IR 05000458/1999008
| ML20211Q422 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211Q396 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-99-08, NUDOCS 9909150063 | |
| Download: ML20211Q422 (12) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-458 License No.:
NPF-47 Report No.:
50-458/99-08 i
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
River Bend Station Location:
5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana Dates:
July 11 through August 21,1999 Inspectors:
M. E. Murphy, Senior Resident inspector N. P. Garrett, Resident inspector Approved By:
William D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Attachment:
Supplemental Information
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9909150063 990908 PDR ADOCK 05000458 Q
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY River Bend Station NRC Inspection Repod No. 50-458/99-08 This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations Three human performance errors were identified. One involved an out-of-position valve
in the main steam isolation valve system and two errors were observed while operators were implementing a clearance order. The tagging errors were not recognized as human performance deficiencies by the licencee until the issues were discussed with the inspectors (Section O1.1).
Maintenance One violation was identified which involved the licensee's discovery that the staking of
the stem nut locknut on the reactor core isolation cooling minimum flow valve to the i
suppression pool, Valve E51-MOV-FO19, was inadequate to prevent movement of the l
stem nut locknut. This is the second example within 6 months of poor staking technique which could have resulted in safety-related equipment failure. This Severity LevelIV
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l violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC
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l Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-1265 (Section M2.1).
En1gineerina r
The inspectors performed a follow up review of Year 2000 (Y2K) readiness activities and
documentation using Temporary Instruction 2515/14," Review of Year 2000 (Y2K)
j Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," dated April 13,1999. The l
followup review determined that the River Bend Station's Y2K preparations are consistently acceptable with respect to industry guidelines (Section E8.1).
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Plant Support The licencee was unable to successfully decontaminate the containment building
following an airborne contamination event during vessel reassernbly. Postings for individual contamination areas within the containment building were not removed prior to posting the entire containment building as a contamination area. Leaving posted contamination areas inside a contamination area without posting special instructions was a poor practice (Section R2.1).
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ReDort Details Summarv of Plant Status At the beginning of the inspection period, the plant was at 80 percent power for rod sequence exchange. Reactor power was raised to 100 percent on 7/12/99. The plant remained at 100 percent power until August 20,1999, when reactor power was reduced to approximately 60 percent to perform suppression testing of fuel rods.
1. ODerations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Human Performance Errors
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a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed three human performance errors involving a mispositioned valve and an equipment clearance order.
b.
Observations and Findinos Valve Out of Position: On July 29,1999, a nuclear equipment operator (NEO) found l
the normally closed main steam isolation valve sealing steam system Division il drain to reactor building equipment drains isolation Valve MSI V61 in the open position during plant operations. Procedure GOP-0001, " Plant Startup," Revision 26, requires in part
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that "MSIV Sealing (Positive Leakage Control) System is operable per SOP-0034."
Procedure SOP-0034, "MStV Sealing System (Positive Leakage Control) and Penetration Valve Leakage Control," Revision 8, requires that Valve MSI V61 be in the closed position for system startup.
Operation of Valve MSI-V61 allows drainage of liquid; 5 the auxiliary building floor
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drains. When Valve MSI-V61 is open during plant operations, a direct flow path exists from the auxiliary building into the main condenser, resulting in a higher than normal off-l
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gas flow rate. As a result of the air in-leakage, the off-gas flow rate was approximately l
120 standard cubic feet per minute. The normal off-gas system flow rate is between 10
and 30 standard cubic feet per minute. The increase in system flow rate was initially
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noted during plant startup; however, troubleshooting efforts by system engineering had not located the source of in-leakage to the off gas system before the discovery of the open valve by the NEO. The increase in system flow results in a higher than normal moisture content in the system. The high moisture content contributes to operability problems with installed radiation monitoring instruments.
.The licensee entered the Technical Requirements Manual actions statements for the off-gas post treatment radiation monitors which were affected by the increased flow and performed periodic grab samples for analysis. The hcensee entered this event in the their corrective action program as Condition Reports (CR) 99-1167 and CR 99-1252. At i
the end of the inspection period, the licensee had not determined why the valve was left i
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2-in the open position. The inspectors determined that out-of-position Valve MSI-V61 constituted a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action.
Errors While Establishing Clearance: On August 8,1999, a Nuclear Control Operator (NCO) hung a clearance tag in the wrong location on a breaker and an NEO signed a procedural step out of sequence while performing the second check. The inspectors observed the hanging and second check of a clearance order to remove the Division i diesel generator from service for maintenance. The clearance order tags were hung by an NCO and second-checked by an NEO. Per the procedure, the NCO signed, dated, and time-stamped the clearance authorization sheet following the attachment of all the tags. The NEO was given the clearance order to perform the second check and proceeded to the first item on the clearance order. The first tag was checked and the NEO signed, dated, and time-stamped the second check of the clearance. The NEO then completed the clearance second check. Procedure ADM-0027, " Protective Tagging," Revision 17, stated, in part, " Sign in the ' Tag Placement'
section of the Clearance Authorization / Installation / Removal Sheet when independent verification is complete." This item was entered in the corrective action program as CR j
99 1336.
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During the second check, the NEO found one tag attached in the wrong location on an electrical breaker. The clearance order required the breaker to be in the off position with the tag attached to the breaker door. The r3cond checker noted that the tag was attached to the breaker handle. The error was pointed out to the NCO who promptly removed the tag and relocated the tag to the breaker door as specified. The inspectors questioned the removal and rehanging of the tag and determined that the procedure did not address actions to be taken if a tag is found in the wrong location during the hanging of the clearance. Additionally, the shift supervisor informed the inspectors that hanging the tag in the wrong location was not a human performance error since it was found and i
corrected prior to officially declaring the clearance active. Following discussions with the inspectors, the licensee entered the incorrect tag placement in the corrective action program as CR 99-1335.
The inspectors determined that the failure to properly document the second check while implementing a clearance order and the placement of a clearance tag in the incorrect location were examples of a violation of minor significance which is not subject to fonnal
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enforcement action, c.
Conclusions Three human performance errors were identified which involved an out-of-position valve in the main steam isolation valve system and two errors observed while implementing a clearance order. The out-of-position valve contributed to operablity problems for the off-gas radiation monitors due to high system moisture. The tagging errors were not recognized as human performance deficiencies by the licencee until the issues were discussed with the inspector r
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Miscellaneous Operations lasues (92901)
08.1-Violation Closure The inspectors performed an in-office review of outstanding violations in the operations area. The Severity Level IV violations listed below were issued in a Notice of Violation prior to March 11,1999. On this date, the NRC changed the policy for treatment of Severity LevelIV. violations (Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy). Because these violations would have been treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Appendix C, they are being closed out in this report, consistent with the new Enforcement Policy for Severity Level IV violations. The inspectors verified that the licensee had included these violations in their corrective action (CA) program. The CA program references for the violations are listed below.
Violation Number Description CA Program Reference
50-458/9713-01 Fail to follow protective tag-out restoration CR 97-1058 i
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.50-458/9713-03 Failure to evaluate SRV lift prior to CR 97-1268 startup Corrective action effectiveness reviews for selected violations will be accomplished as a routine part of the NRC's CA program inspections.
08.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-458/97-05: Reactor scram / failure of a connector to the electric trip solenoid valve.~ This event report documented a reactor scram which resulted from a trip of the main turbine. The main turbine tripped when a short circuit developed on the main turbine electrical trip solenoid valve, causing a trip signal to be sent to the turbine emergency trip system. The issues identified in this LER
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were reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/97-13. The circumstances addressed i
in the LER and the NRC inspection report are addressed in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 97-1255. The licensee's corrective actions included the replacement of the shorted connector, providing additional training to instrumentation and control technicians to enhance soldering skills, and inspecting all similar connectors on electrical trip solenoid valves to insure compliance with vendor instructions. The inspectors determined that the licensee's corrective actions were acceptabl r
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11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance a.
Inspection Scope (61726. 62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities:
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Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 256-6302, Division ll Standby Service Water
Quarterly Valve Operability Test, Revision 6 STP 256-6306, Division 11 Standby Service Water Quarterly Valve Operability
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Test, Revision 1 STP 257-0202, Standby Gas Treatment System Filter Train 8 Monthly
Operability Test, Revision 5 MAI 322416, E51 MOV010, Clean, inspect, insulation Test, Lubricate, RCIC Min
Flow to the Suppression Pool Valve Oper. (See M2.1)
STP 209-6310, RCIC Quarterly Pump and Valve Operability Test, Revision 12
MAI 327427, E31-N621 A, Replace Riley Trip Unit
STP 207-5500, Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation -Equipment Area Temperature
High Channel Functional Test ( E31 N620A, E31-N621 A, E31-622A, E31-N623A), Revision 7C STP 508-0201, Manual Scram Channel Functional Test, Revision 8
STP 204-6302, Div 11 Low Pressure Core injection (RHR) Quarterly Pump and
Valve Operability Test, Revision 15
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Observation and Findinas The inspectors determined that the performance of maintenance and surveillance was generally thorough and professional.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
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M2.1 Repair of Reactor Core Isolation Coolina (RCIC) Motor-Operated Valve a.
insDection Scope (62707)
The inspectors obsented the repair to RCIC minimum ficw Valve E51-MOV-FO19.
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Observation and Findinas On August 3,1999, during preventive maintenance on the RCIC minimum flow valve to the suppression pool, Valve E51-MOV FO19, electrical maintenance personnel identified that the valve stem nut locknut was loose. The valve actuator was replaced in January 1996 using Maintenance Action item (mal) 30924.
Technical Cpecification 5.4.1.a requires. in part, that " Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978."
Section 9 of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires the licensee to have procedures to perform maintenance. MAI 30924 referenced plant Procedure CMP-1282, "Limitorque SMB-000 and SMB/SB-00 Overhaul." CMP-1282 states in part that
"!F the stem nut locknut is to be staked, THEN stake the locknut in two places 180 degrees apart." The original staking of the locknut was observed to be inadequate to prevent movement of the locknut. The original stake resulted in a dimple in the metal and did not adequately deform sufficient metal to prevent movement. Had the stem nut disengaged, the valve would have been rendered inoperable due to inadequate staking.
Operations personnel declared the RCIC system inoperable and the applicable limiting condition for operation was entered. The stem nut locknut was tightened and staked as required by MAI 322416. The inspectors determined that this was the second example within 6 months of poor staking technique which could have resulted in safety-related equipment failure. The failure to provide adequate staking of the Va!ve E51-MOV-FO19 locknut is a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This Severity Level IV violation-is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-458/9908-01). The violation in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 99-1265.
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Conclusion One violation wasidentified which involved the licensee's discovery that the staking of the stem nut locknut on the RCIC minimum flow valve to the suppression pool, Valve E51-MOV FO19, was inadequate to prevent movement of the stem nut locknut.
This is the second example within 6 months of poor staking technique which could have resulted in safety-related equipment failure. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 99-1265.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 Violation Closure The below violations are closed consistent with the guidance previously provided in Section 08.1 of this report.
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6-Violation Number Description CA Program Reference 50-458/9713-05 Failure to implement foreign material CR 97-1186 exclusion near suppression pool 50-458/9713-06 Failure to maintain emergency core CR 97-1231 cooling system room water tight door closed 111. Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues E8.1 Year 2000 Readiness Review a.
'Insoection Scope (Temocrarv instruction 2515/141)
The inspectors conducted a followup review of the licensee's preparation for the Year 2000 (Y2K) transition, b.
Observation and Findinas The inspectors performed a followup review of Y2K readiness activities and documentation using Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/141, " Review of Year 2000 (Y2K)
Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," dated April 13,1999. The followup review determined that the River Bend Station's Y2K preparations are consistently acceptable with respect to industry guidelines.
Conclusions regarding the Y2K readiness of this facility are not included in this report.
The results of this review will be combined with reviews of Y2K programs at other plants in a summary report to be issued at a later date.
IV. Plant Support R2 Status of Facilities and Controls R2.1 Containment Buildina Contamination
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Insoection Scope (71707. 71750)
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The inspectors observed radiological conditions in containment during routine plant tours.
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Observations and Findino On June 17,1999, during cavity draining for vessel reassembly during forced Outage 99-01, the containment building became contaminated from radiological airborne activity. The licensee decontaminated the containment twice (below the
release criteria of 1000 dpm/100 cm ), but following each release the contamination returned. Following the second unsuccessful attempt to decontaminate the containment
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building, on July 15,1999, the licensee posted the entire containment building as a contaminated area. All existing contamination area postings, step-off pads, and bins
. used for anticontamination clothing and trash in the containment building were left in p' ace. Contamination areas in effect when the entire containment building access was posted as a contaminated area included both contamination areas (> 1000 dpm/100
2 cm ) and high contamination areas (> 10000 dpm/100 cm ). The licensee placed the inability to succesciully decontaminate the containment in the corrective action program f
I as CR 99-1185 and was developing plans to decontaminate the containment building.
The inspectors determined that, in accordance with radiation protection procedures, anticontamination clothing should by removed prior to crossing the step-off pads, unless directed by radiation protection personnel. The inspectors commented that leaving
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step-off pads in place without special posted instructions can result in confusion by radiological workers and a loss of sensitivity for the meaning of radiological barriers and posting.. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comment and placed issue of the nonremoval of posted contamination areas inside a contamination area in the corrective action program as CR 99-1275.
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Conclusions The licencee was unable to successfully decontaminate the containment building following an airborne contamination event during vessel reassembly. Postings for individual contamination areas within the containment building were not removed prior to posting the entire containment building as a contamination area. Leaving posted contamination areas inside a contamination area without posting special instructions could result in a radiological worker's loss of sensitivity for the meaning of radiological barriers and postings.
F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues F8.1 Violation Closure The below violation is closed consistent with the guidance previously provided in Section 08.1 of this report.
Violation Number Description CA Program Reference
'50-458/9713-07 Failure to control combustibles in fuel CR 97-1164 building
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8-V. Manacement M_qstings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The exit meeting was conducted on August 25,1999. The licensee did not express a position on any findings in the report. None of the material discussed in the exit meet;ng.
was considered proprietary.
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ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Burnett, Superintendent, Chemistry T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Maintenance J. Holmes, Manager Radiation Protection and Chemistry H. Hutchens, Superintendent, Plant Security R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D. Mims, General Manager, Plant Operations J. McGhee, Acting Manager, Operations D. Pace, Director, Engineering M. Davis, Acting Superintendent, Radiation Control l
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED i
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Temporary Instruction 2515/141: Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Open and Closed 50-458/9908-01 NCV Failure to follow maintenance procedure for valve maintenance Closed 50-458/9713-01 VIO Fail to follow protective tagout restoration procedure 50-458/9713-03 VIO Failure to evaluate SRV lift prior to startup 50-458/9713-05-VIO Failure to implement foreign material exclusion near suppression pool 50-458/9713-06 VIO Failure to maintain emergency core cooling system room water tight door closed 50-458/9713-07 VIO Failure to control combustibles in fuel building
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i-2-50-458/97-05 LER Reactor scram / failure of a connector to the electric trip solenoid valve j
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CA ~
corrective action CFR Code of Federal Regulations
cm square centimeters CR condition report dpm disintegrations per minute
LER licensee event report MAI maintenance action item NCV noncited violation NCO Nuclear Control Operator
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NEO Nuclear Equipment Operator NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J
RCIC reactor core isolation cooling PDR public document room RHR residual heat removal i
STP surveillance test procedure VIO violation
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Y2K
' Year 2000
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