IR 05000458/2023001
| ML23116A235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/2023 |
| From: | Jeffrey Josey NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBC |
| To: | Franssen R Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2023001 | |
| Download: ML23116A235 (1) | |
Text
May 01, 2023
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2023001
Dear Robert Franssen:
On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at River Bend Station. On April 4, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements, one of which was determined to be Severity Level IV. Two Severity Level IV violations without an associated finding are documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Two licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety significance are documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief Projects Branch C Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000458 License No. NPF-47
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000458
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-001-0010
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
River Bend Station
Location:
St. Francisville, Louisiana
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2023, to March 31, 2023
Inspectors:
D. Childs, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector
R. Easter, Project Engineer
R. Kumana, Senior Resident Inspector
W. Schaup, Senior Project Engineer
C. Wynar, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief
Projects Branch C
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at River Bend Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Two licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report section 7115
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Ensure Adequate Design of the Diesel Generator Starting System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2023001-01 Open/Closed None 71111.04 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, appendix B, criterion III, Design Control, with two examples, when the licensee failed to ensure that the design basis was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the minimum required pressure in both the standby and the high pressure core spray diesel generator starting air receivers, all safety-related components to which appendix B applies, were suitably designed to meet the required number and timing of consecutive starts as described in the updated safety analysis report under the most adverse design conditions.
Failure to Maintain Accurate Information in the Updated Safety Analysis Report Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000458/2023001-02 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71111.04 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.71(e) when the licensee failed to update the updated safety analysis report to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the design capacity of the high pressure core spray diesel generator air start system was updated to reflect a change to the diesel engine start time requirement.
Failure to Mitigate Risk During Containment Unit Cooler Maintenance Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2023001-03 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.13 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.65(a)(4) for failing to manage an increase in risk from maintenance activities. Specifically, on December 14, 2022, the licensee failed to manage the increase in risk from planned maintenance on the division 2 containment unit cooler.
Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification of Standby Liquid Control Tank Level Instrument Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green Severity Level IV NCV 05000458/2023001-04 Open/Closed None 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.49(b)(3) with a traditional enforcement aspect for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.59 when the licensee failed to maintain environmental qualification of a level instrument. Specifically, starting in 2010, the licensee failed to maintain the environmental qualification requirements for the standby liquid control tank level instrument, a class 1E instrument required to be qualified by regulatory guide 1.97, after incorrectly removing it from their environmental qualification program without prior NRC approval. The inspectors additionally identified a traditional enforcement aspect to this finding as a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.59(c)(2)(ii), Changes, Tests and Experiments, when the licensee failed to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a proposed change which resulted in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component.
Failure to Obtain a License Amendment Prior to Implementing a Proposed Change Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000458/2023001-05 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71111.18 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.59(c)(2)(viii), Changes, Tests and Experiments, when the licensee did not obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a proposed change which resulted in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the updated safety analysis report used in establishing the design basis. Specifically, the licensee changed the method for establishing the design basis of the standby diesel generator air start system capacity from eight starts of which five are 10-second starts to five starts with no specified time. This method departed from the approved method described in the standard review plan and was implemented without agency approval.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status licensee event reports (LER)05000458/2022-002-00 Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to Reactor Scram and Turbine Trip Level 8 Trip Setpoint Deviation 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
River Bend Station began the inspection period at approximately 79 percent of rated thermal power due to a coastdown to a scheduled refueling outage. Power continued to drift down for the first half of the quarter. On February 11, 2023, where at approximately 71 percent of rated thermal power, the licensee shut the plant down for the scheduled refueling outage. The mode switch was taken to shut down at 0200 on February 11, 2023, and the unit remained shut down for the remainder of the quarter.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures on March 1, 2023, for the following systems:
service water system
standby service water system
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)diesel generator starting system on February 9, 2023 (2)reactor plant component cooling water on March 13, 2023 (3)standby service water system on March 13, 2023
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the alternate decay heat removal system on March 13, 2023.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)residual heat removal pump B room, fire area AB-3, on February 3, 2023 (2)division 2 emergency diesel generator, fire area DG-4/Z-1, on February 3, 2023 (3)hydraulic control unit area east, fire area RC-3/Z-3, on March 28, 2023 (4)hydraulic control unit area west, fire area RC-4/Z-3, on March 28, 2023
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the on-site fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on February 1, 2023.
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding
Activities (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing the following activities from February 27, 2023, to March 9, 2023:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.
radiographic examination, reactor coolant system, E51-MOVFO63, XI-FW02, pipe to valve
radiographic examination, reactor coolant system, E51-MOVFO63, XI-FW03, valve to pipe
ultrasonic examination, reactor coolant system, E51-MOVFO63, XI-FW03, valve to pipe
ultrasonic examination, high pressure core spray, CSH-041-CD-A, pipe to valve
ultrasonic thickness examination, reactor water cleanup, 3-inch diameter 45-degree elbow - This component had a relevant indication that was evaluated as satisfactory for one cycle.
ultrasonic thickness examination, reactor water cleanup, 4-inch diameter 90-degree elbow
magnetic particle examination, residual heat removal, RHS-014-CD-A, pipe to trunnion
visual test-1, jet pump 05-06 riser brace, RB-2b
visual test-1, steam dryer supports, SDSB 33, SDSB 90, SDSB 213, SDSB 270, SDSB 326
visual test-1, residual heat removal, RHS-045-CD-B, welded attachment visual test-3, residual heat removal, RHS-PSA-2067-A2, pipe support-anchor
weld package for E51-MOVFO63, XI-FW02 and XI-FW003
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during shutdown on February 10, 2023.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during cooldown on February 11, 2023.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)emergent work controls for temporary repair of offsite power line on February 3, 2023 (2)elevated risk during work on containment unit cooler HVR-UC1B on March 13, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)operability of transmitter E31-PDTN084B on January 17, 2023 (CR-RBS-2023-00097)
(2)operability of dryer support bracket on March 13, 2023 (CR-RBS-2023-01469)
(3)operability of standby liquid control tank level on March 21, 2023 (CR-RBS-2022-
===06167)
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)
=
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 93806, revise diesel air starting requirements, on February 24, 2023
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated refueling outage RF-22 activities from February 11, 2023, to March 31, 2023. The inspectors completed inspection procedure 71111.20, sections 3.01.a and 3.01.b.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)work order 589995, replacement of E31-N623B temperature switch, on February 24, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) STP-207-4241, revision 15, RCIC Equipment Room Ambient Temperature High Channel Calibration and LSFT, on February 3, 2023
- (2) STP-309-0602, revision 54, DIV II ECCS TEST, on March 13, 2023
- (3) STP-256-6305, revision 14, Div I SSW Quarterly Valve Operability Test, on March 13, 2023
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) STP-256-6610, revision 303, Div II 2 Year Position Indication Verification Test, on March 7,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022 IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issue:
(1)load shed circuit information in the updated safety analysis report on February 6, 2023 (CR-RBS-2021-07166)
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following LERs:
LER 05000458/2022-002-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to Reactor Scram and Turbine Trip Level 8 Trip Setpoint Deviation (ADAMS Accession No. ML22160A397)
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under inspection results section 71153. This LER is closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Ensure Adequate Design of the Diesel Generator Starting System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2023001-01 Open/Closed None 71111.04 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, appendix B, criterion III, Design Control, with two examples, when the licensee failed to ensure that the design basis was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the minimum required pressure in both the standby and the high pressure core spray diesel generator starting air receivers, all safety-related components to which appendix B applies, were suitably designed to meet the required number and timing of consecutive starts as described in the updated safety analysis report under the most adverse design conditions.
Description:
While performing an inspection on the alignment and configuration of diesel generator starting air systems, the inspectors attempted to verify that the starting air receivers had sufficient air pressure to meet the design requirements as specified in the licensing basis. The inspectors determined that the standby diesel generators, consisting of the division 1 and division 2 diesel generators, has four air receivers grouped into two banks, with a minimum air pressure of 160 psig. The high pressure core spray (HPCS) diesel generator has two air receivers grouped into two banks, with a minimum air pressure of 200 psig. Each bank was part of a redundant diesel generator starting system train such that each of the three diesel generators could start with either of the two starting system trains. The inspectors requested the design basis for the minimum required pressure.
The licensees updated safety analysis report (USAR), section 9.5.6.1, Design Bases, specified the following design requirements for the standby and HPCS diesel generator starting systems:
Each redundant DGSS train is capable of providing the standby diesel generator with eight starts (five of them are 10 sec starts) from two air receivers without recharging the associated air receivers.
The HPCS diesel generator air start subsystem has sufficient capacity to accelerate the diesel generator from standby conditions to operating speed within 10 seconds five times without recharging. Either the forward or rear air start subsystem has the capacity to satisfy these multiple start requirements when initially charged to 200 psig.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had not used any calculational methods to demonstrate that the receiver air pressures met the design basis requirements. Instead, the licensee relied on preoperational testing to demonstrate the adequacy of the receivers. The inspectors reviewed the preoperational testing data for the standby and HPCS diesel generators.
Example 1: Standby Diesel Generators The inspectors found that the preoperational test data for the standby diesel generators did not demonstrate the ability to perform eight starts, five of them 10-second starts, from each air bank if the air receivers were at the minimum air pressure of 160 psig. The inspectors determined that the preoperational testing consisted of eight starts, none of which were timed, from a pressure of approximately 250 psig. The inspectors noted that the licensee recorded that the fourth start was from a pressure of 160 psig for division 1 and from a pressure of 165 psig for division 2. The inspectors identified multiple issues with using that data. First, the fourth start on division 2 was from a pressure above 160 psig. Next, the inspectors noted that the licensee only recorded pressure on one of two receivers of only one of two banks. The inspectors concluded that the licensee had not demonstrated that the other receiver was not at a higher pressure which could invalidate the test data. Additionally, the licensee had not demonstrated the second starting system train on either division could also perform the required starts. Furthermore, the inspectors noted that the test data used the pressure as read on the mechanical gauges. The licensees surveillance procedure to verify the pressure was maintained above technical specification limits also used the pressure as read on the gauges. The inspectors reviewed the specifications for the gauges and determined that the instruments had a calibration tolerance of plus or minus 4 psig. The inspectors concluded that if both receivers in a bank read 160 psig, the actual pressure could be as low as 156 psig.
The inspectors also reviewed additional test data that the licensee considered relevant. The inspectors determined that in 1992 the licensee had performed additional starts from approximately 160 psig that were timed. The inspectors noted that in these tests, the licensee performed a single timed start from one of the two air banks with the pressures on all receivers recorded. The inspectors determined that the licensee started the division 1 diesel in 8.49 seconds from a starting pressure of 165 psig in receiver 1A and 160 psig in receiver 1C. The licensee did not account for instrument tolerance which meant the 1C receiver could have had an actual pressure as high as 169 psig if the instrument was calibrated. The inspectors also determined that the licensee started the division 2 diesel in 9.75 seconds from a starting pressure of 161 psig in receiver 1B and 160 psig in receiver 1D. The inspectors noted that the 1B receiver could have been as high as 165 psig if the instrument was calibrated.
Overall, the inspectors concluded that the licensee failed to demonstrate the ability to perform eight starts, including five 10-second starts, from the lowest pressure that could exist under design conditions, specifically a pressure of 156 psig in both receivers of either air bank. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to:
- (a) ensure the test data accounted for the lowest possible air pressure,
- (b) ensure that both air banks were verified to meet design requirements,
- (c) account for instrument error or calibration tolerances, and
- (d) ensure the required starts could be performed within the design start times.
The inspectors noted that, after the inspectors raised the above concerns, the licensee made a change to their licensing basis. The licensee removed the requirement to perform eight starts and removed the requirement for the five starts to be 10-second starts. The inspectors documented a separate violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.59 for this change.
Example 2: HPCS Diesel Generator
The inspectors found that the preoperational test data for the HPCS diesel generators did not demonstrate the ability to perform five 13-second starts from each air receiver if the air receivers were at the minimum air pressure of 200 psig. The inspectors noted that the licensee had submitted license amendment 63 in 1991, which was subsequently approved, to increase the required start time for the HPCS diesel generator from 10 seconds to 13 seconds. Section 9.5.6 of the USAR still states a design requirement for five 10-second starts, but the inspectors reviewed the test data in consideration of the 13 second requirement. The inspectors documented a separate violation of 10 CFR 50.71.e for the failure to update the USAR.
The inspectors determined that the preoperational testing consisted of five timed starts from a pressure of approximately 200 psig on receiver 1B and from approximately 225 psig on receiver 1A. The inspectors identified multiple issues with using that data. First, the first start on receiver 1A was from a pressure above 200 psig. Next, the inspectors noted that the test data used the pressure as read on the mechanical gauges. The licensees surveillance procedure to verify the pressure was maintained above technical specification limits also used the pressure as read on the gauges. The inspectors reviewed the specifications for the gauges and determined that the instruments had a calibration tolerance of plus or minus 6 psig. The inspectors concluded that if each receiver read 200 psig, the actual pressure could be as low as 194 psig.
Overall, the inspectors concluded that the licensee failed to demonstrate the ability to perform five 13-second starts, from the lowest pressure that could exist under design conditions, specifically a pressure of 194 psig in either air bank. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to:
- (a) ensure the test data accounted for the lowest possible air pressure in either air receiver, and
- (b) account for instrument error or calibration tolerances.
Corrective Action(s): The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-RBS-2022-02739 and CR-RBS-2023-03301
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure the design basis was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the design basis for the standby and HPCS diesel generator starting system air receivers was correctly translated into appropriate calculations or test procedures.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in the standby and HPCS diesel generator starting systems failing to meet design requirements for multiple starts.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using exhibit 2, Mitigating System Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability and probabilistic risk assessment functionality and was of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B, criterion III, Design Control, requires in part, that for those SSCs to which this appendix applies, measures shall be established to ensure that the design basis is correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
Contrary to the above, from initial construction until March 2023, for quality -related components associated with the standby and HPCS diesel generator starting systems to which 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B applies, the licensee failed to ensure that the design basis was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the design basis for the standby and HPCS diesel generator air receivers was demonstrated, through appropriate testing or calculational methods, to ensure the ability to perform five 10-second starts from either subsystem from the lowest possible air pressure under the most adverse design conditions.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Maintain Accurate Information in the Updated Safety Analysis Report Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000458/2023001-02 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71111.04 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.71(e) when the licensee failed to update the updated safety analysis report to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the design capacity of the HPCS diesel generator air start system was updated to reflect a change to the diesel engine start time requirement.
Description:
During a review of the diesel generator air start system, the inspectors identified that the design capacity of the starting air banks for the HPCS diesel generator was described in the USAR as capable of starting the HPCS diesel generator five times, each within 10 seconds.
Specifically, section 9.5.6 of the USAR states:
The HPCS diesel generator air start subsystem has sufficient capacity to accelerate the diesel generator from standby conditions to operating speed within 10 seconds five times without recharging. Either the forward or rear air start subsystem has the capacity to satisfy these multiple start requirements when initially charged to 200 psig.
The inspectors reviewed the preoperational testing for the HPCS diesel generator and determined that the testing did not demonstrate five starts from the minimum pressure were within 10 seconds. Instead, the testing demonstrated that following the first start from the minimum allowed pressure, multiple subsequent starts exceeded 10 seconds. The inspectors asked the licensee how they were meeting the design requirement in the USAR.
In 1991, the licensee submitted a license amendment request that extended the allowed start time for the HPCS diesel generator from 10 seconds to 13 seconds. The amendment was approved by the NRC; however, the licensee failed to update the design capacity of the air start system as described in the USAR.
The inspectors determined that the description in the USAR was not accurate because the actual capacity, as amended, was not described in the USAR.
Corrective Action(s): The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-RBS-2023-00875
Performance Assessment:
The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.
Enforcement:
The Reactor Oversight Process SDP does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter noncompliance.
Severity: Because this performance deficiency had the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, it is necessary to address this violation using traditional enforcement to adequately deter noncompliance. Using the NRC Enforcement Policy, dated January 13, 2023, the violation was determined to be Severity Level IV in accordance with section 6.1.d.3 because the lack of up-to-date information in the USAR had not resulted in any unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures that resulted in a low -to -moderate or greater safety significance.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.71(e), requires in part, that licensees shall update periodically, as provided in paragraphs (e)(3) and
- (4) of 10 CFR 50.71, the USAR, originally submitted as part of the application for the license, to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed.
Contrary to the above, from January 1992 through March 2023, the licensee failed to update the USAR to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed. Specifically, USAR, section 9.5, did not contain accurate information about the HPCS diesel generator starting system.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Mitigate Risk During Containment Unit Cooler Maintenance Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2023001-03 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.13 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.65(a)(4) for failing to manage an increase in risk from maintenance activities. Specifically, on December 14, 2022, the licensee failed to manage the increase in risk from planned maintenance on the division 2 containment unit cooler.
Description:
The inspectors identified one example of maintenance activities that were assessed as placing the plant in an elevated risk category but were not appropriately managed in accordance with industry guidance and approved licensee procedures.
On December 14, 2022, the licensee was performing Procedure STP-410-6304, revision 004, Division II Chilled Water System Quarterly Valve Operability Test. This makes containment unit cooler 1B unavailable and places the plant in a yellow risk condition.
During a control room tour, the inspectors noticed that containment unit cooler 1A was not protected. The inspectors reviewed Procedure EN-OP-119, revision 16, Protected Equipment Postings, and noted that section 5.2.4 states, When the loss of the redundant component or system would result in a TS action statement that requires an immediate plant shutdown (24 hrs or less) and not performing a surveillance that meets the requirements of step 5.2.9 then protect the component or system.
The inspectors determined that the licensee met the conditions in this section of procedure EN-OP-119 that would require them to protect the division 1 containment unit cooler 1A, since loss of the unit cooler 1A would result in a shutdown action statement of 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. The licensee failed to take the prescribed risk mitigating actions (RMAs) until questioned by the inspectors.
Corrective Action(s): The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-RBS-2023-03302.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires the licensee to assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from maintenance activities before performing them. The inspectors determined that during the maintenance on containment unit cooler 1B system, the licensee failed to assess and manage the increase in risk for maintenance activities by taking required RMAs and was therefore a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to protect the redundant train of containment unit cooler adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone because it increased the likelihood that other Mitigating Systems could be affected.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management SDP. The inspectors requested that the licensee perform a risk assessment of the specific configurations of both conditions. In their assessments, the licensee estimated the risk deficits and incremental core damage probabilities for each condition were less than 1.0E-6. A regional senior reactor analyst independently reviewed the licensees assessments and confirmed the licensees risk estimates. The inspectors applied this information to the flowcharts in appendix K to determine this finding had very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow their risk management procedure and perform required RMAs.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires the licensee to assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from maintenance activities.
Contrary to the above, on December 14, 2022, the licensee failed to assess and manage the increase in risk before performing maintenance activities. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement appropriate RMAs to manage the increase in risk that resulted from maintenance on the containment unit cooler 1B system.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification of Standby Liquid Control Tank Level Instrument Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green Severity Level IV NCV 05000458/2023001-04 Open/Closed None 71111.15 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.49(b)(3) with a traditional enforcement aspect for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.59 when the licensee failed to maintain environmental qualification of a level instrument. Specifically, starting in 2010, the licensee failed to maintain the environmental qualification requirements for the standby liquid control tank level instrument, a class 1E instrument required to be qualified by regulatory guide 1.97, after incorrectly removing it from their environmental qualification program without prior NRC approval. The inspectors additionally identified a traditional enforcement aspect to this finding as a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.59(c)(2)(ii), Changes, Tests and Experiments, when the licensee failed to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a proposed change which resulted in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component.
Description:
On October 25, 2022, while reviewing condition reports (CRs), the inspectors noted that CR-RBS-2022-06167 documented spurious standby liquid control (SLC) tank level hi/low alarms on panel P601-19A-H06 in the control room. The SLC system is manually initiated from the main control room, as directed by the emergency operating procedures, if the operator believes the reactor cannot be shut down or kept shut down with the control rods. This system injects borated water into the core to compensate for positive reactivity effects that could occur during operation. The solution is stored in the SLC tank common to both trains of SLC. The tank maintains the solution at specific temperature ranges and chemistry technicians ensure the concentration of the sodium pentaborate solution is within specification and normally contains around 4,000 gallons. While reviewing this CR for operability, the inspectors discovered that the tank level instrument, C41-LTN001, was listed in the USAR in table 7.5-2, number 34 as a category 2 variable type D instrument in accordance with regulatory guide 1.97, which provides guidance on instrumentation for post-accident monitoring. Regulatory guide 1.97, regulatory position C.1, specifies that category 2 equipment should be qualified in accordance with regulatory guide 1.89, Qualification for Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants.
The inspectors found that the site did not have C41-LTN001 listed in its environmental qualification (EQ) equipment lists. Further review showed that in 2010, under EC-22498, the licensee incorrectly removed LTN001 from the EQ master list and stopped maintaining its environmental qualification. The licensee believed that because the instrument did not provide a safety function that it did not need to be environmentally qualified. However, correspondence between the licensee and the NRC in 1985 regarding the station's safety evaluation report states that the instrument would meet the requirements of regulatory guide 1.97. This requirement is still reflected in the licensees USAR, but the licensee did not maintain that qualification. The failure to ensure the instrument is environmentally qualified is a violation of 10 CFR 50.49(b)(3).
The inspectors discovered that EC-22498 did not contain a process applicability determination (PAD) screening contrary to licensee procedure EN-DC-210, revision 1, section 5.2.11, which states that any EQ downgrade requires a PAD. This PAD process drives the licensee to do a 50.59 screening. Removing an instrument from the EQ program results in a more than minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR and therefore requires prior NRC approval.
Corrective Action(s): The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-RBS-2022-07295
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure of the licensee to ensure the components in the plant listed in their USAR as EQ are maintained as EQ is a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to maintain the SLC tank level instrument in the EQ program degraded the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of equipment, but the equipment maintained its probability risk assessment functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
The Reactor Oversight Process SDP does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter noncompliance.
Severity: The inspectors assessed the severity level using the NRC Enforcement Policy, dated January 13, 2023, section 6.1.d.2 and determined that the violation was Severity Level IV because it was a violation of 10 CFR 50.59 that resulted in conditions evaluated as having very low safety significance (Green) by the SDP.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, requires in part, that a licensee establish a program for the EQ of electric equipment important to safety. Title 10 CFR 50.49(b)(3) states that certain post-accident monitoring equipment is required to be covered under this program.
Specifically, the applicable note four on this part states that specific guidance concerning the types of variables to be monitored is provided in revision 2 of regulatory guide 1.97.
Revision 2 of regulatory guide 1.97 states that the SLC tank level instrument is category 2 variable D equipment, which is consistent with how the component is described in the licensee USAR. Title 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2)(ii), states in part, that a licensee shall obtain a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 prior to implementing a proposed change that would result in a more than minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR.
Contrary to the above, since May of 2010, the licensee failed to maintain the EQ requirements on 10 CFR 50.49 for C41-LTN001, SLC tank level instrument, when they used EC-22498 to remove the level instrument from the EQ program without a license amendment, thus resulting in a more than minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Obtain a License Amendment Prior to Implementing a Proposed Change Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000458/2023001-05 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71111.18 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.59(c)(2)(viii), Changes, Tests and Experiments, when the licensee did not obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a proposed change which resulted in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the USAR used in establishing the design basis. Specifically, the licensee changed the method for establishing the design basis of the standby diesel generator air start system capacity from eight starts of which five are 10-second starts to five starts with no specified time. This method departed from the approved method described in the standard review plan and was implemented without agency approval.
Description:
The inspectors performed a walkdown and review of the standby diesel generator air start system. As part of the review, the inspectors reviewed the design basis for the diesel air start receiver setpoints. The inspectors found that the design basis for the standby diesel generator air receivers was based on performing eight consecutive starts, five of which are 10-second starts, without recharging the receivers. The inspectors then requested the documentation showing that the design basis was met.
The licensee used preoperational testing in lieu of a calculation to show the receivers had adequate capacity at the minimum allowable pressure of 160 psig. The inspectors found that the test data did not show the capability to perform eight starts, of which five were 10-second starts, because the licensee failed to measure the time of the starts. The licensee stated their belief that the 10-second start requirement was not accurate and that they were not required to be capable of performing five 10-second starts. The inspectors disagreed but continued to inspect the design basis of the standby diesel generator air receivers by conferring with personnel in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
While the inspectors were researching the licensing basis for the River Bend diesel generators, the licensee issued EC-93806 to modify USAR section 9.5.6.1.5 to replace the original design basis of the diesel generator air start system with a revised design basis.
The original design basis stated:
Each redundant DGSS train is capable of providing the standby diesel generator with eight starts (five of them are 10 sec starts) from two air receivers without recharging the associated air receivers.
The revised design basis stated:
Each redundant DGSS train is capable of providing the standby diesel generator with five consecutive starts from two air receivers without recharging the associated air receivers.
The standard review plan in NUREG-0800, SRP 9.5.6, revision 2, section II.4.g, states:
As a minimum, the air starting system should be capable of cranking a cold diesel engine five times without recharging the receiver(s). The air starting system capacity should be determined as follows:
- (1) each cranking cycle duration should be approximately 3 seconds;
- (2) consist of two to three engine revolutions; or
- (3) air start requirements per engine start provided by the engine manufacturer; whichever air start requirement is larger.
In the licensees evaluation of the EC, the licensee stated that they closely matched criteria
- (1) or
- (2) but did not address whether they met criterion (3). The inspectors determined that criterion (3), which was determined based on the design specification of the diesel, was 10 seconds. Because the licensee had specified that value in the USAR, the inspectors determined that was the method used to establish the design basis.
Because the removal of the requirement to perform five 10-second starts departed from the method of evaluation described in the USAR, the inspectors determined that this change required agency approval to implement it. The licensee issued this EC on September 22, 2022, without obtaining agency approval.
Corrective Action(s): The licensee entered this issue into their correction action program.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-RBS-2023-03307
Performance Assessment:
The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency. The licensee did not obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a change to the facility in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2)(viii) for a change that resulted in a departure from a method described in the USAR to establish the design basis but had not made an actual change to the system.
Enforcement:
The ROPs SDP does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter noncompliance.
Severity: Using the NRC Enforcement Policy, dated January 13, 2023, the violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with section 6.1.d.2 because the change would not result in conditions that would be greater than very low safety significance by the SDP.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2)(viii), Changes, Tests, and Experiments, states in part, that a licensee shall obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a proposed change that would result in a departure from a method described in the USAR to establish the design basis.
Contrary to the above, on September 22, 2022, the licensee implemented a change, EC-93806, that changed the method of establishing the design basis of the diesel generator air start system but did not obtain a license amendment prior to implementing the change.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.05 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee, has been entered into the licensee corrective action program, and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: The River Bend Station, Unit 1, Renewed Facility Operating License, section 2.C(10), requires that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. The approved fire protection plan requires that hourly administrative fire watches be conducted when fire doors are opened.
Contrary to the above, between February 11, 2023, and February 13, 2023, required hourly fire watches were not conducted for door SH113-01.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors determined the finding was associated with fire confinement and was assigned a high degradation rating. Using attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors used step 1.4.4 to determine that the finding screened to Green.
The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding represented a loss of compensatory measures needed for open fire barriers.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-RBS-2023-01049 Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71153 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee, has been entered into the licensee corrective action program, and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B, criterion III, Design Control, requires in part, that measures include provisions to assure that the design basis is correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
Technical specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.2.2 requires all minimum critical power ratios (MCPRs) shall be greater than or equal to the MCPR operating limits specified in the core operating limits report when thermal power is greater than or equal to 23.8 percent of rated thermal power. LCO 3.2.2, condition A, states that if any MCPR is not within limits, restore the MCPRs to within limits in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. LCO 3.2.2, condition B, states that if the required action and associated completion time of condition A is not met, reduce thermal power to below 23.8 percent of rated thermal power in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, prior to July 2021, for the quality-related components associated with the reactor protection system, to which 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B applies, the licensee failed to assure that the design basis for the reactor protection system was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the design basis of the high reactor water level scram function required the high reactor water level reactor scram to occur prior to or simultaneously with the high reactor water level turbine trip, and the licensee failed to ensure the trip setpoints were set at appropriate values to meet that requirement. The licensee identified this issue during a review of fleet CRs and implemented interim compensatory measures to maintain MCPRs within allowable limits in accordance with technical specification 3.2.2. The licensee subsequently determined that on multiple occasions between July 15, 2018, and July 15, 2021, they failed to meet the MCPR operating limits specified in the core operating limits report as required by technical specification 3.2.2.
Additionally, because the licensee was not aware of the failure to meet MCPR operating limits during the units operation cycles, the required actions of LCO 3.2.2 conditions A and B were not met.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power. Using exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was screened as very low safety significance (Green) because the finding affected a single reactor protection system trip signal to initiate a reactor scram but did not affect the function of other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-RBS-2021-04827 and CR-RBS-2022-02220
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On March 15, 2023, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Robert Franssen, Acting Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On April 4, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Robert Franssen, Acting Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Severe Weather Operation
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
1995-00335, 1995-00339, 2022-02739
Miscellaneous
1-PT-309-1
Standby Diesel Generator 1EGS-EG1A
09/18/1984
Miscellaneous
1-PT-309-2
Standby Diesel Generator 1EGS-EG1B
2/04/1984
Miscellaneous
1-PT-309-3
Diesel Generator 1EGS-EG1C
2/17/1985
Miscellaneous
1.ILCSH.001
Miscellaneous
1.ILEGA.001
Generator Emergency Air Compressor Diesel Starting Air
Miscellaneous
ER-98-0519-ERT-
Division I Diesel Generator Low Starting Air Pressure Lockout
Control Logic Modification
Miscellaneous
ER-98-0519-ERT-
Division II Diesel Generator Low Starting Air Pressure Lockout
Control Logic Modification
Procedures
SOP-0016
Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System
056
Procedures
SOP-0031
Residual Heat Removal (SYS #204)
344
Procedures
SOP-0042
Standby Service Water System
Procedures
SOP-0140
Suppression Pool Cleanup and Alternate Decay Heat
Removal (SYS #656)
041
Work Orders
WO 2401, 152402
Fire Plans
RB-114-004
HCU Area East RC-3/Z-3
Fire Plans
RB-114-005
HCU Area West RC-4/Z-3
Calculations
10630932
Code Case N-513-4 Evaluation of Thinned RHR Drain Line
Calculations
G13.18.10.2*143
Determination of Acceptable Minimum Wall Thickness of
Piping Components Affected by Erosion/Corrosion
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
21-00056, 2021-00099, 2021-00128, 2021-00670, 2021-
00684, 2021-01056, 2021-01143, 2021-01480, 2021-01546,
21-01593, 2021-01620, 2021-01801, 2021-01957, 2021-
263, 2021-02264, 2021-02265, 2021-02266, 2021-02267,
21-02287, 2021-03389, 2021-03596, 2021-03841, 2021-
03867, 2021-04316, 2021-04784, 2021-04910, 2021-05670,
21-4585, 2021-05830, 2021-06380, 2021-6001, 2021-
06720, 2021-06812, 2021-06813, 2021-06815, 2021-07210,
21-07266, 2016-06437, 2022-00378, 2022-00914,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
22-01005, 2022-01985, 2020-05390, 2020-05304, 2015-
00861, 2015-05418, 2015-04966, 2015-05485, 2022-02021,
22-02421, 2022-02905, 2020-2680, 2021-2688, 2022-
03162, 2022-04220, 2022-05328, 2022-06180, 2023-01361,
23-01376, 2023-01469 2023-1698, 2023-1718
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-RBS
23-01975, 2023-01976, 2023-01979, 2023-2066, 2023-
2075, 2023-2083, 2023-2610
Drawings
LRA-PID-26-03A
Reactor Water Cleanup and Filter
Engineering
Changes
Design Of Weld Overlay for RWCU (Reactor Water Clean Up)
Per CR-RBS-2015-2131 & 2199 R
Engineering
Changes
SWC Cooling Tower Basin Alternate Make-Up Water Using
FPW System
Engineering
Changes
Replacement of Carbon Steel with Chrome Moly Alloy
Engineering
Changes
LDT-WCS Line Designation Table
Engineering
Changes
Replace E51-MOVF063
1/18/2023
Miscellaneous
LO-RLO-2019-
00075
River Bend Station Self-Assessment Report Inservice
Inspection (ISI) and Containment Inservice Inspection (CISI)
10/26/2020
Procedures
CEP-COS-0100
Control And Use of Iddeal Concepts Software Entergy Nuclear
Engineering Programs
Procedures
CEP-COS-0110
Control and Use of the Iddeal Software Suite Version 8
Schedule Works and Version 9
311
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0255
Radiographic Examination ASME, ANSI, AWS, API, AWWA
Welds and Components
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0255
Radiographic Examination ASME, ANSI, AWS, API, AWWA
Welds and Components
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0400
Ultrasonic Examination
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0404
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds
_ASME XI
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0407
Straight Beam Ultrasonic Examinations of Bolts and Studs
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
_ASME Section XI
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0423
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds
ASME XI
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0428
Manual Ultrasonic Through Wall Sizing in Piping Welds
ASME XI
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0429
Ultrasonic Examination-ASME Section XI Appendix III
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0641
Liquid Penetrant Examination _PT_ For ASME Section XI
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0731
Section XI Magnetic Particle Examination _MT
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0901
VT-1 Examination
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0903
VT-3 Examination
Procedures
Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program
Procedures
Corrective Action Program
Procedures
Surveillance Program
Procedures
SEP-ISI-RBS-001
Program Section for ASME Section XI, Division 1 Riverbend
Station Inservice Inspection Program
Procedures
STP-000-6617
Check Valves Tested Per ASME XI Inservice Testing by
Disassembly
Procedures
WPS_CS_1_1_A
Welding Procedure Specification
Procedures
WPS_CS_1_1_B
Welding Procedure Specification
Self-Assessments
LO-RLO-2019-
00075
Inservice Inspection (ISI) and Containment Inservice
Inspection (CISI)
10/26/2020
Work Orders
WO 2901381, 52900587, 52958382, 00137708, 00529256,
0559861
Procedures
Protected Equipment Postings
016
Procedures
SOP-0140
Suppression Pool Cleanup and Alternate Decay Heat
Removal (SYS #656)
041
Procedures
Operability Determination Process
018
Work Orders
Engineering
Changes
Revise SDC-309 and UFSAR Section 9.5.6.1.5 Air Start
Requirements, CR-RBS-2022-02739
Miscellaneous
SDC-309
Reactor Protection System Design Criteria - Standby Diesel
Generator Div I & II, 309
Procedures
EN-OP-115-09
Maintaining the Station Narrative Log
004
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-
2000-01810
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-RBS-
21-04827, 2022-02220