IR 05000458/1998012

Insp Rept 50-458/98-12 on 980517-0627.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20236V213
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	07/29/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236V204	List: IR 05000458/1998012 ML20236V202 ML20236V208
References
50-458-98-12, NUDOCS 9807310364
Download: ML20236V213 (13)

Text

- _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - . . _ _ _ __ . _ _ _ _ _ - __________ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .

.

.

ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-458 License Nos.: NPF-47 Report No.: 50-458/98-12 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: River Bend Station Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana Dates: May 17 through June 27,1998 Inspectors: G. D. Replogie, Senior Resident inspector N. P. Garrett, Resident inspector Approved by: C. S. Marschall, Acting Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Attachment: Supplemental Information

,

l'

i l

l l'

(

f:

9807310364 980729 PDR

?

O ADOCK 05000458 2 PM ,

.

.

.

i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY River Bend Station NRC Inspection Report 50-458/98-12 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Ooerations

-

The conduct of operations was generally professional and safety-conscious. Operators were consistently knowledgeable of plant status and significant equipment problems (Section O1.1).

.

One violation of Technical Specifications 5.4.1 (procedures) was identified for operating a different breaker than specified on a clearance order. The Division 11 diesel generator i

'

output breaker was mistakenly operated, instead of the C residual heat removal pump breaker, which momentarily rendered the diesel generator inoperable. This was the third operator related human performance problem identified within the last two report periods that has affecteo plant operation (Section 04.1).

Maintenance

. The performance of maintenance and surveillance was generally professional and thorough (Section M1.1).

-

Plant material condition was very good, overall, with a few relatively minor exception Material condition concerns included two out-of-service suppression pool pumpback j pumps, an out-of-service suppression pool cleanup system, and repeated trips of instrument air compressors. The instrument air compressor trips were not of major concern due to automatic backup features (Section M2.1).

Enoineerina

-

The diesel generator system engineer demonstrated excellent support of Operations by identifying the cause of anomalous Division 11 diesel generator power variations in a very l prompt manner (1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the problem was first identified). This helped to minimize the out-of-service time for the diesel generator. The engineer determined that the

, problem was caused by a failed relay. The function of the relay was test related and did

! not affect the operability of the diesel generator (Section E2.1).

. The Quality Assurance review of an old open corrective action item (inaccurate CST

level switches associated with HPCS and RCIC suction valves) was not thorough and i i

l failed to identify that: the engineering evaluation credited a compensatory measure canceled in 1993; minor USAR discrepancies were not corrected in a timely manner; engineering managers did not ensure adequate oversight for deferral of measures to correct the problem; and, the engineer assigned ownership of the item did not have an appropriate understanding of the engineering evalcation and applicable TS and USAR sections. (Section E7.1).

r

, .

i [

!

-2-

_

Plant Sucoort

.

Most emergency preparedness facilities and the emergency response organization staffing were maintained consistent with the River Bend Emergency Plan (Section P2.1). j

-

One violation of 10 CFR 50.54q (emergency preparedness requirements) was identified for failing to maintain the capability (for 19 days) to activate all emergency preparedness sirens within 15 minutes of the notification of the state and local government official ,

Only 18 of 93 sirens activated during a surveillance. The problem was caused by a !

defective software upgrade. An opportunity to identify the problem earlier was missed because post-installation testing of the software upgrade was inadequate (Section P2.2).

-

Security facilities, equipment, isolation zones, and illumination levels were properly maintained (Section S2.1).

Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant was in Operational Mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power for essentially the entire l inspection perio I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations

.

O1.1 General Comments (71707)

i

<

, The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to conduct frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. The conduct of operations was generally professional and safety-conscious. Operators were consistently knowledgeable of plant status and significant equipment problems.

!

02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment j O Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707. 71750) >

The inspec. tors walked down accessible portions of the following systems:

. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)

- Reactor Core isolation Cooling (RCIC)

. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Trains A, B and C

. Low Pressure Coolant injection

. Standby Gas Treatment System Trains A and B

+ Diesel Generators (DGs) 1,2 and HPCS

__ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __- ___ _ _ _ ____ __ _ _ _ _

.

.

-3-The systems were found to be properly aligned for the plant conditions and, generally, in good material condition. During the plant tours, housekeeping was very goo Operator Knowledge and Perforrnance 04.1 Clearance Order lmolementation Insoection Scooe (71707)

The inspector performed followup to an event where a reactor operator mistakenly removed control power fuses to the Division ll Diesel Generator (DG) output breake Observations and Findinas On June 1,1998, a licensed operator attempted to rack-in Breaker ACB28, RHR Pump C breaker in accordance with Clearance Order 98-0583. When the breaker was initially racked-in the operator called the control room to verify that the control power available ,

light was lit. The operator was informed that the light was not lit and was requested to rack the breaker out, which included pulling the control power fuses, and rack it back i The operator then attempted to rack out the subject breaker but mistakenly proceeded to the Division 11 DG breaker in the adjacent cubicle and pulled the control power fuses for that breaker instead. This action rendered DG2 inoperable. Control room operators were alerted to the mistake by alarms. The fuses were immediately replaced and the DG was restored. The licensee initiated Condition Report (CR) 98-0675 to document the proble Inadequate self-checking was considered to be cause of this particular proble Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends procedures for equipment control (locking and tagging). The inspectors noted that the violation was self-disclosing through an even The failure to properly manipulate plant breakers in accordance with Clearance Order 98-0583 is a violation of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1, which requires the licensee to implement the procedures specified by Regulatory Guide 1.33 <

(VIO 50-458/98-12-01). l The error described above represents the third Operations related " plant-impact" type of ,

human performance problem during the last two inspection periods. In April of this year {

an equipment operator was involved in two valve mispositioning events which affected a feedwater pump speed increaser and a hydraulic control unit accumulator pressure ,

switch. CR 98-0707 was initiated to address the apparent increasing trend in operator I human performance errors. Specific corrective measures to address this problem were l not developed by the end of the inspection perio I Conclusions inspectors identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to operate the appropriate plant breaker in accordance with a clearance order. An operator mistakenly removed the control power fuses from the DG2 output breaker, instead of the RHR C pump breaker, momentarily rendering the diesel generator inoperable. This was L___-_______________

<. y

= ,

.

-4-the third operator related human performance problem that affected plant operation in the last two report period II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Insoection Scooe (62707. 61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance activities: ;

a MAI 315080, " Control Building Chilled Water Chiller Condenser A Service Water Outlet Line Pressure Control Valve Replacement,"

!

.

STP-500-5201, " Control Rod Scram Accumulator Instrumentation (West) Channel l Functional Test and Channel Calibration," Observations and Findinas 1 The performance of maintenance and surveillance was generally professional and

'

thorough. Issues related to missed surveillance are addressed in Section M1.1 belo M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours Insoection Scoce (62707)

)

During this inspection period, the inspectors conducted interviews and routine plant tours to evaluate plant material conditio l Observations and Findinas l Material condition challenges included: 4

.

Instrument Air Compressors: At different times during the inspection period all

,

three instrument air compressors experienced repeated trips on "high pressure ,

outlet temperature," due to high ambient temperatures in the area. In response to the problem the licensee installed cooling devices in the vicinity of the air l compressors, which appeared to be effective for the short term. The potential I

consequences of the compressor trips were minimal because the service air system would auto-align to supply instrument air loads in the event of simultaneous trip of multiple compressors.

I

_ _____- __ ________ _ _

- - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

.

.

-5-

. Suppression Pool Pumpback System: On June 10,1998, both Division 11 suppression pool pumpback pumps tripped on thermal overloads during surveillance testing. While the pumps appeared to operate properly during subsequent testing, they remained in an inoperable status until the cause of the simultaneous failures, debris in the sumps, could be effectively addressed. The licensee expected to return the pumps to service during the second week of Jul . Suppression Pool Cleanup (SPC) System: The SPC was out of service for most of the report period due to the repetitive isolation of the filter / demineralized on an erroneous high temperature signal. The cleanliness of the suppression pool has degraded since the SPC was removed from servic Conclusions Plant material condition was, overall, very good. Minor material condition concerns j included repeated trips of instrument air compressors, two out-of-service suppression j pool pumpback pumps, and an out-of-service SPC syste )

l 111. Engineering i

E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E Division 11 Diesel Generator (DG2) Power Oscillations Insoection Scoce (37551)

The Division ll diesel generator experienced anomalous power variations during surveillance testing. The inspector observed the Engineering response to this conditio Observations and Findinas During the monthly Division 11 DG surveillance at 4 a.m. on June 3, operators observed )'

that the DG did not respond correctly to adjustments of the governor. Specifically, while tied to the power grid the DG experienced larger than expected power swings in response to minor adjustments in load demand. The DG was declared inoperable pending further engineering evaluatio l The DG system engineer responded to the site and identified that the problem was caused by a fai!ed telay. The sole purpose of the relay was to place the DG into droop mode so that the DG could be tied onto an energized bus for load testing. The relay was

! fail-safe and had failed in its safety position. As such, the relay failure did not affect the j operability of the DG. The total time from the observation of the condition to the identification of the cause was only 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The inspector considered the system engineer's efforts to be an example of excellent support of Operations. His efforts helped to minimize the DG out-of-service time.

l i __ . - _ _ - _

- _ - _ _ - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

-

i l

s

' -

-6- Conclusions The DG system engineer demonstrated excellent support of Operations in identifying the cause of anomalous DG2 power variations in a very prompt manner (1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the problem was first identified). This helped to minimize the out-of-service time for the D E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities

- E Quality Assurance Oversicht of Outstanding Corrective Action items a. Insoection Scoce (37551)

The inspector randomly selected one old outstanding corrective action item for a detailed review to check the quality of engineering work and QA oversigh b. Observations and Findinas Corrective Action item 91-0295-01: In 1991, the licensee identified that level switches

used to control High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling l , (RCIC) pump suction valves were not appropriately compensated for flow. The lack of j flow compensation had the potential to adversely impact the availability of water from the

!

CST for HPCS. The lack of flow compensation did not have safety impact, since the USAR, Chapter 15 accident analysis did not take credit for CST water in mitigating the consequences of any accident. The licensee identified one Technical Specification (ECCS Shutdown) that was affected by the problem. This TS required that at least two ECCS systems be available when shutdown, with reactor water level less than 23 feet above the reactor pressure vessel flange. If HPCS was one of the systems credited for compliance with Technical Specification requirements for ECCS during shutdown, the potential impact on CST availability could adversely impact HPCS effectiveness in the event that the suppression pool was not available as a water source. To address the l potential TS problem, a compensatory measure (Operations Standing Order 96) was established to ensure that the suction swap would not occur while the plant was .

shutdown. -The licensee evaluation took credit for this compensatory measure in determining that the condition did not require a TS change and did not constitute an {

unreviewed safety questio I When inspectors reviewed this long standing issue, the following problems were l l identified: {

l l

l

. Although the licensee's evaluation, performed in 1991, still took credit for the '

compensatory action item, it was canceled ir 1993. Operations Standing Order 96 was canceled because Operations believed that a corrective modification was about to be installed. The modification was not installe . USAR discrepancies were not corrected. The USAR states that level is controlled so that sufficient CST water (preferred water) is available for HPCS

I

!

l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _

, .

and RCIC injecdon. The licensee initiated a modification to correct the condition and update the USAR, however, leaving this condition as-is since 1991 was considered untimel .

Procedure RBNP 30 requires that the plant manager approve deviations from the USAR, that extend past a refueling outage. Engineering managers have approved the extensions for correcting this problem since 1994. This demonstrates weak management oversight of plant modification . The engineer assigned responsibility for the corrective action itcm was knowledgeable of the modification details but was not knowledgeable of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, or applicable TS and USAR section In response to the inspector's concerns, the licensee determined that, since 1993 when the standing order was canceled, HPCS had not been credited as an ECCS system when shutdown. In addition, during those periods, the suppression pool was always available as a water source for HPCS, and the control logic for the HPCS CST suction valve would have ensured that the valve would have remained open until the suppression pool suction valve reached the full open position. Based on the licensee's review, the inspector concluded that the safety-significance of the lack of flow compensation was minimal, and no failure to comply with TS shutdown requirements for ECCS had occurre I The inspector noted that QA had previously reviewed the corrective action item on several occasions, and performed a detailed review during the most recent refueling

'

outage. Since QA had not ider'tified any of the problems noted above, the inspector cor.cluded that they had not thoroughly review corrective action item 91-0295-01.

, Conclusions The Quality Assurance review of an old open corrective action item (inaccurate CST level switches associated with HPCS and RCIC suction valves) was not thorough and reflected a lack of depth on the particular issue and a failure to consider programmatic implication !

IV. Plant Support 1 P Status of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Facilities, Equipment, and Resources P General Comments (71750)

During routine plant tours the inspectors verified that EP facilities were properly maintained and, curing off-normal hours, periodically verified that the licensee maintained at least the minimum staffing requirements specified in the River Bend Emergency Pla i

.

_ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ .

_ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _

.

, .

-8-l P2.2 EP Sirens

, Insoection Spooe (717501 On June 3, during a surveillance, the licensee attempted to activate all EP sirens located in the 10 mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). Only 18 of 93 sirens were successfully activated. The inspector performed followup of this proble Qblervations and Findinas While attempting to initiate all 93 EP sirens from the five local parishes, only 18 of 93 sirens activated. Sirens from one parish worked properly but the sirens from the remaining four parishes failed to function. The licensee identified that a recently installed software upgrade did not perform as expected. The software upgrade was installed and tested on May 14,199 The licensee informed the inspector that, in response to an actual event, the on-shift communication specialist may have been able to reboot the backup computer F.nd sound the sirens from the emergency operations facility. These actions would have taken approximately 25 additional minutes, if the communications specialist knew exac'ly what to do. The licensee did not specify how many of the qualified communication specialists knew how to manipulate the system and accomplish the tasks in a timely manner (there was no procedural guidance). Alternatively, the parishes could have notified residents manually (police and other local government officials, but it would have taken approximately 1.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> to initially notify all residents ir the EPZ). The River Bend Emergency Plan and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, required the licenvee to have the capability to activate all EP sirens within 15 minutes of the notification of the state and local government official Inspectors concluded that the post-installation testing of the software upgrade, performed on May 14,1998, was inadequate. The testing only exercised the capability to activate the sirens from the emergency operations facility (a silent test) but did not ensure that the local government officials in the parishes could activate the sirens (the normal method oi activation). Personnel involved with the test did not follow the licensee's local procedural requirements for testing the softwara located in Procedure RBNP-41, " Computer Software Management," Revision 6. This procedure specified that the entire software package and program capabilities be tested, which was not accomplished. The l technicians were apparently unaware of the procedural specification NRC Assessment: While the basic malfunction of the EP sirens was identified by the l

licensee during a surveillance, the licensee clearly had a prior opportunity to identify the problem during post-installation testing of the software. However, this testing was

{ inadequate and did not provide assurance that the sirens could have functioned, if required. The failure to maintain the capability to activate all EP sirens within 15 minutes of the nafication of the state and local government officials is a violation of f

l

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

'

.

l l

.

-9-l 10 CFR 50.54q, which requires the licensee to follow and maintain in effect emergency

,

plans which meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E

, (VlO 50-458/9812-02).

! Conclusions One violation of EP requirements was identified for the failure to maintain the capability (for 19 days) to activate all EP sirens within 15 minutes of the notification of the state and local government officials. The problem was caused by a defective software upgrad An opportunity to identify the problem earlier was missed because post-insta!!ation testing of the software upgrade was inadequat S2 Status of Security Facilities ano Equipment S General Comments (71750)

During routine tours the inspector observed protected area illumination levels, maintenance of the isolation zones around protective area barriers, and the status of security secondary power supply equipment. No problems were observe V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 7,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings

- presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie l l

l

1

!

,

%

- - -____ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ -_ _ _ _-_ _ __ - ___ _ _ __ _ _ - _ -

'

I

.

( ATTACHMENT l SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licantes J. McGaha, Vice President-Operations l B. Biggs, Licensing Engineer l P. Chapman, Superintendent, Chemistry l D. Dormady, Manager, Plant Engineering l

'

J. Fowler, Acting Director, Quality Programs T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Maintenance H. Hutchens, Superintendent, Plant Security R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing D. Mims, General Manager, Plant Operations W. O'Malley, Manager, Operations D. Pace, Director, Design Engineering A. Wells, Superintendent, Radiatioa Control INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

,

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering L IP 61726: Surveillance Observations

! IP 62707: Maintenance Observations j' IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support i

!

,

!

..

_ -. _. _ _ -_ --

.

.

l- 2-l

-

,

l ITEMS OPENED Ooened 50-458/9812-01 VIO Failure to operate plant breakels in accordance with clearance order requirement /9812-02 VIO Failure to maintain EP sirens operational.

I f .

l

!-

f

!

I I

!

!

!-

i l-l i

!

'

!~

t I

l L__________ _- -- - - _ _ - 1

_ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

.

'.

-3-LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ADM administrative procedure cc/ hour cubic centimeters per hour CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR condition report DG diesel generator EOF emergency operations facility EP emergency preparedness i EPZ emergency planning zone J HPCS high pressure core spray

'

l&C instrument and controls LCO Limiting Condition for Operation LER Licensee Event Report LLRT local leak rate test MAI maintenance action item NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR public document room QA Quality Assurance  !

RBNP River Bend nuclear procedure RBS River Bend Station RCIC reactor core isolation cooling RHR residual heat removal SPC suppression pool cleanup SRM source range monitor STP surveillance test procedure SR Surveillance Requirement TRM Technical Requirements Manual TS Technical Specification TSR Technical Requirements Manual Surveillance Requirement URI unresolved item USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report VIO violation l

l l

l

,