ML20059D647
| ML20059D647 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1990 |
| From: | Powers D, Terc N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059D643 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-90-15, NUDOCS 9009070132 | |
| Download: ML20059D647 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1990015
Text
-
.
.
.
.
.
..
,
APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-458/90-15
Operating License: NPF-47
Docket:
50-458
,
Licensee: Gulf States Utilities (GSU)
P.O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
'
Facility Name:
River Bend Station (RBS)
Inspection At:
RBS, St. Francisville, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted: June 11-15, 1990
Inspector:
W***
7
f * S i ' "_ ',
Nomen M. Terc, Emergency Prepared;e s
Date
Analyst, Security and Emergen'y
Preparedness Section
Approved:
(uM4
b# 7#
,
Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Security and
Date
Emergency Preparedness Section
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted June 11-15, 1990 (Report 50-458/90-15)
Areas In oected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of the operational status of
the emergency preparedness program; including followup to previous inspection
findings; changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures; and
changes to emergency facilities, equipment, instrumentation and supplies. The
inspection also included organization and management control, training of
emergency response personnel, and independent audits of the emergency
preparedness program.
Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified. Two concerns were identified during the inspection for which the
licensee committed to take corrective action. The first concern pertained to a
rapidly developing emergency during which dose assessment calculations were
delegated to the control room supervisor who also had reactor operator
I
supervisory responsibilities,
The second concern pertained to the licensee's
I
ability to simultaneously perform dose assessment calculations and
9009070132 900829
gDR
ADOCM 05000458
PNU
..
.
.-
.
.g.
notifications to offsite authorities from the control room during a rapidly
developing emergency inasmuch as the licensee used one computer for both
functions, thus negating the possibility of simultaneous actions.
In general, interviewees in walkthroughs performed well in their actions.
Interviewees demonstrated a proficiency that assured the ability to adequately
protect the health and safety of the emergency workers and the public offsite.
However, one weakness was identified in their performance.
During the inspection, it was found that the licensee had reduced the emergency
preparedness staff by about 50 percent since the beginning of this year.
NRC
will review this aspect again during a subsequent inspection to verify the
continuing effectiveness of the emergency preparedness staff.
,
I
.
' . .
.
1
3
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- W. M. Smith, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
- J. B. Spivey, Jr., Senior Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer
- D. N. Lorfing, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
- K. E. Suhrke, General Manager, Engineering and Administration
- W. L. Curran, Cajun Site Representative
- T. F. Plunkett, General Manager, Businass Systems and Oversight
- J. C. Maher, Engineer, Licensing
'
'J. S. Miller, Director, Engineering Analysis
- W. H. Odell, Manager, Oversight
- T. C. Crouse, Manager, Administration
- P. D. Graham, Plant Manager
- G. R. Kimmell, Director, Quality Services
"R. K, Jobe, Senior Emergency Planner
- G. K. Henry, Director, Quality Operations
- E. M. Cargill, Director, Radiation Programs
- A. G. Bysfield, Gupervisor, Control Systems
- J. P. Schippert, Assistant Plant Menager, Operations and Radwaste
- M. A. Stein, Supervisor, Civil / Structural Design
- J. P. Madison, Manager, Health Physics Services (Contractor to QA)
- D. L. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training
N_RC
- E. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector, RBS
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
FEowuponDreviousInspectionFindings (92701)
(Clourd) Open Item (458/8946-02):
Insufficient Training and Procedure
Inaderuacy - Procedure EIP-2-007, " Protective Action Recommendation
Guidelines," was changed to incorporate a table correlating protective
action sections (used by the state and parishes to take protective
action ) and sectors (used by the licensee to make protective action
recommendations [ PARS]).
The training inadequacies identified during the
walkthroughs pertained to miscellaneous issues (e.g., site boundary, value
of postaccident containment radiation monitor related to gap activity,
clarification of terms such as communications versus notifications).
Since that inspection, the licensee performed additior,a1 training to
clarify the observed issues and revised training lessons plans
accordingly.
-
'.
,'
o
,
,
-4-
,
3.
Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (82701-02.01)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's emergency plan and emergency plan
implementing procedures to verify that changes have not adversely affected
,
the licensee's overall state of emergency preparedness.
The inspector noted that no revisions were made to the emergency plan
,
since the last inspection in Deceniber 1989. The inspector noted that six
procedure changes were made since the last inspection. These changes were
implemented in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.
Procedure changes were prepared, revised, and checked for consistency.
against 0ther related procedures, and when finalized, they were
,
distributed to users on a timely basis using mechanisms for document
control contained in Administrative Procedure SSP-1-001, " Preparation,
Revision, and Control of Station Support Manual Procedures."
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
4.
Emergency Facilities Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplios
l
(82701-02. @ )
l
The inspector toured key emergency facilities and equipment to verify that
they were adequately maintained.
.
The inspector observed that emergency facilities, equipment, and supplies
were in place and adeouately maintained, and that no adverse changes were
made since the last inspection.
The inspector noted, however, that if
l
dose projections were to be performed from the control room during a
rapidly developing emergency, then notifications to offsite officials
could not be simultaneously performed because both functions used the same
personal computer. Apparently, in order to accomplish effective dose
calculations without losing the ability to perform accurate and prompt
notifications, additional provisions in the control room were needed. The
i
licensee committed to place an additional personal computer in the control
'
room to accomplish this function.
The inspector also noted that since the last inspection (December 11-15,
1989) the licensee incorporated sealed sources in emergency kits to
perform radiation instrument response checks. However, no specific
instrument scale range was assigned to ensure that the instruments were
not under or over responding prior to use. Additionally, the inspector
noted that the licensee was evaluating habitability criteria for emergency
response facilities (ERFs) in terms of integrated doses by performing
risk-versus-benefit analysis for each individual ERF. The numbers, types,
and ranges of personnel dosimeters kept in ERFs were being evaluated based
on the extent of protection derived from the technical support
center (TSC) and emergency offsite facility (EOF) structures and on the
numbers of personnel expected in these emergency centers during an
.
N
..
,
_
_
. _ - , ,
,'
.
.
,
l
-5-
accident.
(See Ojen Item 458/8946-01).
The licensee intends to finalize
the review and changes to present dosimetry instruments in the near
future.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
5.
,0rganization and Management Control
(82701-02.03)
The inspector reviewed the emergency planning and the emergency response
organizations to determine if changes to these have been properly
incorporated into the emergency plan and implementing procedures and have
not adversely affected the licensee's emergency response readiness.
Before the reorganization of GSU on February 1,1990, the emergency
planning staff consisted of 10 individuals; a supervisor emergency
planner; a senior emergency planner (onsite); a radiation protection
technician with extensive experience onsite; an emergency planner
(onsite); a chemist with onsite experience; an emergency planning
assistant (onsite) with extensive experience in onsite emergency
preparedness; an experienced senior emergency planner (offsite); an
emergency planner (offsite) with offsite experience; a stenographer; and a
departmental clerk.
These individuals were assisted part-time by an
emergency management specialist with extensive on and off-site experience.
As found during thic inspection, the emergency planning organization staff
consisted of five individuals; a supervitor emergency planner; two senior
emergency planners with offsite experience and limited onsite et
planning; and a stenographer.a senior emergency planner without any prior ex
erience;
The inspector noted that a substantial
amount of the onsite expertise previously available in the emergency
planning staff had been lost.
changes with the licensee to confirm that sufficient staff remainedThe insp
available to fulfill emergency planning responsibilities.
this inspection, there was no evidence that the staff reduction hadAt the time of
resulted in any degradation of the licensee's emergency response posture.
However, given this significant staff reduction, the emergency planning
organization will be reviewed again during a subsequent inspection to
verify its continuing effectiveness.
This is an open item (458/9015-01).
The inspector determined that the emergency response organization (ERO)
had remained unchanged since the last inspection.
that the control operations foreman (C0F) had two conflic
of a rapidly developing emergency. responsibilities that may have to be fulfill
reactor operator for accident mitigation.One duty was to respond as a senior
The other duty was to perform
dose assessment calculations so that the shift supervisor was able to make
prompt notifications and accurate PARS to offsite officials.
inspector was concerned that, when responding to a rapidly developing
The
emergency, one of these critical functions may be neglected by the C0F.
1
___---
J
.
c
..
.
i
-6-
i
1
l
Notifications to the public and PARS may also be delayed. The licensee
I
!
committed to augment and increase the flexibility of the emergency
response organization by training other staff members to perform dose
calculations.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
'
6.
Traininc (82701-02.04)
The inspector reviewed the training of emergency responders to-verify that
the training program was established and maintained in accordance with
10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) to determine whether the amount and type of training
and retraining received by emergency responders were adequate', and whether
key decisionmakers were proficient in the performance of their duties
during a simulated scenario.
In addftion, the inspector verified whether
changes to the program since the last inspection were incorporated into
the training program and that emergency responders were aware of such
changes, understood them, and had been properly trained to implement them.
The inspector also interviewed a small sample of selected key emergency
responders working as emergency response organizational teams who would
constitute the first phase of the emergency response.
Interviews were
held with three control room teams; naniely a :hift supervisor, a C0F, and
a communicator. Another team consisted of decisionmakers that would
i
respond to the TSC (i.e., an emergency director, a radiological assessment
coordinator (RAC), onsite coordinator (OC), and a communicator).
Finally,
a team was selected from decisionmakers that would respond to the EOF
(i.e., a recovery manager, an offsite assessor, a RAC, and a
communicator).
Each interview lasted 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and consisted of two parts.
The first part involved presenting a number of questions and evaluating
the teams' response pertaining to their duties and responsibilities during
emergencies, and several other fundamental concepts in emergency response.
The second p.srt consisted of presenting a scenario and conducting a
walkthrough of the teams' response to classify, perform dose assessment,_
-
notify, and make PARS.
The inspector found that, for the most part, the teams performed well,
made correct decisions, and took proper actions to implement the emergency
plan to protect the emergency workers, the public, and mitigate the
accident. The inspector noted that all teams were able to assess the
.
magnitude and scope of the simulated accident presented. However, one of
l
the teams interviewed underclassified the accident and had difficulties in
following the emergency action level classification procedure.
The team
was not always clear about the methods and capabilities of dose
assessment / projection methods available to them, and had conceptual
difficulties pertaining to the factors to be considered when making PARS.
The conceptual weaknesses identified were discussed and misunderstandings
were corrected during the course of the interviews.
.
.
--
--
.
-
-
,
. ' . . .
,'
-7-
The licensee acknowledged these findings and made a commitment to find
root causes and implement corrective measures. This is a weakness
(458/9015-02).
7.
Independent Audits (82701-02.05)
The inspector noted that no independent audits had been performed since
the last inspection, and that an audit of the emergency preparedness
program was being planned in the near future to meet their yearly
requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
8.
Exit Interview
'
i
The inspector met with the resident inspector and licensee representatives
denoted in paragraph 1 above on June 15, 1990, and summarized the scope
and findings of the inspection as presented in this report. The licensee
acknowledged the inspection findings.
The licensee committed to
(a) provide dose assessment training for additional control room staff
personnel and (b) provide an additional personal computer for the control
room.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials
provided to, or revie.'ed by, the inspectors during the inspection.
'
f
W.
,
9
-
r