ML20148C482

Responds to 880128 Ltr to Chairman Zech Expressing Concerns Re Emergency Preparedness Plans at Plant.Nrc Will Not Permit Plant to Resume Operation Until Safe Operation Can Be Determined

ML20148C482
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	03/17/1988
From:	Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Quaid D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
Shared Package
ML20148C486	List: ML20148C482 ML20148C504
References
NUDOCS 8803220404
Download: ML20148C482 (15)

Text

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Mr. David L. Quai 6 21 Sumer Street P.O. Box 1617 Duxbury, Massachusetts 02331-1617

Dear Mr. Quaid:

This letter is provided in response to your January 28, 1988 letter to Chairmar.

Zech of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) expressing your concerns regarding emergency preparedness plans for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Specifically, you challenged the adequacy of evacuation routes for the Duxbury and Plymouth areas and the availability of shelters for the barrier beaches. You also expressed your concern that the NRC has demonstrated a lack of concern for public safety and would allow the Pilgrim plant to resume operation in an unsafe condition.

As you may know, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are the two nuclear around Federalpower agencies assigned plants. to evaluate The NRC emergency) is responsible preparedness (1 for assessing the at and adequacy of onsite emergency plans developed by the utility and (2) for making FEMA is overall safety) responsible (1 judgments r'egarding the operation of nuclear plants.for aesessing the advising NRC of its findings and (2) for assis, ting State and local governments in the preparation of emergency response plans.

In September 1986, because of information received from local officials, the-Comonwealth of Massachusetts, and other interested parties., FEMA began a self-initiated review of its previous finding of adequacy regarding offsite emergency planning for the Pilgrim plant. On August 6,1987 FEMA gave NRC a report on its findings. The report listed six specific areas of concern in the Massachusetts emergency plans for the Pilgrim 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). These areas of concern included the lack of adequate information concerning protective measures for the beach population. FEMA requested the following additional information from the Comonwealth: (1) an updated geographical description of the beaches and their capacity; (2) a detailed analysis of the beach population, including the number of permanent and temporary residents and the number of day visitors, together with their geographical dispersion; (3) an updated estimate of the length of time it would take to evacuate the beach population; and (4) a list of suitable buildings available for sheltering the beach population at each beach, including the capacities of these buildings and their distances from the beaches.

Since the FEMA report was issued, the Comonwealth and local governments within the 10-mile EPZ, with the assistance of the Pilgrim licensee, the Boston Edison Company, have undertaken extensive efforts to improve the offsite emergency response programs. In addition to the upgrading of Emergency Operation Centers which you mention, these efforts include the revision of the local town plans h!O DS 3 c__ _ _ _ _ .

l Mr. David L. Quaid 1 as well as the Massachusetts til Defense Agency Area 11 plan and the Comorwealth's State-wide plan, the development of revised procedures; and the development and implementation of training programs for officials and emergency personnel. We understand that the revised emergency plans for Duxbury and Plymouth will include specific protective measures for the beach population. A draf t plan for Plymouth has been forwarded by the Comonwealth to FEMA for informal technical review. We expect that the plan for Duxbury will be forwarded to FEMA as well.

As to your concern regarding the safe resumption of operations at the Pilgrim plant, Federal regulations for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors have been established to protect the public health'and safety. Their objective is to ansure that the p obability is very small that a serious nuclear power. plant-accident would occur that would result in the release of radioactive materials in amounts that would present a threat to public health and safety. To meet this objective, the NRC relies on a "defense-in-depth" concept. Briefly stated, this concept (1) requires high quality in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likeli-hood of malfunctions in the first instance; (2) recognizes that equipment can fail and opera' tors can make mistakes and, therefore, requires safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunctions will lead to accidents that release fission products from the fuel; (3) recognizes that, in spite of these pre-cautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen and, therefore, requires containment structures and other safety features to prevent the release of fission products off the site; (4) further, for the-unlikely event of an offsite fission product release, requires the added feature of emergency planning to ensure that there will be reasonable assurance that protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants. While there is no absolute guarantee of safety, our objective is to ensure that the risk to the public health and safety from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation is extremely low.

Let me assure you that NRC will not permit the Pilgrim plant to resume opera .

tion until we detemine that Pilgrim can be operated safely and' that the health and safety of the public can be protected. The determination whether to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve consideration of each of the emergency planning issues identified by FEMA. The quality of offsite emergency preparedness at the Pilgrim plant will depend heavily on how well the Comonwealth of Massachusetts is able to correct the deficiencies noted in the FEMA report.

Sincerely, Origirni signed by, n,w d . 2 1eV Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation T

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% ,6 MAR 171988 Mr. David L. Quaid 21 Sumer Street P.O. Box 1617 Duxbury, Massachusetts 02331-1617 #

Dear Mr. Quaid:

This letter is provided in response to your January 28, 1988 letter to Chairman y Zech of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) expressing your concerns regarding emergency preparedness plans for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Specifically, L you challenged. the adequacy of evacuation routes for the Duxbury and Plymouth areas and the availability of shelters for the barrier beaches. You also expressed

'your concern that the NRC has demonstrated a lack of concern for public safety and would allow the Pilgrim plant to resume operation in an unsafe condition.

As you may know, the NRC and the Federal Emergcncy Management Agency (FEMA) are the twonuclear around Federalpower agencies assigned plants. The NRCto evaluate emergency) is responsible preparedness (1 for assessing the at and adequacy of onsite emergency plans developed by the utility and (2) for making FEMA is overall safety) responsible (1 judgments regarding the operation of nuclear plants.for assessing the adequa advising NRC of its findings and (2) for assis, ting State and local governments in the preparation of emergency response plans.

In September 1986, because of information received from local officials, the -

Comonwealth of Massachusetts, and other interested parties, FEMA began a self-initiated review of its previous finding of adequacy regarding offsite emergency planning for the Pilgrim plant. On August 6,1987, FEMA gave NRC a report on its findings. The report listed six specific areas of concern in the Massachusetts emergency plans for the Pilgrim 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). These areas of concern included the lack of adequate information concerning protective measures for the beach population. FEMA requested the following additional information from the Comonwealth: (1) an updated geographical description of the bear.hes and their capacity; (2) a detailed analysis of the beach population, including the number of permanent and temporary residents and the number of day visitors, together with their geographical dispersion; (3) an updated estimate of the length of time it would take to evacuate the beach population; and (4) a list of suitable buildings available for sheltering the beach population at each beach, including the capacities of these buildings and their distances from the beaches.

Since the FEMA report was issued, the Comonwealth and local governments within the 10-mile EPZ, with the assistance of the Pilgrim licensee, the Boston Edison Company, have undertaken extensive efforts to improve the offsite emergency response programs. In addition to the upgrading of Emergency Operation Centers

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which you mention, these efforts include the revision of the local town plans

Mr. David L. Quaid l, as well as the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency Area 11 plan and the Comonwealth's State-wide plan; the development of revised procedures; and the development and implementation of training programs for officials and emergency personnel. We understand that the revised emergency plans for Duxbury and Plymouth will include specific protective measures for the beach population. A draf t plan for Plymouth has been forwarded by the Comonwealth to FEMA for informal technical review. We expect that the plan for Duxbury will be forwarded to FEMA as well.

As to your concern regarding the safe resumption of operations at the Pilgrim plant, Federal regulations for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors have been established to protect the public health and safety. Their objective is to ensure that the probability is very small that a serious nuclear power' plant accident would occur that would result in the release of radioactive materials in amounts that would present a threat to public health and safety. To meet this objective, the NRC relies on a "defense-in-depth" concept. Briefly stated, this concept (1) requires high quality in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likeli-hood of malfunctions in the first instance; (2) recognizes that equipment can

, fail and operators can make mistakes and, therefore, requires safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunctions will lead to accidents that release fission products from the fuel; (3) recognizes that, in spite of these pre-cautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen an'd, therefore, requires containment structures and other safety features to prevent the release of fission products off the site; (4) further, for the'unlikely event of an offsite fission product release, requires the added feature of emergency planning to ensure that there will be reasonable assurance that protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants. While there is no absolute guarantee of safety, our objective is to ensure that the risk to the public health and safety from the consequencesJof nuclear power plant operation is extremely low.

Let me assure you that NRC will not permit the Pilgrim plant to resume opera -

tion until we detennine that Pilgrim can be operated safely and that the health and safety of the public can be protected. The determination whether to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve consideration of each of the emergency planning issues identified by FEMA. The quality of offsite emergency preparedness at the Pilgrim plant will depend heavily on how well the Comonwealth of Massachusetts is able to correct the deficiencies noted in the FEMA report.

Sincerely, Origital signed by, Them E, ndey Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

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Mr. David L. Quaid

21 Sumer Street P.O. Box 1617 Duxbury, Massachusetts 02331-1617

Dear Mr. Quaid:

This letter is provided in response to your January 28, 1988 letter to Chairman Zech of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) expressing your concerns regarding emergency preparedness plans for the PilgrimLtiuclear Power Station. Specifically, you challenged, the adequacy of evacuation routes for the Duxbury and Plymouth  ;

areas and the availability of shelters for the barrier beaches. You also expressed your concern that the NRC has demonstrated a lack of concern for public safety and would allow the Pilgrim plant to resume operation in an unsafe condition.

As you may know, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are the around two nuclear Federalpower agencies assigned plants. The NRC to evaluate emergency) is responsible preparedness (1 for assessing the at and adequacy of onsite emergency plans developed by the utility and (2) for making FEMA is-overall responsible safety) judgments (1 for assessing rbgarding the ade the operation of nuclear plants.f offsite emergency p

. advising.MRCofitsfindingsand(2)quacyofor assis, ting State and local governments in the preparation of emergency respocse plans. -

In September 1986, because of infonnation received from local officials, the-Comonwealth of Massachusetts, and other interested parties FEMA began a self-initiated review of its previous finding of adequacy regarding offsite emergency planning for the Pilgrim plant. On August 6,1987. FEMA gave NRC a report on its findings. The report listed six specific areas of concern in the Massachusetts emergency plans for the Pilgrim 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). These areas of concern included the lack of adequate information concerning protective i i measures for the beach population. FEMA requested the following additional l information from the Comonwealth: (1) an updated geographical description of I the beaches and their capacity; (2) a detailed analysis of the beach population, including the number of permanent and temporary residents and the number of day visitors, together with their geographical dispersion; (3) an updated estimate

of the length of time it would take to evacuate the beach population; and (4) a [

i list of suitable buildings available for sheltering the beach population at each  ;

I beach, including the capacities of these buildings and their distances from the l l beaches.

Since the FEMA report was issued, the Comonwealth and local governments within the 10-mile EPZ, with the assistance of the Pilgrim licensee, the Boston Edison Company, have undertaken extensive efforts to improve the offsite emergency response programs. In aadition to the upgrading of Emergency Operation Centers ,

which you mention, these efforts include the revision of the local town plans

. ~Mr. David L'. Quaid as well as the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency Area II plan and the Comonwealth's State-wide plan; the development of revised procedures; and the development and implementation of training programs for officials and emergency personnel. We understand that the revised emergency plans for Duxbury and Plymouth will include specific protective measures for the beach population. 'A draft plan for Plymouth has been forwarded by the Commonwealth to FEMA for informal technical review. We exoect that the plan for Duxbury will be forwarded to FEMA as well.

As to your concern regarding the safe resumption of operations at the Pilgrim

_ plant, Federal regulations for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors have been established to protect the public health.and safety. Their objective is to ensure that the probability is very small that a serious nuclear power plant accident would occur that would result in the release of radioactive materials in amounts that would present a threat to public health and safety. To freet this objective, the NRC relies on a "defense-in-depth" concept. Briefly stated, this concept (1) requires high quality in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likeli-hood of malfunctions in the first instance; (2) recognizes that equipment can fail and operators can make mistakes and, therefore, requires safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunctions will lead to accidents that release fission products from the fuel; (3) recogni:es that, in spite of these pre-cautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen and, therefore, requires containment structures and other safety features to prevent the release of fission products off the site; (4) further, for the unlikely event of an offsite fission product release, requires the added feature of emergency planning to i ensure that there will be reasonable assurance that protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants. While there is no absolute guarantee of safety, our objective is to ensure that the risk to the public health and safety from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation is extremely low.

l Let me assure you that NRC will not permit the Pilgrim plant to reswe opera-l tion until we determine that Pilgrim can be operated safely and that the health and safety of the public can be protected. The determination whether to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve consideration of each of the emergency planning

)j issues identified by FEMA. The quality of offsite emergency preparedness at the Pilgrim plant will depend heavily on how well the Commonwealth of Massachusetts I is able to correct the deficiencies noted in the FEMA report.

Sincerely, Origin 31 nigned by, Thcru E. MW Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation W

TEMur ey DISTRIBUTION: See next page 3/ *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

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Mr. David L. Quaid /

\ s' development and implementation of training programs for officials and $rgency personnel We unoarstand that the revised emergency plans for Duxby and Plymouth w include specific protective measures for the beach pdpulation. A draft plan f Plymouth has been forwarded by the Commonwealth FEMA for informal techn i review. We expect that the plan for Duxbur will be forwarded to FEMA as well.

As to your concern re arding the safe resumption of ope tions at the Pilgrim plant, Federal regulat gns for the design, constructi , and operation of nuclear power reactors hb e been established to pro et the public health and safety. Their objective i to ensure that the pr ability is very small that a serious nuclear power plan accident would oc r that would result in the release of radioactive materi s in amounts t t would present a threat to public health and safety. To m t this obj tive, the NRC relies on a "defense-in-depth" concept. Briefly stat , this ncept (1) requires high quality in the design, construction, and oper tion f nuclear plants to reduce the likeli-hood of malfunctions in the first i (tance; (2) recognizes that equipment can fail and operators can make mistakesAind, therefore, requires safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunc): ions s will lead to accidents that release F3) recognizes that, in spite of these pre-fission products cautions, serious from the fuel;(cidents chQ happen and, therefore, requires fuel damage containment structures and o er safety features to prevent the release of fission products off the si e; (4) further, r the unlikely event of an offsite fission product release, quires the added fe ture of emergency planning to ensure that there will reasonable assurance at protective actions can be taken to protect the pulation around nuclear po r plants. While there is no absolute guarantee p safety, our objective is to e ure that the risk to the public health and afety from the consequences of nuc ar power plant operation is extremely low Let me assur you that NRC will not permit the Pilgrim plan to resume opera-tion until e determine that Pilgrim can be operated safely d that the health and safet of the public can be protected. The determination hether to restart the Pil im plant will involve consideration of each of the eme ency planning issue dentified ty FEMA. The quality of offsite emergency prep redness at the Pilgy m plant will depend heavily on how well the Commonwealth of 'assachusetts is,4ble to correct the deficiencies noted in the FEMA report.

Sincerely, Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of huclear Reactor Regulation D/hRR DISTRIBUTION: See next page TEMurley 3/ /88 *SEE PREVIOUS CONCLRRENC SC/PEPB/f4RR* TECH ED* C/PEPB/NRR* DIR/PDI-3* D/DR l/fiRR* A/6 ,T/tiRR PEPB/NRR*

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Mr. David L. Quaid development and implementation of training programs for officials and emergency personnel. We understand that the revised emergency plans for Duxbury and Plymouth will include specific protective measures for the beach population. A draft plan f Plymouth has been forwarded by the Comonwealth to FEMA for informal techn' al review. We expect that the plan for Duxbury will be forwarded to FEMA as well.

As to your concern garding the safe resumption of operations at the Pilgrim plant, Federal regula ons for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors ave been established to protect the public health and -

safety. Their objective is to ensure that the probability is very small that a serious nuclear power p nt accident would occur that would result in the release of radioactive mate als in amounts that would present a threat to public health and safety. To eet this objective, the NRC relies on a "defense-in-depth" concept. Briefly sta ed, this concept (1) requires high quality in the design, construction, and op ation of nuclear plants to reduce the likeli-hood of malfunctions in the first stanca; (2) recognizes that equipment can fail and operators can make mistakes nd, therefore, requires safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunctio will lead to accidents that release fission products from the fuel; and (3) ecognizes that, in spite of these precautions, serious fuel damage acciden can happen and, therefore, requires containment structures and other safety fe tures to prevent the release of fission products off the site.

In addition, the NRC has taken the position th the added feature of emergency planning provides that there will be reasonable surance that protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuc ar power plants even in the unlikely event of an offsite fission product releas While there is no abso-lute guarantee of safety, our objective is to ensure at the risk to the public health and safety from the consequences of nuclear powe plant operation is extremely low.

Let me assure you that NRC will not permit the Pilgrim plant o resume opera-tion until we determine that Pilgrim can be operated safely an that the health and safety of the public can be protected. The determination wh ther to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve consideration of each of the emerg cy planning issues identified by FEMA. The quality of offsite emergency preparedness at the Pilgrim plant will depend heavily on how well the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is able to correct the deficiencies noted in the FEMA report.

Sincerely, Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation D/NRR DISTRIBUTION: See next page TEMurley , /)-

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Mr. David L. Quaid [

development and implementation of training programs for officials and em tgency personnel. We understand that the revised emergency plans for Duxbur and _:

Plymouth will include specific protective measures for the beach po lation. A 9 draft plan for Plymouth has been forwarded by the Convenwealth t EMA for qq 5

informal technical review. We expect that the plan for Duxbur ill be forwarded to FEMA as well, h_

As to your concern regarding the safe resumption of opera ions at the Pilgrim a plant, Federal regulations for the design, construction and operation of .I nuclear power reactors have been established to prote the public health and  ;

safety. Their objective is to ensure that the prcba lity is very small that 1 a serious nuclear power plant accident would occur hat would result in the 7d release of radioactive materials in amounts that sould present a threat to public health and safety. To meet this objecti e, the NRC relies on a "defense-  %

in-depth" concept. Briefly stated, this conc t (1) requires high quality in __

the design, construction, and operation of clear plants to reduce the likeli-hood of malfunctions in the first instance (2) recognizes that equipment can '"'

4 fail and operators can make mistakes and therefore, requires safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunction will lead to accidents that release g fission products from the fuel; and ( recognizes that, in spite of these z precautions, serious fuel damage ac dents can happen and, therefore, requires containment structures and other s 'ety features to prevent the release of g _,

fission products off the site. g

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NRC has imposed it', offsite er rgency planning requirements to add even more 8)l]

enservatism to this defense n-depth safety philosophy. The added feature of emergency planning provides that, even in the unlikely event of an offsite  ;

fission product release, t ere is reasonable assurance that protective actions -'

can be taken to protect e population around nuclear power plants. While there

is no absolute guarante of safety, our objective is to ensure that the risk to i" the public health and afety from the consequences of nuclear power plant oper-ation is low. ,

A Let me assure you ) at NRC will not permit the Pilgrim plant to resume opera- d tion until we determine that Pilgrim can be operated safely and that the health 4"!

and safety of thd public can be protected. The determination whether to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve consideration of each of the emergency planning 9 issues identified by FEMA. The quality of offsite eniergency preparedness at the W Pilgrim plaryt' will depend heavily on how well the Cocr,onwealth of Massachusetts

is able to correct the deficiencies noted in tne FEMA report. j p

Sincerely, f

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Document Name:

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Requestor's ID:

COMEGYS Author's Name:

Rosemary Hogan Document Comments:

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Letter To David L. Quaid dated DISTRIBUTION:

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EDO' PRINCIPAL CORRFSPONDFNCE CONTROL..

FROM: DUE: EDO CONTROG - Oo?A75 -

DOC-DT: 01/?S/88 DAV.ID L.-QUAID FINAL RFPLY:

'DUXBURY. MA

. TO: :

CHAIRMAN ZECH' FOR-'SIONATURF. OF ** GRFEN ** SFCY NO: 88-76

.DESC: ROIIT 7 NG:

EVACUATION ROUTE FOR RESiriENTS NFAR PILGRIM iTR ONLY RUSSEl_L DATE: 02/05/88 ASSIGNED TO: NRR CONTACT: Mi nRLEY

'SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION ACTION DUE TO NRR DIRECTOR'S OFFICE BY t

1 0FFICE OF THE SECRETARY 3

• CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET '

l PAPER NUMBER: CRC 0076 14GGING DATE: 2/3/88 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: David L. Quaid AFFILIATION: Duxbury, MA LETTER DATE: 1/28 FILE CODE: ID&R-5 Pilgrim SUMECT: Evacuation route for residents near Pilgrim ACTION: Appropriate DISTRIBUTION:

SPECIAL HANDLING : None NOTES: Encis to: E00 DATE DUE:

SIGNATURE: DATE SIGNED:

AFFILIATION:

L Rec'd Off. EDO Date 7 8 S -

Time - ~3:1FP __ F tlU --- 003475

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