IR 05000458/1999006
| ML20207A817 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207A810 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-99-06, 50-458-99-6, NUDOCS 9905270297 | |
| Download: ML20207A817 (14) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-458 License No.:
NPF-47 Report No.:
50-458/99-06 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
River Bend Station Location:
5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana Dates:
April 19-23,1999 Inspectors:
Claude E. Johnson, Senior Reactor Inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch Paula A. Goldberg, Reactor inspector Engineering and Maintenance Branch Approved By:
Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Engineering and Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety
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ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information l
9905270297 990515 P
PDR ADOCK 05000458
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
River Bend Station
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-458/99-06 This inspection consisted of a review of the licensee's inservice examination program plan and schedule, the implementation of the program plan for the facility, and a maintenance and engineering followup review of previous inspection findings. The inspection report covers a 1-week period onsite by two region-based inspectors.
Maintenance
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The licensee had developed an improved second 10-year inservice inspection program
- plan, in that, the inspection plan was easier to follow and less cumbersome than the first
10-year plan (Section M1.1).
The overall material condition and housekeeping of the steam tunnel area was
- unsatisfactory. Trash, electrical plastic ties, tape, dirt and tools were found scattered
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around the area. Material condition of Main Steam Inboard Drain Valve B21-MOVF020 (nonsafety related) was unsatisfactory. It was disassembled with no workers in the area, and there was no work in progress or caution signs visible. The valve stem had I been left in such a position as to be a potential safety hazard to personnel passing in the area (Section M2).
The licensee's implementation of an industry program for portions (ultrasonic testing) of
- the inservice inspection program indicated the licensee's proactive improvement in the inservice inspection program implementation (Section M3).
Examiners were knowledgeable of procedures, codes and standards, and the licensee's
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corrective action process. In particular, they all were knowledgeable of the various methods of nondestructive testing being utilized (Section M4).
Licensee personnel were effective in the day-to-day coordination of contractor inservice
- inspection activities, as partially evidenced by their close working relationship (Section M4).
Deficiencies identified in a quality assurance audit were documented in condition
- reports, and were tracked by the licensee's corrective action program (Section M7).
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REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The unit was shutdcwn for Re ueling Outage RF08.
11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Inservice insoection a.
inspection Scope (73753)
The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's "First and Second 10-Year Inservice Examination Plan For the River Bend Station," and ASME code cases implemented. In addition, the inspectors reviewed correspondence from the licensee to the NRC about the first and second 10-year intervals to determine if the licensee had submitted relief requests for those Code Class 1,2, and 3 weld examinations where 100 percent full examination coverage could not be achieved.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the licensee had committed to ASME Section XI, " Rules for Inservice inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," 1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda for the first interval. The licensee submitted a request for authorization to
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update the inservice inspection program to the 1992 and portions of the 1993 ASME Boiler and Pressure Code,Section XI for the second 10-year interval. The inspectors found that the NRC granted the licensee approval to use the latest ASME Code, with the exception of the exclusion of Appendix Vill of the 1992 Edition. The licensee had requested to not use Appendix Vlli, but instead follow the requirements in Appendix l of the 1989 Code Edition. The NRC granted approval of the 1992 Edition; however, because the NRC had not completed their review, the licensee was informed to continue using the current requirements (1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda) for the ultrasonic examinations. The licensee also requested an extension of the first 10-year interval from June 16,1996, to December 1,1997, which was granted by the NRC.
The inspectors verified that
- (1) program changes were documented appropriately,
- (2) ASME code cases implemented that were not listed in Regulatory Guide 1.147,
" Inservice inspection Code Case Acceptability ASME Section XI Division 1,"
Revision 11, had been granted approval by the NRC,
- (3) code welds not receiving 100 percent full examination coverage were documented on relief requests, and
- (4) augmented inspections were performed as planned.
j The inspectors noted that the second 10-year interval inservice inspection plan was easier to follow and less cumbersome than the first 10-year interval inspection plan.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had developed an improved second 10-year interval inservice inspection plan and was implementing the program in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a.
c. Conclusions
Overall, the licensee had developed an impmad econd 10-year interval inservice inspection program plan. The inspection plan was easier to follow and less cumbersome than the first 10-year plan. The licensee was implementing the program requirements in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment a.
Inspection Scooe (73753)
' While verifying the nondestructive examinations in the steam tunnel room on elevation 114 foot, the inspectors observed the general housekeeping of the area and external material condition of components.
b.
Observations and Findinas During this observation, the inspectors noted trash, such as electrical plastic ties, tape, paper, dirt, and tools scattered within the steam tunnel room.
The inspectors also noted that Main Steam inboard Drain Valve B21-MOVF020 (nonsafety related) was disassembled with no workers in the area, and there was no work in progress or caution signs visible. The valve stem had been left in such a position as to be a potential safety hazard to personnel passing in the area. Tools were scattered around the area of the valve. The inspectors questioned a maintenance craftsman about the valve's condition and were informed that the valve was left in that condition by the second shift crew. The inspectors informed the licensee's representative of these unsatisfactory housekeeping and material conditions observed, and the licensee initiated Condition Report CR-RBS-1999-0692 to address these concerns.
c. Conclusions
The overall material condition and housekeeping of the steam tunnel area were unsatisfactory because trash, electrical plastic ties, tape, dirt, and tools were found scattered around the area. Material condition of the Main Steam Inboard Drain Valve B21-MOVF020 (nonsafety-related) was unsatisfactory. It was disassembled with no workers in the area, and there was no work in progress or caution signs visible. The
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valve stem had been left in sucn a position as to be a potential safety hazard to personnel passing in the area.
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5-M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
a. Inspection Scope
(73753)
The inspectors reviewed nondestructive examination procedures to determine if they had been developed in accordance with regulatory and applicable ASME code requirements. The procedures reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the nondestructive examination procedures reviewed contained sufficient detail and inspection criteria to perform the intended examinations and were in compliance with regulatory and ASME code requirements.
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Several procedures had been qualified by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
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performance demonstration initiative (PDI) program. Performanced-based qualification i
programs encouraged development of improved methods for detecting and
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characterizing flaws, and facilitated implementing the methods with a defined testing
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curriculum. The licensee's implementation of the PDI program for portions (ultrasonic testing) of the inservice inspection program indicated the licensee's proactive improvement in the inservice inspection program implementation. The inspectors verified that procedures qualified by PDI were demonstrated to the authorized nuclear inservice inspector and approved.
c. Conclusions
The nondestructive examination procedures were in compliance with regulatory and ASME code requirements and were sufficient to perform the intended inservice inspection work activities. Implementation of an industry program for portions (ultrasonic testing) of the inservice inspection program indicated the licensee's proactive improvement in the inservice inspection program implementation.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance a.
ln_ spection Scoce (73753)
The inspectors assessed the knowledge and performance of licensee and contractor personnel by observing their performance of nondestructive examinations, b.
Observations and Findinas b.1 Personnel Knowledae The inspectors found that contractor and licensee nondestructive examiners were knowledgeable of the nondestructive procedures and applicable ASME code requirements used. Only a few contractor (Raytheon) examiners were used during this outage. Most examiners were Level lli Entergy personnel from various Entergy sites, I
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6-and all were qualified to an industry program (i.e., PDI). The inspectors determined that all examiners observed were very knowledgeable of procedures, codes and standards, and the licensee's corrective action process. In particular, they all were knowledgeable of the various methods of nondestructive testing.
b.2 Performance The inspectors observed the pedormance of the ultrasonic examinations for
- (1) the reactor vessel feedwater nozzle, and
- (2) main steam tunnel residual heat removal piping performed by both contractor and licensee nondestructive examiners. The examinations i
observed are listed below:
Reactor Vessel Nozzles N4A (nozzle to safe end)
- Reactor Vessel Nozzles N4B (nozzle to safe end)
- Reactor Vessel Nozzles N4C (nozzle to vessel, nozzle to safe end, and inner
- radius)
Reactor Vessel Noz'zles N4D (nozzle to vessel, nozzle to safe end, and inner
- radius)
Steam tunnel residual heat removal piping Shop Weld RHS-55A-SWO37
- Ultrasonic examinations were performed in accordance with approved procedures. The inspectors noted that during the nozzle to safe end ultrasonic examinations, a different technique was used by the Level til examiner. The Level lli examiner informed the inspectors that the procedure and the technique used were qualified by the industry program (i.e., PDl).
Due to the questions raised by the inspectors during the observations of the reactor pressure vessel feedwater nozzle to safe-end ultrasonic examinations, the Level til examiners demonstrated the technique to the inspectors. Upon completion of this demonstration, the inspectors determined that this technique was more sensitive than the previous technique and was capable of detecting indications better. The use of this technique developed by the industry program (i.e., PDI) indicated the licensee's proactive improvement in the inservice inspection program.
The inspectors verified that the 1980 Edition, Section IWA-2240, allowed the licensee to use alternate or different techniques if equal to or superior to the current methods used.
However, the method used must be demonstrated to the authorized nuclear inservice inspector (ANil) and approved. The inspectors verified that the ANil had observed the demonstration of the procedure and approved its use.
The inspectors verified that ultrasonic instruments used were within calibration. No deficiencies were identified.
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d b.3 Effectiveness of Licensee Control The inspectors found that licensee personnel were effective in the day-to-day coordination of contractor inservice inspection activities, as partially evidenced by their close working relationship.
c. Conclusions
Examiners were very knowledgeable of procedures, codes and standards, and the licensee's corrective action process. In particular, they all were knowledgeable of the various methods of nondestructive testing. Nondestructive examinations were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
Licensee personnel were effective in the day-to-day coordination of contractor inservice inspection activities, as partially evidenced by their close working relationship.
f MS Maintenance Staff Training and Qualification a.
Insoection Scope (73753)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's and its contractor's (Raytheon) nondestructive examination personnel certification records for Level ll and ill examiners.
b.
Observations and Findinas I
The inspectors found that personnel certification records contained adequate documentation, such as examination results for each certified nondestructive examination method, work experience, education, and the annual vision acuity examination, with one exception. The inspectors requested the records for all contractor and Entergy nondestructive examiners for review. Upon receipt of the records, the licensee's representative noted a discrepancy. There was no safety significance involved in this issue, and no additional discrepancies were identified.
The inspectors determined that personnel were properly certified and highly qualified in accordance with ASME code requirements and SNT-TC-1 A," Personnel Qualification and Certification in Nondestructive Testing." All nondestructive examiners were qualified by an industry program (i.e., PDI).
c. Conclusions
i The nondestructive examination personnel were properly certified in accordance with SNT-TC-1 A.
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M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities M7.1 Licensee Self Assessment Activities a.
inspection Scope (73753)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's previous inservice inspection quality assurance
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Observation and Findinos
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The inspectors found that Quality Assurance Audit 97-07-1-INSP/ISI/NDE was j
satisfactory. The inspectors verified that deficiencies identified in the quality assurance j
- audit were documented in condition reports and tracked by the licensee's corrective action program.
c. Conclusions
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The quality assurance audit reviewed was satisfactory. Deficiencies identified in the
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quality assurance audit were documented in condition reports and were tracked by the licensee's corrective action program.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item 50-458/9811-01: the licensee failed to include Weld 1 MSS *800A2-FWC04LA in a relief request
.The inspectors identified that Weld 1 MSS *800A2-FWC04LA did not receive 100 percent.
- examination coverage and was not included in a relief request. Because the end of the licensee's current interval, plus 12 months allowed by regulation for requesting relief, had not expired at the time of discovery, there was no violation of regulatory
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requirements, in addition, the licensee had plans to review all of the past data and relief requests to ensure that correct relief requests had been, or will be, submitted within the required time specified by 10 CFR 50.55a.
The inspectors verified that relief requests were reviewed and submitted within the required time specified by 10 CFR 50.55a for those welds that did not receive 100 percent full examination coverage.
M8.2 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item 50-458/9811-02: incorrect calibration standard used for examinations performed on welds where the pipe thickness changed The licensee identified that an incorrect calibration standard had been used for
- examinations performed on welds where the pipe thickness changed. The licensee had f
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L plans to review all similar configurations where the pipe thickness changed to determine j
if the proper calibration standards had been used during the first inservice inspection j
interval.
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The inspectors verified that the licensee had performed an extensive review of similar i
configurations and identified deficiencies.
111. Enoineerina
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9813-01 (EA98-478): failure to adequately verify or check that the diesel generator control air instrument and control systems remained functional in January 1998, an emergency diesel generator failed the air-start system quarterly valve operability surveillance test. The cause of the failure was the lifting and remaining
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open of Relief Valve EGA-RVSB on the starting air accumulator. The licensee determined that the diesel generators were dependent on control air and that the starting air compressors were nonsafety-related, nonseismically qualified, and non-1E powered. Design control measures did not ensure that the safety-related diesel generator control air instrument and control systems remained functional during an accident. There were no design control measures to ensure the system was provided with a long-term supply of safety-related pressurized air, which was necessary for the continued operation of the diesel generators in response to an extended loss-of-offsite power. At less than 120 psig, the nonessential diesel generator trips would no longer be bypassed and at less than 45 psig, the diesel generators would automatically shut down.
This issue was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill.
The inspectors reviewed Condition Report CR 98-0795, dated June 24,1998, which was initiated to address the above condition. The inspectors found that the licensee had a number of corrective actions to resolve the air requirement for the emergency diesel generator controls. In case of loss-of-offsite power, the licensee staged eight bottles of j
compressed air outside the diesel generator buEding, as well as, pressure regulators,
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fittings, and hoses inside the diesel generator rooms. The licensee modified the control air logic system to prevent enabling of the normal trips on decreasing air pressure. As an interim measure, the licensee powered one air compressor for each diesel with safety-related power. The final corrective action was to replace the nonsafety-related compressor and desiccant dryer skid with safety-related makeup air compressors and membrane dryer equipment.
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The inspectors walked down the diesel generators and found the Division 1 generator had one qualified compressor wired to safety-related power and one of the original air compressor skids wired to nonsafety-related power. The Division ll diesel had the two original air compressor skids, but one of the compressors was wired to safety-related power. Licensee personnel stated that eventually, all four of the compressors would be qualified and wired to safety-related power.
The relief valve on an air accumulator failed open, thereby, causing air pressure to decrease and caused the diesel generator to be inoperable. The licensee determined that the relief valves originally purchased had a fixed (non-adjustable) blowdown, which would cause the valve to reseat at 30 to 70 percent below the set pressure of the valve.
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The inspectors determined that the licensee was in process of purchasing adjustable blowdown valves, as described in draft Engineering Request ER-0524, " Replace Relief Valves EGA RVSA, B, C, D and EGA-RV6A, B, C, D."
The initial design was incorrect since the control logic was setup so that the low air starting logic would take the diesel out of emergency mode when the pressure in the air accumulators reached 120 psig and would trip the diesel when the air pressure reached 40 psig. The licensee rewired the low pressure lockout so that the diesel would not trip out of emergency mode.
E8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9813-02.-03.-04 (EA 98-478/02013): cause of the condition was not determined and adequate corrective actions were not taken for a significant condition adverse to quality Since 1990, the licensee's staff were aware that diesel generator control air instrument and control systems were not provided with a long-term source of safety-related pressurized air to ensure that the nonessential diesel generator trips would remain bypassed during a loss of offsite power. Although procedures were changed in 1990 to require operators to install nonsafety-related air bottles as an alternate air source, the acceptability of relying on this operator action, in lieu of automatic action, was not properly evaluated against the licensee's design-basis description in the safety analysis I
report and the ability to accomplish the manual actions was not fully demonstrated until 1998. Further, the failure to identify the significant condition adverse to quality continued until 1998 and the cause of the condition and the corrective actions taken were not documented and reported to appropriate levels of management.
The licensee issued Condition Report CR 98-0795, dated June 24,1998 to address this violation. The corrective actions were addressed in the above violation l
(50-458/9813-01). The licensee's representative stated that they presented lessons learned from this event during the engineering support personnel training in the fall 1998
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E8.3 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item 50-458/9816-02: root cause of bellows style relief valve failure
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The high pressure core spray pump discharge relief valve failed and the failure was
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documented in Condition Report CR 97-0804, dated May 29,1997. The licensee found i
that the bellows in the relief valve were broken, which allowed water to exit the drain hole in the valve bonnet. The licensee determined that the bellows in the same valve had failed in 1994. Since the condition report was not closed, the licensee initiated another corrective action to determine if the relief valve cycled or chattered during the surveillance test of the high pressure core spray pump. Review of the licensee's root cause evaluation was identified as an inspection followup item.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause evaluation, which was contained in Condition Report CR-RBS 1997-0804. From the analysis, the licensee believed that the
bellows failure was caused by either chlorine stress corrosion cracking or the welds were susceptible to weld solidification cracking. The licensee did not know where the
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chlorine came from. The licensee determined that, even with two methods of root cause analysis performed, there was insufficient information to identify an actual root cause for the failure, in addition, the licensee monitored the relief valve during surveillance testing of the high pressure core spray pump and determined that the relief valve was not cycling or chattering.
E8.4 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item 50-458/9816-01: weakness with licensee's relief valve set pressure program The NRC identified that the pressure relief valve set pressure program had a weakness since, in at least one case, the valve data sheets were improperly used for determining setpoints. The licensee's resolution of relief valve setpoints was identified as an inspection followup item.
The inspectors reviewed Corrective Action 5 from Condition Report CR-RBS-1997-1881, which addressed the inappropriate application of setpoint data sheet information. The licensee's representative stated that they intended to transfer the setpoint information into the component data base. The licensee's representative stated that capturing all the data into one controlled area would help minimize the potential error associated with the current processes. The team reviewed the design engineering department's 1999 goals, which were updated April 21,1999, and noted that inputting relief valve setpoints into the component data base had an estimated completion date of October 31,1999.
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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 23,1999. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee representatives whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
- L. Ballard, Supervisor, Quality
- D. Beaucham, Supervisor, Quality
- R. Brian, Manager, Mechanical Design Engineering
- G. Chatterton, Inservice Inspection Coordinator
- C. Forpahl, Supervisor, Engineering Programs
- R. Jackson, Technical Specialist IV, Engineering Programs
- D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing
- W. Mashburn, Manager, Engineering Support
- D. Williamson, Senior Licensing Specialist
NRC
- G. Replogie, Senior Resident inspector
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
73753
Inservice inspection
2902
Followup - Main'enance
2903
Followup - Engineering
ITEMS Ct.OSED
50-458/9811-01
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Licensee commitment to review all past data and relief
requests.
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50-458/9811-02
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Licensee commitment to review similar configurations where
the pipe thickness changed to determine if the proper
calibration standards had been used during the first 10-year
interval.
50-458/9816-01
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Root cause of bellows style relief valve failure.
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50-458/9816-02
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Problems with pressure relief set pressure program.
50-458/9813-02,-03,
NOV Failure to identify a significant condition adverse to quality,
and -04 (EA 98-478)
and implement adequate corrective actions in regards to the
diesel generator control air instrument and controls systems.
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50-458/9813-01
NOV Failure to adequately verify or check that the diesel
(EA 98-478)
generator control air instrument and controls systems
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remained functional.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
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NDE9.26
" Ultrasonic Manual Examination of Class 1 Reactor Vessel Welds Covered
by Regulatory Guide 1.150," Revision 1
NDE9.23
" Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds (ASME Section XI),"
Revision 1
NDE9.04
" Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds (ASME Section XI),"
Revision 1
ENG-3-039
" Repair and Replacement Program," Revision 1
NDE2.10
"NDE Certification," Revision 2
ADM-0018
" Plant Housekeeping," Revision 10
NDE9.31
%gnetic Particle Examination (MT) (Yoke, Prods, Coils, and Direct
Methods)," Revision 0
NDE9.25
" Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Nozzles Inner Radius From Outer Bend
Radius," Revision 1
Miscellaneous Documen,t.s
Entergy Letter, dated July 12,1996, Supplementary Information Concerning the Update for
Inservice Inspection
Entergy Letter, dated November 30,1998, Final Requests for Relief from ASME Code Section
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XI Inservice inspection Requirements for the First Ten-Year inspection Interval
NRC Letter, dated November 3,1998, Relief Authorization from the Requirements of ASME
Section XI for the Second Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval
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NRC Letter, dated December 12,1996, Evaluation of Entergy Request for Authorization to
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Update Inservice Inspection Programs
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NRC Letter, dated March 26,1999, Evaluation of the Alternate To Augmented Reactor
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Pressure Vessel Examination Requirements
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Raytheon Ultrasonic Calibration Certificates UT-Cal-98-008, -013, -014, -036, -037, and -039,
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Entergy Letter, dated February 28,1997, Evaluation of Entergy Request for Authorization to
Update inservice Inspection Programs to the 1992 and Portions of the 1993 ASME Code
NRC Letter, dated February 3,1995, Approval of Code Cases N-416-1 and N-498-1 as
Alternatives to the Required Hydrostatic Pressure Tests
NRC Letter, dated November 19,1997, Use of ASME Code Cases N-509, N-524, and N-546
NRC Letter, dated August 1,1988, First Ten-Year interval inservice inspection Program
Quality Assurance Audit
97-07-1-INSP/ISl/NDE
ASME Code Case
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N-416-1, Alternate Pressure Test Requirement for Welded Repairs of Installation of
Replacement items by Welding, Class 1,2, and 3
N-498-1, Alternate Rules for 10-Year System Hydrostatic Testing for Class 1,2, and 3 Systems
Examination insoection Records
IR 20535 (includes calibration data)
IR 20536 (includes calibration data)
IR 20537 (includes calibration data)
IR 20538 (includes calibration data)
IR 20546 (BB-D001-N4A-1, -N48-1)
IR 20547 (BB D001-N4C-1, -N4D-1)
IR 20559 (calibration data sheets)
991R 20571 (calibration data sheets)
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