IR 05000458/1999002

Insp Rept 50-458/99-02 on 990124-0306.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20205D789
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	03/26/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205D773	List: IR 05000458/1999002 ML20205D769
References
50-458-99-02, 50-458-99-2, NUDOCS 9904020300
Download: ML20205D789 (11)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-458 License No.: NPF-47_ .

' Report No.: 50-458/99-02 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In I Facility: ' River Bend Station

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Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana {'

Dates: January 24 through March 6,1999 l

Inspectors: G. D. Replogie, Senior Resident inspector N. P. Garrett, Resident inspector Approved By: C. S. Marschall, Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Attachment: SupplementalIr. formation J i

9904020300 990326 PDR ADOCK 05000458 G PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY River Bend Station NRC inspection Report No. 50-458/99-02

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This inspection report included aspects of licensee operation, maintenance, engineering, and plant support., The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Ooerations

• The conduct of operations was generally professional and safety conscious (Section 01.1). ,

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• When a containment isolation valve associated with the postaccident sampling system I failed, operators appropriately isolated the penetration using other valves. Although operators and engineers initiated compensatory actions to allow plant staff to open the valves for sampling under accident conditions, they did not consider the effects of those plant conditions on the workers until questioned by the inspectors (Section O2.2). l Maintenance

• Plant staff performed maintenance and surveillance in a consistently thorough and professional manner (Section M1.1).

• Plant material condition was acceptable, with some notable problems. Significant j material condition concerns included seven potential fuel leaks, degraded first and .

second stage Recirculation Pump A seals, a degraded electrohydraulic controls pump, and a degraded postaccident sampling system (Section M2.1). J Enaineerina

• The licensee identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, in that a procurement engineer failed to follow plant procedures when evaluating relays for use in the diesel generator starting air circuit. As a result, the Division I diesel generator failed to start during postmaintenance testing. Inspectors considered the corrective measures acceptable and determined that the violation met the criteria for a noncited violation (Section E2.1).

Plant Suonort

• The emergency preparedness facilities and plant staffing remained consistent with the 1 River Bend Emergency Plan (Section P2.1). l

• The resident inspectors have found no problems in the security area for the past yea (Section S2.1).

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' Report Details  !

Summarv of Plant Status tThe plant was in Operational Mode 1 at 95 percent power at the start of the report perio . Reactor power was limited to 95 percent to avoid repetition of minor reactor recirculation flow instabilities. On January 25, reactor power was reduced to 65 percent to support locating and suppressing a leaking fuel element and to perform a control rod pattern adjustment. Reactor power was returned to 95 percent on February 1. Between February 1 and 25 power was -

permitted to gradually reduce to 89 percent to preclude flow instabilities. On February 25, reactor power was reduced to 61 percent for fuel suppression testing and a control rod pattern -

adjustment. . Power was returned to 83 percent on February 28, where it essentially remained )

for the remainder of the inspection period. Power was limited to 83 percent due to operations late in the operating cycle, fuel burn up, and the insertion of several control rods for fuel leak suppressio l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to conduct frequent plant operations reviews. The conduct of operations was generally professional and safety-consciou O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707. 71750)

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems:

• High Pressure Core Spray

• Rt sidual Heat Removal, Trains A, B, and C

• Reactor Core isolation Cooling

• - Low Pressure Core Spray

• Division I, il, and til Diesel Generators

• Standby Gas Treatment System Trains A and B

• Standby Liquid Control l

The systems were found to be properly aligned for the plant conditions and in general good mechanical conditio Clearance Orders: The inspectors observed or walked down the following safety-related clearance orders but no problems were found:

• RB-99-0288, EGS EG1B Engine (Division 11 diesel generator)

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0 Postaccident Samolina System

, Insoection Scope (71707)

IThe inspectors reviewed the operational status of the postaccidsnt sampling syste Observations and Findinas .

Background: On January 20, the licensee declared the postaccident sampling system Jet pump sample line outboard containment isolation valve, SSR-V-130, inoperable due to excessive valve seat leakage.- The containment penetration was isolated with the deactivated closed inboard containment isolation valve, SSR-V-131, and manual Valve SSR-V-511. Although closure of one of the two valves would have met the

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Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 requirements, the licensee decided to close both valves for added conservatism. Operators considered the system fully operational because the

- two isolation valves could be opened under administrative controls to support a PASS sampl NRC Evaluation: The inspectors determined that the postaccident sampling system would not be fully operational during some core damage events, when a postaccident

. sampling system sample would be required. Furthermore, the licensee had not taken precautions to ensure that individuals would not be overexposed when opening Valve SSR-V-511 during a postaccident sampling system sample, when fission products would be traveling through the sample lin ~ During a severe core damage event, radiological conditions in the plant would be expected to change substantially. No evaluation of the expected conditions was performed to determine if radiological conditions would make Valve SSR V-511 inaccessible. Additionally, in the event that the valve was initially accessible, the licensee had not properly considered the dramatic increase in radiation levels in the vicinity of the valve when fission products traveled through the line during a postaccident sampling system sample. Since a watch-stander is required to be in the immediate vicinity of Valve SSR-V-511 when it is opened under Technical Specification administrative controls, a watch-stander may inadvertently be overexposed during the evolution. The inspector observed that the licensee had established a watch-stander at Valve SSR-V-511 during the last scheduled postaccident sampling system sampl Moreover, some control room supervisors stated that they may place a watch-stander at

' Valve SSR-V-511 during the conduct of a postaccident sampling system sampl The licensee agreed with the inspectors observations and immediately opened Valve SSR-V-511. Deactivated solenoid operated Valve SSR-V-131 was still used to

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isolate the containment penetration, which met the minimum Technical Specification 3.6,1.3 requirements. Valve SSR-V-131 would be remotely operated under administrative controls and posed no over-exposure potential to plant personne The licensee also briefed engineers and operations personnel on the oversight to

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-3-reinforce attention to detail concepts. The corrective measures were acceptable. The postaccident sampling system was fully operational following the opening of Valve SSR-V-13 Conclusions When a containment isolation valve associated with the postaccident sampling systern failed, operators appropriately isolated the penetration using other valves. Although operators and engineers initiated compensatory actions to allow plant staff to open the -

valves for sampling under accident conditions, they did not consider the effects of those plant conditions on the workers until questioned by the inspector II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Insoection_ Scope (61726. 62707)

The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activitie = Maintenance Action item 320960,1EGS-PSX30A,1EGS-PSX86A,1EGS-PSY30A, and 1EGS-PSY86A Calibrations, Division 1 DG Field Flash Control Circuit and Exciter Reset Control Circuit Pressure Switches

• Maintenance Action item 318323, Division i Tachometer Transmitter and DC to

- DC Converter replacements

• STP 309-0201, Division I Diesel Generator Operability Tos't i Maintenance Action item 323499, EGS-EG18, Division ll Diesel Generator Rocker Arm inspection Observation and Findinas 4 Plant staff performed maintenance and sunteillance in a consistently thorough and professional manner. A Division i Diesel Generator surveillance failure is discussed in l Section E M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

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-4-M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours i Inspection Scope (62707)

. During this inspection period, the inspectors conducted interviews and routine plant tours to evaluate plant material conditio Observations and Findinas Overall plant material condition was good with some notable exceptions. The following material condition problems were observe . The first and second stage recirculation Pump A peals were degrade Following a planned downpower maneuver on November 2, the second stage pump seal cavity pressure was less than expected, indicating degradation of the second stage seal. The seal cavity pressure continued to slowly decrease and was as low as 175 psig. Normal cavity pressure is approximately 500 psi More recently, the second stage seal cavity pressure slowly increased to approximately 675 psig. The increase in pressure was an indicator of potential first stage seal degradation. Secondary indicators, such as temperatures and drywell leakage, were within expected parameters. As such, seal failure was not imminent. Both pump seals are designed as redundant 100 percent capability seals. The licensee was properly prepared for a potential seal failur . Fuel element failures have occurred during this operating cycle. On September 17, the licensee identified an initial fuel element defect. Since that time, a total of seven potential minor defects have surfaced. In each case, engineering prornptly performed testing to identify the location of the fuel leak As a result of the testing, operators inserted control rods to minimize worsening i of the damaged fuel. No appreciable increase in offsite releases occurred )

• The Postaccident Sampling System was degraded during much of the inspection period. Toward the end of the period, operators reopened a manual valve that isolated an inoperable containment isolation valve. A remotely operated valve continued to isolate the penetration. This action returned the system to a fully operational condition. See Section O * The Electrohydraulic Controls Pump A was degraded. The system engineer stated that the pump, if called upon to start, might only run for a short period of time. The redundant pump was in service and showed no signs of degradatio Failure of both pumps would result in a turbine tri :

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1 Conclusions The inspectors considered plant material condition acceptable, with some notable problems. . Significant concerns included seven potential fuel leaks, degraded first and second stage Recirculation Pump A seals, a degraded electrohydraulic control pump i

' and a degraded postaccident sampling syste . M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance lasues (92902)

i M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9617-03: failure to follow lastructions when working in the-standby service water pump room. The inspectors had identified an instance where operators failed to cover holes in the standby service water pump room floor when performing work. A sign at the entrance to the pump room required that the holes be covered. _Since the pumps did not have suction strainers, anything falling through the holes would land in the service water basin and could be sucked into a pump. As short-'

. term corrective measures, the licensee enlarged the warning sign at the entrance of the pump room and trained the River Bend staff on the violation details. More recently, the holee in the floor were covered with permanent boots. The corrective measures were acceptabl Ill. Enoineerina

.E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment (37551)

L E Division I,Emeroencv Diesel Generator Timer Relav Problems a. - Inspection Scope (71707) -

On February 25,1999, the Division i diesel generator failed to start during postmaintenance testing. The inspectors observed the licensee's response to the even Observations and Findinas The licensee identified that the diesel generator failure was caused by an inadequate

'part interchangeability evaluation" of four timer relays. The relays were installed in the

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diesel generator starting circuit prior to the tes '

The origina! relays were approaching the end of their vendor specified service life, were obsolete, and needed to be replaced. In April 1996, a procurement engineer had

- qualified similar relays for use in the application utilizing Procedure EDP-PE 09,"Part interchangeability Evaluation," Revision 2. The procedure required that specific differences between components be documented and evaluated. However, the engineer failed to identify that the original and replacement relays did not have exactly the same pin configuration. The power supplyleads were reversed. The engineer had

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not compared the original vendor information sheet with the similar information for the i

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new relays. He had inappropriately assumed that, because the term " universal" was used to describe the connector for the new relays, the pin configuration was the sam The failure to appropriately accomplish the required steps in Procedure EDP-PE-09 when evaluating the timer relays is a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1. This Technical Specification requires the licensee to properly implement procedures recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, including procedures to control the procurement of replacement parts. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC, Enforcement Policy. The violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-0224 (NCV 50-458/9902-01).

As corrective measures, the licensee:

• Reinstalled the original .elays in the starting circuit. The service life for the relsys does not expire until May 199 * Reperformed postmaintenance testing to verify Operability of the diesel generato * Initiated actions to obtain appropriate replacement relay * Counseled the procurement engineer on appropriate evaluation practice * Verified that the April 1996 evaluation had not resulted in the use of the suspect relays in other application * Discussed the problem with other engineers to sensitize the staff to the issu The corrective measures were appropriate to the circumstance Conclusions The licensee identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, in that a procurement engineer failed to follow plant procedures when evaluating relays for use in the diesel generator starting air circuit. As a result, the Division I diesel generator failed to start during postmaintenance testing. !aspectors considered the corrective measures acceptable and determined that the violation met the criteria for a noncited violatio E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues (92903)

E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9612-02 (02014k On February 14,1996, the Division ll emergency diesel generator tripped on overspeed during a surveillance. Further investigation revealed that the field-flash relay had failed due to an inadequate modification. When the generator failed to excite, the emergency diesel generator tripped on overspee .

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-7-The licensee determined that a modified monitoring light permitted too much current through the field-flash relay. As a result, the relay overheated. Additionally, inappropriate surveillance procedures contributed to the problem, in that they established c. nditions that could damage the relay. The corrective measures included

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redesign of the relay circuit, surveillance procedure changes, and training of the j engineering staff. The inspector considered the corrective measures acceptable and effective at preventing recurrence. No related relay failures have occurred since , -

implementation of the corrective actions. This item is close I IV. Plant SuppoA P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Facilities, Equipment, and Resources P2.1 - General Comments (71750)

During routine plant tours, the inspectors verified that the emergency preparedness facilities remained in good material condition and, during off-normal hours, periodically verified that the licensee maintained at least the minimum staffing requirements specified in the River Bend Emergency Pla S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment i

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S General Comments (71750)  !

During routine tours the inspector observed protected area illumination levels, maintenance of the isolation zones around protective area barriers, and the status of security secondary power supply equipment. No problems were observed. More importantly, however, the resident inspectors have found no problems in the securit area for the past year. This is indicative of a strong security progra V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to memwers of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 18,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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ATTACHMENT

' SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED ,

t Licensee R. Edington, Vice President-operations

B. Biggs, Licensing Enginee P. Chapman, Superintendent, Chemistry D. Dormady, Manager, Plant Engineering -

J. Fowler, Director, Quality Programs .

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T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Maintenance-

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J. Holmes, Manager Radiation Protection and Chemistry H. Hutchens, Superintendent, Plant Security

^ R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D.~ Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing

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D. Mims, General Manager, Plant Operations -

W. O'Malley, Manager, Operations D. Pace, Director, Design Engineering'_

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A. Wells, Superintendent, Radiation Control

. INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

- IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations

' Plant Support

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~ IP 71750:

- IP 92902 ~ Followup, Maintenance .

- IP 92903? Followup, Engineering -

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

- Opened and Closed 50-458/9902-01 NCV Inadequate relay substitution evaluation Clpsesi 50-458/9612-02 VIO Inadequate diesel generator modification i 50-458/9617-03 VIO Failure to cover holes in service water pump room

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-2-LIST OF ACRONYMS CFR Code of Federal Regulations .

NCV- noncited violation

. NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR public document room -

psig ' pounds per square inch VIO violation -

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