IR 05000458/1998020

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Insp Rept 50-458/98-20 on 981101-1212.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support
ML20199E225
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/07/1999
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199E202 List:
References
50-458-98-20, NUDOCS 9901200351
Download: ML20199E225 (10)


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ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-458 License No.: N.F.-47 i

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Report No.: 50-458/98-20 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: River Bend Station Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana Dates: November 1 through December 12,1998 Inspector (s): G. D. Replogle, Senior Resident inspector N. P. Garrett, Resident inspector Approved By: C. S. Marschall, Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENT: SupplementalInformation

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9901200351 990107 PDR ADOCK 05000458 G PDR

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l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY River Berid Station l

NRC Inspection Report 50-458/98-20 l

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Operations  ;

Plant staff consistently conducted operations in a professional and safety-conscious l

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manner (Section 01.1).

Maintenance 1

Plant staff completed performance of maintenance and surveillances in a thorough and professional manner (Section M1.1). I

  • Overall, inspectors found good plant material condition. Material condition concerns !

included two minor fuel leaks, an out-of-service ERIS, and a degraded second stage  !

recirculation pump seal. The maintenance staff started installation of a new ERIS  !

computer. Work continued throughout this inspection period (Section M2.1). i l

Enaineerina  !

  • Engineering appropriately recommended changes to the facility, designed to improve auxiliary building accessibility while operating the Standby Gas Treatment System  :

(SGTS). During this inspection period, workers installed and tested door assist duce l The tests demonstrated structural weaknesses in the devices and operators reporte,d l

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achievable but difficult building access. Engineering pursued appropriate desigr, changes before final implementation (Section E2.1).

i Plant Sucoort

! * The RBS staff failed to adequately perform radiological surveys as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1. As a result, they shipped one container with contaminated items to Waterford 3. The absence of controls for deferred surveys

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caused the violation. Inspectors considered the proposed corrective actions, that

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included training personnel on the occurrence and required a free release survey zone j during outages, acceptable. Technicians also completed surveys on three containers (Section R1.1).

. Security facilities, equipment, isolation zones, and illumination levels were properly maintained (Section 2.1).

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Report Details l Summary of Plant Status Reactor power was approximately 65 percent at the start of the report period to support fuel assembly leak suppression testing. Power was returned to 100 percent on November 2. At the end of the inspection period, the reactor was operating at 100 percent steady-stat I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations -

01.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations using Inspection Procedure 71707. Plant staff consistently conducted operations in a professional and safety-conscious manner. The inspectors did not identify any problems this perio !

02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following j safety-related systems: 1 i

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Reactor Core Isolation Cooling I

  • Division I,11, and ill Switchgear and Battery Rooms I

- Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), Trains A and B

. Standby Liquid Control

. Division I,11, and ill Diesel Generators (DGs)

The inspectors found the systems properly aligned and in generally good material condition. In addition, the inspectors observed and inspected safety related Clearance l

Order RB-98-2030, "EGA-V102 Isolation," and dit not identify any problems.

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08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

0 (Closed) Violation 50-458/9615-01: inspectors identified four examples of failure to maintain plant configuration control in accordance with procedure requirements. The licensee responded to the violation in a letter to the NRC dated January 24,1997. The letter included corrective measures implementing several broad based training programs, increased management oversight, and appropriate procedure changes. The inspectors considered the corrective measures acceptable. Although inspectors identified some additionalinstances of configuration control problems since the violation was cited, they have been relatively isolated and were not generally related to the j i problems identified in this violatio i

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ll. Maintenance

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M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments I Inspection Scope (61726. 62707)

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The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities.

l . mal 314573, inclined Fuel Transfer System Maintenance

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STP-250-4524, FPM PNL1 Fire Detection Functional Test And Halon System Operational Test l

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. mal 315817, Remove and Replace Valve EGA V102

STP-309-306, Division lli DG Air Start System Quarterly Valve Operability Test Observations and Findinas

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Plant staff completed performance of maintenance and surveillances in a thorough and  :

professional manne l l ,

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

M Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tcurs Insoection Scope (62707)

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l During this inspection penod, the inspectors conducted interviews and routine plant l l tours to evaluate plant material condition, j

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i Observations and Findinas Overall maintenance and plant material condition was good. The following material condition problems were observe . Recirculation Pump A Seal Degradation: On November 2, following a planned downpower change, operators identified a lower than expected second stage Recirculation Pump A seal cavity pressure indicating degradation of the second stage seal. Operators observed a pressure of approximately 450 psig, compared to a normal pressure slightly over 500 psig. Further, operators observed a slightly higher than normal second stage seal temperature. Through l l the remainder of the inspection period, the second stage seal continued to slowly f

degrade, with cavity pressure reaching 320 psig at the close of the inspection l . _ - .

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3-period. Because the pump contained two 100 percent capability seals, the plant managers did not consider degradation of the second stage seal an immediate safety concern. As a precaution, they appropriately established contingency plans for a seal failur .

Fuel Element Failure: On September 17 and October 18, the reactor engineers ,

identified relatively minor fuel element failures. Subsequently, they tested to l locate each failure and inserted adjacent control rods to reduce power in the j affected 2.8 millicuries per second (mci /sec) compared to about 1.0 mci /sec l before the fuelleaks. The offgas pretreatment activity levels reached i mci /sec at the close of the inspection peiiod and trended normal activity level slowly downward. The Technical Specification limit is 290 mei/se . Emergency Response information System (ERIS): In recent years, the ERIS computer has experienced numerous shutdowns and failures. During this inspection period, the licensee initiated the installation of a new ERIS computer that consequently required the removal of the ERIS from service. The maintenance staff expected to rnake the ERIS computer fully functional in late Decembe Conclusions Overall, inspectors found good plant material condition. Material condition concerns included two minor fuel leaks, an out-of-sen/ ice ERIS, and a degraded second stage recirculation pump seal. The maintenance staff started installation of a new ERIS computer. Work continued throughout this inspection perio Ill. Enaineerina Enaineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E Auxiliary Buildina Access Improvements (37551) Inspection Scope The inspector observed Engineering activities to improve auxiliary building acces Observation and Findinas Background: Earlier this year, the NRC, in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/98-05, l identified concerns about auxiliary building access during design bases events.

l Specifically, the SGTS drew sufficient suction on the auxiliary building so that operators could not open most building doors with two SGTS trains in service. At least half the operators could not open some of the doors with just one train in service. Engineers

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estimated that with one train in service operators would need to exert approximately 260 pounds of force to open a door. With two trains of SGTS in service, operators would need to exert approximately 500 pounds of forc Engineering Actions: In response to the above concerns, engineers purchased several door assist devices to aid operators in entering the auxiliary building. Workers permanently installed the devices on the doors. The vendor designed the devices to open a door approximately 4 inches, enabling the pressure across the door to equaliz When the devices sufficiently reduced the differential pressure across the door, they should have permitted operators to open the doo During this inspection period, engineers and maintenance craftsmen installed the devices and tested one door with two trains of SGTS in service (the bounding condition).

While individual operators opened the door under these conditions, they stated that the process still required excessive force. Additionally, the structural case for the device showed signs of yielding. In response to the test results, the licensee planned to make design changes to reinforce structural members and to ensure that the doors would open far enough to permit adequate pressure equalization. The inspectors considered the planned measures acceptabl Conclusion I Engineering appropriately recommended changes to the facility, designed to improve auxiliary building accessibility while operating the SGTS. During this inspection period, workers installed and tested door assist devices. The tests demonstrated structural weaknesses in the devices and operators reported achievable but difficult building access. Engineering pursued appropriate design changes before finalimplementatio IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Radioactive Material Control (71750)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the licensee's response to discovery that they inadvertently shipped slightly contaminated articles to another facility following an inadequate surve Observations and Findinas On October 23,1998, Waterford 3 notified RBS personnel that technicians at Waterford 3 found two contaminated items in a portable office. RBS had last used the container during Refueling Outage 7. Technicians had identified a contaminated floor

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mat and a cardboard box containing a contaminated yellow cloth cover. Contamination l levels were higher than allowed by the RBS unconditional release requirements i

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(1000 dpm), with total activity at approximately 0.6 uCi. Contamination on the yellow cloth cover was approximately 3000 dpm per 100 cm2, while contamination on the floormat was slightly over 1000 dpm per 100 cm2, RBS radiation protection staff further researched the problem and found that RBS used the three containers on the RBS turbine deck during Refueling Outage 7. Technicians performed preliminary radiological surveys on the containers on October 15,1997, but j high background radiation levels on the turbine deck prevented successful final unconditional release radiological surveys. Workers removed the containers from the turbine building on October 22,1997, and technicians had planned to perform the remaining surveys prior to shipping the units off-site. The containers, however, were not posted or otherwise marked as potentially contaminated. Consequently, other plant i personnel did not know that the containers needs additional surveys. The containers j were shipped to Waterford 3 without the surveys. The inspectors observed that the licensee had no controls in place to ensure that these types of activities were adequately controlled to preclude the inadvertent release of contaminated material As corrective measures: )

. Technicians surveyed the remaining two containers. They found no contaminatio l

. All health physics technicians received training on the even j l

- Managers planned to establish a centralized free release zone during refueling i

outages to ensure that technicians surveyed all materials used in radiological

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controlled areas were appropriately surveyed prior to being unconditionally release The inspectors considered the corrective measures acceptabl The failure to ensure that the containers were not contaminated prior to the unconditional release was a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1. This regulation requires, in part, that the licensee implement procedures for radiological survey Procedure RSP-0213," Control and Handling of Radioactive Materials," Revision 11 A, states material can be unconditionally released if loose surface beta-gamma l I

l contamination levels are less than 1000 dpm/100 cm2 Plant staff did not properly implement this procedure as evidenced by contamination in excess of the limits on two items in one of the containers (VIO 50-458/9820-01).

I c. Conclusion i

The RBS staff failed to adequately perform radiological surveys as required by l Technical Specification 5.4.1. As a result, they shipped two containers with i

, contaminated items to Waterford 3. The absence of controls for deterred surveys )

caused the violation. Inspectors considered the proposed corrective actions, that i included training personnel on the occurrence and required a free release survey zone l during outages, acceptable. Technicians also completed surveys on three container \

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-6-S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S General Comments (71750)

During routine tours, the inspector observed protected area illumination levels, maintenance of the isolation zones around protective area barriers, and the status of security secondary power supply equipment. The inspectors identified that no problems were observe V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary i

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on December 17,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Edington, Vice President-Operations B. Biggs, Licensing Engineer P. Chapman, Superintendent, Chemistry D. Dormady, Manager, Plant Engineering J. Fowler, Director, Quality Programs T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Maintenance H. Hutchens, Superintendent, Plant Security R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing D. Mims, General Manager, Plant Operations W. O'Malley, Manager, Operations D. Pace, Director, Design Engineering A. Wells, Superintendent, Radiation Control INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support IP 92901 Followup, Operations ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooened i

50-458/9820-01 VIO Failure to ensure containers were not contaminated prior to I unconditional release Closed 50-458/9615-01 VIO Four examples where plant configuration control was not maintained in accordance with procedural requirements i

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2-I LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR Code of Federal Regulations DG diesel generator ,

dpm disintegrations per minute l ERIS emergency response information system i MAI maintenance action item l NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l psig pounds per square inch RBS River Bend Station RSP radiation section procedure l PDR public document room l SGTS standby gas treatment system !

STP surveillance test procedure VIO violation l

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