IR 05000458/1999005

Insp Rept 50-458/99-05 on 990418-0529.Nonccited Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maint & Plant Support

ML20196E075
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	06/18/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196E065	List: IR 05000458/1999005 ML20196E060
References
50-458-99-05, 50-458-99-5, NUDOCS 9906280035
Download: ML20196E075 (17)

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l-l ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-458 License Nos.: NPF-47 l

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Report No.: 50-458/98-05 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In l i

Facility: River Bend Station Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana !

Dates: April 18 through May 29,1999 ,

l Inspectors: G. D. Replogie, Senior Resident inspector N. P. Garrett, Resident inspector Approved by: David N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Attachment: Supplemental lnformation ,

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l l

River Bend Station NRC Inspection Report 50-458/99-05 This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations

The conduct of Operations was generally professional and safety conscious (Section 01.1).

• A control room supervisor and a reactor operator did : understand why a manual residual heat removal valve's position indication lights oere out. The condition of the valve was not properly determined during control room board walkdowns (Section 04.1).

• The licensee identified a Technical Specification 3.7.2 violation in that the Division ll control room fresh air system was not operated in the emergency mode while fuel movement was in progress and the Division I unit was inoperable. Operators had mistakenly declared the Division I unit operable prior to completion of an electrical bus outage. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-0686 (Section 04.2).

Fuel handlers failed to follow procedures and started moving the refueling bridge without first checking the position of the refueling mast. This was a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. As a result, the extended mast was damaged when it ran into the wall below the transfer canal. This was the third significant fuel handling problem observed during the outage. Management response to the previous events was not sufficient to preclude this problem. More recently, however, the licensee invoked a work stoppage on the refueling floor, retrained the fuel handling crews, retested the fuel handlers, and provided increased management oversight of activities. Performance improved following the licensee's corrective measures. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Psport 99-0702 (Section O4.3).

• Inadequate verbal communications between operators and security personnel resulted in the inadvertent loss of fuel building vacuum while fuel movement was in progress. A senior reactor operator permitted personnel to enter the annulus through an inappropriate pathway, which opened a large leakage path to the fuel building. Operator response to the event was appropriate (Section 04.4). )

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Maintenance

• The conduct of maintenance and surveillances was generally thorough and professional (Section M1.1).

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• During the Division 11 emergency core cooling system test, the Residual Heat Removal A and C low pressu.e coolant injection valves failed to open. The licensee determined that poor coordinatic, between two test activities caused the problem. The retest was acceptable (Section 141.2).

• Plant material conditbn was generally good. Significant material improvements included the replacement d th e recirculation pump seals (Section M2.1).

• The licensee identifie1 a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, violation in that workers failed to initiate tracking documents as required when items were dropped into the suppression pool. The licensee determined that emergency core cooling system pump operability was not affected. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-0895 (Section )

M8.1). J l

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• A diesel generator system engineer demonstrated an excellent questioning attitude and identified a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.12 in that testing of the nonessential trip bypass function and current differential trips was not adequate. Successful testing was subsequently performed. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-0903 (Section E2.1).

Plant Support

• Housekeeping in most readily accessible areas was good. However, housekeeping in the drywell remained poor. Tools were scattered in work areas and debris was observed in many areas (Section O2.1).

• Emergency preparedness facilities were properly maintained (Section P2.1).

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• Protected area illumination levels, maintenance of the isolation zones around protective area barriers, and the status of security secondary power supply equipment were properly maintained (Section S1.1).

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Report Details l

l Summarv of Plant Status

The plant was in Operational Mode 5 during this entire report period. River Bend officially i exited Refueling Outage 8 on May 13,1999, and entered Forced Outage 99-0 )

I 1. Operations j l

01 Conduct of Operations  !

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0 General Comments (71707) J l

The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to conduct frequery reviews of ongoing plant operations. The conduct of operations was generally professional and ]

j safety-consciou l 02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 0 Enaineered Safetv Feature System Walkdowns g Insoection Scope (71707. 71750) j The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems:

. High Pressure Core Spray )

• Residual Heat Removal, Trains A, B, and C l

. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling l

= Division I,11, and lll Emergency Diesel Generators l

. Division I,11, and lll Switchgear and Battery Rooms  !

• Standby Gas Treatment System Trains A and B

. Standby Service Water System Trains A and B The systems were found to be properly aligned for the plant conditions and generally in good material conditio During plant tours, housekeeping in readily accessible areas was observed to be goo i However, housekeeping in the drywell remained poor. Tools and debris were obsented )

scattered in many area l 04 Operator Knowledge and Performance 0 Operator Knowledae of Control Room Conditions Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspector conducted periodic interviews with on-shift Operations personnel to assess their knowledge of plant condition ,

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-2- Observations and Findinas While operator knowledge of most plant conditions was considered very good, in one instance both the control room supervisor and the reactor operator did not properly understand a valve's operational status. When questioned about the absence of indication lights for Valve E12-F010, a residual heat removal shutdown cooling manual isolation valve, the reactor operator did not know why the indication lights were out but checked the condition of the light bulbs. Both bulbs were replaced but remained of The control room supervisor then checked the power supply to the lights and found that the indication was powered from a Division il power supply which was de-energized for

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a bus outage. The condition of the valve was not properly determined during control room board walkdown Conclusions A control room supervisor and a reactor operator did not understand why a manual residual heat removal valve's position indication lights were out. The condition of the valve was not properly determined during control room board walkdown .2 Ooerator Knowledae of Plant Status Inspection Scooe (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the details surrounding core alterations and handling of irradiated fuel without meeting the Technical Specification required control room ventilation system alignmen Observations and Findinas The licensee identified that core alterations and handling of irradiated fuel had occurred in violation of the Technical Specification requirements for the control room fresh air system. Technical Specification 3.7.2 requires that both trains of control room fresh air be operable to support fuel movement. The Technical Specification Action Statement allows refueling operations to be performed with one operable system if the system is running in the emergency mode. However, fuel handling operations were performed

' from April 20-21; 1999, with only one control room fresh air train operable and it was not running in the emergency mode. Upon discovery, the licensee immediately secured fuel movemen The licensee determined that operators had inappropriately exited a Division I electrical

- bus Technical Specification Action Statement while the unit was still in the electrical bus outage. As such, during the period in question, operators erroneously believed that the

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Division I control room fresh air unit was operable and did not start the Division 11 unit in >

'the emergency mod l The failure to operate the Division 11 control room fresh air system in the emergency )

mode while fuel movement was in progress and the other unit was inoperable was a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.2. This Severity Level IV violation is being

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-3-treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-458/9905-01). The violation is in the licencee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-068 c.' Conclu.sions The licensee identified a Technical Specification 3.7.2 violation in that the Division ll control room fresh air system was not operated in the emergency mode while fuel movement was in progress and the Division I un!t was inoperable. Operators had mistakenly declared the Division I unit operable prior to completion of an electrical bus outage. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and was in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-068 O4.3. Refuelino Activities Inspection Scoce (71707)

On April 22,1999, a refueling operator drove the unloaded fuel building refueling mast into the wall below the inclined fuel transfer system canal, bending the mast. The inspector observed the licensee's response to the even Observations and Findinos A refueling operator drove the fuel building refueling mast into the wall below the inclined fuel transfer system canal. Prior to the event, the oncoming fuel movement crew performed a premovement walkdown of the fuel movement platform. The platform was left over the fuel storage area with the refueling mast extended. The driver performed a walkdown but did not visually note the relative position of the mast or the electronic mast position readout. The fuel movement supervisor noted the position of the mast and the need to correct the position prior to movement but did not mention it to the driver. After completing the walkdowns, the fuel movement supervisor directed the i driver to move the fuel movement platform to the inclined fuel transfer system. The fuel !

movement supervisor then focused on the movement of the bridge to prevent injury to personnelin the area. The driver initiated movement of the platform toward the transfer l canal. Within seconds of starting the forward motion, the mast contacted the pool wal Procedure FHP-0002, " Fuel Handling Platform Operation", Revision 13, Section 2.7, specifies to " Constantly observe grapple position as the bridge and trolley are moved to prevent running the grapple into any obstructions." Contrary to the above, the fuel movement platform driver did not observe the position of the grapple, which is part of the refueling mast, during movement of the fuel handling platform. The failure to properly implement Procedure FHP-0002 was a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-458/9905-02).

The violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-070 Two other fuel handling problems were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/9903. First, fuel handlers failed to follow procedures, which resulted in a spent fuel

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-4-bundle contacting shielding 5 the fuel pool. Second, fuel handlers failed to follow !

procedures and overextende the refueling mast and bent a fuel bundle handl I Management response to those events was ineffective at precluding this most recent I proble In response to the multiple fuel handling problems, the licensee invoked a work stoppage on the refueling floor, retrained the fuel handling crews, retested the fuel handlers, and provided increased management oversight of activities. Performance j improved following the licensee's corrective measure Conclusions

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Fuel handlers failed to fol!ow procedures and started moving the refueling bridge without first checking the position of the refueling mast. This was a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. As a result, the extended mast was damaged when it ran into the wall below the transfer canal. This was the third significant fuel handling problem observed during the outage. Management response to the previous events was not sufficient to preclude this problem. More recently, however, the licensee invoked a work stoppage on the refueling floor, retrained the fuel handling crews, retested the fuel handlers, and provided increased management oversight of activities. Performance improved following the licensee's corrective measures. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-070 O4.4 Loss of Fuel Buildino Vacuum While Movina Irradiated Fuel Inspection Scoop;192707)

Fuel building vacuum was inadvertently lost while handling irradiated fuel in the fuel building. The inspectors observed the licensee response to the proble Observations and Findinas On April 28, fuel building vacuum was lost while handling irradiated fuel in the fuel building. The vacuum is required to be negative while moving irradiated fuel. Work center operators permitted security and maintenance personnel to open the reactor building annulus to fuel building door, which opened a large leakage pathway. A different pathway through an auxiliary building door should have been utilized for the entry. In response to the high fuel building pressure alarm, the movement of irradiated fuel was immediately suspended, consistent with Technical Specification requirement All personnel in the reactor annulus region were removed and the door was secure Condition Report 99-0775 was initiated. The licensee determined that inadequate verbal communications caused the event. The work center senior reactor operator failed to discuss the specific door to utilize with security personnel, but assumed that the auxiliary building door would be used. Corrective actions included counseling of the supervisor involved, placing the door under the administrative control of the on-shift shift supervisor, and labeling of the door to caution personnel against opening of the door during fuel movemen r

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-5- Conclusions inadequate verbal communications between operators and security personnel resulted in the inadvertent loss of fuel building vacuum while fuel movement was in progress. A senior reactor operator permitted personnel to enter the annulus through an inappropriate pathway, which opened a large leakage path to the fuel building. Operator response to the event was appropriat Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)

0 Violation Closure The inspectors performed an in-office review of outstanding violations in the operations area. The Severity Level IV violation listed below was issued in a Notice of Violation prior to March 11,1999. On this date, the NRC changed the policy for treatment of Severity Level IV violations (Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy). Because this violation would have been treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Appendix C, it is being closed out in this report, consistent with the new Enforcement Policy for Severity Level IV violations. The inspectors verified that the licensee had included this violation in their corrective action program. The corrective action program reference for the violation is listed below. In addition, the violation already has a docketed respons Violation Number Description CA Program Reference 50-458/9707-01 Failure to specify independent CR 97-0193 verification in procedures Corrective action effectiveness reviews for selected violations will be accomplished as a routine part of the NRC's corrective action program inspection .2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-458/99-09: Technical specification noncompliance due to inappropriate action statement exit. The events in this licensee event report are discussed in Section 04.2 of this repor j 11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments i l Inspection Scope (61726. 62707)

i The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance activities, except as

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. MAI 319573, Division til Control Building Normal and Standby Backup Battery Replacement (documentation review)

• MAI 320247, Division lli Control Building Normal and Standby Backup Battery Replacement, Panel E22-S001 (documentation review)

• STP 309-0601, Division i 13 month ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System)

Test, Revision 16

• STP 309-0602, Division 1118 Month ECCS Test, Revision 14

• TP 99-00007, Division til Diesel Generator Differential Trip Functional Test, Revision 0 Observations and Findinas  ;

The performance of maintenance and surveillance was generally thorough and professional. Problems observed during the performance of the Division 11 emergency core cooling system test are documented in Section M M1.2 Division 11 Emeraency Core Coolina System Test Insoectio , Scope (61726)

The inspector observed portions of the tes Observations and Findinos During the Division ll emergency core cooling system test, the Trains A and C residual heat removal low pressure coolant injection valves failed to open. The licensee determined that poor coordination between two test activities caused the problem. The injection valve logic requires that reactor pressure be less than approximately 487 psig before the valves can be opened. At the time of the testing, the pertinent pressure instrument, with input to the residual heat removal valve injection valve logic, was also utilized during automatic depressurization system testing. The instrument output was reading higher than the injection valve permissive setpoint due to the automatic depressurization system testing. As such, the injection valve open permissive logic was not satisfied and the valves did not open. The licensee performed an acceptable injection valve retes Conclusions During the Division 11 emergency core cooling system test, the Residual Heat Removal A and C low pressure coolant injection valves failed to open. The licensee determined that poor coordination between two test activities caused the problem. The retest was acceptabl l

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-7-M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

- M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours (62707)

During this inspection period, the inspectors conducted interviews and routine plant tours to evaluate material condition. Overall plant material condition was goo Significant material improvements included recirculation pump seal replacemen M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance lasues (92902)

M8.1 Sucoression Pool Foreian Material Control Inspection Scoce (62707)

The licensee identified numerous undocumented items in the suppression pool. The inspector observed the licensee's response to the problem, Observations and Findinas The licensee identified that workers did not follow procedures and failed to initiate tracking documents, in numerous instances, when items were dropped into the suppression pool. Procedure ADM-0092, " Foreign Material Exclusion," states, in part:

"If any item is dropped in the Suppression Pool . . . and cannot be retrieved, then dccument on a Condition Report or a Suppression / Fuel Pools Lost item Report . . ."

During pool cleaning, divers found a set of anticontamination coveralls, an anticontamination hood, a step-off pad, a 4-inch plastic bag, two rolls of tape, several

- pieces of paper, and a few hundred smaller items such as pens, washers, and small tools. Most items were not documented in condition reports or suppression / fuel pools lost item reports. The licensee determined that the items were not sufficient to clog emergency core cooling system pump strainers or affect system operability, but the licensee was still concerned with the loss of suppression pool foreign material contro The failure to follow the noted procedure was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. This requirement specifies,in part, proper implementation of procedures affecting quality. Procedure ADM-0092 is a procedure affecting quality. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-458/9905-03). The violation is in the licensee's

. corrective action program as Condition Report 99-089 Conclusions The licensee identified a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, violation in that

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workers failed to initiate tracking documents as required when items were dropped into the suppression pool. The licensee determined that emergency core cooling system pump operability was not affected. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-089 .

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M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-458/97-01: manual reactor scram on low vessel level due to cut cable. The issues identified in this licensee event report were j appropriately addressed and documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/97-0 l M8.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 50-458/97-02: through-wall crack in a reactor recirculation flow control Valve B vent valve weld. This event report documented a vent valve weld failure. The issues identified in this licensee event report were appropriately addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/97-08 with the exception of the licensee's root cause determinatio The licensee's root cause analysis indicated that the weld exhibited several lack of j fusion zones in the root of the weld and also exhibited localized areas of porosity in '

individual weld passes. Low stress high cycle fatigue contributed to crack propagatio The laboratory analysis results were consistent with the root cause determination. The inspector reviewed the root cause and found it acceptabl As corrective measures, the failed valve was replaced and the weld area was modified

- to increase stiffness and improve resistence to fatigue, and a representative sampling of valves were inspected for similar problems. None were found. No additional cracks have been identified since the initial occurrence. The licensee's corrective actions were acceptabl M8.4 - (Closed) Insoection Followuo item 50-458/9708-02: root cause of failed flow control valve vent valve weld. This item is addressed in the closeout of Licensee Event Report 50-458/97-02 in Section M M8.5 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 50-458/99-10: inadvertent breach of fuel building integrity due to failure to self-check. The events in this licensee event report are discussed in Section O4.4 of this repor Ill.' Enaineerina

'E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E Inadeauate Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspector observed the licensee response to inadequate testing of diesel

. generator Observations and Findinos A diesel generator system engineer identified that Divisions I and 11 diesel generator nonessential trip bypass function testing and the current differential trip testin0 were inadequate. The surveillances are required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.12. The nonessential trip testing only checked the function of the

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-9-annunciator circuit. The nonessential trip circuit can only be tested by reducing the control circuit air pressure below 40 psi, which seals in the trip and prevents repressurizing the control circuit. The pressure in the control circuit was only reduced to approximately 45 psi which activated the annunciator only. The engineer also identified that the current differential trip for the output breakers on the Division I, ll, and lil diesel generators was not tested during diesel operation. Subsequent to the finding, the applicable procedures were revised and appropriate testing was accomplishe The inspector determined that the system engineer demonstrated an excellent questioning attitude in identifying the noted surveillance problems. The failure to perform adequate surveillance tests on the Divisions I, ll, and lil diesel generators is a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.12. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as an noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-458/9905-04). The violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-090 Conclusions A diesel generator system engineer demonstrated an excellent questioning attitude and identified a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Renuirement 3.8.1.12 in that testing of the nonessential trip bypass function and current differential trips was not adequate. Successful testing was subsequently performed. The violation met the criteria for a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-090 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92902)

E8.1 - Viotation Closures The below violation is closed consistent with the guidance previously provided in Section 08.1 of this repor Violation Number Description CA Program Reference 50-458/9706-04 Inadequate maintenance of localleak rate CR 97-0127 testing program E8.2 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item 50-458/9719-04: design inconsistencies associated with instrument sensing lines. The inspector had identified inconsistencies between the as-built configuration of safety-related instrument sensing lines and design specifications. The design specifications had stipulated that deviations from the specifications required approval from General Electric. In response to the concern, the j licensee contacted General Electric and a General Electric representative provided a formal response which indicated that the as-built design was acceptabl l l

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-10-IV. Plant Support R8 Miscellaneous Radiolc;fical Protection and Control issues )

R8.1 Violation Closure The below violation is closed consistent with the guidance previously provided in Section 08.1 of this repor Violation Number Description CA Program Reference .

l 50-458/9706-05 Failure to conspicuously post radiation area CR 97-0257 P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Facilities, Equipment and Resources ,

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P2.1 General Comments (71750)

During routine plant tours the inspectors verified that the emergency preparedness facilities were properly maintained. No problems were identifie S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 _G_eneral Comments (71750)

During routine tours the inspector observed protected area illumination levels, maintenance of the isolation zones around protective area barriers, and the status of ,

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security secondary power supply equipment. No problems were observe F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues F8.1 Violation Closure The below violation is closed consistent with the guidance previously provided in 1 Section 08.1 of this repor Violation Number Description CA Program

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Reference 50-458/9708-06 Failure to perform fire watch tours CR 97-0707 l

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-11-V. Manacement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection report results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 10,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie I

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ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Edington, Vice President-Operations B. Biggs, Licensing Engineer P. Chapman, Superintendent, Chemistry )

D. Dormady, Manager, Plant Engineering i J. Fowler, Director, Quality Programs T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Maintenance 1 J. Holmes, Manac;r Radiation Protection and Chemistry l H. Hutchens, Superintendent, Plant Security R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing D. Mims, General Manager, Plant Operations ,

J. McGhee, Acting Manager, Operations {

D. Pace, Director, Design Engineering A. Wells, Superintendent, Radiation Control INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations

. IP 71750: Plant Support IP 90700 Onsite Follow-Up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Closed 50-458/99-09' LER Technical Specification noncompliance due to Inappropriate Action Statement Exit (Section O8.2)

50-458/99-10 LER Inadvertent breach of fuel building integrity due to failure to self-check (Section M8.5)

50-458/97-01 LER Manual scram on low vessel level due to cut cable (Section M8.2)

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50-458/97-02 LER Through-wall crack in a reactor recirculation flow control Valve B vent valve weld (Section M8.3)

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,50-458/9708-02 IFl Root cause of failed flow control valve vent valve weld (Section M8.4)

50-458/9707-01 VIO Failure to specify independent verification in procedures (Section O8.1)

50-458/9719-04 IFl Instrument sensing line design discrepancies (Section E8.2)

50-458/9708-06 VIO Failure to perform fire watch tours (Section F8.1)

50-458/9706-04 VIO Inadequate maintenance of Local Leak Rate Test program (Section E8.1)

50-458/9706-05 VIO Failure to conspicuously post radiation area (Section R8.1)

Ooened and Closed 50-458/5905-01 NCV Failure to meet Technical Specification for Control Room Fresh Air (Section O4.2)

50-458/9905-02 NCV Failure to follow operating procedure resulting in damage to fuel handling platform mast (Section 04.3)

50-458/9905-03 NCV Undocumented items in suppression pool (Section M8.1)

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50-458/9905-04 NCV Inadequate diesel generator surveillance procedure (Section E2.1)

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-3-LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ADM administrative procedure CFR Code of Federal Regulations FHP fuel handling procedure IFl inspection followup item MAI maintenance action item NCV noncited violation NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission psig pounds per square inch PDR public document room STP surveillance test procedure TP temporary procedure VIO violation i

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