E31 N083A, the inspectors observed the technicians closing the transmitter manifold equalizing valve at a time when it should have been closed several steps earlier in the procedure. The technicians were experienc_ing dif ficulty in obtaining differential pressure. Upon checking the test and manifold valve positions, the technicians found the manifold equalizing valve open. Th9 technicians closed the valve and proceeded with the test.
Administrative Piocedure ADM 0015, " Station Surveillance Test Program,"
Revision 18, Section 8.10irequired numbered steps in the.. test procedure to be performed in sequential order.- At the time, the technicians did not identify this
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supervisor. However, the RCIC pump room was very warm and was in a radiation area, thus proceeding without delay was in the best interest of minimizing thennat and radiation exposure.
Section 7.3.1 of STP-207-4236 contained 21 sequentially numbered steps to prepare the transmitter for calibration. The sequence was established to prevent damage to the trensmitter and to minimize potentially contaminated water spills.
Leaving the manifold equalizer valve open was slightly disruptive,_ but did not-damage any equipment.
Approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the test was completed satisf actorily, the inspector discussed the above findings with the technicians and their supervisor. The technicians had a written list containing the above sequence problem, among other comments, for discussion with their supervisor. They stated that they had-discussed initiating a CR as well. The inspectors concluded that the technicians'
failure to follow the sequence specified was licensee-identified!
The ni.pctors expressed concern that the maintenance technicians did not consult with their supervisor or the control room operators at the time the error was discovered. Although this particular instance _was recoverable within the skill of the craft, other sequence errors could cause more significant consequences. The-licensee took corrective actions addressing this issue by counselling the individual technicians, and informed the inspectors that actions were planned to discuss the CR root causes and corrective actions with all technicians. This was intended to reinforce the importance of following procedures in sequence, utilizing-the tools at their disposal to ensure that procedures are followed in a step-by-step manner, and prompt identification of errors so that a proper recovery can be implemented.
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Failure to comply witn Section 8.10 of Procedure ADM-0015 is a violation of TS 5.4.1.a. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-458/97010-02L c.
Conclusiong Overall, the RCIC steam line high flow channel surveillance test was performed well except for an isolated case of a sequence error in one section of the procedure. An NCV was identified for failure to comply with the administrative procedure that required the conduct of surveillance testing in the sequence specified.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92700,92902)
M8.1 [ Closed) Violation 50-458/96004-02: failure to maintain adequate instructions for the operators to obtain valid suction and discharge pressures during an inservice test of the Division 11 residual heat removal (RHR) line fill pump. The procedures used by the operators did not provide adequate instructions for an operator with the expected skills to properly align the instrument valves to obtain valid pressure data.
The licensee determined that a loss of configuration control was the root cause for this problem. The Division illine fill pump instrumentation valves were not maintained in the out-of service configuration, thereby preventing fulfillment of the surveillance test with the procedures as written. The licensee found that System Operating Procedure SOP-0031, "RHR System 204," Revision 16, did not include these instrument valves in the system valve lineups.
The licensee revised System Operating Procedure SOP-0031, effective July 18, 1996, to include the appropriate instrument valves. The inspectors reviewed the revised procedure and, in addition, verified that the applicable system operating procedures for the other three emergency core cooling system lic.a fill pumps included the appropriate instrument valves, with satisfactory eesults. During the year that passed subsequent to this problem, the inspectors found no sepeat occurrences of this nature.
M8.2 LQlosed) Licensee Event Report 50-458/96-007: containment airlock pneumatic system ball valve f ailure due to debris internal to the system. This issue was addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/96-017. No deviations or violations were identified. The inspectors found that this Licensee Event Report was timely, accurate, and adequately described the problem. Corrective actions were appropriate to the circumstances and addressed the root causes.
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E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Criticality Monitorina a.
inspection Scone (71750)
Because of an issue at another facility, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's criticality safety programs to ensure that the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 were met. The inspectors reviewed the TS, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), licenses procedures, and toured the facility to perform this evaluation, b.
Observations and Findingg On January 28,1997, as a result of generic communications, the licensee noted that they did not have an exemption for criticality monitoring for the new fuel vault.
The licensee had used the new fuel vault on several occasions (without incident).
Because licensee procedures still permitted use of the new fuel vault, an exemption request was necessary. Reactor engineering initiated CR 97-0083 to enter this item into the licensee's corrective action system.
The licensee's investigation revealed that the UFSAR discussed lice 7see compliance to Regulatory Guide 8.12 " Criticality Accident Alarm Systems." The UFSAR stated that the licensee's analysis demonstrated that K,,, would be less than 0.95 under all postulated scenarios such that criticality monitoring in the new fuel vault was unnecessary, in addition, the licensee's construction permit contained an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. These facts led the licensee to believe that criticality monitoring was not required for the new fuel vault. However, 10 CFR 70.24 requires that licensees apply for exemption to criticality accident monitoring requirements if these provisions were deemed unnecessary. The licensee submitted an exemption request from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 on May 15,1997. In addition, the licensee informed the inspectors that the new fuel vault would not be used without a criticality monitor until the exemption was approved by the NRC.
Following the licensee's identification that the new fuel storage vault did not have criticality monitors, the licensing organization asked reactor engineering if the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 were met for the new fuelinspection area. Reactor engineering replied affirmatively based on the existence of the fuel building area radiation monitors. Based on this information, the licensee did not req st any further exemption. Following these actions, the licensee closed CR 97- 083.
On June 18. the inspectors questioned the licensee as to how they were meeting the provisions of 10 CFR 70.24 for new fuel receipt inspection. Specifically, the inspectors asked if the area radiation monitors for the fuel building qualified as the
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9-two redundant criticality monitors as described in ANSl/ANS 8.3-1979 " Criticality Accident Alarm Systems." The inspectors also asked if the licensee had emergency
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procedures for criticality accidents and whether or not drills had been conducted.
Following the inspectors' questioning, the licensee reviewed the qualifications of the area radiation monitors for the fuel building. The licensee noted that the area-radiation monitors would go into a saturated condition during a criticality accident scenario, and would not alarm to notify individuals in the area. Therefore, the area radiation monitors in the fuel building were not qualified as criticality accident monitors. The licensee initiated CR 971010 to enter this item into the licensee's corrective action program. The licensee procured temporary criticality monitors to support new fuel receipt in July 1997. The failure to have operable, redundant instruments that monitored for a criticality accident when handling new fuelin the fuel building is a violation of 10 CFR 70.24 (50-458/9710-03, Example 1).
The licensee considered that Annunciator Response Procedure ARP-1RMS-DSPL230
"DRMS RM 11 CRT (1RMS DSPL230) Alarm Response," Revision 1, for an alarming area radiation monitor was sufficient for an emergency procedure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)3. The inspector reviewed Procedure ARP-1RMS-DSPL230 and noted that this procedure was a generic procedure that applied to any alarming area radiation monitor (including the fuel building area radiation monitor), which required operators to read and record the radiation levels and contact RP to perform a confirmatory survey. This procedure did not mention criticality accidents and the actions as stated were not related to a criticality accident. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the licensee did not maintain emergency procedures to address criticality accidents. The failure to maintain emergency procedures for criticality accidents is a violation of 10 CFR 70.24 (50-458/97010 03, Example 2).
The licensee also stated that they periodically conducted drills that evacuated the entire site and, from a generic point of view, this drill was considered to be sufficient to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)3. The inspectors found this determination to be incoriect, because these drills did not exercise the new fuel receipt inspection team on the expected alarms and evacuation routes in the fuel building for a criticality accident. The failure to conduct emergency drills for criticality accidents is a violation of 10 CFR 70.24 (50-458/97010-03, Example 3).
The inspectors noted that the licensee did not appropriately address CR 97-0083 in that their reviews were narrowly focused on the new fuel storage vault, The licensee's review to _ ensure implementation of all criticality accident monitoring requirements was cursory with respect to the receipt inspection area and did not cover each line item of 10 CFR 70.24. After further inquiry by the inspectors following closecut of CR 97-0083, the licensee reviewed their criticality accident monitoring implementation more thoroughly. River Bend Station personnel installed qualified criticality monitors that were borrowed from another licensee to support new fuel receipt inspection scheduled after the end of this inspection period.
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Conclusions A violation with three examples was identified for hilure to implement the criticality accident monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. The licensee's response to a previous CR concerning criticality monitoring was not thorough in that the review was focussed on the new fuel vault and did not perform an indepth evaluation of all new fuel receipt inspection activities.
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R 1.1 Inaooronriate Hiah Radiation Area Entries a.
Inspection Scooe (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to CR 97-0770, which discussed an event in which two equipment operators (EO) made unauthorized entries into a high radiation area, b.
Observations and Findinas On May 20,1997, the licensee performed inservice testing in the RHR B pump room. This test required entry into a high radiation area to perform equipment installation and take vibration readings on the pump. When an EO attempted to log in on the high radiation area RWP, the RP technician noted that the radiological conditions in the RHR B pump room had changed because of recently running RHR B in the shutdown cooling mode. No survey had been performed since the change in radiological conditions. The RP technician provided the EO with an operable alarming dosimeter and informed the EO that the radiological survey maps were not -
up to date, and a new survey was necessary. The RP technician believed that he had communicated to the EO that entry into the high radiation area was prohibited until an RP technician entered the high radiation area to survey the area. However, the EO believed that since the RP technician provided the EO with an operable alarming dosimeter, this action constituted permission to enter the area; therefore, the EO entered the RHR B pump room without reviewing the up-to-date radiological conditions.
The second EO logged in on the high radiation area RWP at the beginning of the shif t.- The EO misinterpreted the wording of the RWP that stated "obtain RP approval prior to entry into any high radiation area." The EO believed that once one logged onto a high radiation area RWP, this action constituted notification of RP for the entire 12-hour sh:f t, and covered as many entries as necessary. The Superintendent, Radiation Control, stated that the intent of the statement in the RWP was for the individual to contact RP just prior to each high radiation area entry, to ensure that the radiological conditions had not changed since the individual
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l-11 logged onto the RWP, This EO also entered the RHR B pump room for inservice testing without being briefed on the up-to date radiological status of the area.
Subsequent to the above high radiation area entry, the engineer designated to take the vibration data on the RHR B pump requested to be logged in on the high radiation area RWP. The RP technician informed the engineer that a new survey was necessary for the RHR B room prior to entry. _The engineer waited at the radiologically controlled area access point until an extra RP technician was available to perform the proper surveys. The RP technician escorted the engineer to the RHR B pump room, performed the proper surveys, and briefed the engineer on the radiological conditions. However, upon entry into the RHR B pump room, the RP technician noted that the EO, who was previously informed that the survey data was not up to date, was already in the RHR B pump room installing equipment.
This individual inforrned the RP technician that another EO had also been in the room. The RP technician initiated a CR to document both EO entries into this high radiation area without knowledge of the radiological conditions.
The licensee's investigation revealed that weak oral communications between the RP technician and one EO contributed to this event. The RP technician did not receive confirmation from the EO that instructions were understood, and the EO assumed that he had permission to enter an area based on the RP technician's actions rather than obtaining specific permission. In addition, the licensee interviewed operations personnel and found that several other operators believed-that logging onto the RWP at the beginning of the shift constituted RP notification for any and all high radiation area entries. Licensee management did not appropriately communicate the requirement for specific RP notification just prior to each high radiation area entry.
For corrective actions, the licensee: (1) updated the applicable survey map to allow entry into the high radiation area, (2) counseled the EOs and the technicians on the -
need to ensure that communications will be property given and confirmed, (3)
briefed the applicable personnel on the need for specific notification of RP upon each high radiation area entry, and (4) initiated an evaluation of the work control process to see if enhancements were required with respect to planning RP activities to support work.
The two individuals entering a high radiation area without being informed of the radiological conditions constitute a violation of 10 CFR 19.12. However, this nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-458/97010-04),
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Conclusions An NCV was identified for two examples of individuals entering a high radiation area without being informed of the radiological conditions. Licensee management did not adequately communicate the appropriate interpretation of the RWP requirement to m
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L 12-notify RP upon each entry into a high radiation area. LThe licensee performed a thorough root cause of the event and proposed appropriate corrective actions.
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- Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
- S1.1 General Comments (71750)
During routine tours the inspectors noted that the security officers were alert at-their posts, security boundaries were being maintained properly, and screening processes at the Primary Access Point were performed well. During night tours the inspectors found, in general, that lighting was being adequately maintained in
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otherwise darkened areas, such as under trailers.
j V. Manaoement Meetinas X1_
Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 24,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined'during the inspection should be considered proprietary. _ No proprietary information was identified.
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.. X3 Management Meeting Summary On July 17,1997, licensee managers and members of the Region IV staff held a meeting -
to discuss River Bend's long term performance improvement ~ plan. Slides used in the licensee's presentation have been included as Attachment 2 to this repor _. _ _
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ATTACHMENT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORM ATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licerisig J. P. Dimmette, General Manager, Plant Operations M. A. Dietrich, Director, Quality Programs D. T. Dormady, Manager, System Engineering J. R. Douet, Manager, Maintenance J. Holmes, Superintendent. Chemistry H. B. Hutchens, Superintendent, Plant Security D. N. Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing J. R. McGaha, Vice President-Operations W. P. O'Malley, Manager, Operations D. L. Pace. Director, Design Engineering A. D. Wells, Superintendent, Radiation Control INSPECTION PROCEDURES (IP) USED IP 37551 Onsite Engineering IP 61726 Surveillance Observations IP 62707 Maintenance Observation IP 71707 Plant Operations IP 71750 Plant Support Activities I
IP 92700 Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92902 Followup - Maintenance
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!TEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened
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-50-458/97010 01 VIO Failure to establish procedures for corrective lenses for operators donning SCBAs (Section 01.2).
50-458/97010-03 VIO Failure to install criticality monitoring devices during new fuelinspection (Section E1.1).
Closed 50 458/96004-02 VIO Failure to maintain procedures for inservice testing (Section M8.1),
50 458/96-007 LER Containment air lock ball valve failures (Section M8.2).
Opened and Closed
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50-458/97010-02 NCV Performance of surveillance procedure steps out of sequence (Section M1.3).
50 458/97010-04 NCV Entry into high radiation area without knowledge of radiological conditions (Section R1.1)
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3-LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ANSI American National Standards Institute ANS
' American Nuclear Society CR Condition Report EO Equipment Operator IP inspection Procedure MAI Maintent.1ce Action Item NCV Noncited Violation PDR Public Document Room RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RHR Residual Heat Removal RP Radiation Protection RWP Radiation Work Permit SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus STP Surveillance Test Procedure TS Technical Specification
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UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
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ATTACHMENT 2
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i RBS/NRC Site Strategic Plan hieeting
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APA July 17,1997
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Meeting Ageria
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Opening Remarks John McGaha
Ellis Merschoff
LTPIP Review Rick King
Strategic Plan Overview Mike Bellamy
Discussion Areas-Operations Bill O'Malley
-Emergency Preparedness Bill Smith
-Radiation Control Davey Wells
-Engineering - IST-Bill Mashburn
People Focus Joel Dimmette
Closing Remarks John McGaha
Ellis Merschoff
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Opening Remarks
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John McGana Vice Presic.ent, Operations
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Agenc.a anc.
LTPIP Review Rick King
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l LTPIP Review EOI Management Arrived September,1993
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Merger Completed January,1994
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Near Term Plan Completed June,1994
-
Long Term Performance June,1994
-
Improvement Plan (LTPIP)
Initiated Completed March,1997
-
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...
.
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
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LTPIP Root Causes Managemen~: sii:.s aac. not 1ept pace
-
wit:1 e aange
- ?~ anning anc. monitoring were not
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- ?ro tem ic.enti:~1 cation anc. pro l.em-
-
so.ving metaoc.s aac. not consistently improvec. Jer:?ormance
- ?rocesses were inef~1cient anc.
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al.owec. Jac11ogs o:? wor 1 to occur
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I,TPIP Corrective Ac: ions Accressec 2: Programs Con:ainec 6z 1 ac:: ion i: ems Comple:ec. 638 action i: ems Remaining action i: ems in:egra:ed into Strategic Plan
'
_
.
i LTPIP Program.s Site Planning & Resource Allocation Procedures FundamentalProject Management Engineering Support Outage Management Radiological Pictection Leadership & Management Plant Chemistry Change Management Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Problem ID & Root Cause Evlauation Security Closure of Problems Training Oversight of Problem Solving Systems Quality Assurance Work Control Human Performance Improvement Materials Management Preventive and Predictive Maintenance Modifications
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The Plant Performance index is a value calculated from a weighted 100.0 combination of the WANO top nine performance indicators.
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Performance improvement Plans implemented
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5. Collect.ive Radiation Exposure
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1. Unit Capability Factor 6. Fuel Reliability
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2. Unit Capability Loss Factor j
7. Thermal Performance
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3. Safety System Performance j
8. Chemistry index
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4. Unplanned Automatic Scramsf 9. Industrial Safety Accident Rate
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SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE UNAVAILABLE HOURS
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1994 1995 1996 1997 as cf 6/30/97
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_ _ _ _ _ _
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l Site Strategic Plan
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Mike Bellamy
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Site Involvement
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Action 1997 Distributed draft to employees January for comment Developed action plans for each April Critical Success Factor
.
Presented Strategic Plan at May employee meetings Review and revise Site Strategic June / July Plan Check and Adjust Quarterly
.
_ _. _ _.. _,
-
' ' '
'
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i DeveLooment Process
_
T:ae Plan is a Living Documerr:
(accessia e e.ectronical:y)
New Dimensions are Sti:.13eing Ac.c ec.
The Plan will Sup:3or: the Buc.ge:
Cycle Signi:~1 carn Ini:ia:ives wiL ~3e Incluc ec. in tae P:.an RBS will C:aeck anc. Acjust :he Plan Quar:erly
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Oyerview VISION
P h11SSION E
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F STRATEGIC OllJECTIVES O
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A CRITICAL, N
-
C SUCCESS
FACTORS
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ENABLING OllJECTIVES
=
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R ACTION PLANS E
S
.
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Oveiview STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES C
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS
Strong & Rigorous Corrective Action Program 0 liigh Level of Regulatory Perfonnance Based on NRC Criteria 0 liigh Level of Regulatory Performance Based on INPO Criteria Safety / Regulatory o
+
0 Strong Leader in Community Relations 0 Leader in Non Nuclear Regulatory Relations
Leader in Radiological Safety, Industrial Safety 0 Leader in Emergency Preparedness s
0 EITertive Dermition and Maintenance of Design Basis O Effective Refueling Outages Operation (Production) o Leadership in Plant Operations
+
~
Maximum Plant EfDelency 0 Effective Plant Management 0 Excellent Plant Appearance / Materiel Condition 0 Plant Modification Cost Reduction 0 innovative Use ofTechnology Cost (Profitability)
+
o O Cost Conscious Environment 0 Process Improvements 0 Efficient Management of Labor Costs O Excellence through Teamwork 0 Energized Employees
Broadennd & Shared Skills of Employees in a Learning
+ People o
Environmer,t 0 Improved Human Performance 0 Diverse Work Force
-
_..
_ _ _ - -.
.
-
---
. River Band Kay Performanco Moasurbs STRATEGIC SAFETY /
OPERATION COST PEOPLE OBJECTIVES REGULATORY (Production)
(Profitability)
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Production Cost Level 1 Performance SALP Rating Capacity Factor Human index 3 Year Average Measures l
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INPO Rating
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Level 2 Performance Unplanned Human Success Production Cost Measures Regulatory Index Shutdown LCOs Rate Year To Date i
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I Human Success WANO Index Maintenance Rule Leading Indicator Capital Costs I
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Operator Quarterly Overall Outage Program Workarounds System Health Teamsharing Effectiveness I
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Plant Schedule Training Program Information Security index Adherence Effectiveness Infrastructure
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Environmental Index PM/ CM Ratio Culture Index
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I Corrective Action MAI Backlog i
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Summary Tae Site S:rategic Plan takes River Benc. ':0 the nex:: per:fonnance leve..
Significan: si:e effort was involved in developing t:ae Plan Performance will be tracked and quar:erly chec'k and adjus1: mee':ings
.
will be :1 eld Tae Plan is an in:egral part of t:ae liver Benc environmen':
_
__o
.
SITE STRATEGIC PLAN l
l
<
l VISION
,
Ptide of the Industry Senmg the Winmng Standard v
I MISSION Deliver power in a safe, reliable, and profitable manner through innovathe, high performance employees and teams.
.
I i STitATEGIC Oil,lECTIVES CltlTICAL SUCCESS FACTOllS
0 Strong & Rigorous Corrective Action Program 0 liigh Level of Regulatory Performance based on NRC Criteria
Safety / Regulatory 0 liigh Level of Regulatory Performa.cc tmed on INPO Criteria
"
.
0 Strong Leader in Community Relatione 0 Leader in Non Nuclear Regulatory Relations 0 Leader in Radiological Safety and Industrial Safety 0 Leader in Emergency Preparedness 0 EfTective Definition and Maintenance of Design liasis l0 EITective Refueling Outages Ohration}lioductioE)] " [0211adershipin Plant.OperatioEsE;13;Mij7dE i
+
0 Maximum Plant Efficieuey 0 Efhetive Plant Management 0 Excellent Plant Appearance / Materiel Condition 0 Plant Modification Cost Reduction 0 innovative Use of Technology
+
Cost (Profitability)
O Cost Conscious Environment
"
0 Process Improvements s
0 Eflicient Management of Labor Costs 0 Excellence through Teamwork 0 Energized Employees
People 0 !!roadened & Shared Skills of Employees in a Learning Environment
0 Improved lluman Performance 0 Diverse Work Force
ENABLING OllJECTIVES for Leadership in Plant Operat: ens (Bill O'Malley)
2'
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+ Operations leads the plant z..,gg3lj#,.pfr.gje
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+ Consistent personnel development $.w ?
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+ Clear, high operst, g standards
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+ Clear departmental communications i M. u,
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Focus on the plant discipline not to get distracted
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Cgerations Department Evo:.ution Technica. Exper:ise Personnel Deve.oamen:
Crew Develoament Depar: men:Leac ershia Si:e leac.ersai?
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V
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Key Initiatives S':ra:egic Planning
-
Manning anc Personnel Se~ ection
-
Crew Perfonnance
-
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Measuremen:s
-
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,,-....m-.
_ _ _ _ -........
-'
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SITE STRATEGIC PLAN
.
I VislON Pside of the Industry Settmg the Wirmmg Standard v
MISSION Deliset power in a sale, teliable, and profitable manner through innovatise, high performance employees and teams, v
STitATEGIC OILIECTIVES ClllTICAL SUCCESS FACTollS
0 Strong & Rigorous Cortective Action Program 0 liigh Level of Regulatory Performance based on NRC Criteria Safety /Regdlatory'X2] "
0 liigh Level of Regulatory Performance based on INPO Criteria
0 Strong Leader in Community Relations 0 Leader in Non Nuclear Regulatory Relations 0 Leader in Radiological Safety and Industrial Safety l[0'.llcader in Emergency Preparedness',,,,,a].
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0 EITective Definition and Maintenance of Design liasis l
0 Effective Refueling Outages 0 Leadership in Plant Operations e
Operation (Production)
0 Maximum Plant EITiciency
"
0 Effective Plant Management 0 Excellent plant Appearance / Materiel Condition
-
0 Plant Modification Cost Reduction 0 innovatise Use of Technology e
Cost (Profitability)
0 Cost Conscious Environment -
O Process improvements
.
0 Efficient Management of1. abor Costs 0 Excellence through Teamwork 0 Energized Employees e
People 0 llroadened & Shared Skills of Employees in a Learning Environment
"
0 Improved lluman Performance 0 Diverse Work Force
_.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES for Leader in Emergency Preparedness
.
Illill Smith)
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'
o Conduct clTective training and challenging, realistic drills / exercises
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+ Foster four effective ERO Teams
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- Enhance Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment
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- Enhance severe weather readiness with a detailed llurricane Readiness Procedure
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Concuct E:?:?ective Training anc Cha.:.enging, Realistic Drills / Exercises Lesson 1an improvemeni:s Rec ua i:~1 cation training etuancemen"s Innrovemerr:s on aosition walk-
- aroughs
-
Writing scenarios using inc.ustry even:s Live simula:or
)
.
.
.
.
Foster Four E:f:fec:ive ERO Teams Increased c ey:a in ERO posi: ions Team aui:cing activi:ies Tab: etops :for :Taci:i:ies anc. specific groups
.
Use of ERO as con:ro..lers, coaches and evalua: ors A 3poin:ing ~?aci:.i:y team leaders Improving owners:ai by ::ae ERO
?
9
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Enaance Strong C>ngoing ReLationsaips Wita State anc. Local Governments
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Quar <:er..y Direc:or of Emergency Managemen': meetings Annual apprecia: ion dinners Including :aeir par:icipal: ion in drills / exercises Reinforce Public confic ence in safe opera,: ion of RBS
'
Frequen: visi:s to the agencies A::ending civic func': ions
i
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'"
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i Enhance Emergency Response Facilities anc Equipment
'
- ns':a. ing new s: ate anc loca. ho::ine Innroving Soor p:ans Enhancing flow ofin: forma:: ion Im:3 roving s:atus boarc s U:3 graded dose assessmen: software Upgradec notifica: ion message
.
software
.
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Enhance Severe Weather Reacines,s With a Detailec.
Hurricane Reaciness Procedure Use oflessons..earnec a': Turkey Poin:,IN 93-53 and NUREG 1474 Benchmarking wia o":her 2 an:s Procedure in draft
'
Sa:elli":e phones purchasec
'
l SITic STRATEGIC PLAN
,
VISION Ptide of the Industry. Setting the it'uming Standard v
MISSION ()eliset power in a safe, reliable, and profitable rnanner through innosative, high performance employees and teams, u
STRATEGIC OllJECTIVES
CRITICAL, SUCCESS FACTOllS 0 Strong & Rigorous Corrective Action Program 0 liigh Level of Regulatory Performance based on NRC Criteria
~ ~
Safety /RegulatsyY[t] "
0 liigh Level of Regulatory Performance based on INPO Criteria e
0 Strong Leader in Community Relations 0 Leader in Non. Nuclear Regulatory Relatiens
[02nader 1nIRadiological Safety _ j and Industrial Safety
~
0 Leader in Emergency Preparedness 0 Effective Definition and Maintenance of Design liasis 0 Effective Refueling Outages 0 Leadership in Plant Operations
Operation (Production)
0 Maximum Plant Efficiency
0 EITective Plant Management 0 Excellent Plant Appearance / Materiel Condition 0 Plant Modification Cost Reduction 0 innovative Use of Technology -
+
Cost (Profitability)
0 Cost Conscious Environment
.
O Process Imptovements 0 Efficient Management of Labor Costs
-
0 Excellence through Teamwork 0 Energired Employees e
People 0 13roadened & Shared Skills of Employees in a Lexnint "nvironi,v41
"
0 Improved lluman Performance 0 Diverse Work Force j
ENAllLING OllJECTIVES for Leader in Rabological Safety.,,,.g. g,.
, j ]';,,5 q' " %
..
(Dasey Wells)
-
-*
'
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e improve the skills and abilities of R.P. Personnel
, 7. ; *, j:,g 7..cm. mn a.:.3,
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+ Minimite perr.onnel radiation exposure
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- Minimize personnel contaminatim
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Improve t:ae Skills anc.
Abilities of R.P. Personnel Reorganizec. to Innrove Communica: ion Improving Supervisor Performance Observation Program Teambuilding
.
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l Minimize Personnel Contamination C:.ean area caa :enge Coni:amina: ion con:rol alan S:andardized posting
.
.
_
.
Minimize Personne~
Raciation Exposure ALARA & Work P:anning ALARA Ini:iatives ALARA Commi: tee
.
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SITE STRATEGIC PLAN YlSION l' tide of the Industry Setting the Winning Standard (
v
.\\llSSION Deliver power in a safe, reliable, and profitable manner through innovative, high performance employees and teans.
v STRATEGIC OILIECTIVES CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS
'*
0 Strong & Rigorous Corrective Action Program 0 liigh Level of Regulatory Performance based on NRC Criteria
,
Safety / Regulatory 0 liigh Level of Regulatory Performance based on INPO Criteria
"
0 Strong Leader in Ctmmunity Relations 0 Leader in Non Nuclear Regulatory Relations 0 Leader in Radiological Safey and Industrial Safety 0 Leader in Emergency Preparedness 0 EITective Definition and Maintenance of Design flasis 0 ElIcctive Refueling Outages 0 Leadership in Plant Operations
[O[diatiinl(PiddiictTonT] "
0 Maximum Plant Elliciency
+
0 EITective Plant Management
'0" Excellent' Plant' Appearance T51ste'iEI'CEdition~~IT'?Nf 0 Plant Modification Cost Reduction
'
0 innovative Use of Technology
Cost (Profitability)
O Cost Conscious Environment
"
0 Process improvements 0 Ellicient Management of Labor Costs 0 Excellence through Teamwork 0 Energized Employees
,
People 0 Broadened & Shared Skills of Employees in a Learning Environment
0 improved lluman Performance 0 Diverse Work Force u
ENABLING OBJECTIVE for Excellent Plant Appearance / Materiel Condition, ';.g sqgg*
(Bill Mashburn)
A M *' !'
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o Optimize IST Processes and continue with program enhancements to establish sustained effectiveness
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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In Service Testing Optimize IST Processes and
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Con:inue wi::a Program Enhancements :o Estatish Sus:ained E ~fectiveness Comple':ed Ac': ions
-
- Procedures
- Training
- Program Changes
- Oaera': ions Coordinator
- Ac ci':iona: Ins:rumental: ion
---
e
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In Service Tes~:ing Continuing 31uancements
-
- Training Continuation
- Process Oy:imization
- Trenc ing 3naancemen"s
- Se :?Cri:ica. Reviews
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Y Peoale Focus
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Joel Dimmette Genera: Manager Plant Operations
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SITF STRATEGIC PLAN
..
VISION Pride of the industry Setting the li' inning Standard v
MISSION Deliver power in a safe, reliable, and profitable manner through innovative, high performance employees and teams.
.-
.y STRATEGIC OILIECTIVES
'=+
CRWCAL SUCCESS FACTORS 0 Strong & Rigorous Corrective Action Program 0 High Level of Regulatory Performance based on NRC Criteria
+
Safety / Regulatory O liigh Level of Regulatory Performance based on INPO Criteria
"
0 Strong Leader in Community Relations 0 Leader in Non Nuclear Regulatory Relations 0 Leader in Radiological Safety and Industrial Safety 0 Leader in Emergency Preparedness 0 Effective Definition and Maintenance of Design Basis 0 EtTective Refueling Outages 0 Leadership in Plant Operations
+
Operation (Production)
0 Maximum Plant EITiciency
0 Effective Plant Management 0 Excellent Plant Appearance / Materiel Condition 0 Plant Modification Cost Reduction 0 lanovative Use of Technology Cost (Profitability)
0 Cost Conscious Environment
e 0 Process improvements 0 Efficient Management of Labor Costs 0 Excellence throuin Teamwork -...
. ;;+.
]N.$y n AML:f"[
e 0 Energized Employees W +$fKKjfy.;e-
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People
..;
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01 Broadened & Shared Skills'of Employus in a Learning Erivironm;nt
0 Improved Human Performance p
'
W.?fa.@g I.
-
0 Diverse Work Force
'~~
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'~~ *
i
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.
i l
People r
Exce:.lence Tarough Teamwork
- Aligning ::eams; matca si:e priorities
- Clarifying team missions
- Saengthening ::eam leadership Improved Skills in Learning
'
Environment
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- Promoi:ing continual pursui1: of education and training
- Sharing skills with one another
- Learning fro ~m experience
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People Energized Employees
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- Improved supervisor role in employee development
- Employees have responsibility for development in a partnering relationship with supervision
- Employees enforce peer accountability Diversi5ed Work Force
'
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- Align with Entergy corporate initiative
-
- Employee Training Complete
- AdditionalInitiatives Being Planned
-
.
A)
P
- - - - _ _ _ _ _. _
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-O i
Improving Human Performance LER Da::a for tae last year-top level
-
performance INPO c.a:a for rol~..ing 2 year average
-
- top quartile performance Conc.ition Report dal:a - reflects
-
.
imarovemen:
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.-.
-.
- - - - - - - - - - - -
J
.
- -
i Improving Human
.
Per ~ormance
>
Blue Ri~non Tas1 Force Performed Ana.ysis INPO Excellence in Human Perfonnance INPO Assist Visits Condition Report Trends Internal Assessments
.
Analysis Ic.entifiec. Focus Areas Communication of Standards Supervisor Coaching of Workers Communication of Performance Measures
,
-
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Summary New Si:rategic Objec::ive - People a
Energized aeople - most imaortan:
-
asse::
Drama:ic improvemen::s in human
-
per:?ormance
.
Con::inued human performance
-
improvement needed Blue Ribbon Tas1 Force initia:ives
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l C:osing Comments John McGaha
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Vice Presic.ent, Operations
.
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Closing Comments
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- Tae Si::e Strategic Plan is our Jata to accom?.isa our vision:
Pride of the industry:
Setting the winning standard
.
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