IR 05000458/1998008
| ML20248J607 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248J604 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-98-08, 50-458-98-8, NUDOCS 9806090212 | |
| Download: ML20248J607 (16) | |
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ENCLOSUR U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.: 50-458 License No.: NPF-47 Report No.: 50-458/98-08 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: River Bend Station Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana i
i Dates: April 5 through May 16,1998 l
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Inspector (s): G. D. Replogie, Senior Resident inspector N. P. Garrett, Resident inspector Approved By: E. E. Collins, Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information 9906090212 990605 PDR ADOCK 05000458 G PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY River Bend Station NRC Inspection Report 50-458/98-08 Ooerations
- In general, the conduct of Operations was professional and safety conscious (Section 01.1).
- The plant shutdown was well controlled. The control room supervisor provided appropriate and timely briefings during the evolution and properly anticipated entry into the emergency operating procedures when the plant was scrammed (Section 01.2).
- The plant startup was orderly and the control room supervisor demonstrated excellent command and control during the evolution. Control room briefs were thorough and the control room supervisor provided exceptional guidance and direction to the crew,
- A nuclear equipment operator demonstrated poor self-checking practices in that he had failed to properly reposition plant valves on two occasions. In the first case, cooling water was inadvertently secured to the Feowater Pump (FWP) B speed increaser. In the second instance an accumulator pressure switch, that activates an accumulator trouble alarm in the control room, was inadvertently isolated for over three weeks (Section 04.1).
Maintenance
+ Causes for a seal oil leak and excessive main generator hydrogen leakage included weak contractor oversight and poor coordination of maintenance, without adequate verification of critical steps, during Refueling Outage (RF) 7. A sealant plug was not properly reinstalled and hydrogen seal assembly bolts were not properly torque Conversely, corrective maintenance performed during the forced outage was thorough, well controlled, and effective at correcting the problems (Section M1.2).
- Plant material condition was very good. Material condition concerns included an out of service suppression pool cleanup system, excessive standby gas treatment system induced differential pressure across the auxiliary building, area a seal leak on FWP Conversely, action was taken to correct main generator hydrogen leakage, repair a high pressure turbine steam leak, arid return a control building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning chiller to service. Additionally, a " black board * was achieved in the control room (Section M2.1).
Enainetting
- .While performing corrective investigation for a previous violation, flow through the standby gas treatment system filter trains was in excess of that assumed in design documents and Technical Specifications. Operability was not affected by the discrepancy and the system flow rates were restored to within appropriate limit . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _- _ - _ _ _ _ __-_ -
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-2-However, the as-left system configuration caused the auxiliary building effluent flow rate (through the standby gas treatment system) to be less than assumed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The auxiliary building effluent flow rate will be restored to within design assumptions at the first available opportunity (Section E8.1).
Plant Sucoort l
- Plant housekeeping was considered good. The preservation of the reactor core isolation l cooling, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) A, B, and C pump rooms and piping systems was poor. Surface corrosion was evident on a majority of the system piping run Scattered tools and a disassembled sump pump were left on the lower level of the RHR C pump room, undisturbed, since at least January 1998. In severallocations in the auxiliary building, tools and other materials were staged for extended periods of time without the performance of work on the prospective jobs (Section O2.1).
- Emergency preparedness facilities and the emergency response organization staffing were maintained consistent with the River Bend Emergency Pla Security facilities, equipment, isolation zones, and illumination levels were properly maintaine _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___-
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant was in Operational Mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power at the beginning of the inspection period. On April 13, the plant was shut down to effect repairs on an unisolable main generator seal oil leak, which was spraying oil on the main generator exciter housing and several other plant components. The plant was returned to criticality on April 27, was synchronized to the grid on April 28, and returned to full power operations on April 29. On May 1, power was reduced to 89 percent to support repairs to FWP B. Reactor power was returned to 100 percent on May 3, where it essentially remained for the rest of the inspection period, l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors performed frequent control room observations to ascertain operator knowledge and performance. Operators demonstrated good three-way communications and were knowledgeable of equipment status and applicable Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operatio .2 Forced Shutdown Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspector observed Operations' conduct of the forced shutdown on April 13 and reviewed details of events that lead to the shutdow Observations and Findinas l
During nuclear equipment operator (NEO) rounds on April 13,1998, the NEO observed hydrogen seal oil spraying from the top of the main generator end shield. The approximate one gallon per minute oil leak was spraying the main generator exciter l I
housing and dripping on equipment on lower elevations, including the isophase ground cooling fan motors. The oilleak was determined to be unisolable. Because of concerns that the leakage could cause damage to plant equipment, Operations shut down the plant to effect repairs to the main generator. The licensee had planned to shut down later in the month to address excessive main generator hydrogen leakage, which has been a significant problem since startup from the previous RF. The causes for the main generator related problems are discussed in detailin Section M1.2 of this repor The plant shutdown was well controlled. The control room supervisor (CRS) provided appropriate and timely briefings during the evolution. Additionally, he properly
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. anticipated entry into the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) on low level when the plant was scrammed, per procedure, at approximately 30 percent powe Conclusions The plant shutdown was performed in a well controlled manner. The CRS provided good direction to the crew and properly anticipated entry into the EOP .2 Reactor Startuo Insoection Scooe (71701)
The inspectors observed the reactor startup to criticality on April 2 Observations and Findinas l The startup was conducted in an orderly manner and in accordance with procedural 1 requirements. The CRS demonstrated excellent command and control during the startup. Control room briefs were thorough and the CRS provided exceptional guidance and direction to the crew. Criticality was achieved consistent with the estimated critical rod position predicted by the reactor enginee The startup was slowed because operators had difficulty withdrawing approximately 90 percent of the control rods from the "00" position. Withdrawal of these control rods required the use of alternate withdrawal methods such as " double clutching and/or the utilization of higher than normal drive water pressure'.' While most boiling water i licensee's experience some rod withdrawal problems during startups, the number of control rods requiring additional assistance to induce movement during this startup was j considered excessive. At the close of the inspection period the licensee dia not know the cause of the problem but had initiated Condition Report 98-0506 to investigate the condition. The inspector verified that none of the potential causes, such as air in the drive mechanisms or unbalanced hydraulic system flows, could reasonably impact the ability of the control rods to be scrammed. The licensee's approach to resolving the problem was acceptabl c, . Conclusions on Conduct of Ooerations The plant startup on April 27,1998, was conducted in an orderly manner and the CRS demonstrated excellent command and control during the evolution. Control room briefs were thorough and the CRS provided exceptional guidance and direction to the cre I
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-3-02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Eagtpeered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707. 71750)
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems:
- RHR, Trains A, B and C
- Containment i
. Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) Trains A and B
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- Standby Liquid Control The systems were found to be properly aligned for the plant conditions and in generally good material conditio During plant tours housekeeping was found to be good. The inspectors observed that the preservation of the RCIC, RHR A, B, and C pump rooms, and piping systems was poor. Surface corrosion was evident on a majority of the RHR and RCIC piping run Although lighting in the rooms was acceptable, illumination was considerably less than in other areas of the plant. The inspectors also observed that scattered tools and a disassembled sump pump were left on the lower level of the RHR C pump room, undisturbed, since at least January 1998. In the RHR B pump room, yellow poly bags and tools were observed setting on the deck with no indication that work was being performed. Similarly, in the high pressure core spray room and the remainder of the auxiliary building, the inspectors observed tools and materials that were staged in place for over a month without the performance of work on the prospective job Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 NEO Performance Insoection Scoce (71707. 61726)
The licensee identified two instances where the same NEO had failed to leave system valves in the proper position. The inspector reviewed the details of those instances and interviewed pertinent personne Observations and Findinos First, on May 3,1998, while attempting to place FWP B back in service, control room operators received a high gear increaser temperature alarm. Operators promptly secured the pump and investigated the occurrence. Valve CCS-V-294," closed cooling water to the speed increaser," was found mispositioned closed. The valve was subsequently opened and FWP B was successfully placed in servic __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ - _ .
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-4-Equipment operators had recently performed a valve lineup of the FWP, and associated support components, just prior to starting the pump. An NEO had indicated, with his initials on the valve lineup sheet, that he had positioned Valve CCS-V-294 in the open position. The NEO informed the inspector that he had been distracted during the valve manipulations and had believed that he repositioned the subject valve when he actually had not. The inspector also observed that the valve lineup did not require the valve's position to be independently verifie Second, on May 11,1998, instrument and controls technicians were performing STP-500-4201, " Control Rod Scram Accumulator instrumentation (East) Channel Functional Test and Channel Calibration," Revision 9, on hydraulic control Unit 08-25. When a technician attempted to isolate the accumulator pressure sensing switch by closing Valve CRD-V-111, he found that the valve was already in the closed position. With the valve in the closed position, the accumulator pressure switch was isolated from the accumulator, which prevented actuation of the accumulator trouble alarm (on low pressure) in the control room. When the valve was opened, the accumulator pressure was found to be within required limits. Condition Report 98-0573 was initiated to address this issu The licensee investigated the valve mispositioning event and found that an NEO repositioned the valve on April 16,1998, while draining moisture from the accumulato The NEO had apparently forgotten to reposition the valve to the full open position. The licensee speculated that the valve may have been partially open but had no evidence to support this theory, in both of the above mispositioning events, the same NEO had failed to return system valves to their proper positions. Since the components involved were not safety-related, no violations of NRC requirements had occurred. Nonetheless, the NEO had demonstrated poor self-checking practices and attention to detail. In response to the mispositioning events, the operator was counseled on proper self-checking technique Concluilom An NEO demonstrated poor self-checking practices in that he had failed to properly reposition plant valves on two occasions. In the first case, cooling water was inadvertently secured to the FWP B speed increaser. In the second instance an accumulator pressure switch, that activates an accumulator trouble alarm in the control room, was inadvertently isolated for over 3 week I l
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-5-11.Malatananra M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Insoection Scooe (61726. 62707)
The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance and suweillance activities:
- MAI 315912, Main Generator Disassembly and Repairs
- STP-500-4201, Control Rod Scram Accumulator Instrumentation (East) Channel Functional Tect and Channel Calibration, Revision 9 (Documentation Review)
The performance of maintenance and surveillance was professional and thoroug Findings from the main generator disassembly are discussed in Section M1.2. Valve mispositioning problems identified during the performance of STP-500-4201 are discussed in Section 0 M1.2 Main Generator Disassembiv and Reoairs (62707) Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed some the disassembly and repairs of the main generator and discussed pertinent findings with the licensee's staf Observations and Findings Background: At the start of the inspection period main generator hydrogen leakage into the hydrogen detainment tank system was averaging approximately 3200 cubic feet per day (cfd), which was considered excessive. Normal leakage could be expected to be ,
approximately 400 to 600 cfd. On April 13 an NEO identified an unisolable seal oilleak l at the top of the main generator end shield. Operations shut down the plant to effect repair Observations: Work on the main generator was well planned and accomplished in l'
accordance with procedural requirements. During the disassembly, maintenance craftsmen identified the following problems:
- The sealant plug at the top of the main generator end shield had apparently not been reinstalled during RF 7. The plug had been removed during the injection of sealant into a groove that was between two flat metal mating surfaces. Over time, sealant was forced out of the exposed port by the pressurized seal oil and on April 13 seal oil started spraying out of the opening. In addition to the above,
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-6-the displaced sealant had opened a hydrogen leakage pathway through the end shield to the hydrogen detrainment system. This was believed to be a cause for the excessive hydrogen leakag . Bolting on the collector end hydrogen oil seal assembly was not properly torque Bolts were supposed to be torqued to 150 foot pounds but several were found torqued to approximately 30 foot-pounds. The licensee believed that maintenance crews did not properly exchange information during shift turnovers and one crew had mistakenly assumed that the other had finished torquing the bolts. The failure to properly torque the bolts may have caused seal alignment problems that contributed to the excessive hydrogen leakage. Lack of detailed guidance and sign-offs in the procedures were contributors to the misunderstanding. Additionally, quality control inspectors were not required to independently verify the bolt torque . Fibrous material was found blocking portions of the hydrogen seat oil pathwa This material was identified as a mixture of seal oil and end shield sealant. The material could have blocked portions of seal oil flow to the seals, preventing the seal system from working properly. The material was removed prior to reassembly of the main generator. The licensee did not believe that the problem would recur because a filter had recently been installed in the subject pathwa This was the first time that the seal assembly had been disassembled and inspected since initial plant startu During RF 7, the main generator work was accomplished by local contract workers. The job was supervised by aaditional contractors with experience in generator work. River Bend managers were responsible for the overall oversight of the job. Based on the above findings, the maintenance on the main generator during RF 7 was considered to be poorly coordinated without adequate verification of critical steps. Overall contractor oversight was considered weak. Conversely, work performed during the forced outage, primarily by the River Bend staff, was thorough and well controlled. At the end of this inspection period, hydrogen leakage was approximately 600 cf c Conclusions Causes for excessive main generator hydrogen leakage and a seal oil leak included
, weak contractor oversight and poor coordination of maintenance, without adequate verification of critical steps, during RF 7. A sealant plug was not properly reinstalled and hydrogen seal assembly bolts were not properly torqued. Conversely, corrective maintenance performed during the forced outage was thorough, well controlled, and effective at correcting the problems.
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. M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Egview of Material Condition Durino Plant Tours Insoection Scone (62707)
During this inspection period, the inspectors conducted interviews and routine plant tours to evaluate plant material conditio Observations and Findinas Material condition challenges included:
. Suppression Pool Cleanup (SPC) System: The SPC system was out of service for most of the report period due to the repetitive isolation of the filter / demineralized on an erroneous high temperature signal. The cleanliness of the suppression pool has steadily degraded since the SPC system was removed from servic . Excessive Auxiliary Building Differential Pressure (dp): The dp across the auxiliary building continued to be excessive when SGTS was in operation (approximately 4.0 inches water gage). The excessive dp could challenge operators while attempting to enter the auxiliary building for implementation of EOPs and abnormal operating procedure Material condition improvements included:
. Main Generator Hydrogen Leakage: Main generator hydrogen leakage was considered excessive (greater than 3200 cfd). Effective repairs were accomplished during the forced outage (see Section M1.2).
. High Pressure Turbine Steam Leak: A small high pressure turbine steam leak was found to originate from an ur. capped instrument port. The port was capped during the forced outag . Control Building Chiller HVK-1 A: The chiller was taken out of service during the previous report period for chemical ck ening and was retumed to service this perio . Control Room Annunciators: Shortly after the forced outage the licensee achieved a " black board" in the control room. At that point in time, all annunciator related problems had been repaire .
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Plant material condition was very good. Material condition concerns included an out of service SPC system, excessive SGTS induced dp across the auxiliary building, and a f sealleak on FWP B. Conversely, action was taken to correct main generator hydrogen j
l leakage, a high pressure turbine steam leak, and a control building heating, ventilation, i and air conditioning chiller. Additionally, the licensee achieved a " black board" status in l the control room shortly after startu Ill. Engineering E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903,37551)
E8.1 (Ocen) Violation NIO) 50-458/9805-01: failure to maintain SGTS dp across the auxiliary building consistent with the environmental design criteria. The environment design criteria specified that auxiliary building dp would be between -1/4 inch and -1/2 inch water gage under accident conditions. However, the dp induced by the SGTS system was approximately 4.0 inches water gage under accident conditions. A contributor to the violation was a lack of pertinent design information for the SGT As part of the corrective measures for the violation, the licensee measured system flow rates and found that the flow through the filter trains was in excess or : hat assumed in design documents and TSs. The flow through Train A was approximately 14,800 cubic feet per minute (cfm) while flow through Train B was found to be approximately 15,400 cfm. The design flow rate through each filter train was 12,500 cfm. Additionally, TS 5.5.7 specified that the SGTS system be tested at a flow rate of 12,500 +/- 10 percent and in accordance with ANSI N510-1989. The ANSI Standard required that testing be performed at design flow rates (normal accident flow rates). While the licensee had performed testing at approximately 12,500 cfm through each train, this was inconsistent with the actual accident flow rates (defacto design flow rates) stated above. Therefore, the testing was not consistent with the requirements of the ANSI Standard. This was not previously identified by the licensee because the TS testing was performed with the recirculation loops isolated, whereas the actual accident configuration included flow through the recirculation loops (which increased total flow through each train). The licensee had not previously measured the actual flow rates through each train under the system's accident configuratio The licensce subsequently performed an engineering evaluation and determined that the additional flow did not adversely impact the safety function of the SGTS. Critical performance parameters, such as methyl iodide penetration, bypass leakage, dp across charcoal beds and filters, and heater capabilities would have still been within TS hmit Additionally, the licensee performed system flow balancing and restored the flow through each train to approximately 12,500 cfm. The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and found it acceptabl _
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i i The flow balancing resulted in reducing the overall effluent rate from the auxiliary building i to approximately 7,400 cfm, which was less than the 10,000 cfm flow rate specified in the (
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l Updated Safety Analysis Report. However, consistent with Generic Letter 91-18,
"Information to Licensees Regarding NRC Inspection Manual Section on Resolution of i Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions," Revision 1, the licensee planed to restore the ;
Updated Safety Analysis Report specified design flow at tne first available opportunity, {
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l not to exceed the next scheduled refueling outage. NRC managers and staff discussed l the planned corrective measures with the licensee during an April 25,1998, conference I
l call. The licensee's planned actions were found acceptable.
l E8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-458/98-001: Flow Rate Through the SGTS j l
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Filter Assembly Units Found to be Higher than the Design Flow Rate. Inspection efforts associated with this LER are discussed in Section E8.1. This LER is closed based on those inspection effort E8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-458/9604-03: failure to analyze test data and increase the test frequency for scram discharge volume vent and drain valves in accordance with the inservice Testing (IST) Program. This violation addressed the failure to promptly evaluate test results and implement an increased testing frequency when valve stroke I times were found in the alert rang I in a letier responding to the violation, dated June 3,1996, the licensee indicated that the valves, while in the alert range for the noted tests, actually required rebaselining due to recent maintenance. The rebaselining evaluation was required to be performed within 30 days of the test. Since this was not accomplished, per the program that existed at the time, the valves should have been placed on an increased test frequency until the rebaselining evaluation was complete. The licensee further indicated that that violation had occurred because of the inexperience of the IST engineer and poor understanding of program requirements by others involved with the testing. As corrective measures, the licensee accomplished the following:
. A more experienced engineer was placed in charge of the IST progra . Operations assigned an individual with ownership over IST implementatio . Personnelinvolved were counsele . Other IST tests were reviewed to determine if similar mistakes had been mad None were foun . IST program procedures were revised to provide better guidanc The inspector verified that the above corrective actions were accomplished and reviewed a sample of more recent IST surveillance where rebaselining was required. No problems were identifie _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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-10-E8.4 (Closed) Insoector Followuo item (IFI) 50-458/9604-04: followup on implementation of the IST program. This item was opened due to a series of IST related problems found in the 1996 time frame. The inspectors determined that a broad based review of the licensee's IST program was necessary. More recently, the NRC performed an inspection of the licensee's IST program, which is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/97-18. This item is closed based on those inspection effort IV. Plant Support P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Facilities, Equipment, and Resources P General Comments (71750)
During routine plant tours, the inspectors verified that emergency preparedness facilities were properly maintained and, during off-normal hours, periodically verified that the licensee maintained at least the minimum staffing requirements specified in the River Bend Emergency Plan. No problems were identified.
3 S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S General Comments (71750)
During routine tours, the inspector observed protected area i!!umination levels, maintenance of the isolation zones around protective area barriers, and the status of security secondary power supply equipment. No problems were observe V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 26,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie i l
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. Bellamy, Acting Vice President-Operations B. Biggs, Licensing Engineer P. Chapman, Superintendent, Chemistry D. Dormady, Manager, Plant Engineering J. Fowler, Acting Director, Quality Programs T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Maintenance H. Hutchens, Superintendent, Plant Security R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Licensing D. Mims, General Manager, Plant Operations W. O'Malley, Manager, Operations D. Pace, Director, Design Engineering A. Wells, Superintendent, Radiation Contro!
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: ,
Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support IP 92903 Followup, Engineering
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-2-ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Closed 50-458/9604-03 VIO Failure to increase test frequency when valves were found in the alert range during IST (Section E8.3).
50-458/9604-04 IFl Followup on implementation of the IST program (Section E8.4).
50-458/98-001 LER Flow rate through the SGTS filter trains found higher than design flow rate (Section E8.2).
Discussed 50-458/9805-01 VIO Failure to maintain SGTS dp across the auxiliary building consistent with the environmental design criteria (Section E8.1).
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ANSI American National Standards Institute efd cubic feet per day cfm cubic feet per minute CFR- Code of Federal Regulations CRS control room supervisor
- d differential pressure EOP- emergency operating procedure
~ FWP feedwater pump gpm gallons per minute !
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IFl inspector followup item IST -inservice testing LER Licensee Event Report
! MAI maintenance action item NEO nuclear equipment operator !
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RCIC reactor core isolation cooling PDR public documeiit room l RHR residual heat removal SGTS standby gas treatment system SPC suppression pool cleanup STP surveillance test procedure
- TS Technical Specification VIO violation
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