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RBS2021001-RP-RJK, River Bend Station - Integrated Inspection Report 05000458/2021001
	ML21124A276
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	05/05/2021
From:	Jason Kozal; NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
To:	Vercelli S; Entergy Operations
References
	IR 2021001
	Download: ML21124A276 (29)
	v • d • e

May 5, 2021

SUBJECT:

RIVER BEND STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2021001

Dear Mr. Vercelli:

On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at River Bend Station. On April 8, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station.

If you disagree with a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jason W. Kozal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch C Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000458 License No. NPF-47

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000458

License Number:

NPF-47

Report Number:

05000458/2021001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0088

Licensee:

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:

River Bend Station

Location:

St. Francisville, Louisiana

Inspection Dates:

January 1, 2021 to March 31, 2021

Inspectors:

B. Baca, Health Physicist

W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector

J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector

R. Kumana, Senior Resident Inspector

J. O'Donnell, Senior Health Physicist

B. Parks, Emergency Response Specialist

D. Reinert, Reactor Inspector

E. Simpson, Health Physicist

C. Smith, Senior Reactor Inspector

C. Wynar, Resident Inspector

Approved By:

Jason W. Kozal, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch C

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at River Bend Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Scope a Flood Control Structure in the Maintenance Rule Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2021001-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, for the licensees failure to include a non-safety-related structure in the scope of their maintenance rule monitoring program. Specifically, the licensee failed to include the Unit 2 excavation flood control berm, which met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2) as a structure whose failure could prevent safety-related structures, systems, and components from fulfilling their safety-related function. The failure of the berm during a design basis precipitation event could prevent the standby service water system from fulfilling its safety-related function.

Manual Reactor Trip Due to Reactor Recirculation Pump Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000458/2021001-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71153 The inspectors reviewed a Green self-revealed finding for the licensees failure to follow Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revisions 16 and 20. Specifically, after suffering unexpected heater drain pump trips that occurred in the aftermath of recirculation pump trips at the plant, the licensee failed to properly investigate the causes of the trips in accordance with the procedure. Consequently, the condition that resulted in the trips was left uncorrected. This condition directly contributed to thermal hydraulic instabilities and resulted in a manual scram in August 2020.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000458/2020-02-00 Manual Reactor Trip Due to Reactor Recirculation Pump Trip 71153 Closed

PLANT STATUS

The inspection quarter began on January 1, 2021, with the reactor operating at 100 percent power. Power was reduced to approximately 67 percent on January 8, 2021, for a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent power on January 9, 2021. Power was reduced to 69 percent on January 22, 2021, for a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent power on January 25, 2021.

River Bend Station shut down the unit on February 21, 2021, and entered Mode 5 on February 22, 2021, to begin Refueling Outage 21. The station performed a reactor startup on March 19, 2021, ending the outage. The unit subsequently reached approximately 100 percent power.

On March 25, 2021, operators scrammed the plant in response to a lowering main condenser vacuum due to the A air ejector inlet valve going shut. The station corrected the issue and performed a reactor startup on March 26, 2021. The unit reached 100 percent power on March 29, 2021. That same day, operators lowered power to approximately 60 percent power for a control rod pattern adjustment. Operators raised power back to 100 percent on March 30, 2021, and maintained it there for the remainder of the quarter.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures for the following systems:

Instrument air and station blackout diesel generator on March 15, 2021

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather on March 17, 2021.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Division I emergency diesel generator on January 16, 2021

(2) Division II standby service water on January 25, 2021

(3) Division I decay heat removal on March 5, 2021

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Diesel generator A room, fire area DG-6/Z-1, on January 16, 2021

(2) Standby cooling tower pump B room, fire area PH-2/Z-1, on January 25, 2021

(3) Standby switchgear 1B room, fire area C-14, on March 2, 2021

(4) Low pressure core spray pump room, fire area AB-6/Z-1, on March 18, 2021

(5) Cable chase I, fire area C-1, on March 23, 2021

(6) Cable chase II, fire area C-2, on March 23, 2021

71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)

BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding

Activities (IP Section 03.01)

Main article: IP 71111.08G

(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing the following activities from February 15, 2021 to March 10, 2021:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

Nondestructive Examinations a. Ultrasonic i. Reactor Coolant System, RCS-900CX-SW023A, Elbow to Pipe ii. Reactor Coolant System, RCS-900CX-SW014CA, Tee to Reducer iii. Reactor Pressure Vessel, B13-D001-AE, BW-Vessel to Flange iv. Standby Liquid Control, SLS-150-037-1 Weld XI-FW001 v. Standby Liquid Control, SLS-150-037-1 Weld XI-FW002 b. Radiographic i. Standby Liquid Control, SLS-150-037-1 Weld XI-FW001 ii. Standby Liquid Control, SLS-150-037-1 Weld XI-FW002 c. Dye Penetrant i. Standby Liquid Control, SLS-150-037-1 Weld XI-FW001 ii. Standby Liquid Control, SLS-150-037-1 Weld XI-FW002 iii. Residual Heat Removal, E12-AOVF041A, Check valve Bearing Cover before weld and machine repair iv. Residual Heat Removal, E12-AOVF041A, Check valve Bearing Cover after weld and machine repair d. Magnetic Particle i. Feedwater System FWS 107 FWS-063A-FW013, PIPE SECTION - SADDLE e. Visual i. Standby Liquid Control, SLS-150-037-1 Weld XI-FW001 ii. Standby Liquid Control, SLS-150-037-1 Weld XI-FW002

Welding a. Gas Tungsten Arc Welding i. Standby Liquid Control System, SLS-150-037-1, XI-FW001 ii. Standby Liquid Control System, SLS-150-037-1, XI-FW002

Problem Identification and Resolution Review of Inservice Items

The inspector evaluated a sample of 68 condition reports associated with inservice inspection activities. No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during a reactor shutdown in preparation for a refueling outage on February 21, 2020.

(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during plant startup on March 19, 2021.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Flood control structures for standby service water on March 1, 2021

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Yellow risk during surveillance testing on Division I low pressure core spray and Division I emergency diesel generator, and planned inspections on Division I standby service water on February 2, 2021

(2) Yellow risk with Division I electrical power out of service during refueling operations on March 3, 2021

(3) Yellow risk with residual heat removal unavailable for inventory control on March 8, 2021

(4) Yellow risk with containment unit cooler 1B out of service on March 31, 2021

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Operability of Division I main steam positive leakage control system with drain valve E33-MOVF006 closed in response to leakage across E33-MOVF007 and E33-MOV5008 on January 11, 2021 (CR-RBS-2021-00058)

(2) Operability of Division II battery with heater out of service on March 5, 2021 (CR-RBS-2021-00123)

(3) Operability of primary containment with valve E12-FV0044B failure on March 22, 2021 (CR-RBS-2021-02384)

(4) Operability of standby service water with non-conservative flooding analysis on March 23, 2021 (CR-RBS-2020-04429)

71111.17T - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Sample Selection (IP Section 02.01)

Main article: IP 71111.17

The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determinations for 10 CFR 50.59 from March 1-5, 2021:

(1) Engineering Change EC-3950, Installation of RF14 C11-AOVF010 O-rings, Revision 2 (Screening)

(2) Engineering Change EC-3955, Installation of RF15 DFR-AOV102 O-rings, Revision 2 (Screening)

(3) Engineering Change EC-30980, Revision to the SLC Orifice C41-ROD001 Bore Size, Revision 2 (Screening)

(4) Engineering Change EC-39182, ERIS Upgrade for Rod Scram Timing and Feedwater Valve Position Indication Software, Revision 1 (Screening)

(5) Engineering Change EC-72271, Install Key-Lock Switches on Main Control Room Panels H13-P691 and H13-P692, Revision 0 (Screening)

(6) Engineering Change EC-72716, Replacement of Obsolete Recirculation Pump Seal Purge Supply Flow Control Valve, Revision 0 (Screening)

(7) Engineering Change, EC-87166, Plug Weep Holes in Concrete Duct to G Tunnel, Revision 0 (Screening)

(8) Engineering Change EC-5000070744, Change Elastomer Materials for Fisher AOV O-rings to Viton, Revision 2 (Screening)

(9) Engineering Change EC-70846, EDG Lube Oil Header Alternate Seal Assembly, Revision 0 (Screening)

(10) Engineering Change EC-71797, Auxiliary Building Steam Tunnel Floor Plugs Sealant Alternative, Revision 0 (Screening)

(11) Engineering Change EC-23335, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) High Level Output Optical Isolator Card Sneak Power Path, Revision 0 (Screening)

(12) Engineering Change EC-31934, Determine Potential Cold Spring Load at the Intercooler Support Brackets (ISB) on Division II Standby Diesel Generator, Revision 0 (Screening)

(13) Engineering Change EC-71135, Base Engineering Change for Replacement of Parson Peebles Voltage Regulator, Revision 0 (Screening)

(14) Engineering Change EC-72271, Install Key-Lock Switches on Main Control Room Panels H13-P691 and H13-P692 to Bypass RHR Loop A and B 135 PSIG Isolations, Revision 0 (Screening)

(15) Engineering Change EC-73013, Install Backdraft Dampers to Control Building HVAC System, Revision 0 (Screening)

(16) Engineering Change EC-73497, Install Boron Carbide Aluminum Metal Matrix Composite Inserts into the Spent Fuel Pool Fuel Storage Racks to Address Boraflex Degradation, Revision 0 (Screening)

(17) Engineering Change EC-76014, Feedwater Debris Strainer Evaluation and Installation, Revision 0 (Screening)

(18) Engineering Change EC-79064, Feedwater Sparger Nozzle Repairs, Revision 0 (Screening)

(19) Engineering Change EC-86067, Temporary Modification to Install an External Oil Reservoir near B33-PC001A to Increase Margin to a Low Oil Level Alarm, Revision 0 (Screening)

(20) Engineering Change ER-RB-2004-0307-001, Change Elastomer Materials for Fisher AOV O-rings to Viton, Revision 0 (Screening)

(21) Engineering Change EC-76380, Open Phase Detection, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

(22) Engineering Change EC-80989, Harris Panel Upgrade, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

(23) Engineering Change EC-86722, Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

(24) Engineering Change EC-31805, Control Building Chiller Controls Upgrade, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

(25) Engineering Change EC-72704, Steam Jet Air Ejector Single Point Vulnerability, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

(26) Engineering Change EC-79427, TRACG Anticipated Operational Occurrences Updates, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Work Order 52869970, testing of valve SSV-MOV1A following preventive maintenance, on March 5, 2021

(2) Work Order 00549941, testing of valve E12-F041A following flange repair, on March 26, 2021

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

Main article: IP 71111.22

(1) STP-309-0201, Revision 63, Division I Diesel Generator Operability Test on February 3, 2021

(2) STP-309-0202, Revision 332, Division II Diesel Generator Operability Test on February 17, 2021

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) STP-256-6302, Revision 28, Div II Standby Service Water Quarterly Valve Operability Test on January 22, 2021

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) STP-208-3601, Revision 13, 'A' Steam Line MSIVs and Outboard Drain Valve Leak Rate Test and Inboard MSIV Inleakage Test on March 12,

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identified the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assessed radiological hazards.

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas for the following:

(1) Radiation Work Packages (RWP)

RWP 2021-1800, Refuel Floor Reactor Vessel Disassembly & Reassembly Activities, Revision 0

RWP 2021-1901, Radiation Protection Activities in the Drywell, Revision 0

RWP 2021-1606, Radwaste, Shipping, and Decontamination Activities in LHRA/HRA, Except Drywell, Revision 0

(2) Electronic Alarming Dosimeter Alarms

One dose rate alarm after exiting the area from Turbine Building Waterbox activities (CR-RBS-2019-02335)

Two dose rate alarms during smoke alarm testing in the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger 1A room (CR-RBS-2020-01845)

Two dose rate alarms during maintenance work on the Radwaste Oil Plate Separator (CR-RBS-2020-03041)

(3) Labeling of Containers

On RadWaste 106' elevation, two Low Specific Activity boxes individually tagged yellow bags of Dry Active Waste (DAW)

On RadWaste 106' elevation, 55-gallon drums of contaminated water and oil

On Turbine Building 95' elevation, 20' Sea/Land container (#148216)

On Turbine Building 95' elevation, Chem Nuclear Shipping Cask (CNSI-14-195L No. 3) - Empty

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material.

(1) Observed licensee conduct surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area.

(2) Observed workers exiting the drywell during a refueling outage.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observed radiological work activities, to include those with airborne radioactivity or the potential for airborne radioactivity, for the following:

(1) Survey and retrieval of highly radioactive item from refueling cavity under RWP 2021-1800, Refuel Floor Reactor Vessel Disassembly & Reassembly Activities, Revision 0

(2) Transfer of highly radioactive item from Reactor Building to RadWaste Building under RWP 2021-1606, Radwaste, Shipping, and Decontamination Activities in LHRA/HRA, Except Drywell, Revision 0

(3) Removal and control of reactor vessel head (RVH) on the Refuel Floor under RWP 2021-1800, Refuel Floor Reactor Vessel Disassembly & Reassembly Activities, Revision 0

(4) Drywell down-posting survey after shielding of RHR valve under RWP 2021-1901, Radiation Protection Drywell Activities, Revision 0

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:

(1) RadWaste Building 106' elevation, Liner Bay - High Radiation Area (>1 R/hr)

(2) RadWaste Building 65' elevation, Reactor Water Cleanup Phase Separator - High Radiation Area (>1 R/hr)

(3) Fuel Building 98' elevation, Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer - High Radiation Area

(>1 R/hr)

(4) Reactor Building 131' elevation, Inclined Fuel Transfer System Blind Flange Area - Very High Radiation Area

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed as low as reasonably achievable practices and radiological work controls. The inspectors reviewed the following activities:

(1) Removal of a highly radioactive item from the cavity under RWP 2021-1800, Refuel Floor Reactor Vessel Disassembly & Reassembly Activities, Revision 0

(2) RVH movement under RWP 2021-1800, Refuel Floor Reactor Vessel Disassembly &

Reassembly Activities, Revision 0

(3) Drywell surveys for down-posting of the drywell from locked high radiation area to high radiation area under RWP 2021-1901, Radiation Protection Drywell Activities, Revision 0

Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during the following Refueling Outage 21 activities:

Cavity decontamination and removal of a highly radioactive item from the drywell head flange area

Movement and control of the RVH (Alpha II controls)

Down-posting radiation survey of RHR valve in the Drywell (>1 R/hr)

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation system:

(1) Control room fresh air system, subsystems A and B

Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation system:

(1) HEPA ventilation system, H-20, to provide negative pressure and filtered ventilation inside the reactor pressure vessel head on refuel floor

Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated that the licensees use of respiratory protection devices to limit the intake of radioactive material meets the requirements of a respiratory protection program.

(1) The inspectors observed the licensee's use of powered air purifying respirators on the refuel floor during the RVH lift.

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self--contained breathing apparatuses.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01)===

Main article: IP 71151

(1) January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020

OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 03.15) (1 Sample)

(1) October 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 03.16) (1 Sample)

(1) October 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Extent of condition inspection results for the failure to develop an adequate operational decision-making issue for compensatory measures related to a degraded condition of the feedwater system sparger nozzles documented in NCV 05000458/2018012-05 on March 1, 2021

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

Main article: IP 71153

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000458/2020-002-00, Manual Reactor Scram Due to Reactor Recirculation Pump Trip (ADAMS Accession No. ML20293A475)

The inspection conclusions associated with this LER and an associated finding are documented in this report under the Inspection Results section.

Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance during a reactor scram due to a loss of condenser vacuum on March 25,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Scope a Flood Control Structure in the Maintenance Rule Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000458/2021001-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, for the licensees failure to include a non-safety-related structure in the scope of their maintenance rule monitoring program. Specifically, the licensee failed to include the Unit 2 excavation flood control berm, which met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2) as a structure whose failure could prevent safety-related SSCs from fulfilling their safety-related function. The failure of the berm during a design basis precipitation event could prevent the standby service water system from fulfilling its safety-related function.

Description:

During a review of external flood protection at River Bend Station, the inspectors identified evidence of degradation of soil slopes in the Unit 2 excavation, an unfilled pit for the canceled unit. In particular, the inspectors noted an area of soil collapse in the vicinity of the Unit 2 excavation berm, a flood control berm designed to divert runoff away from the pit to prevent water accumulation from affecting the standby service water system components located in an adjacent tunnel.

The inspectors questioned whether the area of slope degradation affected the function of the berm and whether there was any monitoring conducted in accordance with the maintenance rule. The licensee determined that, during initial implementation of the maintenance rule program at River Bend Station, the station had failed to include the function of the Unit 2 excavation berm in the program scope.

The berm is not safety-related, but its failure could prevent safety-related SSCs from fulfilling their safety-related function during a design basis flood at River Bend Station. If the berm were to fail to divert runoff from a design basis precipitation event, the Unit 2 excavation could fill up to a level above the ventilation shaft opening of the G Tunnel, allowing water to enter and submerge the safety-related standby service water cooling tower return valves. This structure meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2). The maintenance rule program at River Bend Station requires the station to monitor structures that meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.65(b) in accordance with Procedure EN-DC-150, Condition Monitoring of Maintenance Rule Structures. Specifically, the licensees procedure requires them to inspect structures every 5 or 10 years based on the risk significance, and after external events that may have impacted their function. This monitoring did not take place.

After review by the licensees maintenance rule review panel, the licensee added the berm to the maintenance rule program scope on January 10, 2021. The licensee determined that the identified degradation of the slope did not prevent the berm from performing its function but placed the system in (a)(1) status because additional monitoring would need to be implemented to provide reasonable assurance of the berms continued functionality.

Corrective Actions: The licensee convened the maintenance rule expert panel and entered the berm into their maintenance rule program in (a)(1) status.

Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2020-02275

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to monitor the condition of a non-safety-related structure whose failure could prevent a safety-related system from fulfilling its safety function was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, by failing to monitor or conduct appropriate preventive maintenance on the Unit 2 excavation berm, the licensee failed to identify slope degradation that could have affected the berms function, and reasonable assurance of the ability of the standby service water system to function during a design basis flood could not be maintained.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event (e.g., seismic snubbers, flooding barriers, tornado doors) for greater than 14 days.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2) requires, in part, that the scope of the monitoring program specified in paragraph (a)(1) include non-safety-related SSCs whose failure could prevent safety-related SSCs from fulfilling their safety-related function.

Contrary to the above, from July 10, 1996, to January 10, 2021, the scope of the licensees monitoring program specified in paragraph (a)(1) did not include the Unit 2 excavation flood control berm, a non-safety-related SSC whose failure could prevent safety-related SSCs from fulfilling their safety-related function. The inclusion of the berm in the scope of the monitoring program was necessary because the failure of that structure could prevent the standby service water system, a safety-related system, from fulfilling its safety-related function.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Manual Reactor Trip Due to Reactor Recirculation Pump Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events

Green FIN 05000458/2021001-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71153 The inspectors reviewed a Green self-revealed finding for the licensees failure to follow Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revisions 16 and 20. Specifically, after suffering unexpected heater drain pump trips that occurred in the aftermath of recirculation pump trips at the plant, the licensee failed to properly investigate the causes of the trips in accordance with the procedure. Consequently, the condition that resulted in the trips was left uncorrected. This condition directly contributed to thermal hydraulic instabilities and resulted in a manual scram in August 2020.

Description:

On August 21, 2020, reactor recirculation pump B tripped. Reactor power level fell to approximately 66 percent, and operators entered Procedures GOP-0004, Single Loop Operations, Revision 28, and AOP-0024, Thermal Hydraulic Stability Controls, Revision 34. Following that event, the extraction steam supply was isolated, leading to a reduction in the water level in the B third point feedwater heater. The level eventually fell below the low level setpoint, causing the C heater drain pump (HDL-P1C) to trip. The licensee then entered AOP-0006, Condensate/Feedwater Failures, Revision 26.

Plant operators lowered recirculation flow to maintain A recirculation loop flow within allowable limits. An unexpected entry into the restricted region of the power-to-flow map specified in AOP-0024 led them to begin inserting control rods. The operators then received multiple alarms for the period-based detection system. Reactor power was observed to be fluctuating between 62 percent and 68 percent. To address the potential thermal hydraulic instabilities signified by these alarms, the operator at the controls inserted a reactor scram by placing the mode switch in shutdown.

Upon subsequent review, the licensee concluded that the alarms were associated with actual thermal hydraulic instabilities in the plant. The licensee was able to demonstrate that these instabilities began almost immediately after the C heater drain pump tripped off, indicating that the trip of the heater drain pump, and the temperature transient that it brought about, was the cause.

The licensee determined that the trip of the heater drain pump was caused by a buildup of debris in the air relays of the positioner that controls the high-level dump valve for the B third point heater (HDL-LV24B). The debris originated in the instrument air system, and there is no filter between that system and the positioner. Additional licensee review revealed that the station had experienced unexplained heater drain pump trips in the aftermath of recirculation pump trips on at least two prior occasions. Specifically, after a trip of recirculation pump B in November 2010, a low-level condition occurred in the A third point heater, leading to a trip of the D heater drain pump. After a trip of recirculation pump A in December 2012, a low-level condition occurred in the B heater, causing a trip of the C heater drain pump.

Section 5.2.1.a and Attachment 9.2 of EN-LI-102, the station's corrective action process procedure, require that condition reports be written for events or conditions that could negatively impact reliability or availability and for unplanned conditions or events that affect reactivity. The unexpected low-level condition in the heater that occurred after the 2012 recirculation pump trip met both criteria, but the licensee failed to write a condition report for the issue. No corrective actions were taken for the issue, which allowed the vulnerability to persist until it was triggered again in the 2020 event.

Following the 2010 recirculation pump trip event, the licensee did write a condition report documenting the heater drain pump trip; however, the responsible manager that was assigned to address the condition failed to take appropriate corrective actions in accordance with EN-LI-102. Because the event was classified as a category C condition, the procedure required the responsible manager to ensure that actions were appropriately assigned to correct the problem and appropriately completed within the prescribed time frame. The action of investigating and correcting the cause of the low-level condition in the heater was never appropriately completed, as the individual to whom the action was assigned determined that the heater drain pump trip was expected due to the low-level condition. The responsible manager closed the condition report without requiring that the reasons why the low-level condition had occurred were identified and corrected.

This finding closes licensee event report LER 2020-002-00 dated October 19, 2020.

Corrective Actions: Following the 2020 event, the licensee took actions to remove the debris buildup in the positioner and developed a plan to install an air filter upstream of the regulator that feeds the positioner to prevent buildups from recurring.

Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2020-03497

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The station's failure to take appropriate corrective actions in accordance with Procedure EN-LI-102 was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the station's failure to take appropriate corrective actions for the heater drain pump trips that occurred in the aftermath of recirculation pump trips in 2010 and 2012 allowed a vulnerability to persist in the heater drain system that led to thermal hydraulic instabilities and a manual scram when a heater drain pump tripped in response to a recirculation pump trip in 2020.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the loss of injection did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On February 26, 2021, the inspectors presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. S. Vercelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On March 5, 2021, the inspectors presented the evaluation of changes, tests, and experiments inspection results to Mr. P. Penny, Manager, Design and Program Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.

On March 15, 2021, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. B. Chenard, Director, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.

On April 8, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. S. Vercelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On April 22, 2021, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection re-exit results to Mr. S. Vercelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.08G Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2020-02095, CR-HQN-2020-00198,

CR-HQN-2020-00205, CR-HQN-2020-00208,

CR-HQN-2020-00214, CR-RBS-2019-03211,

CR-RBS-2019-04720, CR-RBS-2021-00099,

CR-RBS-2011-00443, CR-RBS-2018-06601,

CR-RBS-2019-02540, CR-RBS-2019-02545,

CR-RBS-2019-02565, CR-RBS-2019-02606,

CR-RBS-2019-02646, CR-RBS-2019-02725,

CR-RBS-2019-02762, CR-RBS-2019-02841,

CR-RBS-2019-02851, CR-RBS-2019-02883,

CR-RBS-2019-02922, CR-RBS-2019-02982,

CR-RBS-2019-03004, CR-RBS-2019-03020,

CR-RBS-2019-03025, CR-RBS-2019-03050,

CR-RBS-2019-03106, CR-RBS-2019-03137,

CR-RBS-2019-03173, CR-RBS-2019-03275,

CR-RBS-2019-03305, CR-RBS-2019-03309,

CR-RBS-2019-03329, CR-RBS-2019-03373,

CR-RBS-2019-03404, CR-RBS-2019-03459,

CR-RBS-2019-03484, CR-RBS-2019-03839,

CR-RBS-2019-03862, CR-RBS-2019-04192,

CR-RBS-2019-04720, CR-RBS-2019-04889,

CR-RBS-2019-05308, CR-RBS-2019-05367,

CR-RBS-2019-05420, CR-RBS-2019-05830,

CR-RBS-2019-06067, CR-RBS-2019-06946,

CR-RBS-2019-06954, CR-RBS-2019-07497,

CR-RBS-2019-08037, CR-RBS-2020-00384,

CR-RBS-2020-00386, CR-RBS-2020-00594,

CR-RBS-2020-01193, CR-RBS-2020-02738,

CR-RBS-2020-03077, CR-RBS-2020-03619,

CR-RBS-2020-03885, CR-RBS-2020-04083,

CR-RBS-2020-04119, CR-RBS-2020-04162,

CR-RBS-2020-04483, CR-RBS-2020-04570,

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CR-RBS-2020-04729, CR-RBS-2020-05045,

CR-RBS-2020-05064, CR-RBS-2020-05142,

CR-RBS-2020-05407, CR-RBS-2015-05149,

CR-RBS-2018-01037, CR-RBS-2018-06188,

CR-RBS-2018-06601, CR-RBS-2019-01805,

CR-RBS-2019-01022

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-RBS-

21-01204, 2021-02263, 2021-02264, 2021-02265,

21-02266, 2021-02267, 2021-02268

Procedures

CEP-IST-4

Standard On Inservice Testing

309

CEP-NDE-0255

Radiographic Examination ASME, ANSI, AWS, API, AWWA

Welds and Components

010

CEP-NDE-0400

Ultrasonic Examination

008

CEP-NDE-0641

Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) for ASME Section XI

009

CEP-NDE-0901

VT-1 Examination

006

CEP-NDE-0902

VT-2 Examination

009

CEP-NDE-0903

VT-3 Examination

006

CEP-NDE-0955

Visual Examination (VE) of Bare-Metal Surfaces

307-1

CEP-WP-002

Qualification, Development, and Control of Welding

Procedure Specifications

CEP-WP-003

Qualification and Control of Welders

CEP-WP-004

Control and Documentation of Welding Activities

CEP-WP-005

Control and Issuance of Welding Material

CEP-WP-005

Control and Issuance of Welding Material

004

CEP-WP-GWS-1

General Welding Standard ASME/ANSI

005-1

CEP-WP-GWS-5

General Welding Standard Stud Welding

CEP-WP-PHT-1

Preheat and Postweld Heat Treatment Requirements

CEP-WP-RBMD-

Repair Of Base Material Defects

CEP-WP-TCG-1

Thermal Cutting And Gouging

CEP-WP-WIIR-1

Weld Inprocess Inspection Requirements

DR-ECH-

CEP_WP_IGP

Internal Gas Purging

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

EN-DC-153

Preventive Maintenance Component Classification

EN-FAP-LI-001

Performance Improvement Review Group (PRG) Process

EN-LI-102

Corrective Action Program

EN-LI-118

Causal Analysis Process

EN-OP-104

Operability Determination Process

Work Orders

WO- 00485441, 00485667, 00523358

71111.12

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-RBS-

20-04343

Procedures

EDP-CS-15

River Bend Station Maintenance Rule Structural Monitoring

Procedure

EN-DC-150

Condition Monitoring of Maintenance Rule Structures

EN-DC-204

Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis

71111.17T

Calculations

E-192

Standby Diesel Generator Loading

G13.18.12.3*161

Standby switchgear room heat up

G13.18.2.1*059

Control Building Heat Load Evaluation during LOCA with

Offsite Power Available and Normal Operating Conditions

Engineering

Changes

EC-03950

This documents the installation of RF14 C11-AOVF010 O-

rings

EC-03955

This documents the installation of RF15 DFR-AOV102 O-

rings

EC-23335

RHR High Level Output Optical Isolator Card Sneak Power

Path

EC-30980

Revise the SLC orifice C41-ROD001 bore size to reflect GE

SC-10-13 information and update design documents

accordingly

EC-31805

Operation and Maintenance Manual for Adaptiview Chiller

Control Upgrade

EC-31934

Determine Potential Cold Spring Load at the Intercooler

Support Brackets (ISB) on DIV II Standby Diesel Generator

EC-39182

ERIS upgrade migrates rod scram timing and feedwater

valve position indicator software to new ERIS platform

EC-5000070744

Use as needed - Change elastomer materials for Fisher

AOV O-rings to Viton

EC-70846

EDG Lube Oil Header Alternate Seal Assembly

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

EC-71135

Base EC for Replacement of Parson Peebles Voltage

Regulator

EC-71797

Auxiliary Building Steam Tunnel Floor Plugs Sealant

Alternative

EC-72271

Install Key-Lock Switches on Main Control Room Panels

H13-P691 and H13-P692 to Bypass RHR Loop A and B 135

PSIG Isolations

EC-72704, 2018-

Eliminate Secondary Steam Jet Air Ejector Single Point

Vulnerability by disabling auto-close function or primary

Steam Jet Air Ejector offgas suction valves ARC-AOV1A/B

EC-72716

Parent EC Replacement of obsolete recirculation pump seal

purge supply flow control valve C11-FCVD012A and C11-

FCVD012B

EC-73013

Install Backdraft Dampers to Control Building HVAC System

EC-73497

Install Boron Carbide Aluminum Metal Matrix Composite

Inserts into the Spent Fuel Pool Fuel Storage Racks to

Address Boraflex Degradation

EC-76014

Feedwater Debris Strainer Evaluation and Installation

EC-79064

Feedwater Sparger Nozzle Repairs

EC-79427, 2018-

TRACG Anticipated Operational Occurrences Updates

EC-86067

Temporary Modification to Install an External Oil Reservoir

Near B33-PC001A to Increase Margin to a Low Oil Level

Alarm

EC-87166

Plug Weep Holes in Concrete Duct to G Tunnel

ER-RB-2004-

0307-001

Change elastomer materials for Fisher AOV O-rings to Viton

Engineering

Evaluations

RBS-ME-18-

00001

RBS Air Ejector Isolation Valve Study

Miscellaneous

216.210-085-

010 A

Qualification Report for Trane AdaptiView Chiller Controls

216.210-085-

015 A

Factory Acceptance Test Report for HVK-CHL1D

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

N996-0108

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for Trane

Adaptiview Chiller Controls

NEDE-32176P

GEH Licensing Topical Report, TRACG Model Description

NEDE-32177P

GEH Licensing Topical Report, TRACG Qualification

NEDE-32906P-A

GEH Licensing Topical Report, TRACG Application for

Anticipated Operational Occurrences Transient Analyses

OMM-05215515-1 Operation and Maintenance Manual for Adaptiview Chiller

Control Upgrade

RBG-47962

River Bend Station USAR Revision 26, TRM Revision 150,

TS Bases Amendment 196, 10 CFR 50.59 Report, 10 CFR 2.48 Report, and Commitment Change Summary Report

07/26/2019

Procedures

ARP-863-74

P863-74 ALARM RESPONSE

EN-DC-115

Engineering Change Process

EN-LI-100

Process Applicability Determination

EN-LI-101

CFR 50.59 Evaluations

SOP-0031

Residual Heat Removal

2

Work Orders

304024

HVK-CHL1A Controls Upgrade

08/22/2019

480654

Install Key-Switch B21H-S79B

04/27/2019

71124.01

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-RBS-

2019-02335, 2019-02341, 2019-02732, 2019-03058,

2019-03631, 2019-03836, 2019-03836, 2019-04614,

2019-05614, 2019-05635, 2019-05635, 2019-06210,

2019-06260, 2019-06494, 2020-00022, 2020-01845,

20-03041, 2020-03070, 2020-03165, 2020-03714,

20-04931, 2020-05346, 2020-05360, 2020-05484,

21-00198, 2021-00970

Miscellaneous

RF-21 Refuel Floor Work Plan

2/08/2021

CZT Isotope Analysis of highly radioactive item from Cavity

2/23/2021

Procedures

EN-RP-100

Radiation Worker Expectations

EN-RP-101

Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas

EN-RP-102

Radiological Control

EN-RP-105

Radiological Work Permits

EN-RP-108

Radiation Protection Posting

EN-RP-131

Air Sampling

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

EN-RP-141

Job Coverage

EN-RP-153

Radiation Protection Fundamentals Program

EN-RP-404

Operation and Maintenance of HEPA Vacuum Cleaners and

HEPA Ventilation Units

Radiation

Surveys

RBS-2101-00180

Fuel Building 113' Quarterly Survey

01/19/2021

RBS-2101-00209

Refuel Floor Survey Reactor Building 186'

01/21/2021

RBS-2101-00228

Residual Heat Removal "A" Quarterly Survey

01/22/2021

RBS-2101-00237

Routine Quarterly Survey

01/22/2021

RBS-2102-00347

Refuel Cavity Post-Decontamination Survey Reactor

Building 186'

2/21/2021

RBS-2102-00434

Drywell 125/141 Post-Shielding survey of E21-VF007

2/22/2021

RBS-2102-00648

Dose Rate Investigation

2/25/2021

RBS-2102-00662

Survey of Piping below E12-AOVF041A

2/25/2021

RBS-AS-011321-

0053

Auxiliary Building 95' RWCU Vacuum Plate cut out and

removal

01/13/2021

RBS-AS-012921-

0159

Reactor Building 186' Inside tend during Strongback

decontamination

01/28/2021

RBS-AS-062519-

26

Fuel Building 113' Decontamination of Channel Grapple tool

06/25/2019

RBS-AS-100919-

22

Fuel Building 70' Work Area Air Sample

10/08/2019

RBS-AS-121420-

219

Reactor Building 162' Control Room Validation

2/14/2020

Radiation Work

Permits (RWPs)

21-1606

Radwaste, Shipping, and Decontamination Activities in

LHRA/HRA. Except Drywell.

21-1800

Refuel Floor Reactor Vessel Disassembly and Reassembly

Activities

21-1901

Radiation Protection Drywell Activities

Self-Assessments LO-RLO-2019-

00029

RP Pre-NRC Focused Self-Assessment Radiation Safety

Inspection: IP 71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment

and Exposure Controls, IP 71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne

Radioactivity Control and Mitigation, and IP 71151-OR01 -

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness

01/08/2020

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

LO-RLO-2019-

00076

RP Pre-NRC Focused Self-Assessment Radiation Safety

Inspection: IP 71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment

and Exposure Controls, IP 71124.02 - Occupational ALARA

Planning and Controls, and IP 71152 - Problem Identification

and Resolution

11/09/2020

QA-14/15-2019-

RBS-1

Combined Radiation Protection and Radwaste

10/28/2019

71124.02

ALARA Plans

RWP 2021-1235

ALARA Plan: Replace LWS-SP3 (Oil Plate Separator)

Internal Discharge Hose

RWP 2021-1235

ALARA Plan: Replace LWS-SP3 (Oil Plate Separator)

Internal Discharge Hose

RWP 2021-1800

ALARA Plan: Medium/High Risk Radioiodine Exposure

During Reactor Vessel Disassembly

RWP 2021-

1800/2021-1801

Refuel-21 Upper Pool Activities on Reactor Building 186'

Refuel Floor

RWP 2021-1936

Shielding Activities in the Drywell

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-RBS-

2019-02450, 2019-02834, 2019-04197, 2019-04680,

2019-04825, 2019-05191, 2019-06944, 2020-00518,

20-01751, 2020-03156, 2020-03295, 2020-03300,

20-03718

Miscellaneous

Daily Radiation Protection Outage Report - Refueling

Outage 21

2/23/2021

Procedures

EN-RP-105

Radiation Work Permits

EN-RP-106

Radiological Survey Documentation

EN-RP-106-01

Radiological Survey Documentation

EN-RP-110

ALARA Program

EN-RP-110-02

Elemental Cobalt Sampling

EN-RP-110-04

Collective Radiation Exposure (CRE) Reduction Guidelines

EN-RP-110-04

Radiation Protection Risk Assessment Process

EN-RP-110-06

Outage Dose Estimating and Tracking

EN-RP-141-01

Job Coverage Using Remote Monitoring Technology

EN-RP-141-02

Discrete Radioactive Particle Control

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Self-Assessments LO-RLO-2019-

00076

RP Pre-NRC Focused Self-Assessment Radiation Safety

Inspection: IP 71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment

and Exposure Controls, IP 71124.02 - Occupational ALARA

Planning and Controls, and IP 71152 - Problem Identification

and Resolution

11/09/2020

LO-RLO-2019-

00076

RP Pre-NRC Focused Self-Assessment Radiation Safety

Inspection: IP 71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment

and Exposure Controls, IP 71124.02 - Occupational ALARA

Planning and Controls, and IP 71152 - Problem Identification

and Resolution

11/09/2020

71124.03

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-RBS-

2019-01783, 2019-01828, 2019-02157, 2019-02427

2019-03245, 2019-03829, 2019-04386, 2019-04323

2019-05360, 2019-05379, 2019-05569, 2019-06495

2019-06508, 2019-06545, 2020-02537, 2020-02764

20-03642

Procedures

EN-RP-131

Air Sampling

EN-RP-404

Operation and Maintenance of HEPA Vacuum Cleaners and

HEPA Ventilation Units

EN-RP-501

Respiratory Protection Program

EN-RP-502

Inspection and Maintenance of Respiratory Protection

Equipment

EN-RP-503

Selection, Issue and Use of Respiratory Protection

Equipment

EN-RP-504

Breathing Air

EN-RP-505

PortaCount Respirator Fit Testing

STP-402-0201

Main Control Room A/C Train A Operability Test

STP-402-0202

Main Control Room A/C Train B Operability Test

STP-402-3601

Inservice Testing of Division 1 Control Room Fresh Air

System

307

STP-402-8604

Division 1 Main Control Room Fresh Air System Laboratory

Carbon Filter Analysis

STP-402-8605

Division 2 Main Control Room Fresh Air System Laboratory

Carbon Filter Analysis

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

STP-511-4210