IR 05000458/1998015
| ML20237E717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237E711 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-98-15, NUDOCS 9809010127 | |
| Download: ML20237E717 (19) | |
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ENCLOSURE .!
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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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l Docket No.: 50-458'
License No.: NPF 47 Report No.: 50 458/98 15 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Facility:: River Bend Station Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana Dates: June 28 through August 8,1998 d Inspector (s): G. D. Replogie, Senior Resident inspector -
N. P. Garrett, Resident inspector l
. Approved By: C. S. Marschall, Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects
. ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information l
9809010127 980828 PDR ADOCK 05000458 G pm ,
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY River Bend Station NRC Inspection Report 50-458/9815 Operations
.. The conduct of operations was generally professional and safety-conscious '
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(Section 01.1).
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While a trend in human performance problems was identified approximately one month prior to the fire pump failure, short-term corrective actions were not timely. A nuclear equipment operator (NEO) demonstrated poor self-checking practices when he failed to properly reposition the diesel fire pump fuel oil tank outlet valve per clearance order specifications, which resulted in pump failure during postmaintenance testing. This was the fourth " plant impact" type of Operations human performance problem identified during the past three inspection periods (Section 04.1).
Maintenance
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The performance of maintenance was generally professional and thorough (Section M1.1).
. Management involvement to address a through-wall feedwater flow venturi instrument line crack was excellent. Managers responded to the site in the evening to assess the problem and plan corrective measures. The resultant maintenance reflected careful i planning, good coordination with Operations and appropriate consideration of plant risk j (Section M1.2) ;
. A noncited violation was documented to address three licensee identified instances where surveillance were not performed per Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 required procedures. Missed surveillance included: (1) the overall annulus bypass leakage evaluation; (2) a high pressure core spray pump vibration surveillance; and (3) the !
2-year diesel fire pump inspection. Additionally, Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.2.1.12, source range monitor channel function tests, were not performed prior to plant startup on April 27, but did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements. Subsequent performance of the surveillance was satisfactor Contributors included inadequate management oversight, poor implementation of scheduling activities, inadequate training, weak surveillance procedures and confusing surveillance tracking methods. The licensee's investigation was thorough and self-critical. Planned corrective actions were sound and expansive (Section M1.3).
. Plant material condition was, overall, good. Material condition concerns included repeated trips of instrument air compressors, a through-wall crack of a feedwater flow
, venturi instrument line (repaired), a degraded -22 VDC electrohydraulic control bus,
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elevated axial vibration on the high pressure core spray pump, and an erratic emergency response information system transient analysis computer. The instrument
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2-l air compressor trips were not of major concern due to automatic backup features.
l Material condition improvements included restoration of the Diviaion l! suppression pool i pumpback pumps and the suppression pool cleanup system. Suppression pool l
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cleanliness was substantially improved (Section M2.1).
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A design engineer demonstrated excellent attention to detail in that, while walking down a design drawing, he identified that the high pressure core spray diesel ground wire
, solder joint was cracked and about to break free from the post. The connection was l promptly repaired (Section E2).
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. Plant Succort
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The inspector observed several poor radworker practices. When wearing clean cotton
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liners craftsmen touched their used anticontamination clothing in potentially l contaminated parts of the garments, grabbed a potentially contaminated support, and
. picked up potentially contaminated bags of components that had spilled in a clean are '
Some of the cotton liners were found to be contaminated at the exit of the radiologically controlled area. The Radiological Work Permit provided weak controls in that the noted ,
practices were not specifically prohibite l l
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Housekeeping was generally good, but some problems were identified. Empty fuel oil barrels were observed in the turbine building, mezzanine level, that were not properly labeled as " empty" in accordance with site procedures (a repeat finding) and a water hose was not properly secured to preclude the spread of contamination. Corrective measures were acceptable (Section O2.1).
. Foreign materials were not properly controlled in the containment, a foreign material exclusion (FME) zone. Two cloth towels were found near hydraulic control units to collect leakage but were not captivated or captured on the FME log. Additionally, a
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large roll of plastic bags, several cloth towels, and a 30-page procedure were in a closed room within the containment. The items were not on the FME log and were not logged when taken into the main containment. Corrective measures were acceptable (Section 02.1).
. Security facilities, equipment, isolation zones, and illumination levels were properly niaintained. Surveillance were properly performed (Section S2.1),
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Summar/ of Plant Status
- The plant was in Operational Mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power for most of the inspection I
period. On August 1 and 7 power was reduced to approximately 80 percent for a few hours, each time, in support of planned control rod drive maintenance and testin l l
1. Operations l 01 Conduct of Operations 0 Genera, Comments (71707)
The inspectors used inspection Procedure 71707 to conduct frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. The conduct of operations was generally professional and safety consciou I I
O2 Opermional Status of Facilities and Equipment O Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707. 71750)
l The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following l l safety-related systems: ,
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= Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Trains A, B, and C l * Reactor Core Isolation Cooling a Division I,11, and ill Switchgear and Battery Rooms
. Standby Gas Treatment, Trains A and B l
. Standby Liquid Control The systems were properly aligned and generally in good material condition. The semiannual detailed inspection specified by inspection Procedure 71707 was performed i on the HPCS system. No problems were found.
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l During plant tours, housekeeping was considered good, but some problems were I identified, including:
. Empty barrels were stored in the turbine building but were not marked as empty in accordance with housekeeping procedures. This was a repeat observation (see NRC Inspection Report 50-458/98 05).
. A water hose was not properly secured to prevent the spread of contaminatio The hose ran from the control rod drive rebuild room (a contaminated area) to the low pressure core spray pump room (a clean area) and was free to move back and forth across the contamination boundar t L_-___--________ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ __ __ _ _ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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- Foreign materials were not properly controlled in the containment, an FME zone.- l Two cloth towels were found near hydraulic control units (HCUs) to collect leakage. The towels were not logged into the containment FME cone and were not captivated. Additionally, health physics technicians kept supplies in a room within the containment FME zone, including a large roll of plastic bags and cloth toweIs. While the items were within a locked cabinet, they were not documented
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on the FME log anel there were no controls in place to track and account for items taken into the containment above the suppression pool. Finally, a 30-page procedure was also left on the floor of the same room, which was not documented in the FME lo . Housekeeping was generally good, but some problems were identified. Empty fuel oil barrels were observec in the turbine building, mezzanine level, that were not prope ly labeled as " empty" in accordance with site procedures (a repeat finding) and a water hose was not properly secured to preclude the spread of contamination. Corrective measures were acceptable (Section O2.1).
In response to the above concerns: (1) the empty barrels were properly labeled; (2) the unsecured hose was removed from thc, auxiliary building; (3) the cloth towels near the HCUs were captivated and logged; (4) other materials were removed from the cont,ainment; (5) procedural changes were initiated to clarify management expectations; and (6) health physics personnel were coached on appropriate FME practices. The corrective measures were acceptabl Operator Knowledge and Performance 0 NEO Performance Insoection Scope (71707)
On July 4,1998, diesel fire Pump 1B failed to start during postmaintenance testing. The inspector performed followup to this findin Observations and Findinas Diesel fuel oil tank outlet Valve FOF-V-4 was found to be mispositioned closed. The valve was repositioned to the locked open position and the postmaintenance test was satisfactorily accomplishe An NEO had completed Clearance Order 98-0739 on diesel fire pump components just prior to the postmaintenance test. The NEO had indicated, with his initials, that he had i positioned Valve FOF-V-4 in the locked open position. During subsequent interviews the NEO stated that he remembered locking the valve but could not remember
. repositioning the valve. The licensee's investigation determined, in part, that inattention I to detail and f atigue were contributors to the problem. The operator had worked multiple I
night shifts in a row and was working days after a 24-hour turnaround. The incident !
occurred toward the end of his shift. The inspector also observed that the clearance l
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not safety-related so noncompliance with the cleamnce order did not constitute a violation of NRC requirement The inspector determined that the licensee's short-term corrective measure (detailed l . crew briefings) to previously identif d Operation's human performance problems was j not timely. Condition Report 98-0838 was initiated on June 8,1998, to address the negative trend in performance. However, detailed briefings to refocus the crews did not occur until July 7, approximately one month after the trend was identified and 2 days after the fire pump valve mispositioning event. The Operations Manager stated that Operations management had discussed the human performance problems in early June and he believed other crew briefings may have been conducted more closely to the j condition report issue date. However, the inspector interviewed a random sampling of j operators, and the NEO that mispositioned the fire pump valve, and none of the operators could recall a detailed briefing on the subject prior to the July 7 briefing Therefore, the inspector concluded that, if briefings did occur at an earlier time, they were not effectiv Other short-term corrective measures, taken subsequent to the July 7 briefings, included increased peer checking and the establishment of a performance accountability policy. Longer-term corrective measures were still under development at the close of the inspection perio The valve mispositioning event was the fourth " plant-impact" type of Operation's human perfor~.ance error in the past three inspection periods. Previous events included the mispositioning of the Division ll diesel generator output breaker, which temporarily rendered the diesel generator inoperable; the inadvertent isolation of an HCU pressure
- switch; and the failur'e to open the Feedwater Pump B speed increaser cooling water
. valve per clearance order specifications, which forced operators to take the pump off line until the problem was correcte Conclusions l
An NEO demonstrated poor self-checking practices when he failed to properly reposition the diesel fire pump fuel oil tank outlet valve per clearance order specifications, which iesulted in pump failure during postmaintenance testing. This was the fourth ' plant impact" type of Operations human performance problem identified during the past three inspection periods. While a trend in human performance problems was identified approximately one month prior to the fire pump event, short-term corrective actions were i
not timel Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
0 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9605-01 : mispositioning of RHR C keepfill pump instrument isolation valves. This item addressed an instance in which two operators had signed a clearance order indicating that the keepfill pump differential pressure gage isolation valves were closed, but the inspectors identified that the valves were still in the open
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-4-I position. The licensee determined that the violation was caused by personnel error due j to poor work practices. As corrective measures, the operators were counseled, the valves were repositioned, and shift briefings were conducted to reinforce expectations for self-checking, component manipulation, and requirements fcr accurate verification 1 and documentation. The inspector considered the licensee's corrective measures to be I appropriate at the time. Nonetheless, more recently, the licensee has experienced a similar trend in Operation's human performance problems (see Section 04.1 of this raport). Violation 50-458/9812-01 was issued to address one of the more recent problems. Violation 50-458/9605-01 is closed and the inspector will follow up on the current concerns in response to Violation 50-458/9812-01 and the other human performance issue .2 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9605-02: failure to maintain control room pressure boundar This item addressed an instance in which operators had blocked open a control room door, breaching the control room pressure boundary without first following the procedural requirements for an operability determination. The licensee determined that the cause of the violation was personnel error. Operators were not knowledgeable of the procedural requirements and did not check the procedure. As corrective measures participant operators were counseled and all senior reactor operators were trained on the event and the applicable procedure. The inspector interviewed a random sample of five senior reactor operators and found that each was knowledgeable of the event and the applicable requirements. The corrective measures were effectiv i l
11. Maintenance j M1 Conduct of Maintenance i
M1.1 General Comments , Insoection Scope (61726. 62707)
The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities, except as noted belo * Maintenance Action Items 31185 through 31191, HCU Rebuild Activities
= Maintenance Action item 316423, HPCS Pump Breaker Replacement ;
- Maintenance Action item 318001, Feedwater Flow Venturi instrument Line Replacement
. Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)-057-3900, "LLRT [ local leak rate test)- Non Refueling Summation," Revision 6, See"on 7, " Annulus Bypass Leak Rate Determination" (documentation review;
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. STPs-057-4504,4505, an'd4506, Control Rod Block-Source Range Monitor (SRM) Channel Functional Tests, all were Revision 9C (documentation I I
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. STP-203-6305,"HPCS Quarterly Pump and Valve Operability Test," Revision 8 (documentation review)
. STP-251-3606," Diesel Fire Pump Engine Maintenance and Inspections,"
Revision 8A (documentation review) ' Observations and Findinas The performance of maintenance was thorough and professional. Poor radworker
. practices are discussed in Section R4.1, an on-line repair of a feedwater flow venturi instrument line is discussed in Section M1.3, and problems with several missed surveillance are discussed in Section M M1.2 Feedwater Flow Venturi instrument Line Repair insoection Scoce (61726. 62707)
An equipment operator identified a small water leak that originated from a small crack in a feedwater flow venturi instrument line, located in the turbine building. The inspector observed the licensee's response to this proble Observations and Findinas A radiograph of the instrument line was taken for a detailed evaluation. The contract radiograph technician subsequently reported that the line contained a 360 degree circumferential crack. Further, the leak rate was slowly increasin At approximately 8 p.m., senior and mid level managers responded to the site to address the problem. The managers were concerned because the associated instrument provides an input to the reactor vessel level control system, when in three-element control (the normal mode of control). A rupture of the line would challenge the ability of the system to properly control reactor vessellevel and would likely result in a plant trip.
l In response to plant management direction, a repair package was prepared, the reactor vessel level control system was placed in single element control, and the instrument line was replaced. The inspector considered management involvement with the problem to be excellent. The maintenance reflected careful planning, good coordination with Operations, and appropriate cons;deration of plant risk.
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-6- Conclusions Management involvement to address a through-wall feedwater flow venturi instrument line crack was excellent. Managers responded to the site in the evening to address the problem and the resultant maintenance reflected careful planning, good coordination with Operations, and appropriate consideration of plant ris M1.3 Missed Surveillance Inspection Scope The inspectors performed followup to four licensee identified instances in which surveillance were not performed when require Observations and Findinas The licensee found:
. TS SR 3.6.1.3.12, annulus bypass leak rate determination, was missed in January 199 . TRM 3.3.2.1.12 SRM rod block channel functional tests were not performed prior to plant startup on April 27,199 . The HPCS pump inservice testing (IST) surveillance frequency was not increased on April 30,1998, when pump vibration levels were found in the alert range. Consequently, the next required surveillance was misse . The 2-year fire pump inspection required by fire protection procedures was not performed within the surveillance interva Details are provided belo Annulus Bypass Leak Rate Determination: Subsequent to the performance of the TS SR 3.6.1.3.12. " Annulus Bypass Leak Rate Determination" on April 25,1998, an engineer identified that the leak rate determination was not performed in January 1998 following the localleak rate test (LLRT) of containment purge Dampers HVR-AOV-123 and HVR-AOV-165. These dampers are frequently operated and, as such, ar'e required by TSs to be LLRT'd every 92 days. Furthermore, since the results of the tests are inputs into the annulus bypass leakage rate, performance of the annulus bypass leak rate evaluation was also required to be performed following each LLRT by STP-403-7301," Containment Purge System isolation Valve Leak Rate Test," Revision 1, which states:
" Send a copy of the completed procedure to the LLRT Coordinator for tabulation into . . . STP-057 3900."
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f -7-The above step was not accomplishe The licensee stated that the cause for the missed surveillance was related to " change management." Recently, the responsibility for conducting the containment purge l damper LLRTs was transferred from Plant Engineering to Mechanical Maintenanc However, Plant Engineering retained ownership of the annulus bypass' leak rate
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summation. The licensee believed that Mechanical Maintenance personnel had not l received adequate training on the importance of providing the results of the leak rate j test to Plant Engineering for the TS required summation. Additionally, plant supervisors
- had not properly scheduled the annulus leak rate summation in the computer scheduling program. They relied sole!y on Mechanical Maintenance's compliance with STP-403-7301 to prompt the surveillanc Missed SRM Surveillance: On May 27,1998, Quality Assurance inspectors found that the TRM required SRM channel functional tests for control rod block instrumentation were not performed prior to entering Operational Mode 2 on April 27, 1998 (Condition Report 98-0650). rRM SR 3.3.2.1.12 requires that the channel functional tests be performed on SRMs within 7 days prior to entering Mode 2 from a l shutdown exceeding 7 days. Forced Outage 98-01 was 14 days in duration and the pertinent channel functional tests were performed 13 days prior to the mode chang The licensee and the inspector observed the following contributors:
l . Maintenance personnel did not adequately review the TRM and misinterpreted the document. While the TRM requirements were straightforward and easy to l
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understand, the Instrument and Controls supervisor and superintendent informed the NRC inspector that they had preconceived beliefs about the TRM surveillance and only briefly reviewed the TRM itsel . The surveillance schedule was not specific. The schedule only specified that nuclear instrument surveillance's be performed prior to startup. It did not specify which surveillance were actually require . Guidance documents were misleading and/or inaccurate. The surveillance cross
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reference matrix, also referenced by Instrument and Controls staff, tied the l requirement to perform the channel functional tests to entry into Mode 5
! (refueling). Since Mode 5 was not entered during the forced shutdown, the Instrument and Controls personnel believed that the requirement to perform the channel functional tests did not apply. The inspector observed that information on the matrix was inconsistent with the information in the TR . The Instrument and Controls superintendent and supervisor did not utilize the surveillance program coordinator (Plant Engineering) to ensure that their interpretation was appropriate. This surveillance program coordinator was established in 1996 to provide general oversight of the surveillance program, part of the corrective actions associated with surveillance related escalated enforcement activities (see NRC Inspection Report 50-458/96-26).
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-8-Missed HPCS Pump Vibration Surveillance: A maintenance technician identified that the HPCS pump vibration levels were measured in the " alert range" during IST on April 30,1998, but the frequency of testing was not doubled, as required by the ASME
. Code and ADM-0015," Station Surveillance Testing Program," Revision 1 Consequently, the next required surveillance, due approximately June 15, was not i performed. The technician identified the problem on July 22 following surveillance testing where the pump. vibration readings were observed in the alert range. When the technician pulled the prior surveillance (April 30 test) to determine how much the vibrations had degraded, he observed that the vibration reading during that test was also in the alert range but was not identified as such. A technician, the control room supervisor, and the IST coordinator had reviewed the April 30 surveillance resulte and signed the test document indicating the results were satisfactory and not in the alert range. Two additional Operations personnel had also reviewed the surveillance and did not catch the proble The licensee determined that the procedural reviews were inadequate and the personnelinvolved had inappropriately focused on whether all parts of the procedure were completed versus verifying the acceptance criteria were met. These persons all understood management expectations regarding the surveillance reviews but failed to meet the Missed Fire Pump Surveillance: On July 2,1998, the licensee identified that the 2-year fire pump inspection for fire Pump 1B, required by TRM SR 3.7.9.1.15 and STP-251-3606," Diesel Fire Pump Engine Maintenance and Inspections," Revision 8A, was not performed 'oy March,20,1998. The surveillance was last performed on March 19, 1996, and the program specifies that there is no grace period for this surveillanc The licensee determined that a partial performance of STP-251-3603 was performed ,
following a turbocharger replacement in October 1997. Due to a confusing surveillance tracking document (" green sheet"), the information was misinterpreted and the partial surveillance was mistakenly credited as a full surveillanc Licensee investigation and Corrective Actions: The licensee documented the adveYse trend in surveillance performance in Condition Report 98-0939 and initiated the following short-term corrective measures:
. Initiated an " investigation Team" to review the problems and recommend long-term corrective measure . Conducted a plant-wide " stand-down" to refocus plant personne The " Inspection Team," in part, identified the following generic contributors:
. Surveillance actiWies were not given a high priority by site managers and supervisors. Management involvement did not identify problem __ - __ _ _ - . - - - _ _ _ .
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. Scheduling activities were not consistently of high quality. In some instances the computerized scheduling program was not utilized to track surveillance. In i other cases, the schedule specified performing survdilances on nuclear instruments, versus specifying each surveillance individuall . The green sheets used for surveillance tracking v.ere confusing and not all test personnel had a prvper understanding of the documents. Consequently, the green sheets were not consistently completed or interpreted in an accurate manner. Historically, some partial surveillance were inadvertently credited as complete surveillanc . The responsibility for several surveillance was recently assigned to Mechanical Maintenance but training on the tests was inadequate to ensure high quality implementation. Additionally, procedures were not revised to accommodate users with lesser surveillance familiarit . Some procedural guidance was not clear and required the use of judgment for implementation. Surveillance experts, such as the surveillance coordinator, Operations, and Licensing personnel, were not consistently use As corrective actions for the above, the licensee plannsd to:
. Develop and implement a new standard for surveillance program performance ,
and accountability, including the establishment of performance measures. This j should ensure that site management maintains a continued focus on the j surveillance progra j
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. Ensure consistent use of the computerized scheduling program and other tool ;
Additionally, ensure that each outage-related surveillance is identified ;
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. Provide training to site personnel to reinforce surveillance requirement Particular focus will be directed toward the appropriate use and interpretation of surveillance tracking green sheet . Consider an alternate method for tracking partial surveillance, versus using the green sheet . Review and revise, as necessary, surveillance procedures to ensure that an j appropriate level of guidance is provide j NRC Assessment: The " Inspection Team's" evaluation of the missed surveillance was thorough and self-critical. Planned corrective measures were sound and expansive.
l The licensee had received escalated enforcement for a number of missed survei' lances i
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determined that the corrective measures identified at the time wodd have reasonably j i
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-10 j ' been expected to prevent recurrence. The specnic contributors associated with the l currently addressed missed surveillance were sufficiently different from those identified in 1996 so that the missed surveillance were not considered repetitive.
l l- The failure to perform the SRM channel function tests in accordance with the TRM was not a violation of NRC requirements. However, the failure to perform the annulus l bypass leak rate determination,2-year diesel fire pump inspection, and HPCS vibration l l surveillance as specified by plant procedures was not consistent with the requirements of TS 5.4.1. This TS requires that procedures necessary for safety-related surveillance testing and for implementation of fire protection program requirements be implemente This nonrepetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV l
50-458/9815-01).
1 Conclusion .
- A noncited violation was documented to address three licensee identified instances where surveillance were not performed per TS 5.4.1 required procedures. Missed
! surveillance included: (1) the overall annulus bypass leakage evaluation; (2) an HPCS l pump vibration surveillance; and (3) the 2-year diesel fire pump inspection. Additionally, l TRM surveillance of SRMs were not performed prior to plant startup on April 27, but did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements. Subsequent performance of the
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surveillance was satisfactory. Contributors included inadequate management oversight, poor implementation of scheduling activities, inadequate training, weak surveillance procedures, and confusing surveillance tracking methods. The licensee's investigation was thorough and self-critical. Planned corrective actions were sound and expansiv M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours i Insoection Scope (62707)
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l During this inspection period, the inspectors conducted interviews and routine plant tours to evaluate plant material condition.
' Observations and Findinas l Overall plant material con 6 tion was good. The following material condition problems
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were observe . Instrument Air Compressors: Instrument air compressors continued to experienced periodic trips on "high pressure outlet temperature," due to high ambient temperatures. Temporary cooling devices have been effective at reducing the number of trips experienced this inspection period. However, to date, long-term corrective measures were not identified. The potential
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consequences of the compressor trips were limited because the service air l l system would auto-align to supply instrument air loads in the event of the simultaneous trip of multiple compressor ,
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. Feedwater Flow Venturi instrument Line: A 360 degree circumferential crack l was identified on a feedwater flow venturi instrument line. The instrument line
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. Electrohydraulic Control -22 VDC Bus: The subject bus was reading lower than normal at -21.3 VDC. The cause of the anomaly was not identified at the
- close of the inspection period, but was believed to be limited to one of two l redundant power supplies. The bus, in part, supplies turbine control valve logi ;
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. HPCS Pump: The HPCS pump axial vibration was found in the alert range during surveillance testing. The pump is operable but the licensee is required to monitor pump vibration levels on an increased frequenc j
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. Emergency Response Information System: The emergency response ;
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- information system " transient analysis" computer was out of service for the brief I intervals during this reporting period and has, in recent history, been problematic.
l This computer provides information on the transitory behavior of many plant l parameters following a transient or accident. A replacement computer was on- i site but was still being tested. The "real time" emergency response information j system computer (used for plant information during an event) was still in service 1
l and was considered reliabl Material condition improvements included: ,
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- Suppression Pool Pumpback System: Both Division il suppression pool pumpback pumps were returned to service this period.
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. Suppression Pool Cleanup System: The suppression pool cleanup was out of f
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service for most of the previous report period but was returned to service this l
l period. The suppression pool cleanliness was improving and at the close of the inspection period the bottom of the suppression pool was visible. This was a
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substantial improvement in suppression pool cleanlines l i Conclusions
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Plant material condition was, overall, good. Material condition concerns included
. repeated trips of instrument air compressors, a through-wall crack of a feedwater flow venturi instrument line (repaired), a degraded -22 VDC electrohydraulic control bus,
. elevated axial vibration or, ine HPCS pump, and an erratic emergency response information system transient analysis computer. The instrument air compressor trips were not of major concern due to automatic backup features. Material condition i
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improvements included restoration of the Division 11 suppression pool pumpback pumps and the suppression pool cleanup system. Suppression pool cleanliness was substantially improve M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance lasues (92902)
l M (Closed) Violation 50-458/9605-03: failure to perform drywell floor drain sump flow l testing since initial construction. The licensee's investigation and corrective actions were previously documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/96-05 and Licensee l
Event Report 96-011. The inspector reviewed the documents and verified that the key I corrective measures were accomplished. Of those, a concrete blockage was removed !
from one of the piping lines and a procedure was developed to document and control the surveillance. Prior to the corrective measures, the surveillance were performed in accordance with the postmaintenance program, which made surveillance verification
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difficult. The inspector reviewed the latest completed surveillance from Refueling i Outage 7 and found that the test was appropriately accomplished. Additionally, the j l
t inspector verified, through documentation reviews and interviews, that the concrete {
blockage was successfully removed. The corrective actions were acceptabl .
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M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9613-02 : failure to follow IST procedure when connecting {
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pressure gage. This item pertained to an instance where an operator, who was
! confused by the procedural guidance, attempted to install a pressure gage in an
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inappropriate location on the actuator for testable check Valve RHR-V-F098," testable check valve in the RHR B containment flood flow path." He had failed to seek direction
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when he did not understand the procedural step. As corrective measures, the operator was counseled and training was provided to Operations personnel to reinforce the need ; '
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to stop and ask questions when procedural guidance is not clear. The licensee's l response to the violation also indicated that the procedure would be clarified prior to the .
next performance of the test. However, the inspector observed that the valve had been removed from the IST program, which negated the need for the procedural step Removal of this valve from the IST program was acceptable, as the valve did not have an active safety function. Containment flooding is not a safety-related mode of the RHR system, l
Ill. Enoineerina Enoineerina l
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment 0:- Insoection Scope (37551) l A design engineer identified a cracked solder joint on the HPCS diesel ground wir The inspector performed followup to this licensee findin _ __ _ -_ - _-__ - ______________ -_ - _ __-___ ___ _ ______- _ _____ _ - _ _
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- Observations and Findinas While checking the ground configuration for the HPCS DG, a design engineer observed that the ground wire solder was cracked and the wire was about to break free from the post. The engineer determined that the diesel generator was operable but the wire was in a degraded condition. The degraded condition was difficult to see and the engineer )
demonstrated excellent attention to detail by identifying the problem. The connection was promptly repaire l Conclusions A design engineer demonstrated excellent attention to detailin that he identified that the HPCS diesel ground wire solder joint was cracked and about to break free from the post. The connection was promptly repaired. '
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IV. Plant Support !
- R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Radiation Protection and Controls
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R Radworker Practices Followina HCU Maintenance
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a .' .insoection Scope (71750)
l The inspector observed maintenance technician radworker practices while exiting a contamination are Observations and Findinas l
The inspector observed several poor radworker practices. When wearing clean cotton liners, craftsmen touched their used anticontamination clothing in potentially contaminated parts of the garments, grabbed a potentially contaminated support, and picked up potentially contaminated bags of components that had spilled in a clean are Some of the cotton liners were found to be contaminated at the exit of the radiologically controlled area. The Radiological Work Permit provided weak controls in that the noted practices were not specifically prohibite S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S General Comments (71750)
During routine tours the inspector observed protected area illumination levels, maintenance of the isolation zones around protective area barriers, and the status of security secondary power supply equipment. Additionally, selected surveillance were reviewed for compliance with the Security Plan. No problems were observe ,
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-14-V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 13,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings
. presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie ,
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION i PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Edington, Vice President-Operations B. Biggs, Licensing Engineer P. Chapman, Superintendent, Chemistry D. Dormady, Manager, Plant Engineering J. Fowler, Acting Director, Quality Programs i T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Maintenance H. Hutchens, Superintendent, Plant Security R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing D. Mims, General Manager, Plant Operations W. O'Malley, Manager, Operations D. Pace, Director, Design Engineering A. Wells, Superintendent, Radiation Control INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support IP 92901 Followup, Operations IP 92902 Followup, Maintenance 4 ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Closed 50-458/9605-01 VIO Mispositioning of RHR C keeptill pump instrument ,
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isolation valves 50-458/9605-02 VIO Failure to maintain control room pressure boundary 50-458/9605-03 VIO FaiLre to perform drywell floor drain sump flow testing since initial construction 50-458/9613-02 VIO Failure to follow IST procedure when installing '
pressure gage I
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Opened and Closed l
l~ 50 2458/9812-01 NCV Three instances where surveillance were not
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- LIST OF ACRONYMS USED L ADM administrative procedure ASM American Society of Mechanical Engineers l'
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CF Code of Federal Regulations ' .FME foreign material exclusion i HCU hydraulic control unit HPC high pressure core spray IST inservice testing l
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LLRT' localleak rate test
' NCV . noncited violation NEO nuclear equipment operator
- NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .
l .PDR public document room RH residual heat removal
.SR . Surveillance Requirement SRM source range monitor 1 STP surveillance test procedure 'l
- TRM Technical Requirements Manual i l 1TS: Technical Specifications l VDC volts, direct current h VIO - violation
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