ML20151G097
| ML20151G097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1988 |
| From: | Constable G, William Jones, Madsen G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151G089 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-88-13, IEB-88-001, IEB-88-007, IEB-88-1, IEB-88-7, NUDOCS 8807280128 | |
| Download: ML20151G097 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1988013
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APPENDIX B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/88-13
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Docket: 50-458
Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)
P. O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)
Inspection At:
River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted: May 1 through June 30, 1988
Inspectors:
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W. B. Jones, Residen 4 .spector
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Project Section C,
vision of Reactor Projects
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/G.LM!adsen,ProjectEngineer
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Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects
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Approved:
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7/4799
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G. L. Constable, Chief, Project Section C
Date
Division of Reactor Projects
8807280128 99o739
gDR
ADOCK 05000458
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Inspection Summary-
Inspection Conducted May 1 through June 30, 1988_
(Report 50-458/88-13)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on
previous inspection findings, NRC Bulletin 88-01, NRC Bulletin 88-07,
NRC Information Notices, surveillance test observation, maintenance
observation, safety system walkdown, operational safety verification
and licensee plans for coping with strikes.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified
(inadequate shift turnover, paragraph 10).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- D. L. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training
- W. J.- Beck, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering
J. E. Booker, Manager, Oversight
- J. G. Cadwallader, Supervisor Emergency Planning
- E. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs
- J. Conner, Environmental Specialist
- J. W. Cook, Lead Environmental Analyst, Nuclear Licensing
- T.C.Crouse, Manager,QualityAssurance(QA)
- W. L. Curran, Cajun Site Representative
- J. C. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group
D. R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Maiatenance
J. R. Dunkelberg, Supervisor, Projects
- L. A. England. Director, Nuclear Licensing
- P. E. Freehill, Outage Manager
- A. O. Fredieu Supervisor, Operations
- P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations
J. R. Hamilton, Director Design Engineering
- G. K. Henry, Director, Quality Assurance Operations
B. E, Hey, Nuclear Engineer, Design Engineering
- K. C. Hodges, Supervisor, Chemistry
G. R. Kimell, Director Quality Services
- R. J. King. Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
- ?.. J. Kuggler, Acting Director, Field Engineering
I. M. Malik Supervisor, Quality Systems
J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer
- V. J. Normand, Supervisor, Administrative Services
- W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration
- T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager
- M. F. Sankovich, Manager. Engineering
- K. E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management
R. J. Vachon, Senior Compliance Analyst
R. G. West, Supervisor, General Maintenance
- R. Wilson, Radwaste Specialist
NRC
- T J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector
The NRC inspectors also interviewed additional licensee personnel during
the inspection period.
- Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on
July 5, 1988.
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2.
Plant Status
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RBS operated at essentially full reactor power for the entire inspection
period.
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3.
Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings
(92701 and 92702)
a.
(Closed)OpenItem(458/8627-03):
Licensee review of IE Information
Notices.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for reviewing
IE Notices and found that W ?rogram is being implemented in
accordance with nuclear 1 & s ug procedure NLP-10-006, "Processing
and Tracking of Regulatory
4 *ndustry Correspondence." Several
IE Notices were selected _ m serified to have been reviewed for
applicability to River Bend Station.
During the review, it was noted
that several IE Information Notices require additional review or
action by the licensee, however, the percentage of total open or past
due has been decreasing over the previous years.
This open item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Violation (458/8728-02):
Failure to follow temporary test
procedure.
The licensee has revised administrative test procedure ADM-0003,
"Development, Control and Use of Procedures " to require special test
procedures have a verification step indicating that all perfomers
have read and understand the procedure prior to performing the test.
Temporary procedure (TP) 87-25, "RPV Inservice Leakage Test " has
been revised to plant engineering procedure PEP-0042, "RPV Inservice
Leakage Test." This PEP requires that each individual performing the
test sign the procedure indicating they have read and understand the
test. Step 7.8 ^ has been revised to single out each activity and
require initialing each activity as it is performed.
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This violation is closed.
(Closed) Violation (458/8728-03):
Failure to obtain approved
c.
cancellation extensions for prompt modification requests (PMRs).
The licensee has reviewed the cancellation dates for each PMR and
either cancelled or extended by menorandum each overdue PMR. On
June 26, 1988, the RI reviewed the PMR log and found the status of
each PMR to be current. The Engineering Administration group now
reviews the PMR log on a weekly basis. The engineering supervisors
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also receive copies of the PMR log on a weekly basis, listing all
open PMRs and their due dates.
PMRs which can only be completed at a
giveri milestone, such as a refueling outage, now reflect that
milestone as the cancellation date.
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d.
(Cloted) Urresolved item (453/8726-01): Liquid penetrant and magnetic
particle examination procedures contain acceptance standards that
require clarification.
The lic..id penetrant and magnetic particle test procedures,
GS-PT-W81-1, "Liquid Penetrant Examination," and GS-MT-W81-1,
"Magnetic Particle Examination," have been revised to clarify the
interpretation deficiencies for evaluating indications. A review of
all surface examination reports (MT and PT) that were performed with
the previous procedures has been completed.
No discrepancies in
identification of indications nor indication evaluations were noted.
This unresolved item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Opan Item (458/8720-03):
Review of abnormal and emergency
operating procedures in a timely manner.
The licensee now requires that each licensed operator complete the
required rcading list prior to the end of each trainin module.
Selected abnormal and emergency operating procedures are assigned as
part of the required reading.
Eact individual must 'ndicate that
they have completed the required reading before they will be
admir.istered the module exam. Ilodule exam questions include subject
matter taken from the required reading list.
This open item is closed.
f.
(Closed) Open Item (458/8632-02): Standby liquid control _(SLC)
explosive valves not stored in level A or B facility as required.
The licensee has revised maintenance handling procedure MHP-15-002,
"Storage of Material," to allow for storage of explosives such as the
standby liquid control (SLC) squib valves and halon system initiators
in the required level "A" or "['" storage facility. This procedure
requires that these materials be stored in a flammable equipment type
locker with a keylock and be adequately marked as to its contents.
The squib valves which had been improperly stored, were tested by
applying a small current across the bridgewires and verifying the
resistance was as expected. The squib valve which appeared to have
baen subjected to rodents was installed in the SLC system and
successfully test fired during the performance of STP-201-3601 during
planned outage 4.
This open item is closed.
4.
icensee Actions on NRC Bulletin 88-01
(92701)
Tha licensee actions relative to NRC Bulletin 88-01, "0Wcts in
Westinghouse Circuit Breakers" was reviewed. The licensi:e's response of
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April 4,1988, indicated that GSU does not utilize any circuit breakers
subject to the bulletin in class 1E service at River Bend Station.
This NRC Bulletin is closed.
5.
Licensee Actions on NRC Bulletin 88-07
(92701)
This area of the inspection was conducted to review licensee actions
relative to NRC Bulletin 88-07, "Power Oscillations In Boiling Water
Reactors (BWRs)." This bulletin was directed at the holders of operating
licensee or construction permits for BWRs to ensure that adequate
operating procedures and instrumentatioris are available and adequate
operating training is provided to prevent the occurrence of uncontrolled
power oscillations during all modes of BhR operation. On liarch 2,1088,
LaSalle Unit 2 underwent a dual recirculation pump trip event initiated by
the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) logic. After the pump
trip, the unit experienced an excessive neutron flux oscillation while
operating in natural circulation. This event is further described in NRC
Information Notice 88-39,, "La3alle Unit 2 Loss of Recirculation Pump With
Power Oscillation Event." Additional details of the event are documented
in flRC augmented inspection team (AIT) Inspection Reports 50-373/88-008
and 50-374/88-008.
The licensee has detemined that an initiating event similar to the one at
LaSalle Station would result in a full reactor scram at River Bend
Station. This is because the logic which initiates the recirculation pump
trip on an ATWS signal also energizes the alternate rod insertion
solenoids. However, other events are possible which could cause a loss of
both recirculation pumps, with the control blades at a high rod line.
The licensee has briefed each of the licensed reactor operators on the
above event, with the exception of four operators who are scheduled to be
briefed on the event by July 5, 1988.
Licensee actions required to be
completed within 60 days of receipt of this bulletin will be reviewed
during a subsequent inspection.
This bulletin will remain open.
6.
Followup of NRC Information Notices
(92701)
The NRC Inspector reviewed Information Notices (ins) 86-10,86-106,
86-110,87-040, 87-052 and 87-056.
Procedure No. NLP, Revision 1,
"Processing and Tracking of Regulatory and Industry Correspondence" was
also reviewed. The ins were processed in accordance with procedures, were
routed appropriately, and the resultant actions were considered adequate.
Based on this review the above listed Itts are considered closed.
7.
Surveillance Test Cbservation (61726C)
During this inspection period, the resident inspector (RI) observed the
perfomance of surveillance test procedures STP-057-3705, "Primary
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Containment Air Locks Seal Leakage Rate Test" and STP-209-3302, "RCIC Pump
Operability and Flow Test." The following observations were made during
the performances of the above surveillance tests:
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STP-057-3705 - This surveillance procedure was performed on June 26,
1988, with.the reactor in operational condition 1.
This
surveillance test satisfies the 72-hour test frequency requirement of
~ River Bend Station Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3.d when the
containment airlocks are used for multiple entries. The RI verified
that the technicians perfonning the surveillance had obtained
permission from the control operating foreman (C0F) to conduct the
test and that the test was being conducted in accordance with the
approved procedure. The test results were found to be within the
limits established in the River Bend Station TS and were subsequently
reviewed and approved by the C0F and section supervisor respectively.
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STP-209-3302 - This surveillance test procedure was conducted on
-June 14 and 17, 1988, to meet the River Bend Station TS requirements
of 4.0.5 and 3/4.7.3 for reactor co 1 isolation cooling (RCIC) system
operability with the reactor in operational condition 1.
On June 14,
1988, the-RCIC pump, 1E51*PC001, did not meet the reference test
values specified for the pump delta pressure and speed, and the test
results were declared unacceptable.
Condition Report 88-0467 was
initiated to evaluate this condition. The licensee's evaluation of
the above condition detennined that new baseline reference values
were needed because the RCIC turbine governor valve linkage had been
adjusted during maintenance performed on the turbine prior to running
the RCIC system. The pump curves were adjusted for the higher
turbine speed and pump flow. The resulting delta pressure was found
to correlate with the adjusted pump curves.
This surveillance test
was successfully completed on June 17, 1988.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the
inspection.
8.
Maintenance Observation (62703C)
During this inspection period, the RI observed maintenance activities on
the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system and the Division II
diesel generator ventilation fan HVP*FN28. The following corrective
maintenance activities were observed and the maintenance work packages
reviewed:
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MWO R112350 - This prompt maintenance work order (WO) was released
for work on June 16, 1988, to repair the RCIC lube oil cooling inlet
relief valve 1E51*RVF018. The relief valve was found to be leaking
at normal operating pressures. The valve was removed and repaired in
accordance with the licensee's corrective maintenance procedure
CMP-9221. The relief was functionally '.ested in accordance with
STP-000-3606 prior to being returned to service.
The quality control
inspectors observed the work performed as required for prompt W0s
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and verified the work to be satisfactory. -The inspection results are
documented in quality control inspection reports QCIR 88-21058, 21059
and 21061.
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MWO R110931 - This MW0 was released for work on June 18, 1988, when
the pressure control valve (PCV), 1E51*PCVF015, for the RCIC lube oil
inlet cooling line could not be adjusted to attain normal system
pressure. The PCV was removed and reassembled with new o-rings in
accordance with the vendor manual.
The rework activities were
observed by the quality control (QC) inspector as required by Quality
Control Instruction Procedure QCIP-0011. .These inspection activities
are documented in QC inspection reports QCIR 88-21067.and 21079.
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RCIC system was declared operable on June 20, 1988, following
successful completion of functional test, STP-209-3302,
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MWO 56154 - This prompt MW0 was initialed on May 3,1988, when the
Division II diesel generator ventilation fan, HVP*FN2B, failed to
start as required during a surveillance test of the Division II
diesel generator. The associated breaker 1EJS*SWG2A ACB037 was-found
in the trip condition and "locked up" such that the breaker could not
be reset. The breaker was removed and replaced with spare breaker
1EJS*SWG1B ACB054. The fan motor was meggered and no apparent cause
for the overcurrent trip condition was identified. The surveillance
was again performed and all support systems performed as expected.
The licensee has initiated Condition Report 88-0366 to determine why
the breaker tripped and what condition caused the breaker to
mechanically "lock up" following the overcurrent trip.
The licensee,
working with General Electric (GE), has been able to recreate the
binding only by giving the breaker an overcurrent condition which
trips the breaker and actuates the bell alarm.
The closing spring is
then recharged and a close signal given without first resetting the
d where these
overcurrent trip. Several instances have been identifie
General Electric type AKR-30, 480v, 800 AMP Frame, Air Circuit
Breakers, have tripped on an overcurrent condition and then become
mechanically bound. The licensee is reviewing these failures for
10 CFR Part 21 applicability.
Fifty-five of these AKR-30 breakers are in use in safety-related
applications at River Bend Station. A review of the maintenance
activities performed on these breakers by the licensee shows that all
the GE service information letters have been implemented. Confidence
in these breakers reliability is being based on the following:
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Very low failure rate.
Random failure has been analyzed and can be corrected quickly.
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New breakers do not exhibit the binding problem.
All but one of
the breakers have been replaced and problems have not recurred.
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Surveillance testing will continue to provide a high level of
confidence of equipment operability and identify any potential
problems.
Resolution of the cause for the overcurrent breaker trips and binding
problem experienced in the GE AKR-30 breakers following a breaker
trip, will be an open item.
(458/8813-02)
9.
Safety System Walkdown (71710C)
During this inspection period, the RI performed a walkdown of the "C" low
pressure coolant injection (LPCI) and high pressure core spray (HPCS)
systems. These systems are required to be operational during operational
conditions 1, 2, and 3 with the capability of taking suction from the
suppression pool and transferring the water to the reactor vessel.
The' system walkdowns revealed the following:
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System valves located on the major flowpaths were. properly aligned,
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Associated instrumentation was properly aligned,
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No abnormal control room instrumentation readings or alarms were
present which would prevent the systems from responding if required.
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The associated system pump bearing oil reservoirs were properly
filled.
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Accessible hangers and snubbers were intact.
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The electrical switchgear was properly aligned.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the
inspection.
10. Operational Safety Verification (71707C)
Theresident. inspector (RI)observedoperationalactivitiesthroughoutthe
inspection period and closely monitored operational events.
Control room
activities and conduct were generally observed to be well controlled.
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Proper control room staffing was maintained and access to the control room
operational areas was controlled. Selected shift turnover meetings were
observed and it was found that information concerning plant status was
being covered in each of these meetings. However, on June 14, 1988, at
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7:50a.m.(CDT),itwasdiscoveredthattheat-the-controls (ATC) operator
was not cognizant as to why annunciator P863-75A-C02, "Fuel Building
Supply Air low Flow," was lit.
The licensed operator had assumed the ATC
position at approximately 6:00 a.m. (CDT). Operating support procedure
OSP-0002, "Shift Relief and Turnover," requires that each individual shall
be responsible for reviewing and understanding the logs and checklists
applicable to his position before assuming the shift. Attachment 3, to
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' this procedure, "At-The-Controls (ATC) Operator Relief Checksheet,"
requires that the ATC operator review the annunciator status and perform a
board walkdown prior to assuming the shift. This failure of the ATC
operator _ to be fully cognizant of each annunciator in the control room was
identified by the RI as a potential violation (458/8813-01). The control
operating foreman (C0F) was ' subsequently questioned concerning the lit
It was then determined that the annunciator was not valid.
A maintenance work order had been initiated to correct the invalid
annunciator. On June 16, 1988, a memorandum from the operations
supervisor to all operations personnel was initiated reiterating the
licensed operator's duties.
System walkdowns of the "A" and "B" low pressure coolant injection systems
and the control rod drive system were conducted to verify major ficw
alignments for operability. Also, detailed system walkdowns of the "C"
low pressure coolant injection ad high pressure core spray systems were
conducted and the results are documented in paragraph 8 of this report.
Plant tours were conducted, and overall plant cleanliness was good.
General radiation practices were observed and no problems were noted.
Personnel exiting the radiation control area were observed and radiation
monitors were being properly utilized to check for contamination.
Security officer response to alarms was observed and compensatory posts
were established where required.
Protected and vital area barriers were
found to be intact.
The resident inspector also reviewed licensee actions on operational
events and potential problems.
The results of reviews of selected items
are described below:
a.
Inadvertent Activation of Emergency Sirens: At 3:25 p.m. (CDT) on
June 4,1988, an emergency siren activated in Point Coupee Parish
because of a lightening strike near the siren unit. All required
notifications were made by 3:40 p.m. (CDT) stating that no actual
emergency existed.
The licensee has completed work to provide additional shielding
around the siren units and enhanced the grounding provided at the
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sirens, as of the end of this inspection period. Electromagnetic
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interference testing was also completed at the five parishes'
emergency operating '. enters. The licensee actions to eliminate
inadvertent siren activations is identified in NRC inspection report
458/8812 as open item 8812-01.
b.
Potential Degradation of Secondary Containment: On May 17, 1988, the
licensee identified that the concrete roof plugs forming part of the
secondary containment boundary were missing the required retention
hardware. The retention hardware is required to retain the concrete
plugs in place in the event a tornado were to pass over secondary
containment.
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Upon discovery of the missing. retention hardware, the licensee
initiated limiting condition of operations (LC0) as required by River
Bend Station Technical Specifications- Section~ 3.6.5.1 which requires
that. secondary containment be restored within 4. hours or be in at
~1 east hot shut down within the subsequent 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with the reactor
in operational conditions 1, 2, .or 3.
.The required retention bolts
were installed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> thus averting the requirement to place
the reactor in hot shut down.
This condition was identified by the
licensee as having existed since January 13, 1988, and is being
reported as a condition of operation prohibited by the River Bend
Station Technical Specifications pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(1).
This report is identified as licensee event report LER 88-012 and was
submitted to the NRC within the required 30 days.
11. Licensee Plans for Coping With Strikes (92709)
The.RI reviewed the licensee plans for coping with strikes during this
inspection period.
It was found that the licensee had addressed such
issues as personnel / training requirements, security support requirements
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The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
members ratified a new contract with the licensee prior to the amended
strike date.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the
inspection.
12.
Exit Interview (30703)
An Exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives identified
in paragraph 1 of this report.
During this interview, the resident
inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.