IR 05000458/1997016
| ML20212D364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212D353 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-97-16, NUDOCS 9710310080 | |
| Download: ML20212D364 (10) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:-
50-458 License No.:
NPF-47 Report hs.:
50-458/97-16 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
l Facility:
River Bend Station Location:
5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Dates:
September 29 through October 3,1997 Inspector:
L. E. Ellershaw, Senior Reactor inspector, Maintenance Branch Approved By:
Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Maintenance Branch Attachment:
Supplemental Information I
i 9710310080 971028 PDR ADOCK 05000458 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY River Bend Station NRC Inspection Repc,rt 50-458/97-16 Thir inspection consisted of followup on previously identified inspection findings. The inrpection report covers a 5-day period onsite.
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Ooerations t
Following a 1996 management conference to discuss ful handling concerns, there
were extensive corrective actions implemented at River Bend Station. Management has subsequently become proactive, and the licensee's performance during this inspection demonstrated a marked improvement in implementating the safe handling of fuel (Section 08).
/ ssessments (internal and external) were focused, candid, in-depth, and self critical.
- Quality assurance peisonnel conducted frequent surveillance activities and demonstrated a thorough knowledge of refueling operations (Sections 07.1 and 08.3).
The refueling crews performed in a very professional and knowledgeable manner.
- Excellent communications between the control room refueling coordinator, refueling floor supervisor, refueling crew supervisor, fuel building bridge operator, and the two inclined fuel transfer system operators were established. There was clearly a marked improvement in refueling crew performance over what was observed during Refuel;ng Outage (RF)-6. A good team attitude was dispiayed with all personnel cognizant of their responsibilities (Section 08.3).
Maintenance To improve the material conditix of the suppression pool, the licensee installed
perrr.anent protect;ve barriers in various ILcations and a permanent cleanup system (Section 08.1).
To improve material conditinn related to fuel handling, the licensee had installed a
high intensity lighting system in the reactor vessel, and mounted a high resolution video camera on the refueling mast to assist in fuel bundle placement and identification (Section 08.3).
To improve material condition related to fuel protection, the licensee installed a
permanent instrument air and backup nitrogen supply for tha containment building pneumatic gate seals and main steam line plugs (Section 08.5).
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3-Reoort Details Summarv of Plant Status s
The plant had entered RF-7 and was in Mode 5 during the inspection period.
1. Ooeratics
- Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (40500)
The inspector reviewed two River 3end Station assessments associated with refueling operations. The first was an assessment performed by Entergy Operations, Inc. personnel (with one outside utility representative) during June 1996, and the second was performed by FPI International, which was documented in their eaport " Common Cause Assessment of Refuel Operations at River Bend Station," dated June 1996. In addition, the inspector reviewed four pality assurance surveillance reports covering fuel receipt training, new fuel receipt inspections, and RF-7 training. The inspector also reviewed 22 quality assurance field note reports that documented quality assurance obsrrvations of fuel movement i
operations during September 12-25,1997.
The inspector found that the assessments were self-critical and candid. Quality assurance personnel conducted frequent surveillance activities and demonstrated a thorough knowledge of refueling operatior. Management applied a lessons-learned approach to the issues identified during the assessments, and quality assurance
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observations were quickly reconciled. The inspector concluded that the assessment / surveillance activities were effective.
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9601-01: Three instances of failure to comply with procedures were identified, and included: (a) the checking of refueling bridge zone computer interlocks was not d)ne in accordance with the procedure; (b) there were numerous instances where items had been brought into the fuel and reactor building pool areas but were not accounted for, documented, and secured; and (c) personnel f ailed to initiate condition reports for numerous items lost in the suppression pool.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated June 17,1996, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified. The corrective actions included: a review of preventive mainterunce tasks which resulted in the initiation of Condition keport (CR) 96-1164
to corrt/2 identified errors; enhanced personnel training, particularly in the area of
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foreign material exclusion (FME) controls; creation of a new FME procedure that was modeled after the corporate (Entergy Operations, Inc.) procedure; establishment of psrmanent protective barriers in various suppression pool locations; and installation
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of a permanent suppression pool cleanup system. In addition, the suppression pool cleanup system was installed, with initial operations beginning in August 1997.
This resulted in pool turbidity, as measured by a turbidimeter, decreasing from 7.2 to 0.87 (i.e., from a murky, semi-opaque condition to a near-clear condition).
The inspector observed the implementation of some cdministrative controls associated with FME, particularly those associated with the logging of materials entering and exiting the reactor cavity pool FME zone. The inspector did not observe any loose or unaccounted foreign material.
08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9601-02: The designated surveillance test procedure (STP) f ailed to adequately test the fuel handling platform main hoist C
loaded interlocx.
The licensee determined that the STP characterized certain actions as prerequisites rather than their being included in the performance section. Thus, a worker's f ailure to adhere to some of the prerequisites (a practice which was administratively allowed) could have prevented accomplishment of the hoist loaded interlock surveillance requirement. The licensee's quality assurance group performed a surveillance which identified additional and similar conditions (e.g., inconsistencies in STP structure and the use of other procedures / documents to perform Technical Specification surveillance requirements). This resulted in the initiation of CR 96-0940. The CR caused a detailed review of surveillance procedures and the Technical Specification cross reference to identify those procedures not in the STP format. The review identified 83 procedures that were not in the appropriate format and corrective actions were identified and implemented.
Further, in February 1997, the licensee established a surveillance testing program coordinator's position in the system engineering department. The general responsibilities included: development of new STPs: maintenance of the surveillance test procedure / technical specification / technical requirements manual cross reference database; review of license basis changes to ensure proper surveillance compliance; tracking of STP performance, test exceptions, and frequency tolerance evaluations; and scheduling of STP performance, including ensuring that required surveillances were performed in the appropriate mode.
08.3 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9601-03: Failure to properly verify the correct core location, which led to the incorrect placement of a fuel bundle.
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During this inspection, the inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated June 17,1996. Reactor Engineering Procedure REP-0029, " Fuel Movement," was revised (Revision 4), and included i
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5-the identified corrective actions. The licensee developed a comprehensive training module for fuel handlers, with emphasis placed on correct fuel placement, safe fuel handling expectations, shift turnover requirements, and the need for a questioning attitude. The licensee also contracted with an independent agency to perform an assessment of human performance errors. The information developed from this in-depth assessmcat was appropriately incorporated into the training module and Procedure REP-0029.
The inspector observed fuel movements at various times during September 29 and 30,1997. The inspector observed refueling crew performance (three crew in the containment building, including one shift turnover, and one in the fuel building).
This was the second consecutive refueling outage in which the refueling crews were made up of Entergy Operations, Inc., personnel. The refueling crews performed in a very professional and knowledgeable manner. Excellent communications between the control room refueling cooidinator, refueling floor supervisor, refueling crew supervisor, fuel building bridge operator, and the two inclined fuel transfer system operators was established. There was clearly a marked improvement over the refueling crew communications and performance that was observed during RF-6.
Personnel appeared to be motivated and have a good awareness of their responsibilities, and a good team attitude was displayed.
During fuel movements, the inspector noted that water clarity was very good, and the licensee had installed a high intensity lighting system in the reactor vessel. To assist in fuel bundle placement and identification, a high resolution video camera was attached to the refueling mast.
The inspector also observed a frequent presence of quality assurance surveillance and overview activity during the refueling operations.
08.4 (Closed) insoection Followuo item 50-458/9601-04: Review of CR 96-0143 and the associated engineering analyses to determine the appropriateness of the licer. sue's reclassification of the pneumatic gate seals.
The licensee's engineering analyses showed that the current plant design, together with administrative controls, provided adequate assurance that the water level coverage assumption for the fuel handling accident analysis remained valid. The analyses evaluated the worst case conditions as follows: Fuel Building - both adjacent pools were drained and the gate seals f ailed; Containment Building -
- simultaneous drain down of the upper transfer pool and the refueling cavity pool, tollowed by a failure of both dryer storage pool gate seals. The licensee concluded, therefore, that the gate seals and seal air supplies could be classified as nonsafety-related. Licensee personnel also identified, with respect to administrative controls, the need for procedural changes / additions in order to support reclassificatio._ ___ _ _ - _ - - _
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' The inspector reviewed CR 96-0143 and the associated engineering analyses, administrative controls, and applicable containment building and fuel bui! ding pool drawings, and determined the licensee's reclassification of the pneumatic gate seals from safety related to nonsafety related was appropriate.
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08.5- (Closed) Violation 50-458/9601-05: Failure to establish appropriate design control measures to assure that the design bases of the fuel building pool and containment building pool pneumatic gate seals were translated into drawings, procedures, and
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The inspector verified that the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter dated June 17,1996,~ were appropriate and complete. Of significance, was the assignment of a system engineer with responsibility for the fuel building and containment building gate seals. Preventive maintenance tasks for the gate seals were established, with specified replacement frequency. Design
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Change Package ER 97-0187 was established to install an appropriately engineered and controlled permanent instrument air and backup nitrogen supply for the contehment building gate seals and main steam line plugs. The modhcations/ installations for both systems were completed during September 1997 and were identified as: " Air-Instrument, System #122, Drawing KD-PID-12-1C, Revision D," and." Nitrogen, System #124, Drawing KA-PID-14-1 A, Revision A."
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These actions also necessitated revisions to system operating procedures, alarm
. response procedures, and training lesson plans.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M 8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 50-458/96-002: Addressed the failure of a
- dissimilar metal weld joint causing a piece of return piping of the residual heat removal system to drep into the suppression pool.
The licensee had appropriately completed all identified repairs and corrective actions.
V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 3,1997. The licensee personnel acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspector asked licensee personnel whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was-identified.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee i
L. Ballard, Technical Specialist L. Ballard, Supervisor, Quality Assurance K. Bankston, Quality Specialist W. Beck, Refuel Floor Superintendent P. Campbell, Technical Assistant, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs D. Castleberry, Quality Specialist
- M. Dietrich, Director, Quality Programs J. Dimmette, Jr., General Manager, Plant Operations
. D. Derbonne, Refuel Project Manager D. Dormady, Manager, Performance and System Engineering-J. Fowler, Manager, Quality Assurance H. Goodman, Superintendent, Reactor Engineering T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Project Outage D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing C. Maxson, Supervisor, Industry Events R. McAdams, Senior Engineer, Licensing M. McHugh, Engineer, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs
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W. O'Malley, Marager, Operations D. Pace, Director, Engineering
. R. Roberts, Manager (Acting), Maintenance G.- Scronce, Fuel Fabrication Coordinator A. Wells, Superintendent, Radiation Control INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 92901 Followup - Operations
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-2-ITEMS CLOSED
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Closed 50-458/9601-01 VIO Three instances of failure to comply i
with procedures (Section 08.1)
50-458/9601-02 VIO The designated STP failed to adequately test the fuel handling
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platform main hoist loaded interlock (Section 08.2)
50-458/9601 03 VIO Failure to properly verify the correct core location, which led to the incorrect placement of a fuel bundle iaction 08.3)
50-458/9601-04 IFl Review of CR 96-0143 and the associated engineering analyses to determine the appropriateness of the licensee's reclassification of the pneumatic gate seals (Section 08.4)
50-458/9601-05 VIO Failure to establish appropriate design control messures to assure that the design bases of the fuel building pool and containment building pool pneumatic gate seats were translated into drawings, procedures, and instructions (Section 08.5)
50-458/96-002 LER Addressed the failure of a dissimilar metal weld joint causing a piece of return piping of the residual heat removal system to drop into the suppression pool (Section M8.1)
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-3-LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures Reactor Engineerinc Frecedure REP-0029, " Fuel Movement," Revision 4 Surveillance Test Procedure STP-055-0702, " Refuel Platform Hoist Operability,"
Revision 10A Fuel Handling Procedure FHP-0005, " Fuel Transfer Tube Operations," Revision 11 Preventive Maintenance Task Instruction MeO1597-14, " Mechanical," Revision 14 Surveillance Test Procedure STP-055-0705, " Fuel Handling Platform Operability Test,"
Revision 6 Surveillance Test Procedure STP-000-0005, " Daily Refueling Logs," Revision 11 Administrative Procedure ADM 0092, " Foreign Material Exclusion," Revis'on 0 Drawinas Drawing KD-PID-12-1C, Revision D Drawing KA-PID-14-1 A, Revision A Condition Reoorts and Acolicable Root Cause Analvsis Reoorts CR 96-1164, CR 96-0940, CR 96-0143, CR 96-0612, CR 97-1086, CR 97-1057, CR 97-1621, CR 971186, CR 97-1561, CR 97-1146 Surveillance Reoorts 707002,707006,708001,708002 Licensee Event Reoort LER 50-458/96-002 Desian Chanae Packaaq ER 97-0187
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Quality Assurance Field Note
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(Various) dated September 12 through 25,1997 Assessments.
Entergy Operations, Inc..." Refueling Activities Assessment," dated July 30,1996 FPI international Report FPI 96-789, " Common Cause Assessment of Refuel Operations at River Bend Station," dated June 1996