IR 05000458/1989033
| ML20248A315 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1989 |
| From: | Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248A309 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-89-33, IEIN-87-062, IEIN-87-063, IEIN-87-62, IEIN-87-63, NUDOCS 8910020182 | |
| Download: ML20248A315 (8) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR' REGULATORY' COMMISSION'
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LREGION IV
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o NRC(Inspection Report:.50-458/89-33 Operating Licensei,NPF-47-
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Docket:
50-458;
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Licensee:
Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)
s P.O.' Box'220 m
.St. Francisville,. Louisiana 70775
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iFacility Name: '. River Bend Station ~(RBS)
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, Inspection At:
River Bend Station, St. Francisville, i.ouisiana
' Inspection Conducted: August 1-31, 1989
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Inspectors:
.E. J.: Ford,' Senior Resident Inspector W. B.' Jones,. Resident Inspector
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G. L Madsen, Project Engineer
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Approvedf YO M
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fv F G.'L. Constable, Chief, Project Section C:
Date Division of. Reactor Projects Inspection Summary.-
Inspection Conducted' August 1-31, 1989, (Report 50-458/89-33)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of followup of events, operational safety verification, maintenance observation, surveillance test observaion, licensee event report followup, followup on 10 CFR Part 21.
reports,: followup on~NRC information notices, and licensee action on previous
. inspection findings.
Results:..Within the. areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified
'The reactor. operators demonstrated an excellent knowledge of plant l
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- equipment, operating procedures, and the Technical Specifications (TS) during the reactor. shutdown and subsequent startup.
Maintenance andisurveillance
< activities were conducted in accordance with the controlling documents.
One example was. identified during the conduct of a surveillance activity where additional attention to detail was neeced.
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DETAILS i
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Persons Contacted J. E.' Booker, Manager, Oversight.
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l E. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs
- J. W. Cook, Lead Environmental Analyst, Nuclear Licensing T. C. Crouse, Manager, Quality Assurance (QA)-
- J. C. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend; Nuclear Group D..R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance L. ' A. England, Director, Nuclear Licensing A.' O. Fredieu, Supervisor, Operations H
P. D. Graham, Executive Assistant, Senior Vice President J. R. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering
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- G. K. Henry, Director, Quality Operations
- G. R. Kimmell,LDirector Quality Services R. J. King, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
- T. F.'Plunkett, Plant Manager
- M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering
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J. P. Schippert, Assistant Plant Managu, Operations and Radwaste
- K. E. Surke, Manager, Project Management J. Venable, Assistant Operations Supervisor
- R. G.- West, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Services
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The inspectors also interviewed additional licensee personnel during the inspection period.
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- Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on
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I September 12, 1989.
2.
Plant Status On August 8, 1989, the licensee commenced a controlled reactor shutdown
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from 100 percent power because of increasing unidentified leakage. The
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total unidentified leakage increased to approximately 4 gpm but did not
l reach the TS shutdown limit of.5 gpm. The licensee subsequently replaced the "A" recirculation pump seal during the 4-day forced outage.
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A reactor startup was initiated.on August 11, 1989, and full power operation was attained on August 13, 1989. Reactor power was reduced to 75 percent on August 18, 1989, to facilitate removal of the "B" feedwater i
pump from service to align the pump speed increaser with the motor. Full
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power operation was again reached on August 25, 1989.
3.
Followup of Events (93702)
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During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed licensee condition reports (CRs) and 10 CFR 50.72 reports and held discussions with various plant personnel to ascertain the sequence, cause, and corrective actions taken to events.
Discussion of a selected event is given below:
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i Loss of Control Rod Position Indication and the Ability to Move Any
control Roos On August 6, 1989, at 10:20 p.m. (CST), with the reactor operating at 100 percent power, the " Rod Control and Info System Inop" annunciator i
energized ano the " Test Display" pushbutton on the reactor operator's control module (0CM) began flashing. The operator subsequently identified
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that the OCM pushbuttons were not functioning properly (, thus preventing control rod selection and rod position verification.
The control rod full in and full cut status lights remained operable, as well as the manual and automatic scram function.) The licensee then declared the control rod position indication system inoperable as required by TS 3.1.3.5.
This TS requires that the control rod position indicating system be restored to operable status within I hour or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The licensee was able to restore the control rod position indication to operable status in 71 minutes. The NRC staff was notified of the plant shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50.72; however, a licensee event report will not be issued because the TS action statement was exited prior to completing the shutdown.
(No power decrease was initiated prior to exiting the TS action statement.)
The licensee's investigation of this event identified that the 5 vdc LANDA power supply in the Rod Action Control System (RACS) "B" panel tripped causing the rod control and information system (RC&IS) to " lockup" and the loss of control rod digital position indication on the rod display module.
The power supply to the RACS "B" panel was then reset and the indication restored.
A similar event occurred on August 12, 1989, with the reactor at 100 percent power. The rod position information was accessed 45 minutes
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after the RC&IS " locked up."
The 5 vdc power supply was subsequently replaced and the system restored to operable.
The licensee is reviewing a similar event that occurred at Perry Nuclear Station on December 12, 1988. The event is described in NRC Inspection Report 50-440/88-20. All three of the events appear to have resulted from a failed 5 vdc nonsafety-related power supply. The licensee is developing
procedural guidance to supplement System Operating Procedure SOP-0071, i
" Rod Control and Information System," to aid in determining control rod I
position from the remaining operable RACS panel follca'ing a loss of control rod position. This guidance was incorporu ed into the S0P on September 10, 1989.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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The inspectors observed operational actis ities throughout the inspection period and closely monitored operational events.
Control room conduct and activities were generally observed to be well controlled.
Proper control room staffing was maintained and access to the control room was well controlled. Selected shift turnover meetings were observed, and it was found that detailed information concerning plant status was being covered.
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-4-Several' control board walkdowns were conducted by the inspectors.
In all cases, the responsible operators were cognizant as to why an alarm was lit and the reason for each plant configuration. Operational conditions and events identified through discussions with the reactor operators and
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. review of the shift turnover logs were identified in the main control room log.
Inoperable equipment identified during the main control board walkdowns were identified by the applicable limiting condition for operation.
On August 8,1989, the operators conducted an orderly reactor shutdown from 100 percent power. This was done to allow replacement of the "A" recirculation pump seal. The operators anticipated the effects of shutting down plant equipment during the power reduction and took action to mitigate the expected transients. The subsequent reactor startup on August 11, 1989, was well controlled and power escalated to 100 percent without incident.
The inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological program were implemented in conformance with facility id regulatory requirements. Radiation and/or policies, procedures
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s contaminated areas wece properly posted and controlled.
Radiation work permits contained appropriate information to ensure that work could be performed in a safe and controlled manner. During the plant tours, the inspectors verified that selected very high radiation area access doors were locked and closed.
The inspectors observed security personnel perform their duties of personnel and package secrch, Personnel access was observed to be controlled in accordance with established procedures. One instance where an incorrect key card was given out was identified by the licensee. This event will be reviewed further during a subsequent security inspection.
The inspectors conducted site tours to ensure that compensatory posts were properly implemented, as required, because of equipment failure or j
degradation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
On August 29, 1989, the inspector observed a corrective maintenance l
activity to replace a main condenser vacuum pressure transmitter. The l
pressure transmitter provides input to one of two channels associated with the Division 11 main steam line isolation logic. The second channel of this trip system, as well as both channels of the second trip system, l
remained operable.
During the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure STP-000-0001, " Daily Operating Logs," the trip unit associated with Pressure i
Transmitter IB21*PTN0758 failed the channel check. The licensee subsequently placed the affected channel into the trip condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> as required oy TS 3.3.2.
This action initiated a Group-6 l
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1/2 isolation which includes the main steam isolation valves.
(The remaining trip system would have to actuate before an isolation would actually occur.) Prompt Maintenance Work Order Request (MWO) R056455 was then initiated to replace the affected pressure transmitter.
Prior to installing the new pressure transmitter in the field, the. unit was bench calibrated in accordance with Surveillance Test Procedure STP-051-4288,
"NSSSS-Condenser Vacuum - Low Monthly CH Funct, 18 Month CHCAL, 18 Month LSFT (B21-N675B; B21-N065B)." The pressure transmitter was then installed I
and a final calibration check performed. Af ter completing STP-051-4288,
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the channel was declared operable and the 1/2 1 solation cleared.
The inspector reviewed the MWO package and found that the maintenance had been conducted in accordance with the job plan. A quality activity (QC) inspector also observed the work activity, as required for a control prompt MWO.
No violations or deviations were identified 6.
Surveillance Test Observation (61726)
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During this inspection period, the inspectors observed surveillance activities associated with the reactor coolant system - identified and unidentified leakage detection system, and the Automatic Depressurization System "A" drywell pressure bypass timer.
Surveillance Test Procedure STP-207-4550, "RCS - Identified and Unidentified Leakage Detection System - Drywell and Containment Equipment Drain and Drywell, Pedestal and Containment Floor Drain Sump Flow tionitor, Monthly CHFunct," was performed on August 22, 1989, with the reactor at 65 percent thermal power. This surveillance procedure meets the TS requirements of Section 4.4.3.1.6 for the sump drain flow monitoring system and Section 3.4.3.2.6 which limits the unidentified leakage to 5 gpm. The inspector verified that the prerequisites were met and that the shift supervisor (SS)/ control operating foreman (C0F) had authorized performance of the test. The test results were determined to be acceptable and were reviewed by the C0F.
Surveillance Test Procedure STP-051-4298, " ADS "A" Drywell Pressure B Timer, Monthly CHFunct, Quarterly CHCAL and 18 tionth LSFT (B21*K114A)ypas
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was performed on August 14, 1989, with the reactor at 100 percent thermal power. This surveillance test meets the TS Section 4.3.3.1, Table 4.3.3.1-1. A.2.g. channel functional test requirement for the ADS "A" Drywell pressure bypass timer (B21*K114A). The inspector noted that the C0F had authorized perfonnance of the surveillance test prior to beginning work. During the performance of the test, the instrumentation and control technicians had recorded the data in the wrong attachment to the procedure. This error was identified and corrected by the licensee. The error did not affect the acceptance criteria. Although the licensee identified the error, the inspector felt that additional attention to detail was needed. This matter was discussed with the licensee during the l
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-6-exit interview. The C0F subsequently reviewed and accepted the test results.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Report Followup (92700)
The following licensee event reports (LERs) were closed on the basis of the inspector's review of licensee documentation and discussions with personnel:
a.
(Closed)LER 458/87-008, " Control Room Charcoal Filtration Start Due to Radiation Monitor Spike." RC networks (voltage suppressors) were installed to. suppress electrical noise associated with manual switches for drywell atmosphere Radiation Monitor IRMS*RE112.
b.
(Closed)LER 458/87-020. " Missed Fost Maintenance Surveillance on ISI Valves." Audits of ASME ~ work packages revealed that, after performing master repair work on Valves 1821*A0VF032B and IE21*A0VF006, the valves were declared operable and placed back in service without performing the required ASME XI valve exercise test.
The omission of these tests was due to program inadequacies in the engineering control and maintenance planning. The valves were subsequently tested and detemined to be operable. Additionally, in January 1987, the engineering reorganization consolidated the plant in-service testing group and the ASME group into a field engineering group. Additional training was instituted for the engineering, operations, and maintenance departments. Copies of the reportable condition were routed as required reading for each of these departments. Plant and engineering procedures which cover ASME XI repair and replacement and the maintenance work order were revised.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Followup on 10 CFR 21 Reports (92701)
The following 10 CFR 21 reports were closed on the basis of the inspector's review of licensee documentation and discussions with personnel:
a.
88-12 - IMO Delaval, Inc... submitted a service information memorandum (SIM), issued by Cooper Industries Services, relating to a seal material to upgrade the sump tank foot valves.
Followup correspondence between GSU and Cooper Industries Services indicated that the SIM was not applicable to RBS.
b.
88-15 - X0MO Corporation, parent company of Atwood Morril, supplied valves assembled with Limitorque electric motor operators which are subject to becoming inoperable. GSU engineering review revealed that the subject valves were installed in the water treatment system and were not reportable per 10 CFR Part 21 for the RBS.
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88-18 - Limitorque Corporation reported that SMB valve actuators with RH insulated DC motors may not develop. full rated starting torque at elevated ambient temperatures. GSU engineering identified nine 125 VDC SMB valve actuators with RH insulated motors in the. reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system. Evaluations by GSU determined
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that SMB-0-40 1E51*F013 will produce rated starting torque at 300*F.
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(Maximum normal operation and isolation condition ambient temperatures are 122*F and 210'F.) The other eight motors were found to have enough safety margin to provide rated starting torque up to 340*F.
GSU concluded that the subject 10 CFR Part 21 report on RH ' insulated DC notors has no detrimental impact on the RCIC system at RBS and that the environmental qualification of the motor operator actuators is still valid.
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88-19 - Limitorque Corporation reported a potential common mode failure of melamine torque switches in Limitorque supplied SMB-000 and SMB-00 actuators. SMB-000 actuators with service numbers lower than 354839 and SMB-00 actuators with serial numbers lower than-233218 were identified in the subject report as potentially subject to failure.
GSU engineering reviews of equipment qualification records determined that 45 actuators were suspect.
Visual inspection of the 45 actuators revealed 11 actuators to have melamine torque switches.
Ten of the torque switches had previously been replaced with acceptable switches. MWO R126103 was written for replacement of the remaining torque switch on (ISWP*M0V778). No cases of failure of the subject torque switches at RBS were identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup on NRC Information Notices (92701)
The inspector reviewed NRC Information Notices (ins)87-062 and 87-063.
The ins were processed in accordance with procedures and routed properly.
Resultant actions were timely and adequate. Based on this review, the above listed ins are considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92703)
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(Closed) Violation (458/8826-02):
Failure to Secure a Very High Radiation Access (VHRA) Door - The licensee has revised Radiation Protection Procedure RPP-66E, " Posting Radiologically Controlled
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Areas," to implement the requirements that:
only radiation protection personnel will be issued keys to VHRA
doors for routine access;
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radiation protection personnel will log the opening and locking of VHRA doors and are responsible for verification of locked doors; for entries without radiation protection coverage,.a double verification is required upon exit to assure that the door is locked;
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radiation protection personnel will daily verify that all VHRA
doors are locked and secured; and an operability verification of accessible VHRA doors will be
performed monthly.
The inspectors have periodically verified that the above requirements are being properly implemented.
No VHRA doors have been discovered unsecured and unattended since the implementation of the above program.
This violation is closed, b.
(Closed) Violation (458/8826-03):
Failure to Submit an LER to the NRC within 30 days - This violation was initiated as a result of the licensee's failure to submit an LER for the VHRA doors left unsecured as' described in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/88-26. The licensee has completed training for the appropriate RBS supervisors regarding deportability of unsecured VHRA doors. The inspector questioned several supervisory personnel regarding the deportability of unsecured VHRA doors. All personnel questioned understood the requirement to submit an LER to the NRC within 30 days following discovery of the event.
This violation is closed.
11. Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 on September 12, 19891 During this interview, the inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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